Sentences, Books I–II
Peter Lombard (1100–1160)
Sententiae in IV Libris Distinctae, libri I–II
First published 1971
Books I–II of Peter Lombard’s Sentences, from the 1971 third edition of the Quaracchi text, with English translation.
Book I: Book I — On the Mystery of the Trinity
Distinctio I: Distinction I
Distinctio II: Distinction II
Distinctio III: Distinction III
Chapter 1 (9).
1. He begins to show how the Creator could be known through created things. For the Apostle says that the invisible things of God are clearly seen, understood through the things that have been made since the creation of the world, as are also his eternal power and divinity. “The creation of the world” is understood to mean man, “because of the excellence by which he excels among the other creatures, or because of the affinity he has with every creature.” Man, then, could perceive—or did perceive—the invisible things of God by the understanding of the mind, through the things that have been made, that is, through visible and invisible creatures. He was helped in two ways: by his nature, which was rational, and by works made by God in order to manifest truth to man. Therefore the Apostle says that God revealed it to them, namely by making works in which some indication of their maker shines forth.
2. The first reason or mode by which God could be known. For, as Ambrose says, “so that God, who is invisible by nature, might also be known through visible things, he made a work which, by its visibility, manifested its maker, so that what is unknown might be known through what is certain, and so that he might be believed to be the God of all who made what man is unable to make.” They could therefore know—or did know—that he who made things that no creature can make or destroy is above every creature. Let any creature come and make such a heaven and such an earth, and I shall say that it is God. But since no creature can make such things, it is clear that the one who made them is above every creature; and thus the human mind could know that he is God.
3. The second reason by which God could be known, or the mode by which they knew him. They could also know—or did know—the truth of God in another way, by the guidance of reason. For, as Augustine says in The City of God, the greatest philosophers saw that no body is God, and therefore, seeking God, they transcended all bodies. They also saw that whatever is changeable is not the supreme God and principle of all things, and therefore they transcended every soul and changeable spirit. Then they saw that whatever is changeable can exist only from him who is immutable and exists simply. Thus they understood that he made all these things and could not have been made by anyone.
4. The third reason or mode. “They also considered that whatever exists among substances is either body or spirit, that spirit is better than body, and that the one who made both spirit and body is far better.”
6 nobis LNW. 15 ineffabilem] ineffabilis BCLNR. 21 potuit] potuerit NRTV.]
7 quo LTV. 18 potest] potest COP, valet other manuscripts. || supra] super BCX. 22 doctrinae] doctrina LOPV. 28 iam transposed before vero BCT.]
5. The fourth mode or reason. “They also understood that the form of body is sensible, and the form of spirit intelligible, and they preferred the intelligible form to the sensible. We call sensible things those which can be perceived by bodily sight and touch; intelligible things are those which can be understood by the mind's vision. Since, then, in their view both body and soul possessed beauty to a greater or lesser degree, and if they could be wholly without beauty they would not exist at all, they saw that there is something by which they were made beautiful, in which is the first and immutable form, and therefore the incomparable one. They rightly believed this to be the principle of things, since it was not made and all things were made from it.”
6. Behold, the truth of God could be known in so many ways. Although God is one and simple essence, consisting of no diversity of parts or accidents, the Apostle¹ nevertheless speaks in the plural of the invisible things of God, because the truth of God is known in many ways through the things that have been made. From the permanence of creatures the eternal Creator is understood; from their greatness, the all-powerful one; from their order and arrangement, the wise one; from their governance, the good one. All these things pertain to demonstrating the unity of the Godhead.
7. How the trace of the Trinity appears in creatures. It remains now to show whether some indication, however slight, of the Trinity could be found through the things that have been made. Augustine says of this in Book VI of On the Trinity²: “As we perceive the Creator intellectually³ through the things that have been made, we ought to understand the Trinity. For a trace of this Trinity appears in creatures. Things made by divine art display in themselves a certain unity, form, and order.” Each of these created things is one thing, as are the natures of bodies and souls; some are formed by a particular form, as are the figures or qualities of bodies and the teachings or arts of souls; and some seek or maintain a certain order, as do the weights or positions of bodies and the loves or delights of souls. Thus the trace of the Trinity shines forth in creatures. For in that supreme Trinity are the highest source of all things, the most perfect beauty, and the most blessed delight.
8. The highest source, as Augustine shows in On True Religion⁴, is understood to be God the Father, from whom all things are, and from whom is the Son and the Holy Spirit. The most perfect beauty is understood to be the Son, namely “the truth of the Father, in no respect unlike him, which we worship with the Father and in the Father; it is the form of all things made by the one and referred to the one. Yet all these things would neither be made by the Father through the Son nor remain within their proper bounds unless God were supremely good: he begrudged no nature the good it had from him, and gave to other things, as far as they could receive it, that they might remain in the Good itself. This goodness is understood to be the Holy Spirit, who is the gift of the Father and the Son. Therefore we ought to worship and hold fast to this Gift, equally immutable with the Father and the Son.” — By considering creatures, then, we understand the Trinity of one substance: one God the Father, from whom we are; the Son, through whom we are; and the Holy Spirit, in whom we are. That is, the source to which we return, the form that we follow, and the grace by which we are reconciled; the one by whose authorship we were made, his likeness by which we are refashioned toward unity, and the peace by which we cling to unity; namely, God, who said Let it be¹, and the Word through whom all things came to be² that exist substantially and naturally, and the Gift of his goodness by which it pleased him that what was made by him through the Word should be reconciled to its author, so that it might not perish.
9. Behold how it has been shown that the image of the Trinity is indicated to some extent in creatures. A sufficient knowledge of the Trinity could not, and cannot, be attained through contemplation of creatures without revelation through teaching or inward inspiration. Hence those ancient philosophers saw the truth as if through a shadow and from afar, failing to perceive the Trinity, like Pharaoh's magicians at the third sign³. Yet through the things that have been made we are helped in faith concerning invisible things.
Chapter 2 (10).
1. How the image of the Trinity is in the soul. “Let us now come to the discussion in which we find the image of the Trinity in the human mind, which knows God or can know him.” For, as Augustine says in Book XIV of On the Trinity12, “although the human mind is not of the same nature as God, the image of him ‘than whom nothing is better’ must be sought and found there—in that which is better than anything in our nature, namely the mind. For God's image is found in the mind itself even before it shares in God; although it is disfigured when it has lost participation in God, God's image nevertheless remains. The mind is God's image precisely insofar as it is capable of him and can share in his being.” Let us therefore inquire into the Trinity that is God in the mind.
13 incomparabile W, incorporabile OP, incorporalis BCLXz. 23 Heading omitted in MRW. 25 quodque] quidquid COP, quidquid BL, corrected to quod in L’s margin. 28 vel] et OP. || locationes] collocationes LNW. 30 est transposed and omitted in OP.] 14 15 16 17
18 reconciliatum C, corrected to reconciliatum in LT. 22 doctrinae] doctrina LOPV. 28 iam transposed before vero BCT.] 19 20 21 22
2. He shows that there are three things in the soul which are spoken of relationally and are equal: memory, understanding, and love. “Behold23, then, the mind remembers itself, understands itself, and loves itself; if we see this, we see a trinity—not yet God, but the image of God.” For a certain trinity of memory, understanding, and love appears here. “Let us therefore treat these24 three especially: memory, understanding, and will.”
3. A most subtle consideration and fitting likeness.* “These three, as Augustine says in Book X of *On the Trinity*25, are not three lives, but one life; not three minds, but one mind, one essence. Memory is spoken of in relation to something; understanding and will, or love, are likewise spoken of in relation to something. Life, however, is spoken of in relation to itself, as are mind and essence. These three, then, are one insofar as they are one life, one mind, one essence; and whatever else each is said to be in itself, they are also said to be together, not in the plural but in the singular. They are three, however, insofar as they are referred to one another.”
4. How they are equal, since each comprehends all and the whole. “They are also equal not only individually, each to each, but each to all; otherwise they would not comprehend one another, but they do comprehend one another. Each is comprehended individually by each, and all are comprehended by each.” — Here he shows how all things are comprehended by each.* “For I remember that I have memory, understanding, and will; and I understand that I understand and will and remember; and I will that I will, remember, and understand.” — Here he shows how memory comprehends all three as a whole.* “I remember my whole memory, understanding, and will at once. For what I do not remember of my memory is not in my memory; but nothing is so much in my memory as memory itself. Therefore I remember it all. Likewise, whatever I understand, I know that I understand, and I know that I will whatever I will; but whatever I know, I remember: therefore I remember my entire understanding and my entire will.” — How the intellect comprehends all three as a whole. “Likewise, when I understand these three, I understand them all together. For there is nothing intelligible that I do not understand, except what I do not know; but what I do not know I neither remember nor will. Therefore, whatever intelligible things I do not understand, I consequently neither remember nor will. Whatever intelligible things, then, I remember and will, I consequently understand.” — How the will comprehends all three as a whole. “My will, too, comprehends my entire understanding and my entire memory while I make use of all that I understand and remember. Since, then, each comprehends all and the whole, these three are equal: each as a whole to each as a whole, and each as a whole together to all as a whole; and these three are one, one life, one mind, one essence.”
5. Behold, the human mind is the image of that supreme Unity and Trinity, where there is one essence and three persons, although it is unequal26. — “Mind here is taken for soul, where that image of the Trinity is; properly, however, ‘mind’ means, as Augustine says27, not the soul itself, but what excels in the soul.” — “It should also be known that memory is not only of absent and past things, but also of present things, as Augustine says in Book XIV of On the Trinity28; otherwise it would not grasp itself.”
6. The sense in which these three are said to be one and one essence is questioned. Here we must carefully consider in what sense we should understand what he said above29: that those three, namely memory, understanding, and will, are one, one mind, one essence. This certainly does not seem true according to the proper meaning of the words. For the mind, that is, the rational spirit, is a spiritual and incorporeal essence; but those three are natural properties or powers of the mind itself, and they differ from one another, since memory is not understanding or will, nor is understanding will or love.
7. They are also spoken of relationally with respect to one another. These three are also referred to one another, as Augustine says in Book IX of On the Trinity30: “For the mind cannot love itself unless it also knows itself; for how does it love—or remember—what it does not know?” “In a wonderful way31 then these three are inseparable from one another, and yet each of them individually and all of them together are one essence, although they are spoken of relationally with respect to one another.”
32 consideratione OP, interrogatio M, comparatio T. || congruaque] et congrua MNV. l. 30 capiat] capit NO. p. 73, l. 5 nec] non OP. l. 9 eo toto MOP, transposed by other manuscripts. l. 15 vero] OP vera BC, autem LR. l. 16 ipsa anima OPR, transposed by other manuscripts. l. 23 dixit] dixi N, diximus OP.]
8. Here is explained what was asked above, namely, how these three are said to be one. But now we must see how these three are said to be one substance: namely, because they exist substantially in the soul or mind itself, not as accidents in subjects, which can be present or absent. Hence Augustine says in Book IX of On the Trinity: “We are admonished, if we can somehow see it, that these things exist substantially in the mind, not as in a subject, as color exists in a body; for although they are spoken of relationally with respect to one another, each nevertheless exists substantially in its own substance.” Behold the sense in which these three are said to be one or one substance.
9. “Whoever keenly perceives these three, as Augustine says in Book XV of On the Trinity, naturally established in the mind by God, and how great is that in the mind by which the eternal and immutable nature can be remembered, contemplated, and desired, will remember through memory, behold through understanding, and embrace through love, and will surely find the image of that supreme Trinity.”
Chapter 3 (11).
1. How there is dissimilarity in that likeness. “Nevertheless, let him beware of comparing this image, made by the same Trinity, to it as though he thought it altogether like; rather, let him discern a great dissimilarity even within whatever likeness there is.” — The first dissimilarity. “This can be shown briefly. One man remembers, understands, and loves by means of those three; he is neither memory, understanding, nor love, but has them. Thus there is one man who has these three; he is not these three. In the supreme simplicity of the nature that is God, however, although God is one, there are nevertheless three persons, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and these three are one God.” “The Trinity itself is one thing, then, and the image of the Trinity in the soul another; but because the human being is what is more excellent in the soul, the human being is called the image. Just as both the tablet and the picture on it are called an image, the tablet is named ‘image’ because of the picture on it.”
Another dissimilarity. “Again, this image, which is a man possessing those three, is one person; that Trinity, however, is not one person but three: the Father of the Son, the Son of the Father, and the Spirit of the Father and the Son. Thus in this image of the Trinity those three do not constitute one man but belong to one man; in the supreme Trinity, however, of which this is the image, those three do not belong to one God, but are one God; and they are three, not one person.” “Those three are not man, but belong to man or are in man. But can we say that the Trinity is in God in such a way that something belongs to God and is not itself God? God forbid that we should believe this! Let us say, then, that the image of the Trinity in our mind is small and of some sort, bearing a likeness to the supreme Trinity while being for the most part unlike it.”
2. We must know that “this trinity of the mind, as Augustine says in Book XV of On the Trinity, is the image of God not only because the mind remembers, understands, and loves itself, but also because it can remember, understand, and love him by whom it was made.”
3. Another description of the trinity in the soul, namely mind, knowledge, and love. The trinity in the soul, which is the image of that supreme and ineffable Trinity, can also be distinguished in another way and by other names. For, as Augustine says in Book IX of On the Trinity: “The mind, its knowledge, and its love are three things. For the mind knows and loves itself, and cannot love itself unless it also knows itself. The mind and its knowledge are two things; likewise the mind and its love are two things. When, then, the mind knows and loves itself, a trinity remains: mind, love, and knowledge.” Here “mind” means not the soul, but what is more excellent in the soul.
4. How they are said to be one. These three, although distinct from one another, are nevertheless said to be one because they exist substantially in the mind.
39 utrumque MOPRV. 20 ita] et transposed in MNV. 21 aestimet] existimet MN. 22 dissimilitudo (o) similitudo (o) OP. 25 non] nec OP.]
40 “Quod per [propter L.N.] illa tria homo dicitur ymago” (“By these three man is called an image”), rubric added in the margin by manuscripts here or a little below. 2–3 in ea est transposed in BCTX. 4 Altera] alia CNVX. 11 non homo] “or a little below.” 15 gerit] ingerit OP. 19 meminerit] meminerit R (Augustine). 28 amor] et added in BCCMNVW.]
5. The mind is taken as the Father, its knowledge as the Son, and love as the Holy Spirit. The mind itself is, as it were, the parent, and its knowledge as its offspring: “For when the mind knows itself, it begets knowledge of itself, and it alone is the parent of its knowledge.” The third is love, which proceeds from the mind itself and its knowledge, when the mind, knowing itself, loves itself; for it could not love itself unless it knew itself. It also loves its pleasing offspring, that is, its knowledge; and so love is a kind of bond between parent and offspring.
6. Knowledge is not less than the mind, nor love than either. “The offspring is not less than its parent, since the mind knows itself to be as great as it is; nor is love less than its parent and offspring, that is, the mind and its knowledge, since the mind loves itself as much as it knows itself and is.”
7. How these three are in themselves. “Each of these is also in itself, because the loving mind is in love, love is in the knowledge of the one who loves, and knowledge is in the mind that knows.” Behold, some trace of the Trinity appears in these three.
8. How the mind advances through these things toward understanding God. The rational mind, then, considering these three and that one essence in which they exist, extends itself to the contemplation of the Creator, and sees unity in Trinity and Trinity in unity. For it understands that there is one God, one essence, one principle. It understands that if there were two, either each would be insufficient or one would be superfluous. If one lacked something that the other had, supreme perfection would not be there; but if one lacked nothing that the other had, since everything would be in one, the other would be superfluous. It therefore understood that there is one God, one author of all things. It saw that he cannot be without wisdom, as though foolish; and thus it understood that he has wisdom begotten by him. And because he loves his wisdom, it understood that love is also there.
Chapter 4 (12).
On the unity of the supreme Trinity. Therefore, in keeping with this consideration, as Augustine says in Book IX of On the Trinity, “let us believe that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one God, creator and ruler of all creation; that the Father is not the Son, nor the Holy Spirit either the Father or the Son, but that they are a Trinity of persons related to one another.” — For, as he says in On Faith to Peter, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit have one nature or essence, but not one person: “For if there were one person, just as there is one substance of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, the Trinity would not truly be said to exist. Again, the Trinity would be real, but the Trinity itself would not be one God, if, just as the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are distinct from one another by the property of their persons, so they were separated by a diversity of natures.” “The faith of the Patriarchs, Prophets, and Apostles proclaims that the Trinity is one God.”
“In that holy Trinity, then, there is one God the Father, who alone essentially begot from himself one Son; one Son, who alone was essentially born from the one Father; and one Holy Spirit, who alone proceeds essentially from the Father and the Son. Yet all of this cannot be done by one person, that is, to beget oneself, to be born from oneself, and to proceed from oneself.” For, as Augustine says in Book I of On the Trinity, “there is no thing that begets itself so as to exist.”