Sentences, Books I–II

Chapter 1 (21).

1. On the truth, immutability, and simplicity of God’s essence. We must now treat the truth or proper nature, immutability, and simplicity of the divine nature, substance, or essence.

2. «God, then, as Augustine says in Book V of De Trinitate¹, is without doubt a substance—or, if this is a better name, an essence, which the Greeks call ousia. For just as “wisdom” is named from “being wise,” and “knowledge” from “knowing,” so “essence” is named from “being.” And who is more than the one who said to his servant Moses²: I am who I am, and, “You shall say to the children of Israel: He who is has sent me to you”».

3. He alone is truly and properly called essence whose essence knows neither past nor future. Hence Jerome, writing to Marcella, says³: «God alone, who has no beginning, truly holds the name of essence, because in comparison with him who truly is, since he is immutable, mutable things are as though they were not. For what is said to “have been” is not, and what is said “will be” is not yet. God, however, alone is, who knows neither “having been” nor “being about to be.” God alone, therefore, truly is, and compared with his essence our being is not».

4. One must ask how Jerome’s words are to be understood. We must carefully consider how Jerome’s words are to be understood, namely, «God alone is, and does not know having been», as if one could not say of God «he was» or «he will be», but only «he is»; for we frequently find it written of him⁴: «He was from eternity, he was always, and he will be forever», and the like. Hence it seems that one should not say of God only «he was», «he is», or «he will be». For if one said only «he was», one would think that he had ceased to be; if only «he is», one would think that he had not always existed but had begun to exist; if only «he will be», one would think he does not exist now. Therefore let it be said that he always was, is, and will be, so that it is understood that he neither began nor ceased, neither ceases nor will cease to be.

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5. Augustine says this in his commentary on John⁶: «Although “is” is properly said of an everlasting thing, in our usage “was” and “will be” are also rightly said. “Was,” because it never ceased; “will be,” because it will never be absent; “is,” because it always is. It did not pass away, as though it did not remain; it will not arise, as though it did not exist. Since our speech varies according to tenses, words of every tense are truly said of him who was absent from no time, is absent from no time, and will be absent from no time. It is therefore no wonder that Truth, speaking of the Spirit of truth, used the future tense⁷: Whatever he will hear, he will speak. He will hear, that is, from him from whom he proceeds. For him, hearing is knowing; it is also being: therefore from him from whom his essence comes comes his hearing, that is, his knowledge, which is nothing other than his essence. He therefore said “he will hear” of what he heard and hears, that is, what he always knew, knows, and will know». Behold, Augustine here says that words of every tense are said of God, but «is» properly.

6. Here he explains how these words are to be understood. What Jerome says, then, is to be understood thus: «He does not know having been or being about to be, but only being»; that is, when it is said of God that he was or will be, we must not understand that he has passed away or is still to come, but that he simply is, without any temporal change. Although verbs of being in different tenses are said of God, such as «was», «will be», «is», and «was being», they do not then distinguish temporal changes—past, future, imperfect past, perfect past, or pluperfect past—but simply indicate the essence or existence of divinity.

7. God alone, then, is properly called essence or being. Hence Hilary says in Book VII of De Trinitate⁸: «Being is not an accident in God, but subsisting truth, abiding cause, and the property of natural kind».

⁹ quod LVWX. 11 legitur] ergo CLRTVW. 15 etiam] est COPV. 20 Rubrica omitted in MPRW. 27 praeteritum] Hilarius. Quia non coepit esse sed Deus semper vere fuit, rubric added in the margin by CLWX.]

Chapter 2 (22).

On immutability here. The essence of God alone is also properly called immutable, because it neither changes nor can be changed. Hence Augustine says in Book V of De Trinitate¹⁰: «Other essences or substances admit accidents, by which great or any other change may occur in them; nothing of this kind can happen to God. Therefore the only substance or essence that is God is immutable, and being belongs to it most truly and supremely. For what changes does not preserve its very being; and what can be changed, even if it is not changed, can cease to be what it was. Therefore only what not merely does not change, but cannot change at all, is most truly said to be», that is, the substance of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Hence the Apostle, speaking of God, says¹¹: Who alone has immortality.

2. What true immortality is, which belongs to the Creator alone. For as Augustine says in De Trinitate¹², «since the soul is said, and is, to be immortal in a certain way, the Apostle would not say “he alone has immortality” unless true immortality were immutability, which no creature can possess, since it belongs to the Creator alone». Hence James says¹³: With whom there is no change or shadow of alteration; and David¹⁴: You will change them, and they will be changed; but you are the same. Therefore Augustine, in Super Genesim¹⁵, says that God is moved neither through places nor through times, whereas a creature is moved through times and places. To be moved through time is to be changed through affections. God, however, cannot be changed by place or affection; through the Prophet he says¹⁶: I am God, and I do not change. He alone is immutable, and therefore is rightly said alone to have immortality.

3. «For in every mutable nature, as Augustine says in Against Maximinus¹⁷, death is change itself, because it makes something in it no longer be what it was. Hence the human soul itself, which is called immortal because in its own manner it never ceases to live, nevertheless has a certain death of its own. If it lived justly and sins, it dies to justice; if it was sinful and is justified, it dies to sin, to say nothing of its other changes, which it would take too long to discuss now. The nature of the heavenly creatures could also die, because it could sin. For angels sinned and became demons, whose prince is the devil; and those who did not sin could have sinned. If grace is bestowed on any rational creature so that it cannot sin, this is not proper to its own nature, but is God’s grace. And therefore God alone, as the Apostle says¹⁸, has immortality: by his own nature, not by anyone’s grace, he neither could nor can be changed by any conversion, nor could nor will he sin through any change».

¹⁹ of God L, omitted in P, added in O², transposed before De in MN. 7 est Deus transposed in BCMNW. 9 etiam] et LNX. 12 and therefore] therefore LRX. 14 Rubric omitted in LRW. || For as] Hence and LNX. 16 he would say] it would truly be said P, the Apostle added in BCRV, added in the margin in O²W². 24 I am God] I am added in OP.]

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4. «Therefore, as Augustine says in Book I of De Trinitate²¹, it is necessary, though difficult, to contemplate and know God’s substance making mutable things without any change in itself, and creating temporal things without any temporal movement in itself». The divine essence alone, then, is truly and properly immutable: without changing itself, it established all natures.

Chapter 3 (23).

Here he treats simplicity.—Why a creature is manifold and not simple. That same essence alone is properly and truly simple, with no diversity, variation, or multiplicity of parts, accidents, or any forms whatsoever. To learn how that substance is simple, as Augustine teaches in Book VI of De Trinitate²², «consider first why every creature is manifold and in no way truly simple», first the bodily creature, then the spiritual.

Chapter 4 (24).

1. Here he shows why the bodily creature is manifold. «A bodily creature certainly consists of parts, so that one part is larger and another smaller, and the whole is greater than any part. In every body, size is one thing, color another, and shape another. For its color and shape can remain the same even when its size is reduced; and its shape and size can remain the same when its color changes. Thus the nature of a body is shown to be manifold and in no way simple».

²³ cuique OP. 8–9 rationabili] rationali LMNRX. 22–23 te docet transposed in OPX. 23 primo] primum LNRX.]

2. Here he shows how the spiritual creature is manifold and not simple. «A spiritual creature, such as the soul, is simple in comparison with a body, but without comparison with a body it is manifold and not simple. It is called simple in relation to the body because it is not spread by its bulk through space, but is wholly in each body and wholly in the whole body and in each of its parts. Therefore, when something happens in any small part of the body that the soul perceives, even if it does not happen in the whole body, the whole soul perceives it, because nothing of it is hidden from the whole soul. Yet there is no true simplicity even in the soul itself. For since being skillful is one thing and being dull another, being keen another and being retentive another, desire one thing, fear another, joy another, and sorrow another; and since these and innumerable other such things can be found in the nature of the soul, some without others and some to a greater or lesser degree, it is clear that its nature is not simple but manifold. For nothing simple is mutable, whereas every creature is mutable»; therefore no creature is truly simple.

3. «God, however, though he is spoken of in many ways, is truly and supremely simple. For he is called great, good, wise, blessed, true, and whatever else it seems fitting to call him; but his greatness is the same as his wisdom, for he is great not in bulk but in power; and his goodness is the same as his wisdom, greatness, and truth. In him, being blessed is not one thing and being great, wise, true, or good another, nor is being itself another thing».

Chapter 5 (25).

How God, though simple, is nevertheless spoken of in many ways. Here we must carefully note why Augustine says that God alone is truly simple, yet is spoken of in many ways. — He says this not because of a diversity of accidents or parts, but because of the diversity and multitude of the names said of God. Though these names are many, they signify one thing, namely, the divine nature. When they are said of that immutable and eternal substance, incomparably simpler than the human mind, they are not understood in the same way as when they are said of creatures. Hence Augustine says in Book VI of De Trinitate²⁴: «For God, being is the same as being strong and being wise; whatever you say of that simple multiplicity or multiple simplicity signifies his substance. But for the human mind, being is not the same as being strong, prudent, or just: for the mind can exist without having any of these virtues».

²⁵ est added in OPR. 3 minuta] mutata BCW. 11 fit] sit LOW. 16 possintque] possuntque NOPR. 23 indigne dici transposed in OP. 29 sit simplex transposed in BCLMTVW.]

Chapter 6 (26).

God’s simplicity is so great that he is subject to none of the categories. That there is no diversity of accidents or any mutability at all in the nature of divinity, but perfect simplicity, Augustine shows in Book V of De Trinitate²⁶, saying: «Let us understand God, as far as we can, as good without quality, great without quantity, creator without need, present without position, containing all things without possession, everywhere without place, everlasting without time, making mutable things without any change in himself, and suffering nothing. Whoever thinks of God in this way, even if he cannot yet discover entirely what he is, should nevertheless piously beware, as far as he can, of thinking anything about him that is not so». If you attend closely, these words and the foregoing show that the categories of dialectical art do not at all apply to God’s nature, which is subject to no accidents.

Chapter 7 (27).

God is called substance improperly, not properly. Hence God is not properly called substance, as Augustine shows in Book VII of De Trinitate²⁷: just as essence is named from being, so we call something substance from subsisting, if indeed it is fitting to say that God subsists. This is rightly understood of things in which what is said to be in a subject is contained in a subject, as color or shape is in a body. A body subsists and is therefore a substance. Mutable things, then, are not properly called substances, nor are simple things. But if God subsists, so that he can properly be called substance, something inheres in him as in a subject, and he is not simple. It is impious to say that God subsists and is subject to his goodness, so that this goodness is not substance, or rather essence, and God himself is not his goodness but has it in him as in a subject. It is therefore clear that God is called substance improperly, so that a more familiar term may convey essence, which is truly and properly said; perhaps only God ought to be called essence. For he alone truly is, because he is immutable».

Chapter 8 (28).

1. That there is nothing in God that is not God. The simplicity and purity of this essence are so great that there is nothing in it that is not itself; what has and what is had are the same. Hence Hilary says in Book VII of De Trinitate²⁸: «God, who is life, does not subsist from composites; he who is power is not held together from weakness; he who is light is not joined from darkness; he who is spirit is not formed from unlike things. Everything that is in him is one». — The same author in Book VII of De Trinitate²⁹ says: «God is not made in the human way from composites, so that one thing in him is what he has and another the one who has it; rather, he is wholly life, that is, perfect and infinite nature, not composed of unlike things, but living throughout himself». On this same matter Boethius says in Book I of De Trinitate³⁰ says: «Therefore that is truly one in which there is no number, nothing in itself other than what it is; for it cannot become a subject». ...nothing in itself other than what it is; for it cannot become a subject». Augustine also says in De fide ad Petrum³¹: «There is nothing that is not substance, as though one thing there were that underlies and another that accrues to substance; rather, whatever can be understood there is substance. These things can indeed be said and readily believed, but they cannot be seen at all». — The same author in Book XV of De Trinitate³²: «The nature of each thing is such that what has something is itself what it has, as in an immutable and simple substance». Hence Isidore says³³: «God is called simple either because he does not lose what he has, or because he is not one thing and what is in him another».

³⁴ aut OP. 19 formalis] formabilis BHil. 21 Sicut] Sicuti OP.]

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2. Although the divine nature is of such great simplicity and purity, there is nevertheless a Trinity of persons in it. Hence Augustine says in Book XI of De civitate Dei³⁷: «We do not call the nature of the highest good simple because only the Father is in it, or only the Son, or only the Holy Spirit—that is, because this is merely a trinity of names, without the subsistence of persons, as the Sabellians thought. Rather, it is called simple because it is what it has, except that each person is spoken of relatively to another and is not that other. For the Father has the Son, to whom he is spoken of relatively, yet he is not the Son; and the Son has the Father, yet he is not the Father. But in what is said of itself, and not of another, it is what it has: as it is said to be living in itself by having life, and that same life is in it. This nature is therefore called simple because it is not one thing that has and another thing that it has, as is the case with other things. For what has a liquid is not itself a liquid, nor is a body color, nor is a soul wisdom».

³⁸ accidit BCLM. 22 in se] ipse LNRV (Augustinus), corr. in ipse T. 25 est sapientia trp. VWX.]

3. Behold, according to the measure of our infirmity, we have assigned to the divine substance its identity, unity, immutability, simplicity, and purity.