Sentences, Books I–II
Peter Lombard (1100–1160)
Sententiae in IV Libris Distinctae, libri I–II
First published 1971
Books I–II of Peter Lombard’s Sentences, from the 1971 third edition of the Quaracchi text, with English translation.
Book I: Book I — On the Mystery of the Trinity
Distinctio I: Distinction I
Distinctio II: Distinction II
Distinctio III: Distinction III
Distinctio IV: Distinction IV
Distinctio V: Distinction V
Distinctio VI: Distinction VI
Distinctio VII: Distinction VII
Distinctio VIII: Distinction VIII
Distinctio IX: Distinction IX
Distinctio X: Distinction X
Distinctio XI: Distinction XI
Distinctio XII: Distinction XII
Distinctio XIII: Distinction XIII
Distinctio XIV: Distinction XIV
Distinctio XV: Distinction XV
Distinctio XVI: Distinction XVI
Distinctio XVII: Distinction XVII
Distinctio XVIII: Distinction XVIII
Distinctio XIX: Distinction XIX
Distinctio XX: Distinction XX
Distinctio XXI: Distinction XXI
Distinctio XXII: Distinction XXII
Chapter 1 (90).
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The difference among the names we use when speaking of God. After what was said, we should discuss the diversity of names used when speaking of the ineffable Unity and Trinity, and then show in what ways something is said of it.
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“Let us chiefly hold this: certain names belong distinctly to the individual persons, as Augustine says in book VIII of On the Trinity, and are said only of individual persons; others signify the unity of essence and are said both of each individually and of all together; still others are said of God figuratively and by analogy.” Thus Ambrose says in book II of On the Trinity: “For faith to shine more purely, a threefold distinction seems necessary. Some names clearly show the property of deity; some express the manifest truth of divine majesty; others are said of God figuratively and by analogy. Generation, Son, Word, and the like indicate property; wisdom, power, truth, and the like indicate eternal unity; splendor, character, mirror, and the like indicate likeness.”
Chapter 2 (91).
In addition to what was said, there are names that apply to God temporally and are said relatively. Some names, Augustine says in book V of On the Trinity, apply to God in time and are said relative to the creature. Some are said of all the persons, such as Lord, Creator, and refuge; others not of all, such as given, given-to, and sent.
Chapter 3 (92).
He adds something about the name “Trinity.” There is also one name that is not said of any person individually but of all together, namely “Trinity”; it is not said according to substance but, as it were, signifies a collective plurality of persons.
Chapter 4 (93).
Other names that apply to God temporally but are not said relatively. There are also names that apply to God in time but are not said relatively, such as incarnate, made human, and the like. We have therefore assigned six differences among the names we use when speaking of God; each must now be treated.
Chapter 5 (94).
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Names that properly belong to individual persons are said relatively; those that signify the unity of essence are said in relation to themselves and are said both of each person and of all together, and in the singular rather than plural in the aggregate. Names that properly belong to individual persons are said relatively to one another, such as Father and Son, and the gift of both, the Holy Spirit; names that signify the unity of essence are said in relation to themselves. Such names are said substantially, both commonly of all the persons and individually of each, and in the singular rather than plural in the aggregate: God, good, powerful, great, and the like. Names said relatively are not said substantially.
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Augustine says in book V of On the Trinity: “Whatever is said in relation to itself is said substantially of that most excellent and divine sublimity is said; but whatever is said in relation to something is said not substantially, but relatively. The force of the same substance in the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is so great that whatever is said of each in relation to himself is taken in the singular, not in the plural, in the aggregate. We say that the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God; this is said substantially, as no one doubts. Yet we do not say that this Trinity is three gods, but one God. The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are each great, yet they are not three great ones but one great one. Likewise each is omnipotent, yet they are not three omnipotent ones but one omnipotent one. Whatever is said of God in relation to himself is said similarly of each person and together of the Trinity, not in the plural but in the singular. Since for God to be is not one thing and to be great another, but his being is the same as his greatness, just as we do not say three essences, so we do not say three greatnesses, but one essence and one greatness.”
1 om. MNX, add. interl. V. 14 quaedam] om. BOPX. 16 veritatem] eodd.; unitatem] Ambr.]
3. God is great by the greatness which he himself is; the same is to be said of goodness and everything said substantially. “God is not great by a greatness which is other than what he is, as though he participated in it; otherwise that greatness would be greater than God. Nothing is greater than God, so he is great by the greatness which he is. Therefore we do not say three greatnesses but one greatness, nor three great ones but one great one. God is not great by participation in greatness, but by himself as great, because he is his own greatness. The same must be said of God’s goodness, eternity, omnipotence, and everything that can be substantially predicated of God, said of him properly rather than figuratively and by analogy—if anything can properly be said of him by human speech.”
4. He has plainly taught that names signifying the unity of divine majesty are said of God in relation to himself, without relation, and are said commonly of all the persons and separately of each, being taken in the singular rather than plural in the aggregate. Names that properly belong to individual persons are said relatively, not substantially. “Whatever is properly said of an individual person in the Trinity,” Augustine says, “is in no way said in relation to itself, but to another person or to the creature; and therefore it is manifestly said relatively, not substantially.”
4 trp. MVX. 5 Deus] et add. BTVWX. 20 qua] quae BENOEX.]