Sentences, Books I–II

Cap. 1 (159).

1. Whether one should grant that all things are in God's essence, given that all things are said to be in God's knowledge or present to him. It is customary to ask here: since all things are said to be in God's knowledge or presence, or in God through knowledge, and his knowledge or presence is the divine essence, should one grant that all things are in the divine essence or in God through essence?

2. Response *. To this we say that God's knowledge is indeed his essence, and his presence, in which all things are, is his knowledge; nevertheless, one should not say that all things that are in his presence or knowledge are in his essence. For if this were said, they would be understood to be of the same essence as he. For what is said to be in God by essence is the divine essence, which is God. Therefore God has with himself, in his presence, things that he does not have in his own nature. — Hence Augustine, De verbis Apostoli¹, says: “He chose us before the foundation of the world². Who is sufficient to explain this? Those who do not exist are chosen, yet the one who chooses does not err or choose in vain. Nevertheless, he chooses and has the elect whom he is going to create so that they may be chosen; he has them with himself, not in his nature but in his presence.” Those to whom a promise was made did not yet exist, and yet they themselves were promised to those to whom the promise was made. — Here he clearly says that God had the elect with himself before the world, not in his nature but in his presence; although his presence is nothing other than his nature, since his presence is his knowledge. Yet “in his nature” can be referred to the elect, meaning in their nature. For he had them with himself from eternity, not in their own nature—that is, in theirs, since they did not yet exist—but in his presence, because he knew them as though they existed.

Cap. 2 (160).

1. Whether evils should be said to be in God as all good things are, since both are in his knowledge and presence: for he knows all things. After the foregoing, it is asked: since all things are said to be in God not through the essence of nature but through the knowledge of his knowledge, and God knows good and evil, should one simply grant that evils are in God, or that they are in God through knowledge? — For God knows and has always known everything, both good and evil, even before they came to be, and from eternity he foreknew that they would be. Therefore, since we have said that all good things are in God because of the presence of his knowledge, it seems for the same reason that all evil things should be said to be in him, since he has always known them and they have been present to him through knowledge. For God foreknew from eternity that certain people would be evil; and, as Augustine¹ says, he foreknew their wickedness but did not prepare it. Since, then, he knows everyone's sins, should they be understood as included in that general statement in which the Apostle² says that all things are in God? “From him,” he says, “and through him, and in him are all things.”

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2. What is understood to be in God *. But who, unless insane, would say that evils are in God? For those things are understood to be in God that are from him and through him; and those things are from him and through him whose author he is. But he is the author only of good things; therefore only good things are from him or through him, and so only good things are in him.

3. God does not know evils altogether in the same way as good things, because he knows evils only by knowledge, but good things also by approval and good pleasure *. Therefore evils are not in God, because although he knows them, he does not know them altogether in the same way as good things. He knows evils as though from afar, as the Prophet says³: And he knows the lofty things from afar—that is, pride. Elsewhere, speaking to God about the wicked, he says⁴: Their belly is filled from your hidden things. Explaining this, Augustine⁵ says: “Hidden things are sins, which are hidden from the light of your truth.” But how are sins hidden from the light of divine truth, since they are known by God? If he did not know them, how would he judge them and condemn the wicked for them? Elsewhere the Prophet says⁶: For there is no absence from the East or from the West. Explaining this, Cassiodorus says⁷: “God is absent neither from the good nor from the wicked, but is present to all and knows all.”

4. God therefore knows both good and evil by knowledge; but he knows good things also by approval and good pleasure, whereas he does not know evils in this way. Hence Cassiodorus says in Super Psalmos⁸: “Sins are hidden from God because he does not know them—that is, does not approve them.” It is in this sense that Augustine said they are hidden from God's light. He also indicates in the book Ad Helvidium⁹ that God's knowledge is to be understood in various ways, saying: “If you refer it to knowledge, God is not ignorant of certain people or things; nevertheless, at the judgment he will say to some: I did not know you¹⁰. Their rejection is signified by this expression.” — Here God is said not to know what he does not approve, what does not please him. It is therefore clear that what we said is true: God knows good things in a certain way in which he does not know evils. In respect of knowledge, indeed, he knows both alike and in the same way; but he knows good things also by approval and good pleasure.

5. Here he explains why only good things, and not evils, are said to be in God. This is why only good things, not evils, are said to be in God, and why the former are near while the latter are far away. For although some things are said to be in God because of the presence of his knowledge, and God knows both good and evil, he knows evils only by knowledge, but good things not only by knowledge, but also by approval and good pleasure. It is on account of this kind of knowledge that certain things are said to be in God: namely, because he knows them in such a way that he also approves them and they please him—that is, he knows them in such a way that he is their author.

Cap. 3 (161).

That it is the same for all things to be from God, through him, and in him. Therefore, if we consider carefully, it seems to be the same for all things to be from God, through him, and in him. Hence Ambrose, in book II of De Spiritu Sancto³: “We said above that these three—from him, and through him, and in him are all things⁴—are one. When he says all things are through him, has he denied that all things are in him? All these expressions have the same force, namely in him, with him, and through him; one and a similar meaning, not a contrary one, is understood in them.” Here you have it: Scripture says that all things are in him, through him, from him, or with him on the same understanding. — Since, then, all things are said to be from God or through him for this reason—not only because he knows them, but also because he is their author—it follows that for the same reason they are said to be in God: namely, because he knows them and is their author. It is said that in him we live and move and have our being, because by his authorship we are, move, and live. Since, then, he is the author only of good things, rightly only good things are said to be in him, just as they are from him or through him. — Although, therefore, all things, namely good and evil, are in his knowledge or presence, they are nevertheless said to be in him only insofar as they are good and he is their author. Hence Augustine says in the book On the Nature of the Good²: «When we hear, he says, that all things are from God and through him and in him, we must understand all natures, surely, and everything that exists by nature. For sins are not from him, since they do not preserve nature but corrupt it, and arise from the will of sinners.» Here it is plainly said that, in this general expression, only good things are included.

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Chapter 4 (162).

That all things are from the Father and through the Father and in the Father; and that the same must be said of the Son and the Holy Spirit, although a distinction is made on account of the Persons. Moreover, it must be understood that, although a distinction of Persons is indicated there when it is said from him, through him, in him, all things are nevertheless from the Father and through the Father and in the Father; and the same is to be understood of the Son and the Holy Spirit. Hence Augustine says in the book On the Trinity³: «We must not understand confusedly, he says, what the Apostle⁴ says: From him and through him and in him: saying from him with reference to the Father, through him with reference to the Son, and in him with reference to the Holy Spirit.» But take care: because he wished the Father to be understood and said from him, do not understand this to mean that all things are from the Father in such a way that you deny that all things are from the Son or from the Holy Spirit. For just as it can rightly be said that all things are from the Father, through the Father, and in the Father, the same must be held of the Son and the Holy Spirit.

Chapter 5 (163).

1. That not all things said to be from God are also said to be of him, though the converse holds. This too must be added here: not everything said to be from God ought also to be said to be of him. For, as Augustine says in the book On the Nature of the Good¹, «from him does not mean exactly the same as of him. What is of him may be said to be from him; but not everything that is from him may be said to be of him, because it is not of his substance. For heaven and earth are from him, because he made them; but they are not of him, because they are not of his substance. Just as, if a man begets a son and builds a house, the son is from him and the house is also from him; but the son is of him, whereas the house is of earth and wood,» not of the man himself.

2. He gathers together in brief what has been said. It has been made clear in what precedes that all things, namely good and evil, are in God's knowledge or presence, but evil is not there in the same way as good; that only good things are in God, as from him and through him, not evil things; and the sense in which these expressions are to be understood has been specified. It has also been shown that what is other than God is not properly said to be of him, whereas all things whose author he is are said to be from him.