Sentences, Books I–II

Cap. 1-6 (150-155).

1. On certain things said of God according to substance that call for a special treatise, namely, knowledge and foreknowledge, providence and disposition, predestination, will, and power. Since above we have discussed and said many things in common about those things said of God according to substance, some of which nevertheless call for a special treatise, they are now to be treated: namely, knowledge, foreknowledge, providence, disposition, predestination, will, and power.

2. Although God's wisdom is one, it receives several names on account of the various states of things *. It should therefore be known that God's wisdom or knowledge, although one and simple, nevertheless receives many different names on account of the various states of things and their different effects. For it is called not only knowledge, but also foreknowledge or foresight, disposition, predestination, and providence. — Foreknowledge or foresight concerns future things alone, but all of them: good and evil; disposition concerns things to be done; predestination concerns human beings to be saved, and the good things by which they are delivered here and crowned in the future. — For God predestined human beings to good things from eternity by choosing them, and predestined good things for them by preparing them. The Apostle shows that God predestined human beings, saying¹: He predestined those whom he foreknew to be conformed to the image of his Son; and elsewhere²: He chose us before the foundation of the world, that we might be holy and immaculate. The prophet Isaiah shows that he prepared good things for them, saying³: Eye has not seen, O God, apart from you, the things you have prepared for those who love or await you. Therefore, from eternity he predestined certain people to be good and blessed in the future—that is, he chose them to be good and blessed—and predestined good things for them, that is, prepared them. — Providence, however, concerns those to be governed, and seems to be understood in the same way as disposition; sometimes, nevertheless, providence is taken for foreknowledge. — Wisdom or knowledge, in turn, concerns all things: good and evil, present, past, and future, and not only temporal things but eternal ones as well. For God does not know these temporal things in such a way that he does not know himself; rather, he alone knows himself perfectly, in comparison with whose knowledge the knowledge of every creature is imperfect.

Cap. 7 (156).

1. Whether knowledge, foreknowledge, disposition, or predestination could have been in God if there had been no future things. Here one must consider whether knowledge, foreknowledge, disposition, or predestination could have been in God if there had been no future things. For since “foreknowledge⁴ concerns future things, disposition things to be done, and predestination those to be saved,” if there were no future things, if God were to do nothing or save no one, it does not seem possible that foreknowledge, disposition, or predestination could have been in God. God could have foreknown no future things; he could have created nothing or saved no one; therefore foreknowledge, disposition, or predestination could have been absent from God.

¹ “Nothing,” with “which” prefixed in RV. 16 praescientia] “foreknowledge,” with “and” added in BCL.]

²

³ “of which there is foreknowledge or foresight,” added as a rubric in LV. 4 and] “of which there is,” added in LMWV. || disposition] “of which disposition,” added as a rubric in LV. 5 predestination] “of which predestination,” added as a rubric in LV. || human beings... by which] “all... who,” MX. 6 will be crowned] “that human beings are predestined to good things and good things for human beings,” added as a rubric in LV. 14 prepared] “of which providence,” added as a rubric in LV. 17 knowledge] “which,” CMOPRX; “by which,” N. || all things] “human beings,” BCOP, corrected to “which,” OP.

⁴

⁵

2. An objection to the contrary *. Some raise this objection: “If,” they say, “God's foreknowledge could have been absent from God from eternity, and could have failed to exist, then, since God's foreknowledge is his knowledge, and knowledge is his essence, that which is the divine essence could have been absent from eternity.” They make the same objection about disposition and predestination, which are the divine essence.

3. Another objection *. They add yet another argument, saying: “If God could have failed to foreknow certain things, since for God to foreknow is the same as for him to know, and to know the same as to be, then he could have not existed. Likewise, since for God to be foreknowing and for God to exist are the same, if he could have been not foreknowing, he could have not been God. But he could have been not foreknowing if he could have foreknown nothing; and he could have foreknown nothing because he could have done nothing.”

4. Response: foreknowledge, disposition, and predestination are said relatively to future things or things to be done. To this we say that foreknowledge and “foreknowing” seem to be referred to something future, disposition to something to be done, and predestination to someone to be saved. Nevertheless, “creator” is said relatively in such a way that it does not signify the essence; foreknowledge or “foreknowing,” however, is said both with respect to future things and as designating the essence. The same is true of disposition and predestination.

5. This is made clear by the statement, “If there were no future things, there would be no foreknowledge or foreknowing in God.” Because the ground for saying it varies here, one must distinguish the meaning of the statement. When you say, then, “If there were no future things, there would be no foreknowledge in God,” you have in mind this ground: there would be no objects of his knowledge, on account of which it could be called foreknowledge, or he could be called foreknowing; both terms are said on account of future things, or with respect to future things.

6. Those expressions must be qualified in the same way: “God's foreknowledge could have been absent” or “God could have not foreknown.” But if you say this on the ground that there would be no knowledge in him by which he foreknows future things, or that he would not be the God who foreknows future things, the interpretation is false. God could have not foreknown certain things—that is, it could have been that there were no future things as objects of his knowledge, and so he could not be called foreknowing or said to foreknow, nor could his knowledge be called foreknowledge. Yet he himself would not thereby be any less, nor would his knowledge be any less; rather, he could not be called foreknowing, said to foreknow, or said to have foreknowledge if no future things were objects of his knowledge. The same applies to disposition, predestination, and providence; for, as was said above¹, these refer to temporal things and concern temporal things alone.

Cap. 8 (157).

That God's knowledge concerns eternal things as well as temporal things. Knowledge or wisdom concerns not only temporal things but eternal things as well. Thus, even if there had been no future things, the same knowledge that is now in God would still have been in him; it would have been no less than it is now, nor is it greater than it would have been. Therefore God knew from eternity what is eternal and everything that was to be, and he knew it immutably. He knows past and future things no less than present things. By his eternal and immutable wisdom he knows all that is known. “For,” as Ambrose² says, “the whole account of heavenly and earthly wisdom is in him, because his boundless knowledge encompasses all wisdom and knowledge.”

Cap. 9 (158).

1. Why all things are said to be in God, and that what was made is life in him. For this reason all things are said to be in God and to have been from eternity. Hence Augustine, Super Genesim³: “These visible things,” he says, “did not exist before they were made. How, then, were things that did not exist known to God? And again: how could he make things that were not known to him? For he made nothing in ignorance. Therefore he made them known; he did not learn of them after they were made. Thus, before they were made, they both were and were not: they were in God's knowledge, but they were not in their own nature.”

⁶

⁷

I would not dare to say that God himself came to know them in another way after making them than by the way in which he knew them in order to make them—he with whom there is no change or shadow of alteration¹.” Here you have it: these visible things existed in God's knowledge before they were made. It is in this sense, then, that all things are said to be in God and everything made is said to be life in him²—not because the creature is the Creator, or because these temporal things are essentially in God, but because they are always in his knowledge, which is life.

2. That all things are said to be present to him for the same reason. This is also why all things are said to be present to him—not only those that exist, but also those that have passed away and those that are future—according to the saying³: He calls things that are not as though they were. For, as Ambrose says in the book De Trinitate⁴, he knows things that are not just as he knows things that are. For this reason all things are said to be in him or with him, or present to him. Hence Augustine, on that passage of the Psalm⁵, And the beauty of the field is with me: “It is with me,” he says, “because with God nothing has passed away and nothing is future. All future things are with him, and past things are not taken away from him. All things are with him through a certain ineffable knowledge of God's wisdom.” Here Augustine makes clear in what sense such expressions are to be understood—“all things are present to God,” “all things are in God,” “with God,” or “in God's presence,” or “life in him”—namely, because the ineffable knowledge of all things is in him.