Sentences, Books I–II

Chapter 1 (113).

1. Whether Augustine and Hilary assign the same properties, and whether these are what are called paternity, filiation, and procession. Here it may be asked whether the properties which Hilary assigned above—namely, that the Father is always Father and the Son always Son—are the same properties which Augustine distinguished above, saying that it is proper to the Father that he begot the Son, proper to the Son that he was begotten by the Father, and proper to the Holy Spirit that he proceeds from both; and then whether these too are what are called paternity, filiation, and procession.

2. That the properties Hilary and Augustine posit do not seem to be the same. It seems that the properties Hilary posits are not the same as those Augustine posits. For if they are the same, then for the Father to be Father is the same as having begotten the Son, which some certainly grant. But if this is so, to whatever it belongs to be Father it belongs to have begotten the Son. Therefore, if the divine nature is Father, it begot the Son; but if it did not beget him, it is not Father. Yet who would dare say either that it begot the Son or that it is not itself Father? If it is Father itself and did not beget the Son, then to say that something is Father is not the same as to say that it begot the Son; and so the property does not seem to be one and the same.

¹ om. RVW.]

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3. The answer, where he shows that the properties are the same. — How Hilary’s foregoing words are to be understood. We say, without prejudice to others, that both authors indicate the same properties, although in different words. What Hilary says must be understood in this way: ‘It is proper to the Father that he is always Father’, that is, the property of the Father is that by which he is always Father; and he is always Father because he has always begotten the Son. Likewise, ‘it is proper to the Son that he is always Son’, that is, the property of the Son is that by which he is always Son; and the Son is always Son because he has always been begotten. Therefore the property by which the Father is Father is that he has always begotten; and this same property is called paternity or generation. And the property by which the Son is always Son is that he has always been begotten by the Father; and this same property is called filiation, or begetting, or birth, or origin, or begottenness. Likewise, the property by which the Holy Spirit is the Holy Spirit or the Gift is that he proceeds from both; and this same property is called procession. The same properties, therefore, are signified in the foregoing expressions.

Chapter 2 (114).

1. That it is not altogether the same to say that something is Father and that it has begotten or has the Son; and likewise concerning the others. Nevertheless, it does not seem to us altogether the same to say that something is Father and that it has begotten the Son, or that something is Son and has the Father, or that it is the Holy Spirit and proceeds from both. Otherwise Father would not be the name of a hypostasis, that is, a person, but only of a property; and likewise Son and Holy Spirit; and thus three persons would not be signified by three names.

2. The names Father, Son, and Holy Spirit signify not only relations but also hypostases, and are names of hypostases. Therefore we say that the name Father signifies not only a relation but also a hypostasis, that is, a subsistence; and the same is true of Son and Holy Spirit.

3. The terms of relations are paternity, filiation, and procession, and they do not signify persons. The terms of relations—paternity, filiation, procession, or begetting, being begotten, and proceeding—signify only the relations themselves, not hypostases; the same is true of having a Son and having a Father.

4. What is understood when it is said: God is Father, God is Son, or God is the Holy Spirit. For example, when we say ‘God is Father’, by the name Father we signify both a relation and the divine hypostasis, so that the understanding is this: God or the divine essence is Father, that is, the one who begot, namely, the hypostasis which has the Son. Similarly, ‘God is Son’ means the begotten hypostasis, or the one who has the Father. Likewise, ‘God is the Holy Spirit’ means the hypostasis proceeding from both, or the one who proceeds. But when we place the names of relations in predicates, we signify only the notions, not hypostases, as when it is said ‘God begot’, that is, has the Son, and ‘God was begotten’, that is, has the Father. Then in the subjects only hypostases must be understood, not the essence, which is determined by those properties.

Chapter 3 (115).

1. The properties determine hypostases, not substance, that is, nature. For those properties belong properly, one to each, to the persons, and through them the persons are determined; they differ from one another but do not withdraw from one another. — Hence John Damascene says: «The hypostases do not differ from one another according to substance, but according to characteristic idioms, that is, determinative properties; characteristic, that is, determinative properties belong to hypostases, not to nature, for they determine hypostases». — Likewise: «We say that the divine hypostasis of the Word exists timelessly and eternally, simple and possessing all that the Father possesses, consubstantial with him, differing from the paternal hypostasis in the mode and relation of birth, but never withdrawing from the paternal hypostasis».

2. Here the properties are distinguished plainly. The same author, expressing the personal properties more clearly, says in the same work: «We recognize the difference of the hypostases, that is, of the persons, in three properties, namely the paternal, filial, and processional; but the hypostases themselves are inseparable and undivided». They are distinct from one another, yet there is unity, and unity indeed without confusion: for they are three, although united, and divided without separation.” For each one “is a perfect hypostasis and possesses its own property, namely its own proper mode of existence; yet they are united in substance and neither differ from nor withdraw from the paternal hypostasis.” Here you have the three distinct properties mentioned above in different ways.

⁴ est add. LNRTVW. 15 est] om. BCMPR. 16 est] om. BLMN, exp. P. 25 esse] om. MPV. 34–35 Rubrica] om. MRW. 34 Relationum] vero add. BLX. 1 gignere] vel add. LOP. 23 intemporaliter] temporaliter OPRX, quod corr. O. 28 Rubrica] om. RVW.]

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3. Other names of the persons that signify these same properties: begotten, begetter, Word, and image. It must not be omitted that, just as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are names of persons and designate personal properties, so there are other names of persons, that is, names signifying the persons themselves and denoting their properties, the same properties as the names mentioned above. Hence they too are said relatively: begetter, begotten, Word, and image. Augustine says in book V of On the Trinity: “We must see that when ‘begotten’ is said, what is signified is what is signified when ‘Son’ is said. He is Son because begotten, and because Son he is certainly begotten.” “Just as Son is referred to Father, so begotten is referred to begetter; and just as Father is referred to Son, so begetter is referred to begotten.”

4. On the name Word and image. The same author says in book VI of On the Trinity: “Word is understood of the Son alone, not of Father and Son together, as though both were one Word. Word is said in the same way as image; but Father and Son together are not both image: the Son alone is the image of the Father, just as he is the Son.” Again in book VII: “Insofar as the Word is wisdom and essence, it is what the Father is; insofar as it is Word, it is not what the Father is, because the Word is not the Father, and Word is said relatively, like Son.”

5. The Word is not called Word in the same respect in which it is called wisdom. Again: “Just as Son is referred to Father, so Word is referred to him whose Word it is when it is called Word. Therefore it is not called Word in the same respect in which it is wisdom. It is not called Word in the same respect in which it is wisdom, because Word is not said in relation to itself but only relatively to him whose Word it is, just as Son is referred to Father.” — The Word is called Word in the same respect in which it is Son. “For it is Son in the same respect in which it is Word, and Word in the same respect in which it is Son; but it is wisdom in the respect in which it is essence, and therefore, since Father and Son are one essence and one wisdom…” Again: “The Father himself is not the Word, just as he is neither Son nor image.” “What could be more absurd than to say that image is referred to itself?” Again in book V: “Son is said relatively, and Word and image are also said relatively; in all these names they are referred to the Father. But none of these is said of the Father.”

⁶ omitted in LNPRV, expunged in OT. 2 divisas] diversas BCW. 6 modis] vel nominibus added in BCW. 21 solus] est added in BCNTV.]

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6. He briefly gathers the meaning of what was said. It has been plainly shown that just as Son or begotten is said relatively to Father, so too Word and image; and that Word or image is said in the same respect as Son, that is, Word and image are said by the same property or notion as Son. But Word is not said in the same respect as wisdom or essence, because wisdom is said according to essence, not according to relation.

Cap. 4 (116).

The general rule of what is said in relation to itself and what is said relatively: whatever is said in relation to itself is said of both together, but not so in the foregoing relatives. Here we must observe a general rule concerning what is said in relation to itself and what is said relatively of Father and Son. “Whatever is said in relation to itself,” Augustine says in book VI of On the Trinity, “is not said of one without the other; that is, whatever is said that manifests their substance is said of both together. Thus neither is the Father God without the Son, nor the Son without the Father, but both together are God”; yet they are not both together Father, nor both together Son, Word, or image.

⁹ eo add. N (Aug.), add. interl. RT. 22 dicuntur] dicitur CL, corr. in dicitur O². 23 dicuntur] dicitur M, corr. in dicitur O²V. 25 non] nec BCL.]

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Cap. 5 (117).

1. Whether “God from God,” “light from light,” and the like are said substantially. When we say “God from God,” “light from light,” and the like, are these expressions substantial? It is clear that they are not relative. If they are substantial, then Father and Son together can be called God from God and light from light, according to the rule given above.

2. Answer: substantial names are sometimes used for persons. Although God, light, wisdom, and the like are said substantially and are never taken relatively, they are sometimes taken for relatives, that is, for persons, though not relatively—as when we say “God begot God,” using one for the Father and the other for the Son. Likewise we say “God from God” and “light from light.” In other expressions too, names of essence are drawn toward the signification of persons, as when we say “God was born,” “God died,” or “God suffered,” where only the Son is signified. Thus “God from God” and the like are understood of the Son alone. Augustine asks how such expressions are said: “How is God from God, light from light said? For Father and Son are not together God from God, but the Son alone is from God, namely the Father; nor are both together light from light, but the Son alone is from the Father who is light.”

3. “From that” is said only according to names of substance, not names of persons. We say “that from that” only according to names of substance, even when those names there do not signify substance. According to the same names of persons we never say “that from that,” as Word from Word or Son from Son, because such names cannot belong to different persons. Augustine says: “The one thing that cannot be said of them is ‘that from that,’ when both are not together that thing. Thus Word cannot be said from Word, because both are not together Word; nor image from image, nor Son from Son, because both are not together Son or image.”

¹¹ omitted in LRW, last in MOPTX. 9 quia] quod LWX. 11 pro] omitted in OP. 18 VII] septimo in MOPTX. 25 eadem] omitted in LNRW, deleted by T. 28 ait] dicit BCLMRTV.]

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4. Names of substance sometimes produce an understanding of the Trinity. Just as names of substance sometimes lead to an understanding of the individual persons, so at times they lead to an understanding of the whole Trinity together. Augustine says: “In the name Father, the Father himself is pronounced by himself; in the name God, both he and the Son and the Holy Spirit are signified,” as when it is said, “No one is good except God,” because the Trinity is one God.