Sentences, Books I–II
Peter Lombard (1100–1160)
Sententiae in IV Libris Distinctae, libri I–II
First published 1971
Books I–II of Peter Lombard’s Sentences, from the 1971 third edition of the Quaracchi text, with English translation.
Book I: Book I — On the Mystery of the Trinity
Distinctio I: Distinction I
Distinctio II: Distinction II
Distinctio III: Distinction III
Distinctio IV: Distinction IV
Distinctio V: Distinction V
Distinctio VI: Distinction VI
Distinctio VII: Distinction VII
Distinctio VIII: Distinction VIII
Distinctio IX: Distinction IX
Distinctio X: Distinction X
Distinctio XI: Distinction XI
Distinctio XII: Distinction XII
Distinctio XIII: Distinction XIII
Distinctio XIV: Distinction XIV
Distinctio XV: Distinction XV
Distinctio XVI: Distinction XVI
Distinctio XVII: Distinction XVII
Distinctio XVIII: Distinction XVIII
Distinctio XIX: Distinction XIX
Distinctio XX: Distinction XX
Distinctio XXI: Distinction XXI
Distinctio XXII: Distinction XXII
Distinctio XXIII: Distinction XXIII
Distinctio XXIV: Distinction XXIV
Distinctio XXV: Distinction XXV
Distinctio XXVI: Distinction XXVI
Distinctio XXVII: Distinction XXVII
Distinctio XXVIII: Distinction XXVIII
Distinctio XXIX: Distinction XXIX
Distinctio XXX: Distinction XXX
Cap. 1 (129).
1. Things said of God temporally and relatively according to an accident belonging not to God but to creatures. Some things are said of God in time and apply to him temporally without change in him, and are said relatively according to an accident—not an accident belonging to God, but one belonging to creatures—such as creator, lord, refuge, given, donated, and the like. Augustine says: “Creator is said relatively to creature, as lord to servant.” Again: “It should not disturb us that, although the Holy Spirit is coeternal with Father and Son, something is nevertheless said of him temporally, such as what we called ‘given.’ Eternally the Spirit is gift, but temporally given. If lord is not said until one begins to have a servant, this relative appellation is also temporal for God. The creature of which he is lord is not eternal; therefore being lord is not eternal, lest we be forced to say that the creature too is eternal. Just as there cannot be a servant without a lord, so there cannot be a lord without a servant.”
2. The opinion that “lord” is not temporal because God is lord of time, which is not temporal. Someone may say that the title “Lord” does not apply to God from time, because he is lord not only of things that began in time but also of time itself, which did not begin in time; for time did not exist before it began, and therefore God did not begin to be lord from time. — Reply. We may answer that, although he did not begin to be lord of time from time, he nevertheless began to be lord of time, because time did not always exist; and he began in time to be lord of this human being. Augustine continues in the same book: “Whoever says that only God is eternal, while times are not eternal because of their variety and changeability, but that times nevertheless did not begin in time because there was no time before times began, and therefore it did not happen to God in time that he became lord, since he was lord of times, which certainly did not begin in time—what will he answer about the human being, who was made in time and whose lord God surely was not before he existed? Certainly it happened to God in time that he became lord of a human being; and, to remove all controversy, it certainly happened in time that he became lord of you or me, who began to exist only now.”
1 mutatione LNRW.]
3. How it is to be understood that nothing is said of God according to an accident, and what relative accidents are. “How, then, shall we maintain that nothing is said of God according to an accident? Only because nothing happens to his nature by which it is changed. Relative accidents are those that occur with some change in the things of which they are said, as ‘friend’ is said relatively. One does not begin to be a friend unless one begins to love; thus a change of will occurs when someone is called a friend.”
4. By analogy he shows that God can be called what he was not previously called without change in him, as money is called a price. “Money is said relatively when it is called a price, yet it is not changed when it begins to be a price, or when it is called a pledge and the like. If money can be called relatively so many times without any change in itself, how much more should we understand that the unchangeable substance of God is called relatively in relation to a creature, so that although it begins to be said temporally, nothing is understood to have happened to God’s substance, but to the creature to which the expression refers.”
5 omitted in MNRWX. 6 dominus] “Quando cepit tempus, deus cepit esse dominus, nec ante tempus fuit dominus, sed cum tempore, non ex tempore vel in tempore, quia non ante fuit tempus quam ipse dominus, sed simul” added in the margin of LX and in the third column of BCW; cf. note below. 7 dicit] ait OP. 10 acciderit] accidit NRW (Augustine). 24–25 Inauthentic heading in NT, omitted in the other manuscripts.]
5. God is called “our refuge” relatively and temporally without change in himself. “How is he also called our refuge? God is called our refuge relatively: he is referred to us, and he becomes our refuge when we flee to him. Does anything then occur in his nature that was not there before we fled to him? A change takes place in us, who become better by fleeing to him; in him there is no change.”
6. The Father too is called relatively. “So he begins to be our Father when we are regenerated by his grace, which gave us power to become children of God. Our substance is changed for the better when we become his children; at the same time he begins to be our Father, but without any change in his substance. Therefore, when God begins to be called temporally by a name by which he was not previously called, it is clear that the name is relative—not according to an accident in God, as though something happened to him, but according to an accident in that to which God begins to be relatively named.”
7. He briefly summarizes the foregoing. It is clear that some things are said of God temporally and relatively to creatures without change in the deity, though not without change in the creature. The accident is therefore in the creature, not in the Creator. The name by which a creature is said relatively to the Creator is relative and signifies a relation in the creature itself; the name by which the Creator is said relatively to the creature is relative, but signifies no relation existing in the Creator.
Chapter 2 (130).
How the question is solved whether the Holy Spirit is said to be given relatively to himself when he gives himself. The question raised above can now be solved: since the Holy Spirit is called given or donated (“what is given is referred both to him who gives and to him to whom it is given”), and since the Holy Spirit gives himself, is he said relatively to himself when he is said to be given or donated? — Solution. We answer that the Holy Spirit is called given or donated relatively both to the giver and to the recipient. The giver or donor is the Father with the Son and the Holy Spirit. Yet we do not say that the Holy Spirit is referred to himself; rather, the name “given” or “donated” is referred to giver and recipient, because nothing can be called given unless it is given by someone to someone. When the Holy Spirit is said to be given by himself or given from himself, this is relative to the one to whom he is given: the name is relative, and the change occurs in the recipient, not the giver.
7 trp. BNVW. 14 simul] similiter MVN. 28 ad... se] om. LNR, inferi. T. 31 cum] om. LMNX. 32 Solutio] om. ENTX.]