Sentences, Books I–II

Chapter 1 (72).

Here we treat the equality of the three persons. Now that we have briefly indicated, as our ability allowed, the co-eternity of the three persons, something remains to be said about their equality. For the Catholic faith asserts the three persons to be co-eternal and likewise co-equal. The Son is equal to the Father in all things, and the Holy Spirit is equal to the Father and the Son. For Augustine, briefly explaining how equality is to be understood in his book On Faith to Peter, teaches: "None of these precedes another in eternity, exceeds another in greatness, or surpasses another in power; for, insofar as the unity of the divine nature is concerned, the Father is neither earlier nor greater than the Son or the Holy Spirit, nor is the Son earlier or greater than the Holy Spirit. For what the Son is, existing from the Father's nature, is eternal and without beginning; and what the Holy Spirit is, proceeding from the nature of the Father and the Son, is eternal and without beginning. Therefore we rightly believe and say that the three are one God, because the three persons have one eternity, one immensity, and one divinity by nature." Augustine has briefly assigned the point on which the equality of the three persons consists: namely, that none surpasses another in eternity, greatness, or power. ¹

² consistit MV, constat L.]

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Chapter 2 (73).

1. That eternity, greatness, and power in God are one, although they are posited as though distinct. Although these are enumerated as though distinct, in God they are nevertheless one and the same, namely the simple and immutable divine essence.

2. That greatness is God's essence. Hence Augustine says in Book VII of The Trinity⁷: "He is not great by one thing and God by another, but he is great by the same thing by which he is God; for it is not one thing for him to be great and another to be God. His greatness is the same as his power, and his essence the same as his greatness." The Father and the Son, then, are together one essence and one greatness.

3. That God's power is God. God's power too is therefore the divine essence. Hence Augustine says in Book VII of the Confessions⁸: "The will and power of God is God himself."

4. That God's eternity is God. God's eternity too is the divine essence. Augustine shows this in his exposition of the Psalm⁹ From generation to generation are your years, saying: "There is a generation of generations that does not pass away, gathered from all generations, that is, the saints. In it will be the years of God that do not pass away, that is, God's eternity. For God's years are not one thing and he another; rather, God's years are God's eternity, and eternity itself is God's substance, having nothing changeable."

5. Let us hold firmly, then, that the one and same thing—that is, the divine essence—is God's eternity, power, and greatness; nevertheless Scripture is accustomed to set these and similar things forth as though distinct. In these words Augustine has briefly gathered the equality of the three persons: "Because one does not surpass another in eternity, greatness, or power."

6. Above he treated eternity. That none of the three persons surpasses another in eternity was shown above¹⁰, where the co-eternity of the three persons was indicated.

¹¹ et add. BMRTVW; 16 generationum] et generationem MTX, corr. in generationum T.]

¹²

¹³

Chapter 3 (74).

1. Here he treats greatness, by which none of the persons surpasses another. It remains now to show that one person does not surpass another in greatness or power; let us first consider greatness.

2. That one person is not greater than another, nor are two anything greater than one, nor three than two or one. It must therefore be known that the Father is not greater than the Son, nor the Father or the Son greater than the Holy Spirit; nor are two persons together anything greater than one, nor are three together anything greater than two; nor is the essence greater in three than in two, or in two than in one, because it is wholly in each. Hence John Damascene¹⁴ says: "We confess that the whole nature of the Godhead is perfectly in each of its hypostases, that is, persons: wholly in the Father, wholly in the Son, and wholly in the Holy Spirit; and therefore the Father is perfect God, the Son perfect God, and the Holy Spirit perfect God."

Chapter 4 (75).

1. How the Father is said to be in the Son, the Son in the Father, the Holy Spirit in both, and each in each. Hence the Father is said to be in the Son, the Son in the Father, the Holy Spirit in both, and each in each. Hence Augustine says in On Faith to Peter¹⁵: "Because of the natural unity, the whole Father is in the Son and the Holy Spirit, and the whole Holy Spirit is in the Father and the Son. None of them is outside any of the others, because of the unity of the divine nature." Here he opens up to some extent—for the mystery cannot be fully disclosed to a human being—by what understanding each person is said to be wholly in the others.

2. Hence Hilary too, investigating these matters more deeply in Book III of The Trinity¹⁶, says: "The Lord's statement, when he says¹⁷, I am in the Father, and the Father is in me, brings obscurity to many, and not without reason. For the capacity of human understanding cannot grasp the nature of this statement, nor can any human comparison provide an example for divine matters. But what is unintelligible to a human being is possible for God. We must therefore recognize and understand what this means: I am in the Father and the Father is in me—if we can comprehend it as it is—so that what is thought impossible by the nature of things may be attained by the reason of divine truth." "The Father, then, is in the Son and the Son in the Father: the perfect fullness of divinity is in both." "For the fullness of deity is in the Son: what is in the Father is in the Son; what is in the unbegotten is in the begotten. One is from the other, and both are one": "namely, he who has nothing that is not also in the one from whom he is." "Not two in one, but one in the other, because there is nothing different in either," "so that both may be one in our faith, not one person; we confess neither the same person in both nor something else, because the birth of God from God permits neither that the begotten be the same person nor that he be something else," "we therefore confess in both the same likeness of power and fullness of divinity, because the Truth says: I am in the Father and the Father is in me. For the Son has received all things from the Father"; "for if he received a part of the same one who begot him, neither would be perfect: for the part from which he came would be lacking in him, and there would not be fullness in one constituted from a portion. Neither, then, would be perfect if the one who begot him lost his fullness, nor if the one born did not attain his own."

3. "Let us therefore confess that the Father is in the Son and the Son in the Father, God in God," as the same Hilary says in Book VII of The Trinity, "not through the conjunction of two suitable kinds, nor through the grafted nature of a more capacious substance, but through the united likeness of nature, through the birth of a living nature from living nature: while the thing does not differ, while birth from God does not degenerate from the nature of God, while something other than God is not born from God, while there is nothing new, nothing alien, nothing separable in these." These words show, insofar as human weakness permits, the sense in which Christ said that he is in the Father and the Father in him.

¹⁸ excedat MRT; 17 et om. OPW; 20 naturalem] naturae BW, corr. in naturae V; 21 totusque] totus quoque NORW.]

¹⁹

²⁰

²¹ prestabat MOPT; quod corr. OT; inintelligibile] intelligibile BEMNOPV, corrected in the interlinear; in- added in the interlinear by NOV; non added by BLMNORWX; 18 qui] quod OP; 25 viventis] naturae add. BL²TVW; 28 verbis] patet add. B, intelligi potest add. N; 31 infirmitas] intelligi POTR.]

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4. The Holy Spirit's being in both, and each person being in each, is understood in the same sense: namely, because the same fullness of divinity and united likeness of nature is in each. For the divine nature is not greater in one of these persons than in another; these three persons have one undivided nature. Therefore one is said to be in another, as was stated above.

5. Ambrose, too, opening up the meaning of the foregoing words for us, says in his commentary on the Second Epistle to the Corinthians: "By this it is understood that the Father is in the Son and the Son in the Father, because their substance is one: there is unity wherever there is no diversity." — By the testimonies of three illustrious men—Augustine, Hilary, and Ambrose—converging on the same point, the faithful who wish to believe are shown, through the revelation of the Holy Spirit speaking in them, how it should be understood—yet as through a mirror and in an enigma—when the Father is said to be in the Son, or the Son in the Father, or the Holy Spirit in both.

6. He returns to the subject he had begun, namely to show that one does not surpass another in greatness. But now let us return to our purpose and continue what we began, showing that none of the three persons surpasses another in greatness, because none is greater than the others, nor are two anything greater than one, nor three than two: "nor is God greater than each of them, because each is perfect, and that perfection has no room to grow."

³¹ eorum BTVWX. 27 Rubric omitted in PRW.]

³²

³³

Cap. 5–6 (76–77).

1. That none of the persons is a part in the Trinity. None of the three persons is a part of God or of the divine essence, because each of them is true and complete God, and the whole and complete divine essence is in each; therefore none of them is a part in the Trinity.

2. Augustine states and answers the position held by the heretic. Hence Augustine says in Book II Against Maximinus the heretic: "You suppose that God the Father with the Son and the Holy Spirit cannot be one God; for you fear that the Father is a part of one God constituted from three. Do not fear this: there is no division into parts in the unity of the Godhead. The one God is the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—that is, the Trinity itself is one God." can be a part of the Trinity. For the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are three persons, and these three, because they have one substance, are one, and supremely one, where there is no diversity of natures and no diversity of wills. For if they were one by nature but not by agreement, they would not be supremely one; and if they were different by nature, they would not be one. These three, then, who are one because of the ineffable union of the Godhead by which they are ineffably joined, are one God. Therefore no one of the three can be a part of the Trinity. In the Trinity, which is God, the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God; and together these three are one God. Nor is one of this Trinity a third part; nor are two anything greater there than one, nor are all greater than each, because greatness is spiritual, not bodily. Let the one who can grasp this grasp it³⁴; but let the one who cannot, believe, and pray that he may understand what he believes. For true is what is said through the Prophet³⁵: Unless you believe, you will not understand." In these words he plainly shows the undivided greatness of the three persons.

Augustine's argument against the heretic, by which he shows that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are not parts of the Trinity. Again, in the same work³⁶: "You said that one God is not composed of parts, and you want this understood of the Father. He is, you say, an unbegotten, simple power. Yet in this simple power you seem to mention many things when you say: God begot God, the good begot the good, the wise the wise, the merciful the merciful, the powerful the powerful. Are goodness, wisdom, mercy, and power therefore parts of one power which you said is simple? If you say that they are parts, then the simple power consists of parts; and since, according to your definition, this simple power is one God, you find that God is composed of parts. ‘I do not,’ he says. ‘Then they are not parts. If, then, in the one person of the Father you find those things that seem many, but do not find parts because he is one simple power, how much more are the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit one God because of their undivided divinity, three persons because of the property of each, and not parts of one God because of the perfection of each? The Father is power, the Son is power, and the Holy Spirit is power. You speak truly in this; but when you refuse to have the power begotten from Power and the Power proceeding from Power possess the same nature, you speak falsely; you speak against the true and catholic faith.’ These words plainly teach that those three persons are not parts of God or the divine essence, that none of them is a part of the Trinity, and that none is greater than the others."

³⁷ quare tres personae dicantur summe unum rubricated before the text in NX; 15 spiritualis] spiritalis OPR; 33 Deus] est added in MNRWX (Augustine).]

³⁸

Chapter 7 (78).

1. When we say that the three persons are one essence, we do not predicate it as a genus of species, nor as a species of individuals, because essence is not a genus and the persons species, nor essence a species and the persons individuals. Here it must be added that the equality of the three persons and their undivided greatness are such that, when we say that the three persons are one essence or substance, we predicate it neither as a genus of species nor as a species of individuals; for the divine essence is not a genus and the three persons species, nor the divine essence a species and the three persons individuals.

2. He first proves that it is not said as a genus of species. Augustine clearly demonstrates this by probable and irrefragable arguments in Book VII of The Trinity³⁹, saying: "If essence is a genus and person a species, as some think, then three substances ought to be called, just as three persons are called; just as, when animal is a genus and horse a species, three horses are called three animals. For species is not used there in the plural and genus in the singular, as though one said, ‘three horses are one animal’; rather, just as three horses are named by a specific name, so three animals are named by a general name." Since we confess the three persons to be one essence, not three essences, whereas three horses are called three animals and not one, it is clear that essence does not signify a genus, nor person a species.

3. Here he proves that it is not said as a species of individuals. "But if they say that person does not signify a species by its name, but something singular …"

⁴⁰ speciem BLOPWX. 17 probable arguments transposed in LOPR. 24 general name transposed in LNV.]

⁴¹

Cap. 7, no. 1: Peter Abelard, Theologia «Scholarium», II, 10 (PL 178, 1057 D); Augustine, The Trinity, VII, ch. 4, no. 8 (PL 42, 941; CCL 50, 257ff.); Hugh, On the Sacraments, II, 1, 4 (PL 176, 377 D); and individual, and by the name “essence” a species is understood: so that a person is not called as one says “man,” but as one says “this man,” such as Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, or anyone else who could even be pointed out as present with a finger. Thus the same reasoning will also refute them. For just as Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are called three individuals, so too three men and three animals. Why, then, if we discuss these matters according to genus, species, and individual, are the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit not called three essences just as they are three persons?”

4. He proves the same point in another way. Augustine also proves the same point in another way, namely, that the divine essence is neither a genus nor the persons a species, or that the essence is not a species and the persons its individuals. “One essence,” he says, “does not have species, just as one animal does not have species. Therefore the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are not three species of one essence; the divine essence, therefore, is not a genus. But neither is the divine essence a species and the persons individuals, as man is a species and Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are individuals. For if the essence is a species, as man is, then just as one man is not said to be Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, so one essence will not be said to be three persons. We do not therefore speak of these things according to genus and species.”

Chapter 8 (79).

The three persons are not said to be one essence according to a material cause either. It must also be noted that the divine essence is not the matter of the three persons, as Augustine teaches in the same work: “as though, according to one common and identical matter, three persons were said to be one essence, just as, if three statues were made from the same gold, we would say that the three statues were one gold. But we do not say that the Trinity, that is, the three persons, is one essence and one God in this way, as though three things subsisted from one matter. For among equal statues there is more gold in the three together than in any one, and there is less gold in one than in two. But in that essence of the Trinity it is in no way so.” Therefore we do not say that the three persons are one essence according to a material cause, as three statues are said to be one gold.

⁴² ratione OPX,]

1. On the Trinity, VII, ch. 6, no. 11 (PL 42, 944s; CCL 50, 263, 265). 2. Ibid. (PL 42, 944s; CCL 50, 264). Cap. 8: Cf. P. Abael., Theologia “Scholarium”, II, 15 (PL 178, 1073 D)

Chapter 9 (80).

1. The three persons are not said to be one essence in the way that three men are one nature or of one nature. To this it must also be added that we do not say that the three persons are one essence, or of one essence, as Augustine says in the same work, “as we say that three men of the same sex, the same bodily constitution, and the same disposition of soul are one nature or of one nature. For in these things one man is not as much as three men together, and two men are something more than one man, just as we said is the case with statues. But in God it is not so: the essence of the Father and Son together is not greater than that of the Father alone or the Son alone, but those three persons together are equal to each one.”

2. It is clear from what has been said that the three persons are called the divine essence neither according to a material cause, as three statues are one gold; nor according to a likeness of composition, as three men are of one nature; nor as a genus is predicated of species or a species of individuals—that is, as a containing thing of contained things, or a greater thing of lesser things.

3. Things that seem contrary to what was said. What certain Catholic interpreters of Sacred Scripture handed down in their writings seems contrary to these points; in those writings they appear to signify that the divine essence is something common and universal, like a species, whereas the three persons are three particulars, three individuals differing numerically. Hence John of Damascus, a great teacher among the Greeks, says in the book he wrote on the Trinity, which Pope Eugene had translated: “Common and universal things are predicated of the particular subjects belonging to them. The common thing, therefore, is substance, while the particular thing is hypostasis, that is, person. But the particular is so called not because it has a part of nature, but because it is particular in number, like an atom, that is, an individual. Attend carefully! For hypostases are said to differ in number, not in nature.” Again in the same work: “Substance signifies the common and encompassing species of species-similar persons, such as God and man; hypostasis, however, indicates an individual, namely the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, Peter, Paul, and the like.” Behold, he plainly says that substance is universal and hypostasis particular; that God is a species like man; that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are individuals like Peter and Paul; and that they differ numerically. These statements seem wholly contrary to the propositions of Augustine. What, then, shall we say to them?

⁴³ adiciendum OP; 19 quoddam] quiddam MN; 20 sint] sunt OPT, om. M.]

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⁴⁶

4. He says that Augustine’s words must be held. We can and must say this: what Augustine taught above must be held without any hesitation.

5. What John says can indeed be understood, and he shows how. Although what is said here may, on the surface of the wording, seem to sound like something alien to the faith, it can nevertheless be rightly understood, and it requires a pious and highly intelligent reader. In explaining it, I would rather listen silently to others than, by speaking, provide ill-willed people an occasion for detraction.

6. In what sense he said that God’s substance is a species or universal and the persons individuals. It seems to me that this can be understood as follows. When he says, “substance is common and hypostasis is particular,” he did not take these terms, when they are spoken of God, in the sense in which they are taken in philosophical discipline; rather, he spoke by analogy with what philosophers say. Thus, just as there the common or universal is what is predicated of many, while the particular or individual is what is predicated of one alone, so here substance was called universal because it is said of all the persons together and of each separately, while each person is called particular because it is predicated neither commonly of the others nor individually of any other. He therefore called substance universal and the persons particulars or individuals because of the similarity of predication. For the same reason he also called the one divine essence “the common and encompassing species of persons similar in species”: for just as the species “man” is predicated of its individuals, such as Peter, Paul, and others, and they do not differ in that species but agree in it, so God is predicated of the three persons, who do not differ in divinity but agree in every respect. John, therefore, considering this similarity between eternal and temporal things, transferred to eternal things the names of universality and particularity, which properly belong to temporal things. Augustine, however, seeing greater dissimilarity than similarity between the things just mentioned, He removed those names from the excellence of the Trinity.

Chapter 10 (81).

⁴⁷ accipit MNR.]

⁴⁸

1. In what sense he said that the persons differ in number. When John says that the hypostases differ in number, not in nature, he speaks most truly and without any difficulty when he says that they do not differ in nature; but when he says that they differ in number, one must be careful how this is understood. For things are said to differ in number in different ways.

2. The ways in which things are said to differ in number, and the way in which this can apply to the persons. Things are said to differ in number when they differ in such a way that this is not that, nor anything that is that or is in that—such as Socrates and Plato and similar things, which philosophers call individuals or particulars. In this sense the three persons cannot be said to differ in number. Things are also said to differ in number when, in enumeration or counting, they are not joined to one another but are distinguished from one another, as when, speaking of certain things, we say: one, two, three; and perhaps John said that the hypostases, that is, the persons, differ in number in this sense. For we can say: the Father is one, and the Father and Son are two, and the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are three; and likewise: this person is one, this and that are two, and this, that, and another are three. Nevertheless, it is more fitting to say that those three persons are distinguished only by their properties; their distinction according to properties will be treated in what follows.

3. Let us now return to what we began, repeating what has been said so that, “by turning it over more often, it may become more familiar.”

⁴⁹ numeratione BOP, corr. ex numerat T.]

⁵⁰ ad OPRW.]

1 In Dist. 26. 2 August., On the Trinity, VIII, no. 1 (PL 42, 947; CCL 50, 268).

Cap. 10: Peter Abelard, Theologia christiana, III (PL 178, 1250 D); Theologia “Scholarium”, II, 10; Sic et non, ch. 8 (PL 178, 1057s; 1359–1364).

Chapter 11 (82).

1. That one person is not greater than another, nor the three together greater than one, and he proves this by Catholic reasoning. We must therefore know, as Augustine says in book VIII of On the Trinity⁵¹, that “there is such equality in the Trinity that not only is the Father not greater than the Son, but the Father and Son together are not something greater than the Holy Spirit, nor is any person something less than the Trinity itself.” — How this is so must, if possible, be demonstrated in some way. “As far as the Creator himself helps us,” Augustine says in the same work⁵², “let us attend to how, in this Trinity, two or three persons are not something greater than one of them.”

2. He uses a very subtle argument to show that this is so. “What⁵³ is called great there is not great for any reason other than that it truly is; for there greatness itself is truth, and truth is essence. Therefore there is nothing greater there that is not more true. But the Father and Son together are not more true than the Father alone or the Son; therefore the two together are not something greater than either singly. And since the Holy Spirit too is equally true, the Father and Son together are not something greater than he, because they are not more true.”

3. He proves the same point in another way. Again⁵⁴: “In the essence of truth, that is, what is true being is being, and what is being is great being; therefore great being is true being. Whatever is equally true there is equally great; therefore whatever has no more truth there has no more greatness. What is not more true does not have more truth; but one person is not more true than another, nor are two more true than one, nor three than one; and the Trinity itself is not something greater than any one person there, but is as great as each. For where truth itself is greatness, that is not greater which is not more true.”

Apparatus, p. 170: 3–4 aequalitatem esse transposed in NRX; 10 sunt] sint BANTVWX; 24 persona] quam added in LNRVWX; 26 maius aliquid transposed in OPV.

Chapter 12 (83).

1. God must not be called triple but triune. Therefore, although God is called triune, he must not be called triple; there is no triplicity where there is supreme unity and undifferentiated equality. Hence Augustine says in book VI of On the Trinity⁵⁵: “Because God is Trinity, he must not therefore be thought triple; otherwise the Father alone or the Son alone would be less than the Father and Son together.” “Since⁵⁶, then, the Father alone, the Son alone, or the Holy Spirit alone is as great as the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit together, God must in no way be called triple. For the Father with the Son and Holy Spirit is not a greater God than each of them individually, because that perfection has no increase. The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are perfect, and each of them is perfect God; therefore he should be called Trinity rather than triple.”

2. It is not so in bodily things as it is in the Trinity. “In bodily⁵⁷ things one is not as much as three together, and two things are more than one. In the Trinity, however, the one person is as much as the three together, and the two are as much as the one. And in themselves they are infinite,” because there is no limit to their greatness⁵⁸. Thus what we said above is disclosed: “how⁵⁹ each is in each and all are in each, and each is in all and all are in all, and there is one in all and one is all.” — We have now sufficiently shown how in the Trinity no person surpasses another in greatness.

⁶⁰

Cap. 12: Cf. P. Abael., Theologia “Scholarium”, II, 10 (PL 178, 1057 B–D); and Summa sententiarum, I, 8 (PL 171, 1081 A; 176, 55 A).