Sentences, Books I–II

Chapter 1 (173).

1. He returns to his subject, repeating what was said above in order to add further points. Now, returning to our subject, let us continue what we began. It was said above² that God's foreknowledge concerns only future things, but all of them, good as well as evil; knowledge or wisdom, however, concerns not only future things but also present and future things, and not only temporal things but also eternal things, since God knows himself.

2. The question whether knowledge or foreknowledge causes things, or whether things cause foreknowledge. Here an unavoidable question arises: whether knowledge or foreknowledge is the cause of things, or whether things are the cause of God's knowledge or foreknowledge.

3. Why knowledge or foreknowledge seems to be the cause of things. For God's foreknowledge seems to be the cause of the things subject to it and to impose on them the necessity of occurring, since no future things would have existed unless God had foreknown them; nor can they fail to occur, since God has foreknown them. But if it is impossible for them not to occur because they were foreknown, then the foreknowledge by which they were foreknown seems to be their cause of occurring. It is impossible for them not to occur once foreknown because, if they did not occur despite having been foreknown, God's foreknowledge would be mistaken. But God's foreknowledge cannot be mistaken; therefore it is impossible for those things not to happen, since they have been foreknown. Thus foreknowledge seems to be the cause of the things foreknown. The same is said of knowledge: namely, that certain things exist because God knows them.

¹ BCL, “83” MNTVW, “85” OPR. 28 “Reply”] omitted in PRVW. 31 “they enter”] “they will enter” CNOP, “they enter” BTVX, “it is entered” LMRW.]

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³ omitted in LMNRVW, deleted in CT. 4 “through”] “because of” LNRVW. 5 “which”] in the margin in L, deleted in BCT, omitted in NRW. 13 “future things”] “past things” V (cf. 1916 ed.).]

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4. He adduces authorities that seem to assert this. Augustine seems to support this view in Book XV of The Trinity¹, saying: «God did not come to know these things at some point in time, but before all beginning he foreknew all future temporal things, and among them also what we would ask of him and when, and whom and concerning what he would hear or not hear. He knows all creatures, spiritual and bodily, not because they exist, but they exist because he knows them. For he was not ignorant of what he was going to create. He created because he knew; he did not know because he created. He knew created things no otherwise than things to be created. Nothing was added to his wisdom by them; rather, when they existed as was fitting and when it was fitting, his wisdom remained as it was. Hence Ecclesiasticus² says: Before they were created, all things were known to him; so also after they were completed.» In these words Augustine seems to imply that God's knowledge or foreknowledge is the cause of what happens, when he says that these things exist because God knows them. — He seems to say the same in Book VI³: «As times pass away and succeed one another, nothing passes away or succeeds in the knowledge of God, in which he knows all things he made through it. For the things created do not exist from God because they were made; rather, they were made because they are known immutably by him.» Here too he seems to signify that God's knowledge is the cause of what happens, saying that they do not exist because God knew them after they were made, but were made because God knew them. Therefore it seems that God's knowledge and foreknowledge are the cause of the things he knows.

5. He shows the absurdity that would follow if knowledge or foreknowledge were said to cause all the things subject to it. If so, then it is the cause of all evils, since all evils are known and foreknown by God; and this is far from the truth. For if God's knowledge or foreknowledge were the cause of evils, God would certainly be the author of evils, which is altogether false. God's knowledge or foreknowledge, then, is not the cause of everything subject to it.

6. Future things are not the cause of God's knowledge or foreknowledge. Nor are future things the cause of God's foreknowledge. Although they would not be future unless God foreknew them, still they are not foreknown because they are future. For if this were so, then something alien to and distinct from what is eternal would be the cause of it; the foreknowledge of the Creator would depend on creatures, and what is created would be the cause of what is uncreated.

7. This seems contrary to what was said above. Origen, however, says in his Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans¹: «Something will not happen because God knows it is going to happen; rather, because it is going to happen, it is known by God before it happens.» This seems to conflict with Augustine's words just cited. For Origen seems to mean that future things are the causes of foreknowledge, whereas Augustine means that foreknowledge is the cause of future things.

8. What should be held from the foregoing, with an interpretation of the authorities. Wishing to remove this apparent conflict, we say that future things are in no way the cause of God's foreknowledge or knowledge, nor are they foreknown or known because they are future or have happened. We therefore interpret Origen's statement, «Because it is going to happen, it is known by God before it happens,» to mean that what is going to happen is known by God before it happens, and would not be known unless it were going to happen: thus the cause indicated there is only that without which it does not occur. — We also say that God's knowledge or foreknowledge is not the cause of what happens, except in the sense of a condition without which it would not happen, if by knowledge we mean knowledge alone. If, however, God's good pleasure and plan are also included under the name of knowledge, then it can rightly be called the cause of what God does. As noted above², God's cognition or knowledge is taken in these two ways: as knowledge alone, or as knowledge together with good pleasure. Augustine may have taken it in the latter sense when he said³, «They exist because he knows,» that is, because it pleased him as one who knows, and because he planned them in his knowledge. This interpretation is supported by the fact that Augustine speaks there only of good things, namely creatures and the things God makes; he knows them all not only by knowledge, but also by good pleasure and plan. God's cognition is therefore used there to signify not knowledge alone, but also God's good pleasure.

⁶ igitur BCMV, om. T. 3 esse trp. p. causa BMT, post praescientia V, om. CNR. 5 Rubrica om. NRW. 21 haec] ea M, om. BCNOPX, add. interl. T. 22 sunt] sed add. VX, om. BCOP. 28 subsunt] subdunt BLX. 29 est] BC M, trp. p. est.]

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9. God knows and foreknows evils before they happen, but by knowledge alone, not by good pleasure. God foreknows and foretells even things he will not do himself, as he foreknew and foretold the Jews' unbelief, but did not cause it. Nor did he compel them to the sin of unbelief because he foreknew it; he would not have foreknown or foretold their evils unless they were going to have them. Hence Augustine, On John¹: «God, foreknowing the future, foretold through the Prophet the Jews' unbelief, but did not cause it»; nor does he compel people to sin because he foreknows their future sins: he foreknew their sins, not his own. Therefore, if what he foreknew were not theirs, he would not have foreknown them truly; but because his knowledge cannot be mistaken, without doubt it is they themselves, and no other, who sin: God, who knows what is to come, foresaw that they would will to do not evil but good. If we consider these words carefully, they clearly show that God's foreknowledge is not the cause of the evils he foreknows, since these are foreknown not as his own, but as belonging to those who will do or have them. He therefore foreknows them by knowledge alone, not by the good pleasure of his authority. We are thus given to understand that, just as he foreknows good things as his own, so he foreknows evils as alien to him; and in his foreknowledge of the former there are both his knowledge and the good pleasure of his authority, which are absent in the case of evils.

Chapter 2 (174).

1. Objection to the statement that God's foreknowledge cannot be mistaken. To the statement made above², namely that God's foreknowledge cannot be mistaken, some customarily object as follows: God foreknew that this man would read today; it may happen that he does not read; therefore what happens may differ from what God foreknew; therefore God's foreknowledge may be mistaken. — This is entirely false. Something may indeed fail to happen, although it was foreknown as going to happen; God's foreknowledge still cannot be mistaken, because if it did not happen, it would not have been foreknown by God as going to happen.

2. They press the question further, saying: Either it can happen otherwise than God foreknew, or it cannot. If it cannot, then everything happens necessarily; but if it can, God's foreknowledge can be mistaken or changed. Yet it can happen otherwise, since it can happen otherwise than it does happen; but it happens as it was foreknown; therefore it can happen otherwise than it was foreknown. — Reply. We say that this expression and others like it have more than one meaning: «It can happen otherwise than God foreknew,» «what God foreknew may fail to be,» «it is impossible for what God foreknew not to be,» and «it is impossible that everything that happens was not foreknown,» and the like. These can be understood either conjunctively, with an implicit condition, or disjunctively.

If you understand «It cannot happen otherwise than God foreknew» to mean that these two things cannot both be true, namely, that God foreknew it would happen in this way and that it happens otherwise, you understand correctly. But if you understand it disjunctively, as saying that this cannot happen otherwise than it does happen, in the manner God foreknew it would happen, the statement is false. For it can happen otherwise than it does happen, and yet God foreknew it would happen in this way.

— Interpret the other expressions in the same way: «It is impossible that what God foreknew should not happen,» or «that it should not happen when God foreknew it.» If you understand these conjunctively, you speak truly; if disjunctively, falsely. Likewise, «It is impossible that everything that happens was not foreknown» means that these two things cannot both be true, namely, that something happens and was not foreknown: this is true. But if you say that God could not have failed to foreknow everything that happens, that is false. For he could have made it not happen, and then it would not have been foreknown.

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