Sentences, Books I–II

Chapter 1 (95).

1. The name “person,” although said substantially, is nevertheless taken in the plural rather than the singular in the aggregate. To what was said we must add that, although all names said of God substantially are said in the singular rather than plural of all the persons together, as shown above, there is one name—“person”—which is said substantially of each person but is taken in the plural rather than singular in the aggregate. We say that the Father is a person, the Son is a person, and the Holy Spirit is a person; this is said substantially. Yet we do not say that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one person, but three persons. This name is therefore excepted from the rule concerning names said substantially of God: although it is said in relation to itself and substantially, it is taken in the plural in the aggregate.

2. Authority that “person” is said in relation to itself and substantially. Augustine shows this in book VII of On the Trinity: “For God, to be is not one thing and to be a person another, but they are wholly the same.” — The Father is not Father by that by which he is. Again: “When in this Trinity we say ‘the person of the Father,’ we say nothing other than the substance of the Father. Thus, just as the Father’s substance is the Father himself—not by which he is Father, but by which he is—so the Father’s person is nothing other than the Father himself. Person is said in relation to itself, not to the Son or Holy Spirit, just as God, great, good, just, and the like are said in relation to themselves. As for him to be is the same as to be God, great, and good, so for him to be is the same as to be a person to be. — Thus you have explicitly that “person” is said substantially: when it is said, “the Father is a person,” the meaning is that the Father is the divine essence; likewise, when it is said, “the Son is a person” or “the Holy Spirit is a person,” the meaning is the divine essence.

¹ om. MRW. 26 magnum] esse add. LPT.]

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3. Why the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are not called one person, as they are called one substance and one God. A difficult but useful question arises: why are these three not called one person, as they are called one essence and one God? Augustine carefully treats and suitably explains the question in book VII of On the Trinity: “Why do we not call these three together one person, as we call them one essence and one God, but call them three persons, when we do not call them three gods or three essences?” — He answers: “Because we wish to preserve some word for the meaning by which the Trinity is understood, so that we might not remain entirely silent when asked what the three are.” “When, therefore, it is asked what the three are, human speech is laboring under great poverty. Yet ‘three persons’ was said, not so that this might be said, but so that we might not be silent.” The excellence of the ineffable reality cannot be explained by this word. He shows that “persons” is said in the plural by necessity, so that we might answer those who ask about the three with this one name.

Chapter 2 (96).

1. Why the Latins say “three persons,” and the Greeks “three hypostases” or substances. Not only Latin speech but Greek speech is constrained by almost the same poverty of names when speaking of this matter. Augustine explains what Greeks and Latins have said by necessity about the ineffable Trinity in book VII of On the Trinity: “For the sake of speaking about ineffable things, so that we might somehow utter them, the Greeks said: one essence, three substances” (that is, one ousia, three hypostases; for the Greeks take “substance” differently from the Latins), “while the Latins said: one essence or substance, three persons, because in our speech, that is, Latin, essence and substance are ordinarily understood in the same way. And so that it might at least be understood in an enigma, it pleased us to speak this way: if it were asked what the three are, something could be said; what the three are is held by true faith.”

³ interroganti LOPW. 17 taceretur] omnino add. BNW.]

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Chapter 3 (97).

1. Why we do not say that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are three gods, as we say they are three persons, although what God is is common to them, since the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God. Since we say that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are three persons because what person is is common to them—that is, because each is a person—why do we not likewise say “three gods,” since each is God? Because Scripture contradicts the former expression; although it does not say the latter, it does not contradict it.

2. The question. Augustine raises and settles this question in book VII of On the Trinity: “If we say that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are three persons because what person is is common to them, why do we not also say three gods?” Certainly, as was said above, because the Father is a person, the Son a person, and the Holy Spirit a person, they are called three persons. Since the Father is God, the Son God, and the Holy Spirit God, why are they not called three gods?” — Behold, he poses the question. Attend to his answer: “Is it because Scripture does not say three gods? But Scripture nowhere mentions three persons either. Was it therefore permitted, by the necessity of speaking and disputing, to say three persons—not because Scripture says so, but because Scripture does not contradict it? If we said three gods, Scripture would contradict us when it says: ‘Hear, O Israel: the Lord your God is one God.’” Here is the solution: we say three persons rather than three gods because the latter contradicts Scripture.

⁵ dicatur BMX, dicitur L. 11 quoniam] quia LNRW. 30 contradicit] dicit MOPX, quod corr. O²X². 31 movens hanc] trp. MNRV.]

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Chapter 4 (98).

1. Another question: why do we not say three essences as we say three persons, when Scripture does not contradict this. Another question follows, which Augustine adds: “Why is it not permitted to say three essences, since Scripture likewise neither says this nor contradicts it? If, because of the unity of the Trinity, three essences are not said but one essence, why, because of the same unity of the Trinity, are three persons said rather than one person? Just as the name essence is common to them, so the name person is common to them.” — “What remains, then? We must confess that these names were obtained by Greeks and Latins from the necessity of speaking, against the traps and errors of heretics. When human poverty tried, by speaking, to present to human understanding what faith or some understanding holds in the mind’s sanctuary about God, it feared saying three essences, lest some diversity be understood in that supreme equality. Yet it could not say that there were not three in some sense, for Sabellius said that and fell into heresy. It therefore sought what to call the three, and said three persons or three substances,” according to the Greeks.

⁷ est add. LNR. 4 Sanctus] est add. LMRV. 6 Dominus] om. BMNRTVW. proponit] MOPX, propo.]

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2. As we say three persons, so the Greeks say three substances, which they call hypostases, taking “substance” differently from us. What we understand by persons according to our usage, they understand by substances according to Greek usage. They say three substances, one essence—that is, three hypostases, one ousia—just as we say three persons, one essence or substance. If they wished, they could say three persons, three prosopa, just as they say three substances, three hypostases; but they preferred the latter, perhaps because it is more fitting according to the usage of their language.

Chapter 5 (99).

1. There is no diversity, singularity, or solitude in the Trinity, but unity and Trinity, distinction and identity. It has now been sufficiently shown why we say three persons and why we do not similarly say three gods or essences: in the first case Scripture opposes the expression, and in the second it would imply diversity. In the Trinity there is no diversity at all, nor singularity or solitude, but unity and Trinity.

2. Augustine says in book VII of On the Trinity: “Human poverty, seeking what to call the three, said three persons or substances. By these names it did not wish diversity to be understood, but it did not wish singularity, so that unity might be understood from ‘one essence’ and Trinity from ‘three persons.’”

3. Hilary likewise says in book VII of On the Trinity: “The Lord says, ‘Who sees me sees the Father.’ When this is said, the understanding of a solitary and unique one is excluded. For the wording does not signify solitude, while the confession teaches an undivided nature. The Father was seen in the Son through the unity of their nature. The begotten and the begetter are one, yet they are not one person. The Son is therefore not solitary, not singular, and not unlike.” Again: “Just as it is impious to believe the Father and Son are two gods, so it is sacrilegious to proclaim the Father and Son a solitary God.” “There is nothing new, nothing different, nothing alien, nothing separable in them.”

⁹ trp. RWX. 24 unici] id est solitarii add. T, add. interl. RV², mg. W.]

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4. Augustine likewise says in his book Questions on the Old and New Law: "There is one God, but he is not solitary." Ambrose too says in Book I of The Trinity: "What is of one substance cannot be separated, even if it is not a matter of singularity but of unity." "When one God is spoken of, the Trinity of the Godhead is in no way excluded; therefore what is asserted is not singularity but unity." — From the foregoing it is shown that God must not be confessed as singular, diverse, one alone, or solitary, because singularity or solitude excludes the plurality of persons, while diversity removes the unity of essence.

5. Diversity introduces separation into the Godhead; singularity removes the distinction of the Trinity. Hence Ambrose says in Book I of The Trinity: "Equality is neither diverse nor singular, and does not fail to distinguish the Father and the Son. For the Father and the Son have distinction, but they do not have separation." — Again, in the same work: "The Father and the Son are one in divinity; there is neither difference of substance nor any diversity there—otherwise how would we say that they are one God? For diversity makes many." It is therefore established from the foregoing that there is no diversity in the Trinity.

6. Persons are sometimes called diverse, that is, distinct. If Scripture is nevertheless sometimes found to say "three diverse persons" and the like, it calls them "diverse" in the sense of "distinct."

Chapter 6 (100).

1. That God should not be called multiple. Just as there is no diversity in the Trinity, so there is no multiplicity; therefore God should not be called multiple, but triune and simple. Hence Ambrose says in Book I of The Trinity: "In the Father and the Son there is not a discordant but one divinity; what is one cannot be confused, and what is undivided cannot be multiple." God, then, is not multiple.

¹² sacrilegum RVW (Hil.). 8 deitatis trinitatem] deitatem trinitatis NVW. 23 aliquando in Scriptura] trp. MNX.]

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