Sentences, Books I–II

Chapter 1 (143).

1. Whether the properties of the persons are the persons themselves and God, that is, the divine essence. After what was said above, it is necessary to consider inwardly and inquire carefully whether the properties of the Persons, by which the persons themselves are determined, are the persons themselves and are God, that is, the divine essence, or whether they are in the persons in such a way that they are not persons and, consequently, are not the divine essence. No one dares deny that there are Properties in the Persons, since the authority¹ plainly cries out that «in the persons there is property, and in the essence unity». Above also² we established with many testimonies of the Saints that the persons are distinguished and determined by their properties, and we expressed those properties—three, namely—by their proper names.

2. That the properties are the persons *. Since the properties themselves have existed from eternity, by which the persons themselves are determined and differ, how could they exist if they were not in them? And how could they be in them without themselves being persons, unless multiplicity existed there? — He briefly touches on what was stated above in order to add something else *. Therefore, just as we confess that properties are in the persons, so we confess that they are persons, as above¹ we protested on the authority of Jerome², so that it may not be burdensome to recall it, when he says in the Exposition of the Faith: «Avoiding the heresy of Sabellius, we distinguish three expressed persons under property. For we confess not names only, but also the properties of names—that is, persons, or, as the Greeks express it, hypostases, that is, subsistences». Behold, he plainly says that the persons are distinguished by properties and that the properties themselves are persons; here we touch on his words briefly, since we set them out more fully above.

3. That the properties are the divine essence *. And when above³ we were discussing the simplicity of the Godhead, we demonstrated by the authorities of the Saints—Augustine, Hilary, Isidore, and Boethius—that God is altogether what he has in himself, except that the Father has the Son and is not the Son, and the Son has the Father and is not the Father; and that the three are in the nature in such a way that whoever has is what he has, and that everything there is one being, one life. We do not repeat these things now, lest we weary the reader.

4. From what was said he concludes that the properties are the persons and one essence *. If, then, the properties are there, each of them is that in which it is, and each of them is one and the same life. Let us therefore confess both that the properties are in the three persons and that they are themselves the persons and the divine essence.

4. He proves by an authority that property is nature. That property is also the divine nature is shown by Hilary, who says that the Son’s begetting is the nature from which it is, in Book VII of The Trinity⁴: «The nature of both does not differ: the Father and the Son are one. Begetting therefore has this mystery, that it embraces in itself name, nature, and power, because begetting cannot fail to be that nature from which the Son is born». — The same author in Book VI⁵: «Begetting is property, it is truth». — The same author in Book VII⁶ says that «the begetting of nature is to be understood as existing in the nature of God». — Above he also says¹ that «it is proper to the Father that he is always Father, and proper to the Son that he is always Son», signifying that the property of the Father is the Father and the property of the Son is the Son. By these and many other authorities it seems plainly signified that the property of the Son is the Son, and likewise God; and so too the property of the Father and the property of the Holy Spirit.

¹ ipse mg. W, etiam M, om. LMPRX, in corr. O. 27 ea om. BCOPX. 28 VI] libro add. NVX. 29 naturae nativitas trp. OP.]

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6. Some deny that the properties are persons and the divine nature, and why. Some people², however, deny this, saying that properties are indeed in the persons but are not the persons themselves, because they say that they are in the persons or in the divine essence in such a way that they are not inwardly as those things are which are said of God according to substance, such as goodness and justice, but are attached externally. They endeavor to prove by arguments that this is so.

7. Their first objection, by which they wish to prove that the properties are not persons *. For, they say, if the properties are persons, the persons are not determined by them. — Against this we say that the persons also differ by themselves, as Jerome says above³, speaking of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit: «They are one in substance, but are distinguished in persons and names».

8. The second *. But they add again: If the properties themselves are the divine essence, then, since the three persons do not differ in essence, neither do they differ by their properties. For how does the Father differ from the Son by being the divine essence, when they are one in essence? — Answer to the foregoing, resting on an authority *. To these new doctrines and human inventions I reply with Hilary’s words⁴: «What is demanded is immense and incomprehensible; it lies beyond the meaning of speech and beyond the mind’s intention; it is not uttered, reached, or grasped. The nature of the thing itself consumes the significance of words; an impenetrable light darkens the contemplation of the mind; what is contained by no limit surpasses the capacity of understanding. Therefore there is fault in my meaning, stupor in my understanding; but in speech I shall confess not weakness now, but silence. It is exceedingly dangerous to say anything about such great and hidden matters beyond what has been prescribed, so that speech about God should go beyond God’s definition. The form of faith is certain: nothing, therefore, must be added, but a limit must be set to boldness; whatever is sought beyond this is not understood».

9. How wicked heretics persist by adding other things. — The third objection *. But the wickedness of the heretics, «stirred up by the prompting¹ of diabolical fraud», is not yet quiet; rather, «in² so great a question» it adds: If paternity and filiation are in God or in the divine essence, then the same thing is father to itself and son. For where paternity is, there is the Father; and where filiation is, there is the Son. If, then, one and the same thing has paternity and filiation in itself, it both begets and is begotten. — By saying this³ they are dragged into the Sabellian heresy, «extending⁴ the Father into the Son, since they propose the Son himself as both himself and the Father». But if they deny that paternity and filiation are in the one essence of God, how then do they say that God exists? They use these and other barbs of argument in support of their opinion, in order to dissect the form of truth.

10. A reply to this opposition of theirs, in which it is taught that properties are not said to be wholly in the divine essence as they are in the hypostases. Resisting their audacity and providing for their ignorance, we shall dare to say something on this subject. Paternity and filiation are not said to be altogether in the divine substance in the same way as they are in the hypostases themselves, in which they are such as to determine them, as John Damascene says⁵: «Characteristic idioms are properties that determine the hypostasis, and not the nature: for they determine the hypostasis», and not the nature. Therefore, although paternity and filiation are the divine essence, since they do not determine it, it cannot for that reason be said that the divine essence both begets and is begotten, or that the same thing is its own father and son. For property determines the person in such a way that by this property one hypostasis is begetting and by that other property another hypostasis is begotten; and so the same does not beget and is not begotten, but one begets another.

⁵ quae add. MOPT, quod exp. T. 12–13 Rubrica om. RVW. 18 Secunda om. MNRVW. 1 quia] quod CLN. 6 scilicet om. LNX. 9 sunt om. BCLNRX. 10 de Deo dicuntur trp. BCN. 13 personae] personis BCNOPTW, quod corr. OT.]

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Chapter 2 (144).

1. The question how properties can be in the nature without determining it. But perhaps you will ask: since these properties cannot be in the persons without determining them, how can they be in the divine essence in such a way that they do not determine it? — I answer you here too with Hilary¹: «I do not know; I do not inquire; yet I shall take comfort. Archangels do not know, angels have not heard, the ages do not contain it, the Prophet has not perceived it, the Apostle has not asked about it, the Son himself has not disclosed it. Let the pain of complaints therefore cease. Let no one think that by his own understanding he can attain the mystery of begetting. Yet the Father and the Son» and the Holy Spirit «must be understood without qualification. The understanding of the words stands at this limit: the Son is from the Father, who is the only-begotten from the unbegotten, offspring from parent, living from living; not one nature of the Godhead and another, because both are one». By believing this, «begin, advance, persist; even though I know that you will not arrive, I shall nevertheless rejoice that you are making progress. For whoever piously pursues the infinite, even if he never reaches it, will nevertheless make progress by advancing. But do not insert yourself into that secret, and do not plunge into the hidden mystery of an unthinkable birth, presuming to comprehend the summit of understanding; rather, understand that these things are incomprehensible».

By these and many other authorities it is clearly shown that we are in no way permitted to scrutinize the majesty², to impose a law upon power, or to circumscribe the infinite.

2. By what authorities they support their opinion, namely, that the property by which the Father is Father and the property by which the Son is Son are not the divine essence. Nevertheless they do not yet desist, but also wish to demonstrate their opinion by the authorities of the Saints: that the property by which the Father is Father and the property by which the Son is Son are not substance. Thus one authority says: «God is a certain substance. Hence we are also built up in the Catholic faith in such a way that we say that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are of one substance. What is ‘of one substance’? Whatever the Father is as God, that the Son is, that the Holy Spirit is. But when the Father is Father, he is not that which he is. For the Father is said with reference not to himself but to the Son; with reference to himself he is called God. Therefore that by which or in which God is, is substance. And because the Son is of the same substance, undoubtedly the Son too is God. But what the Father is, since it does not belong to substance but is referred to the Son, we do not say in the same way that the Son is Father as we say that the Son is God».

3. How they twist Augustine’s words to their own perversion *. From these words they say that it is signified that the property of the Father or the property of the Son is not God or the divine essence. For when he says, ‘By that by which he is God he is substance, but by that by which he is Father he is not substance’, they plainly show, they say, that that by which he is God is substance, but that by which he is Father is not substance. — Again, when he says, ‘The Father is not that which he is’, they show that he is not Father by that by which he is substance. For he did not simply say, ‘The Father is not that which he is’, but said, ‘When the Father is Father, he is not that which he is’, signifying that that by which he is Father is not that by which he is, that is, essence. Explaining these things in this way, they make their inventions seem true to the simple and unwary.

4. That those words must be understood otherwise than they understand them *. We, however, say that these things must be understood otherwise. For when he says, ‘By that by which he is God he is substance, but by that by which he is Father he is not substance’, he intended this to be understood: the essence is God, and by deity it is substance. For it is substance by that by which it is God, and conversely: its deity is the substance it has, and its substance is its deity. But ‘what the Father is is not of substance’ means that he is not substance by that by which he is Father, because he is Father by the property of begetting, by which he is not substance; yet he did not deny that the property itself is substance. The same is to be understood of what he says: ‘When the Father is Father, he is not that which he is’: that is, the Father is not Father by that by which he himself is, namely essence, but by a notion.

5. They also use other words of Augustine to assert what they say, namely, that the properties of the persons are not the substance of God. Augustine press hard upon the statements set out above¹, namely: «The Word, insofar as it is wisdom and essence, is that which the Father is; insofar as it is Word, it is not that which the Father is». If, they say, the Word is not that which the Father is insofar as it is Word, then that by which the Word is, is not that which the Father is; therefore the property by which the Word is is not that which the Father is, and therefore is not the divine essence. — Answer *. We say that, although the Word is not that which the Father is insofar as it is Word, nevertheless the property by which the Word is is that which the Father is, namely the divine essence, but it is not the hypostasis of the Father.

⁷ percurre MNRTV, curre OP. 15 persequitur] prosequitur LTV, corr. in prosequitur B.]

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