Sentences, Books I–II
Peter Lombard (1100–1160)
Sententiae in IV Libris Distinctae, libri I–II
First published 1971
Books I–II of Peter Lombard’s Sentences, from the 1971 third edition of the Quaracchi text, with English translation.
Book I: Book I — On the Mystery of the Trinity
Distinctio I: Distinction I
Distinctio II: Distinction II
Distinctio III: Distinction III
Distinctio IV: Distinction IV
Distinctio V: Distinction V
Distinctio VI: Distinction VI
Distinctio VII: Distinction VII
Distinctio VIII: Distinction VIII
Distinctio IX: Distinction IX
Distinctio X: Distinction X
Distinctio XI: Distinction XI
Distinctio XII: Distinction XII
Distinctio XIII: Distinction XIII
Distinctio XIV: Distinction XIV
Distinctio XV: Distinction XV
Distinctio XVI: Distinction XVI
Distinctio XVII: Distinction XVII
Distinctio XVIII: Distinction XVIII
Distinctio XIX: Distinction XIX
Distinctio XX: Distinction XX
Distinctio XXI: Distinction XXI
Distinctio XXII: Distinction XXII
Distinctio XXIII: Distinction XXIII
Distinctio XXIV: Distinction XXIV
Distinctio XXV: Distinction XXV
Distinctio XXVI: Distinction XXVI
Distinctio XXVII: Distinction XXVII
Distinctio XXVIII: Distinction XXVIII
Cap. 1 (118).
1. The persons have not only the three properties mentioned above, but also others signified by other names, such as unbegotten. It must be considered that the persons have not only the three properties or notions mentioned above, but also others indicated by other names. The name “unbegotten” is said relatively of the Father alone and designates a notion different from “father” or “begetter.” To be father is not the same as to be unbegotten; the Father is called father by the notion of generation, but unbegotten by the property of not being born. The Father therefore differs from the Son by the authority of generation and also by the property of not being born, that is, because he is unbegotten. Augustine distinguishes the property by which he is called father from that by which he is called unbegotten: “To say unbegotten is not the same as to say father; for even if he had not begotten the Son, nothing would prevent us from calling him unbegotten. And if someone begets a son, he is not thereby unbegotten, since begotten men beget others.” He is therefore not called father because he is unbegotten. “When both are said of God, there is one notion by which he is called begetter and another by which he is called unbegotten. Begetter is said in relation to the begotten, that is, the Son; but when unbegotten is said, what he is not is stated.”
1 om. BCMNV, exp. T.]
2. He uses examples to make this clear. “What is meant by unbegotten must be made plain by examples. To say unbegotten shows that he is not a son. Begotten and unbegotten can suitably be said; Latin usage, however, allows ‘son’ but not ‘non-son.’ Nothing is lost to understanding if we say non-son, just as nothing else is said if we say non-begotten instead of unbegotten. We must therefore consider not what the usage of our speech allows or forbids us to say, but what understanding of the things themselves becomes clear.” — Non-begotten has the same force as unbegotten, and non-son the same force as unbegotten. “Let us not only say unbegotten, but also non-begotten, which has the same force. Are we saying anything other than non-son? The negative particle does not make a word that is relatively said without it become substantial when the particle is prefixed; it merely denies what was asserted without it. Thus, when we say ‘man is,’ we designate substance; whoever says ‘he is not a man’ does not state another category, but merely denies it. So, just as I affirm substantially when I say ‘man is,’ I deny substantially when I say ‘he is not a man.’ If begotten has the same force as son, then non-begotten has the same force as non-son. We deny relatively when we say non-son, and therefore deny relatively when we say non-begotten. What is unbegotten other than non-begotten? The relative category is therefore not left behind when unbegotten is said. Begotten is not said in relation to itself, but indicates that it is from a begetter; similarly, unbegotten is not said in relation to itself, but indicates that it is not from a begetter. Both are nevertheless said relatively. What is said relatively does not indicate substance. Although begotten and unbegotten differ, they do not indicate different substance, because just as son is related to father and non-son to non-father, so begotten must be related to begetter and non-begotten to non-begetter.” He clearly shows that unbegotten is said relatively and is understood of the Father alone; the notion by which he is called unbegotten differs from that by which he is called Father, and unbegotten has the same force as non-begotten or non-son.
4 om. RTW. 12–13 Rubrica] om. RTVW. 5 hoc] hic BCOPW. 11 quis] quid BCOX, quod P. 30 tamen] om. LWX.]
Cap. 2 (119).
1. Whether, just as the Father alone is called unbegotten, he alone should be called non-begotten or non-son. It is often asked whether, just as the Father alone is called unbegotten, he alone should be called non-begotten or non-son, so that the Holy Spirit could not be called non-son or non-begotten.
2. The opinion of some. Some think that the Father alone should be called non-begotten or non-son; just as the Holy Spirit is not called unbegotten, they say he should not be called non-begotten or non-son. He should indeed be said and believed not to be begotten or not to be a son, but he should not be said to be non-begotten or non-son.
3. The opinion of others. Others think that, although the Holy Spirit cannot be called unbegotten, he can nevertheless be called non-begotten or non-son. When Augustine said above that unbegotten has the same force as non-begotten or non-son, they say he was showing the etymology of the name, not the basis of its predication.
Cap. 3 (120).
The property according to which the Father is called unbegotten. If you wish to know the property according to which the Father is called unbegotten, hear Hilary call it “not being born” in book IV of On the Trinity: “There is one from one, namely one begotten from the unbegotten, with the property in each being respectively that of not being born and of origin. Since the understanding of the persons is signified in Scripture, and the sense of not being born and of being born is distinguished, God must not be thought solitary. The discernment or distinction of persons is therefore established in Scripture, but in no way a distinction of nature.”
Cap. 4 (121).
- The Arians tried to prove that the Father was of one substance and the Son of another because the one is unbegotten and the other begotten. Ambrose answered them that he had not read this name in the divine Scriptures. They argued from the difference between being unbegotten and being begotten, but Ambrose replied: “Some have heard us say that the Son of God, who was begotten, cannot be unequal to the Father who begot him, since the one is begotten and the other begets, because generation belongs to nature. They think that they have found an answer to the question, but, by a culpable evasion, they turn the matter into a change of wording, saying: How can unbegotten and begotten be of one nature and substance? I answer: nowhere in the divine Scriptures do I find ‘unbegotten’; I have not read it or heard it. What kind of fickleness is theirs, that they accuse us of using what is not written, while we speak what is written and they object that it is not written? Do they not contradict themselves and weaken the authority of their own slander?”
2. Why Ambrose refused to use “unbegotten,” namely, because of the heretics. Reader, attend: Ambrose did not wish to use this name because of the heretics. We too must sometimes keep silent because of the traps of slanderers about things that Catholic and devout readers can safely believe.
3. A useful rule: there are things that we may sometimes use and sometimes religiously leave unmentioned. Some matters do not have such religious authority that we must always serve them by confessing and accepting them; they may sometimes be passed over in silence. Yet they are not so perverse that, when the occasion is suitable, we may not freely use them.
8 autem BCL.]
Cap. 5 (122).
1. Whether being Father and being Son are different. Since it was said above that to say unbegotten differs from saying father, and that begotten differs from unbegotten, it is asked whether being father likewise differs from being son, or whether they are the same.
2. Answer: being Father and being Son are different, but “the Father is” and “the Son is” are not different. In the same sense in which begotten and unbegotten differ, and in which saying begotten is not the same as saying unbegotten, we may say that being Father, Son, or Holy Spirit is different, because the Father is father by one notion, the Son son by another, and the Holy Spirit Holy Spirit by another. But if the words are reversed—“it is one thing for the Father to be, another for the Son to be”—the meaning changes and the statement is not granted. It would mean that the Father is by one thing, not insofar as he is father but simply insofar as he is, and the Son by another thing, not insofar as he is son but simply insofar as he is; that is wholly false. The Father is by the same thing by which the Father is God, namely essence or nature. The Son is God by the same thing by which the Father is God; therefore the Son is by the same thing by which the Father is, so being Father and being Son are the same, although being a father and being a son are not the same. Augustine says: “Although being a father differs from being a son, the substance is not different, because this is not said according to substance but according to relation; yet relation is not an accident, because it is not mutable.” It is therefore according to the foregoing reasoning that being father and being son differ: the notion by which one is father differs from that by which one is son; the Father is called father and the Son son according to relation, not essence.
Cap. 6 (123).
1. How wisdom is said to be begotten or born, whether relatively or substantially. Just as the Son alone is called “Word” or “image,” so he alone is called “born wisdom.” and therefore it is asked whether this is said relatively; and, if relatively, whether according to the same relation by which it is called Word and image. Augustine says: “Let us understand ‘Word’ as though ‘born wisdom’ were said, so that it is both Son and image. When these two are said, namely ‘born wisdom,’ in one of them—that which is ‘born’—Word, image, and Son are understood, and essence is not shown by any of these names, because they are said relatively; but in the other, ‘wisdom,’ essence is also demonstrated, since it is said in relation to itself. It is wise by itself, and its being is the same as its being wise; hence Father and Son together are one wisdom, because one essence.”
10 quod BCP. 17 quidem] quod BCPW.]
2. How Augustine’s foregoing words are to be understood. Reader, take care how you understand Augustine here. He seems to say that, when “born wisdom” is said, wisdom signifies essence and born signifies relation. If so, we would have to say that the divine essence is born, contrary to what was said above. We answer that in the one term, “born,” the same notion is understood as in Word and image; in the other, “wisdom,” essence is demonstrated, that is, that the Son is essence, because wisdom is said according to essence. Thus “born wisdom” means that the one who is born is essence. Yet “wisdom” there does not stand for essence but for hypostasis. Attend carefully: just as Word or Son signifies a hypostasis with its property, so “born wisdom” signifies the begotten hypostasis. Therefore he carefully says that the same thing is understood when Word and born wisdom are said: the same relation and the same hypostasis in which that property exists. This supports what was said above: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit signify not only the properties, as fatherhood and sonship do, but also hypostases with their properties.
Cap. 7 (124).
Image is sometimes said according to essence. Although it was said above that image is said relatively of the Son, like Word or Son, it is sometimes found to be said substantially. Augustine says in On the Faith that “the divinity of the holy Trinity is one essentially,” and that this is the image to which man was made. Hilary says in book V of On the Trinity: “Man is made according to the common image. The name does not differ, nor does the nature; for the species according to which man was created is one.” This shows that image sometimes conveys an understanding of essence; then it is said in relation to itself, not relatively.
12 filius add. MOPT, deleted by T. 28 nec] non LMNRVW, corrected to non by T.]