Sentences, Books I–II

Chapter 1 (15).

1. Here it is asked whether the Father begot the divine essence or the essence begot the Son, whether essence begot essence, or whether the essence neither begot nor was begotten. After this it is asked whether it should be granted that the Father begot the divine essence, or that the divine essence begot the Son, or that essence begot essence, or whether the divine essence neither begot nor was begotten at all. — In agreement with Catholic interpreters, we say that neither did the Father beget the divine essence, nor did the divine essence beget the Son, nor did the divine essence beget essence. Here by “essence” we mean the divine nature, which is common to the three persons and wholly present in each.

2. The first reason why this is so. We must not say that the Father begot the divine essence because, if the Father were said to have begotten the divine essence, the divine essence would be spoken of relatively to the Father or substituted for a relative term. But if it were spoken of relatively or substituted for a relative term, it would not signify substance. For, as Augustine says in Book V of On the Trinity¹, “what is spoken of relatively does not signify substance.”

3. The second reason. Again, since God the Father is the divine essence, if the essence were his offspring, he would be the begetter of the very thing that he is; thus the same thing would beget itself, which Augustine denies, as we showed above².

4. The third and stronger reason. Again, if the Father is the begetter of the divine essence, and the divine essence exists and is God, then by begetting it the Father exists and is God. Thus it is not what is begotten that is God from the Father; rather, the Father is God because he begets and exists. If this is so, then the begotten is the cause of the begetter—not the begetter of the begotten—so that he may exist and be God. — By a similar argument Augustine proves in Book VII of On the Trinity³ that the Father is not wise by the wisdom he begot, for if he is wise by it, then he exists by it: “For there to be there is the same as to be wise. If existing there is the same as being wise, the Father is not wise through the wisdom he begot. For what else do we mean when we say, ‘for him to be is the same as to be wise,’ except that ‘he exists by that by which he is wise’? Therefore, the cause by which he is wise is also the cause by which he exists. If, then, the wisdom he begot is the cause by which he is wise, it is also the cause by which he exists. But no one would say that wisdom begotten by the Father is the cause by which the Father exists. For what could be more absurd?” Thus, if the Father begot the essence by which he exists, the essence he begot would be the cause of his existence; therefore he did not beget the essence by which he exists. “For in that simplicity,” Augustine says⁴, “since to be wise is no different from to be, the wisdom there is the same as the essence.” Therefore what we say of wisdom we also say of essence. Just as he did not beget the wisdom by which he is wise, so he did not beget the essence by which he exists.

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5. This seems to conflict with what was said. What Augustine says in On Faith to Peter⁷ seems contrary to this: “When God begot the Word, he begot what he himself is—not from nothing, nor from some already made and formed matter, but from himself, what he himself is.” Likewise: “God the Father, who both willed and was able most truly to reveal himself to minds that would know him, begot for the purpose of revealing himself that which he himself is, who begot it.” Behold, in these words he plainly says that God the Father begot that which he himself is. But what he himself is can only be the divine essence; it therefore seems that he begot the divine essence. — We reply that these words are to be understood as follows: “The Father begot from himself that which he himself is,” that is, the Son, who is that which the Father is. For the Son is what the Father is, but the Son is not the one who is the Father.

6. He treats the other parts of the question. Likewise, we must not say that the divine essence begot the Son: since the Son is the divine essence, the Son would already be the thing from which he is begotten, and thus the same thing would beget itself. — We likewise say that the divine essence did not beget essence: since the divine essence is one supreme thing, if the divine essence begot essence, the same thing would beget itself, which is altogether impossible. But the Father alone begot the Son, and the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son.

7. What seems contrary to what has been said. What Augustine says in Book VII of On the Trinity⁸ seems contrary to the foregoing: “For to God, to be is the same as to be wise; hence the Father and Son together are one wisdom, because they are one essence; and each individually is wisdom from wisdom, as essence from essence.” Behold, in these words Augustine plainly says “wisdom from wisdom” and “essence from essence,” where he seems to signify that wisdom begot wisdom and essence begot essence. — The same author says in On Faith to Peter⁹: “Believe Christ, the Son of God, that is, one person of the Trinity, to be true God, and do not doubt that his divinity was born from the nature of the Father.” Here he seems to say that the Son's nature was born from the Father's nature. — The same author also says in Book XV of On the Trinity¹⁰: “The Son is said to be counsel from counsel and will from will, just as substance from substance and wisdom from wisdom.” Here too he seems to say that substance is begotten from substance and wisdom from wisdom.

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8. Resolution of what seems to conflict. We resolve these statements as follows: “Wisdom is from wisdom and substance from substance,” that is, the Son, who is wisdom and substance, is from the Father, who is that same substance and wisdom; and the Son, who is divinity, was born from the Father, who is the divine nature. To express it more clearly, we say that the Son, who is wisdom, is from the Father who is wisdom, and that the Son, who is substance, was begotten from the Father and by the Father who is substance. — Augustine shows in Book VII of On the Trinity¹² that this is how it should be understood, saying: “The Father himself is wisdom, and the Son is called the wisdom of the Father just as he is called the light of the Father: that is, just as light is from light and both are one light, so wisdom from wisdom is to be understood, and both are one wisdom and one essence.” — Likewise: “Christ is called the power and wisdom of God”¹³ because, being from the Father who is power and wisdom, he himself is also power and wisdom, just as he is light from the Father who is light, and himself the fountain of life with God the Father, the fountain of life. The Son, then, is wisdom from the Father who is wisdom, just as the Son is light from the Father who is light, and God the Son from God the Father; each individually is light, God, and wisdom, and together they are one light, one God, and one wisdom.” Behold, in these words Augustine plainly explains the sense in which the foregoing and similar statements are to be understood, such as “substance from substance” or “substance begot substance.”

9. What seems contrary to the foregoing explanation. What Hilary says in Book IV of On the Trinity¹⁴ also seems contrary to this: “The Son possesses nothing that is not born; and the wonder of the honor of the begotten belongs to the honor of the begetter.” Since the Son possesses essence—for the whole divine essence is in him—it therefore seems that the divine essence itself was born. — The same author says in Book V¹⁵: “The birth of God cannot fail to retain the nature from which it proceeded; for what subsists is nothing other than God, since it subsists from no one other than God.” Here he says that God's birth proceeded from the nature, and thus from these words and the foregoing ones it seems that God's nature was both begotten and begetting. — That God's nature, remaining in its own form, assumed the form of bodily weakness.

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10. How the foregoing words of Hilary are to be understood. But because he wishes these words to be understood soundly, he himself says in Book IV: «The meaning of what is said must be gathered from the causes of the speaking, for the thing is not subject to the word, but the word to the thing». These words, then, can be understood thus: «The Son has nothing except what is born», that is, according to his being God, he has nothing except what he received by being born; and by being born he had within himself the nature of the Father, subsisting in him.

11. He confirms the exposition with words of the same author. Hence the same Hilary adds in Book V¹⁷: «The begotten has the same nature as the one who begot him, yet the one who was born is not the one who begot him: for how can he be the same, since he was begotten? But let the one who was begotten subsist in those very things in which the one who begot him is wholly himself, because the one who was begotten is not from elsewhere. And therefore that which subsists in one from one is not referred to another. Thus, in the generation of the Son, immutable God, begetting immutable God, follows his own nature, so to speak; nor does the perfect birth of immutable God from immutable God abandon its nature. Let us therefore understand the nature of God as subsisting in him, since God is in God, and there is no other God besides him who is God, because God himself is God and God is in him». It is therefore taught that the truth of the nature of God the Father is in God the Son, when it is understood that the one who is God is in him. For one is in one, and one is from one.

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12. What is read concerning the Father’s begetting the Son from his substance and the Son’s being of the Father’s substance. It is also said, and frequently read in Sacred Scripture, that the Father begot the Son from his substance. Hence Augustine says in De fide ad Petrum¹⁹: «God the Father, begotten by no God, once begot God the Son from his own nature, without beginning, equal to himself and coeternal in the same divinity by which he himself is naturally eternal». Behold, Augustine here says that the Son was begotten from the Father’s nature. But the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit have one nature. If, then, the Son was begotten from the Father’s nature, he was begotten from the nature of the Son and of the Holy Spirit—or rather, from the nature of the three persons.

13. Augustine also says in Book XV of De Trinitate²⁰ that Christ is the Son of the Father’s substance and begotten from the Father’s substance. He is discussing the Apostle’s words about God the Father: Who rescued us from the power of darkness and transferred us into the kingdom of the Son of his love²¹: «By “the Son of his love,” he says, let nothing else be understood than his beloved Son, the Son of his substance. For the Father’s love, which is ineffably simple in his nature, is nothing other than that very nature and substance, as we have often said and do not weary of repeating; and therefore the Son of his love is none other than the one begotten from his substance». Behold, Augustine here plainly says that the Son was begotten from the Father’s substance and is the Son of the Father’s substance.

14. Augustine likewise asserts that God’s substance begot the Son and that the Son was begotten from the Father’s substance, in Book II Against Maximinus the heretic²², saying: «Full of carnal thoughts, you do not think that God’s substance begets the Son from itself unless it suffers what bodily substance suffers when it begets. You are mistaken, not knowing the Scriptures nor the power of God»²³. For you cannot think of the true Son of God at all if you deny that he was born from the Father’s substance. For he was not already the Son of man and then, by God’s gift, became the Son of God, born from God by grace and not by nature. Or perhaps, although he was not the Son of man, he was nevertheless already some sort of creature, and was changed into the Son of God by God? But none of this is so. Therefore he was born either from nothing or from some substance. But lest we think that you suppose the Son of God to be from nothing, you have affirmed that you do not say the Son of God is from nothing. He is therefore from some substance. And if not from the Father’s, tell us from what. But you cannot find one. Therefore do not hesitate to confess with us that the only-begotten Son of God, Jesus Christ, is of the Father’s substance».

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15. The same author, in the same work²⁵: «We both read²⁶: That we may be in his true Son, Jesus Christ. Tell us, then, whether this true Son of God, distinguished by a certain property from those who are sons by grace, is from no substance or from some substance. “I do not say,” you reply, “that he is from none, lest I say he is from nothing”; therefore he is from some substance. I ask: from which? If he is not from the Father’s substance, seek another. If you find no other, acknowledge the Father’s substance and confess the Son to be homoousios with the Father».

16. Likewise in the same work²⁷: «I confess that God the Father begot wholly incorruptibly, but begot what he himself is. Again I say what must often be said: either the Son of God was born from some substance, or from none. If from none, then from nothing—which you now deny. But if from some substance, and yet not from the Father’s substance, he is not the true Son. If from the Father’s substance, then the Father and Son are of one and the same substance». «You, however, neither wish the Son to be begotten from the Father’s substance, nor yet concede that he is from nothing or from some matter, but from the Father. You do not see how necessary it is that one who is from neither nothing nor any other thing, but from God, can be from nothing other than God’s substance; and that he is what God is, from whom he is—that is, God born from God, because there was no other before him, but he is by nature coeternal with God»²⁸

17. Gathering up the foregoing, he explains the sense in which it should be understood. By the foregoing words it seems to be implied that the divine substance begot the Son, that the Son was begotten from the Father’s substance, that he is a nature coeternal with God, and that the Father begot what he himself is. What he himself is, however, is the divine essence; and thus it can be thought that the divine essence begot. — These words greatly trouble us; I would rather hear from others how they are to be understood than set it forth myself. Yet, to speak without prejudice or rashness, the words can be taken in this sense: «A nature coeternal with God is from God», that is, the Son, coeternal with the Father, is from the Father in such a way that he has the same nature as he, or is of the same nature. — Augustine confirms this sense in the same place²⁹, adding what he had said as an explanation: after saying «A nature coeternal with God is from God», he added: «The Son is no other than that from which he is, that is, he is of one and the same substance».

Then he makes clearer that such an understanding is to be drawn from the foregoing words, in the same book Against Maximinus³⁰, saying: «This Trinity is of one and the same substance, because the Son is from neither some matter nor nothing, but from him from whom he was begotten; and likewise the Holy Spirit is from neither some matter nor nothing, but is from him from whom he proceeds». By these words he plainly shows that «the Son is from the Father’s substance» because he is begotten from the Father and is of the same substance as he; and that «the Holy Spirit is from the substance of the Father and Son» because he proceeds from both and is of the same substance.

Chapter 2 (16).

1. That neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit is from nothing, but from something, though not from matter. It is also shown from those words that the Son and the Holy Spirit are not from nothing, but from something, though not from any matter. Hence Hilary too says in Book XII of De Trinitate³¹: «Since God the Only-begotten was born, he bears witness to the Father as his source; since he was born from one who remains, he was not born from nothing; and since he was born before time, by being born he surpasses all understanding»³². Here it is plainly said that the Son was not born from nothing.

2. Similarly, the Holy Spirit must not be said to be or proceed from nothing, because «the Son was born from the Father’s substance»³³, that is, he is from the Father, with whom he is of the same substance and is the same substance. In this sense, too, that saying³⁴ is to be understood: «The Father begot what he himself is», that is, the Son who is what the Father is. — Augustine makes clear that this is how it should be understood, saying in Book I Against Maximinus³⁵: «The Father begot what he is; otherwise the Son is not true, if the Son is not what the Father is».

3. Likewise, «God’s substance begot the Son» means that the Father, who is substance, begot the Son³⁶, who is the same substance and of the same substance. — Augustine shows that this is how it should be understood, saying to Maximinus³⁷: «As you say, “Spirit begot Spirit,” so say: Spirit of the same nature or substance begot Spirit. Likewise, as you say, “God begot God,” so say: God of the same nature or substance begot God. If you believe and say this, you will no longer be accused about this matter». For by these words he makes clear how the foregoing should be understood.

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4. Similarly, «the Son was born from the Father’s substance» or «the Father begot the Son from his nature or essence»⁴⁰ means that from himself, as nature and essence, he begot the Son, who is of the same essence and nature and is that same essence and nature. Explain «the Son of the Father’s substance»⁴¹ in the same way: the Son belonging to the Father’s substance, that is, the Son who is substance, with whom the Son is the same substance, because the Son is consubstantial with the Father. — This sense is also supported by Augustine’s words. In Book VII of De Trinitate⁴² he says: «We speak of three persons of one essence, or of three persons as one essence. We do not, however, say that the three persons are from one essence, as though there were there one thing that is essence and another that is person». By these words he shows that one must not say that a person is from the essence except in the sense already stated. — The same sense is also confirmed by what he says in Book XV of De Trinitate⁴³: «As our knowledge differs from God’s knowledge, so our word, which is born from our knowledge, differs from God’s Word, which was born from the Father’s essence. It is as though I said: from the Father’s knowledge, from the Father’s wisdom; or, more expressly, from the Father as essence, from the Father as knowledge, from the Father as wisdom». From this understanding, then, God’s Word, the only-begotten Son, wholly like and equal to the Father, is rightly called God from God, light from light, wisdom from wisdom, essence from essence: because he is altogether what the Father is, yet is not the Father, because this one is the Son and that one is the Father.

Chapter 3 (17).

Why the Word of the Father is called a Son by nature. This is why only God’s Only-begotten is called a Son by nature: he is of the same nature as the Father and is the same nature with him. Hence Hilary, speaking of Christ in De Trinitate⁴⁴, says: «He is the Son by nature, because he has the same nature as the one who begot him».

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