Theodor Meyer, Ius naturae generale
Institutiones iuris naturalis, Pars I: Ius naturae generale
First published 1906
Theodor Meyer’s Ius naturae generale from the second corrected edition (1906), in Latin with an original English translation. Preface and proemium included; the navigational contents and publisher advertisements are excluded.
Introductio I: Preface
Introduction
Sectio I: General Ethics
Sectio II: Social Right in General
Liber I: Book One. General Sociology
Liber II: Book Two. The Essential Bond of the Social Organism, or Right
Chapter I. The Genuine Notion of Right Analytically Established
Chapter II. The True Idea of Right Critically Confirmed against Its Various Corruptions
Chapter III. Knowledge and Appropriate Division of Right
Article 1.
On the sources of right.
546. We have already learned with certainty that there can be only one original and supreme source of right, common to the whole moral order, namely, the natural law of God itself. But since neither moral obligation specifically determined nor right is derived from that divine source only immediately, but usually mediately, it is clear enough in itself that, besides and after that one original source, certain derivative and proximate sources, more than one and various, must be distinguished, from which particular rights, as determined in individual cases and different from one another, must be said to derive proximately their force and existence. Since these alone can also be sources for knowing right, only they are customarily called, properly speaking, sources of right (Rechtsquellen) in the science of law.1
547. Moreover, for anything in human affairs to be considered a true source of right, that is, such that rights are legitimately derived through it from their original divine principle, it is necessary above all that it objectively represent divine law’s authority in some way, either in itself or through an authentic participation in it. Hence it follows that there can be no true source of right at all unless it is an authority either divine itself or entrusted to human beings by an authority that descends from it. This assertion requires no other confirmation than what is contained in the very concept of right, since right consists either in law itself or in some determination of law that is morally and socially inviolable. Therefore, generally speaking, there can be as many sources of right as there are objective means available to human beings by which the ordinance of legitimate social authority (whether divine or human) concerning particular matters of right can be reliably known and established.
And so, in fact, in every age two principal sources of right were recognized in the broadest sense: namely, divine law itself, made certainly manifest to human beings in whatever way, and human law, which participates mediately in divine authority. The most general division of right into divine and human right corresponded perfectly to these sources. Divine law is further divided into two kinds: one, natural, enacted according to eternal law by way of rational nature and promulgated through the light of reason; the other, positive, added to it by the free counsel of the eternal legislator and manifested by divine utterance beyond the order of nature. Hence divine right is twofold, natural and positive. Human law, which by nature can only be positive law, is distinguished not only according to the social authority from which it proceeds (civil or ecclesiastical) but also according to the manner in which it is enacted and established: whether it directly takes the form of an explicit law proceeding from social authority, or only of an implicit and tacit law, introduced socially through legitimate custom and usage with the authority’s acquiescence. From the former manner human right is called statutory, from the latter customary.
548. Thus, more specifically, four sources of right are counted in all. The first, natural law, is proper to natural right alone; the others—positive divine law, human law, and legitimate historical custom—pertain to positive right. On this matter, since it is clear enough in itself and objectively suited to the various orders of right, the whole of Christian philosophy and equally Christian jurisprudence, civil and ecclesiastical alike, were in harmonious agreement almost down to our own time. They still agree spontaneously today, if one excepts one of the proposed sources, which we called the source of natural right: that is, if it is considered sufficient by itself, on the same footing as the others and without positive intervention, to produce a true and valid “natural right.”
§ 1. The recent theory of “historical right” (the historical school).
549. Only in the past few decades, first in Germany and then almost everywhere in jurisprudence, has this opinion begun to prevail against the tradition of all antiquity and finally come to be held as if axiomatic: there is no right properly so called except positive right; while the dictates of reason, or the precepts of natural law, commonly called “natural right,” truly present natural principles for making law but lack the character of genuine and valid right in themselves. Therefore, setting aside “abstract natural law,” which supposedly savors of a kind of subjectivism of right and a spirit of revolution, chief care should instead be given to customary right (Gewohnheitsrecht), and to know it one must investigate the history and customs of each people as accepted through usage.
This philosophy of right, first born in the bosom of orthodox Protestantism, was soon raised into a kind of common banner for a very broad school celebrated by the name “historical school.” Nearly all the more authoritative jurists of recent times who are devoted to “conservative” political views are counted among it. And this is no wonder. For after the subversive political principles that have been spread among the people over the past century undermined public order, and seemed to be circulated and critically opposed to historical right under no pretext more often than that of “natural” or “rational” right (Vernunftrecht), it is easy to understand, for anyone considering the matter cursorily, how this new doctrine appeared all the more to be an immediate remedy for the evil insofar as it stripped natural law of its proper juridical authority in favor of positive and historical right.
550. Thus, according to its general character, the “historical school” is rightly counted among those attempts of recent practical philosophy commonly included under the name “reaction against the Kantian school.” Like the Schellingian and Hegelian schools, it professes the common tendency of trying to substitute real objectivism for the abstract subjectivism of right; it is laudably distinguished from both, however, in that, for the most part rejecting pantheism, it tries to draw its foundations instead from theistic, indeed even Christian, philosophy. Accordingly, it too displays some remote kinship with that class of writers who, from the struggle they waged against the errors of the French Revolution, were honored with the name counter-revolution (“contre-révolution”), whose principal leaders are rightly considered to be de Maistre and de Bonald among the French, Burke among the English, and Lud. von Haller and Adam Müller among the Germans.
551. Such is the instability of human understanding that even sincere minds, aspiring to the best things, sometimes encounter their own stumbling block of error, especially when, incautiously, they leave the well-trodden paths of the ancients, made safe through use. And so it happened that the historical school, otherwise deserving well of legal science and public life, while exaggerating the dominion of positive law at the expense of natural law, corrupted the genuine concept of right by mutilating it, and thus did not wholly escape even the consequences of the Hegelian system, by which right must necessarily be identified with public legalism.
The very gravity of the matter therefore requires this theory to be considered more carefully from its sources.
As we have said, various precursors of it appeared already toward the end of the eighteenth century and afterward, as it were, as a corrective or remedy against the arbitrary and purely “a priori” construction of public law.2 But the founder of the “historical school” is rightly named above all as:
552. F. C. von Savigny3 (1779–1861), whose principles for restoring the science of law are especially set forth in his book Beruf unserer Zeit zur Gesetzgebung, 1815, and in the larger work System des heutigen römischen Rechts, 1840. Although he was little devoted to philosophy himself, he had nevertheless come under the influence of Schellingian philosophy when he first undertook to reconstruct and regenerate the whole juridical discipline on new foundations. Two considerations chiefly prompted this. For jurists had long and rightly complained partly of the empty and shamefully disordered formalism of law, compiled from every direction and handed down mechanically without clear and common principles to guide jurists appropriately through such a forest of materials, and partly of the advances of rationalism and criticism, which seemed certain to make all legal institutions increasingly unstable and confused. With a sincere mind, von Savigny devoted all his effort and life to remedying this twofold evil. Indeed, to revive lifeless legal formalism he taught that above all one must investigate the spirit of each people, living and expressed in its own history and culture, and recommend from it the true juridical institutions proper organically to each people. For from Schelling he had learned (as Hegel later developed more extensively) that legal norms are not determined by subjective ideas of the human spirit but by the world-spirit (Weltgeist), and in individual peoples by the spirit of the people (Volksgeist), continually active in history and constantly revealing itself by an internal necessity; therefore, what is to be considered right, just, and reasonable must be drawn from this actual and historical revelation.4
He likewise considered this to be the most effective remedy against individualism and rationalism in law. Once that purely historical principle of right was admitted, it seemed at last that a radical antidote had happily been found against “natural right,” which political and social rationalism had chiefly used until then for its destructive ends, since it would henceforth deprive rationalism of all material and room for action. In addition, in this way the science of right adapted itself to the common genius of all “modern” science. For since whatever savored of metaphysics had already begun to be commonly treated with skepticism and contempt under the title of “exact science,” and positive empiricism, partly natural and partly historical, had begun to be substituted in its place, it seemed to follow that the science of right too should share a similar condition.
Accordingly, von Savigny endeavored to substitute for the ancient “natural law,” which he considered to rest on subjective rather than objective foundations5, a “philosophy of right,” whose first task would be to investigate the historical sources of right and then bring the positive elements of right drawn from them into the internal unity of science. Hence, rejecting the ancient division of right into natural and positive, this common axiom became prevalent in his school, as we have said: There is no right properly so called except positive right; nor is there any other source for knowing right except the historical one, which they distinguish as twofold: historical custom and statutory laws.
553. Although this doctrine had initially been proposed almost solely to serve as a practical rule for jurisprudence, it soon was also developed more broadly in theory and elevated to the form and dignity of a new philosophy of right. Above all, the philosopher of the “historical school” may rightly be called:
Fr. Julius Stahl (1802–1861) tried in his work Philosophy of Right6, Heidelberg, 1830–1837 (4th ed. 1870–1871), not only to establish exclusive legal positivism philosophically but also to commend it as especially consonant with the Christian order (that is, the ideal political dominion of orthodox Lutheranism).7 If we set aside this Lutheran theological tendency, we find this man’s juridical and political-philosophical ideas generally accepted within the “historical school.” Therefore, for our purpose, this single interpreter of the doctrine will stand for many.
In examining the nature of right, Stahl rightly begins from its connection with the whole moral order of this world, but he miserably errs in determining this very connection and thus sets a false principle before all his other deductions. This chief error lies above all in the following: although both the moral and juridical orders are said to derive from one and the same original divine source—the former for sanctifying individual human beings according to the image of God, the latter, as objective ἔθος, for morally shaping human society as such according to the mind of the divine ordainer—nevertheless the perpetual union and agreement of right with morality is in no way recognized as an essential condition of right. The reason given is that the juridical order, unlike the moral order, is not established immediately by God but mediately, namely, entrusted to human beings themselves by God’s command to be established as an order that is human in itself (cf. what was noted above on the same matter from the author’s words at nos. 487, 494, 506). In this matter a twofold hypothesis appears to be asserted without warrant:
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that the whole juridical order, to the full extent of its scope, has been established immediately by human beings alone;
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that God’s command implicitly contains this remarkable concession: whatever human beings establish in the name of right, even against the intention of the one commanding or against moral law, is nevertheless to be considered firm and valid.
This is perfectly consistent with what he then adds concerning the present question:
“Right . . . is a human order, although it serves to sustain the divine order in the world. Therefore it subsists as human beings have determined it at a certain time and place, and because they determined it thus and not otherwise, whether rightly or wrongly, not because they ought to have determined it thus by force of divine command; that is: right is positive. It too has a higher law, situated in the ideas and precepts of the divine order of the world, to which it must conform, and according to which human beings ought to determine it. Thus, indeed, a divinely commanded, just, and rational principle stands before positive right; but this rational principle, the ideas and precepts of the divine order in the world, are not themselves right—what is commonly called natural or rational right. For it belongs to the essence of right itself to be a human order of life established by human beings’ own power, and consequently positive right. . . . These are principles and a directive norm for laws, not the laws themselves according to which human affairs can be ordered and disputes settled. . . . They do not have juridical (externally binding) authority in the human community so long as, and insofar as, the human community has not established them as precepts of its own order. . . . It is the human order itself, which is right, not the divine-order requirements that relate to it, that has God’s sanction by which it externally and communally obligates human beings. Thus the human order that is right is rooted in the divine order, but it subsists in and through itself; and in this subsistence of its own consists the positivity of right.”
“Right is positive according to what it contains: . . . its determinate laws, enacted by human beings, are positive; it is also positive according to its force. Although the ultimate ground of its binding authority is the divine order of the world, the seat of this authority is nevertheless the humanly determined order, subsisting right. According to this subsistence in itself, right can even contradict the divine order of the world, which it ought to serve . . . and even in this quality of being opposed to God, right retains its authority to obligate (!). . . . Right and positive right are therefore identical concepts; there is no right except positive right.”
“What underlies the concept of some ‘natural law’ is precisely those ideas and precepts of the divine order in the world, the ideas of right; but, as has been shown, these are endowed neither with the requisite determination (precision) nor with the binding force of right. . . . Thus there are indeed demands of reason concerning right, but there is no rational right. It is not lawful for subjects, either individually or in a multitude formed by coalition, to oppose positive right by force of natural right—that would be the crime of revolution.”8
554. From these statements it is readily apparent how precarious and dangerous a remedy is proposed here against what they call the “subjective” “discretion” in judging right. For who would deny that “objective” right must be opposed to an arbitrary opinion about right? — But unless we wish skeptically to deny objective truth to the evident and common voice of rational nature, the most certain and essentially true, and therefore eternal, objectivity of right is that which exists as the inviolable law of justice promulgated by God to the whole human race by way of rational nature. Human enactments have objectivity of right only insofar as they participate in that law in some way. But what we see established here as something to be absolutely revered as objective right is in fact nothing other than another mode of human discretion: I mean, the will of human beings expressed in public law, to which absolute plenipotence for asserting right is rashly, not to say impiously, imagined to have been divinely entrusted and sanctioned in advance. Thus this philosophy of right, which boasts of Christian principles, having rejected Hegelian worship of the state, reintroduces it in another form, and all the more perniciously because it is adorned with Christian phrasing.
555. Sensing this danger, those Catholic jurists who joined the same school thought they could avoid it through the Catholic method of science itself. To this end, while agreeing with their non-Catholic associates in asserting exclusive legal positivism, these men are usually distinguished from them by professing that, when applying the historical system of law to ecclesiastical institutions as well, ecclesiastical and positive divine law must be constantly considered and defended as in themselves independent of civil law. In this way they think that natural (divine) law can in practice be regarded as superfluous or at least sufficiently compensated for.9
556. Meanwhile, political events themselves have already shed timely light on the true value of this “conservative” novelty, as was almost foreseeable. For although its authors may be unaware of it, from its very beginnings it displays an open kinship with those modern principles of philosophy from which all recent social and political naturalism, or “liberalism,” draws its life and strength. It is therefore no wonder that this very theory today is by no means displeasing to those against whom it at first seemed designed to fight. The same men who once conspired everywhere in the world against the legitimate and historic order of things under the pretext of natural law, after they have themselves perhaps successfully obtained the reins of public government somewhere, readily admit the principles of “historical law,” by whose aid everything once accomplished historically, by whatever means and in whatever manner, is thereafter to be held (by their opponents, of course) sacred and inviolable. And perhaps one may then hear such converts from their former revolutionary spirit discoursing with singular piety about this new conservatism: the ethical and religious dignity of the public order (which they emphatically call the “divine order”), and the majesty of law, which they proclaim the “public conscience” and the sole norm of civil accountability. Thus it can happen that this “historical law” theory, as expounded by Stahl, may, under the possible circumstances of the times, also involve political danger. For suppose that in some state a powerful faction of audacious men should at some time seize supreme government and represent the public order through its legislative power. At the will of these legislators a wholly new order of positive law, “constituted by human beings,” adapted to modern ideas, may perhaps be erected; and if it successfully maintains itself, it will soon also be revered by the whole people, even against their will, through an obligation grounded in the right of an accomplished fact (durch das Recht der vollendeten Tatsache), and finally under the title of historical law. For God’s ratification is presumed in advance, even if the new positive law should perhaps presume to enact things contrary to divine law.10
It is enough to have noted these things beforehand, so that one may understand what fruits that doctrine, however laudable the intention from which it first arose, and although not in itself false in every respect, seems likely to bring to human society once it has been adapted to the genius of the “modern state” and put into practice. This very fact should warn learned men sincerely devoted to the Christian cause that the path consecrated by the practice of all Christian antiquity can scarcely ever be abandoned and forsaken with impunity.
§ 2. The existence of true natural law is asserted.
557. We do not undertake to attack “historical law,” as it is called, considered in itself; indeed, we readily acknowledge that in its revived cultivation, if kept within its proper limits and amicably reconciled with certain sound principles of philosophy, a notable advance of the whole science of law is contained. Nor do we wish the case for natural law to be advanced in such a way as to detract anything either from the estimation or from the very broad domain of positive law, since it is clear that the whole juridical order by which, through God’s providence, human society on earth is rightly established and preserved according to the external forms of life, consists for the greatest part of positive law, and even of human law. Indeed, we have already proved above (no. 289) that this is necessary and required by natural law itself.
558. Accordingly, against exclusive legal positivism we contend only this, and contend it irrefragably: within the bounds of the juridical order, a necessary and inalienable place must also be left to natural law, as valid and inviolable in itself. And we are certain that this concerns nothing more than positive law itself.
Thesis XLVIII. Natural law exists, possessing genuine juridical force in itself, independently of every positive enactment.
Preliminary remarks. This assertion is the direct contradiction of the opponents’ common principle: “There is no law except positive law.” Therefore, leaving aside here the question of the greater or lesser extent of natural law, we undertake to prove only its real existence: that among human beings there are certain juridical relations, or rights and duties of right, which derive immediately from natural law and, as such, possess the force of law—prior to any positive human enactment, whether established by statute or historical custom, and even prior to positive divine legislation.11
Besides the theoretical proof we undertake, this thesis receives confirmation and illustration from the entire history of natural law, which was practically admitted and named with reverence, not only in the documents of the canon law of the Catholic Church, but among all civilized peoples down to almost the present time. To pursue this history here in detail through Greek and Roman writers, the Fathers of the Church, theologians and legal scholars of the Middle Ages, and all the more celebrated writers on law from the end of the Middle Ages onward—with the Protestants of the schools of Grotius, Leibniz, and Wolff, etc., excluded—would lead us too far from our path. It is therefore preferable to recommend a clear source on this subject that is already available.12
559. It is proved, first: from the commonly admitted characteristics of true law.
The characteristics of true law, by the opponents’ own confession and explicit teaching, are reduced to two: one consists in the determination of law (“Bestimmtheit, Präzisierung”), the other in its proper efficacy (“Rechtskraft”), by which legal duties are made subject to coercion.13
And indeed, both these characteristics are immediately grounded in what we set forth beforehand concerning the genuine notion of law. They are also connected to each other, so that one requires and presupposes the other: the condition of the second is manifestly contained in the first, while the fundamental and final reason for the first lies in the second.
Yet there exist, by force of natural law, many juridical relations among human beings to which both those characteristics undoubtedly belong immediately and in themselves.
Therefore natural law exists, etc.
The minor premise is proved in parts.
A. The required determination, or “precision,” of law arises from two sources: both from the unquestionable promulgation and clarity of the laws from which particular rights and duties of right are derived, and from some actual fact by which the rule of a law or general principle is made applicable in a particular case—that is, determined with respect to certain persons, a certain matter, and a certain manner. Where these conditions are present, there can surely be no doubt about the determination of the law, whatever its source.
But natural law is given sufficient determination from both sides:
- On the side of the natural promulgation of laws pertaining to the order of justice. Anyone who does not wish to profess mere “traditionalism” in philosophy cannot deny that, just as the general moral order is known to human beings, so in particular the general precepts of the order of justice are made evident by the natural light, in such a way that invincible ignorance of them is naturally excluded among all those who possess the proper use of reason.14 Consequently, by virtue of the same evidentness, the application of the laws of nature, general in themselves, at least in the most immediate cases and those within ready reach, must also be clear and straightforward for every intellect developed enough to exercise its most elementary and essential functions. If, nevertheless, it sometimes seems obscured, this should be attributed not to any defect in the natural light, but to darkness introduced from outside, namely, the impulse of an evil will that rebels against the intellect, and hence to something that occurs with culpability. For above (no. 268 ff.), under the guidance of the Angelic Doctor, we clearly demonstrated that in this way God’s natural law is continually promulgated in the human being.
Indeed, the general precepts of right shine in our minds with an even clearer light than other things, as each person’s innermost conscience and daily experience of human affairs testify. God the Creator has wisely provided in this way: natural reason should have readily at hand, clear in the light of ordinary understanding, especially those notions that concern not just any foundations of social life on earth, but foundations immediately and directly necessary to it.15
2. On the side of determining facts. There are many human rights and duties of right that derive immediately from the evident principles of natural law in such a way that they also receive their particular determination, and hence their concrete applicability, from facts that are either natural and do not immediately depend on human choice, or indeed free but such that by their very nature they entirely precede any positive public enactment or declaration, whether in a law or in an established custom of the people. The following plainly belong here:
a) all human rights called absolute or innate, whose title is contained in human nature itself as such, and which are therefore immediately determined by the very (natural) fact of the real existence of the individual human being. Such are, for example, the right to live and preserve one’s life, the right of personality, the right to essential freedom of conscience; indeed, also the right to acquire property, the right to make contracts in general, and similar rights. Although in themselves they concern subject matter not yet determined in the individual case, they nevertheless, as such,
Much more radically does R. v. Ihering deviate from the truth. In his more recent work Der Zweck im Recht, II, 107 ff. (1884), he tries to revive and exaggerate Locke’s doctrine of the “blank slate” of the mind, contending that not only moral principles but even the very sense of morality was acquired by historical experience, not implanted in human beings by nature: “Nicht die Natur, sondern die Geschichte ist die Urheberin des Sittlichen, und zwar nicht bloss der sittlichen Grundsätze, Ideen, sondern selbst des sittlichen Gefühls, welches nur die Form der unmittelbaren, unbewussten Beherrschung derselben darstellt, ja sogar des sittlichen Willens.” He says the same about ideas of law and the sense of justice (Rechtsgefühl): “Dass alle Rechtssätze und Rechtseinrichtungen ohne Ausnahme . . . lediglich Niederschläge der historischen Erfahrung sind, dass kein einziger derselben dem Menschen durch sein angeborenes Rechtsgefühl vorgezeichnet worden ist, selbst nicht die einfachsten, scheinbar sich von selbst verstehenden Rechtswahrheiten” (p. 111). This opinion, which conflicts with the common sense of nature and denies rational nature itself, needs no further refutation here. Such rights belong determinately to every human being, so that their subject matter in the individual case is determined by no other fact than the very fact that someone actually wishes to make use of them.
b) All those hypothetical or acquired private rights which, in view of the organic origin of human society, by their very nature precede every public society and are logically presupposed by it. To this class belong: α) juridical relations between private persons that are determined by the simple exercise of some innate right, such as, for example, the right of ownership in a particular thing, previously not subject to ownership or abandoned, acquired by simple occupation or transformation; rights defined in the individual case by a simple contract, such as a gift, exchange, purchase, etc.; β) the essential and constitutive juridical relations of domestic society, whether between spouses or between parents and children—and who denies that these are wholly determined by the natural fact of the children’s birth?
c) Finally, there are also among public rights certain rights whose sufficient determination precedes any positive intervention by public society as such. First, in kind, and beforehand, that is, marked out within certain fixed limits by their essence, are all those rights which, as constitutive rights of public society, receive their inner rationale and norm from the naturally proper and specific end of that society. Such, for example, is the very right of public authority considered in itself, and the common relation between it and its subjects. For since these things are common and essential to every public society, however various its historical form may be, they are imposed and predetermined by the very Author of nature together with that end, and thus are removed from the private, and even from the public, choice of human beings. They are also determined in the individual case, though not without the varied cooperation of human beings, yet not by an enactment of public society already constituted: rather, they are determined either by a varied concurrence of natural facts and private freedom, or sometimes even by the free agreement of private persons who are equal, and thus through the exercise of rights naturally pre-existing (cf. nos. 361 ff., 421).
B. Juridical efficacy (“die Rechtskraft”), which exhibits the other characteristic of true law, belongs in a similar way to these same rights of nature by nature’s institution. To understand this, one must carefully note what was explicitly demonstrated above (nos. 487 ff.): the efficacy of law, that is, its coercive inviolability, by which every law properly so called or rigorous law is essentially distinguished from merely precarious law, must not be confused with the actual physical power external to the law, by which its effect could in fact be obtained through coercion if need be. For the former is entirely moral in itself and founded on a postulate of reason; therefore, like law itself, it subsists in its full rational force even if, perhaps because of external circumstances, sufficient physical power to exercise coercion effectively is lacking. This seems all the more necessary to point out beforehand here because the common error of almost all the opponents, and their principal reason for contradiction, turns on this very confusion of concepts.16
With these points established, one may reason as follows:
The moral efficacy of law, by which genuine reciprocal obligations subject to coercion are produced among human beings, necessarily accompanies in itself every enactment whose object is the order of social justice and which is otherwise not lacking the requisite “precision,” that is, promulgation and determination. But, as has just been demonstrated, such natural legislation exists. Therefore it must likewise have true juridical efficacy naturally inhering in it.
560. It is proved, secondly, from the philosophical necessity of admitting natural law valid in itself and prior to positive law.
This necessity is established by several most weighty reasons, each an argument in its own right:
Argument 1. Because natural law valid in itself is the foundation and necessary condition of every positive law.
Unless some natural law valid in itself is admitted prior to positive law, positive law itself is deprived of its necessary philosophical foundation; and this cannot be assumed (objectively speaking) except as a philosophical and juridical absurdity. Just as faith is logically built upon the natural light, and the supernatural order upon the natural order, so in a similar way every positive law, in order to have force, presupposes natural law valid in itself—and indeed not merely as an ideal norm of law, but as law properly so called, subsisting immediately as such not by the force of human choice or an added benevolent public acceptance, but by virtue of divine law promulgated in rational nature. This assertion is plainly verified
a) in the case of human positive law. Every human law, whether introduced by statute or custom, ultimately proceeds immediately from some human authority, and receives its objective force as law from that authority. But no human authority or power of jurisdiction exists of itself or through blind fate; it requires an antecedent juridical foundation, that is, it must rest on some antecedent right by which that authority is established as legitimate and recognized by all who are to be juridically subject to it. Within the bounds of the natural order, however, such an original right that juridically grounds human authority can be nothing other than natural: that is, a right which, by virtue of natural law as hypothetically necessary, is first recognized in the abstract by every rational human being, and then, with the actual determination of that hypothesis, is also to be recognized as really existing and valid.17
b) in the case of positive divine law. A law freely established by God the lawgiver beyond the natural order, although it contains within itself immediately the force to bind, could not have the force of true law for human society unless, as a rational condition of obedience, it presupposed an antecedently known genuine and irrefragable juridical duty, by which not only individual human beings privately in their conscience, but also the human community as such, are publicly bound to God as absolute Lord and lawgiver. But this essential juridical relation of the whole human race to God constitutes a supreme natural law, to be recognized both privately and publicly, by the force of natural law alone and prior to all positive legislation, even divine legislation. Surely it does not begin to have the force of law only after human society has chosen positively to accept and enact it. Therefore, etc.
Argument 2. Because the organic origin of society requires and presupposes natural law.
Considered in terms of its natural origin, public society represents the nature of a kind of moral organism. It begins with the simplest social elements, namely individual human beings, collected into the first and closest social unity in the family; then it continually grows organically into further analogous and increasingly complex units formed from families, groups of families, tribes, and so on, until at last it reaches the broadest form of civil society. Each stage of this social development is not to be considered a mere element or member of civil society, with no proper form or rationale of existence beyond that relation; rather, each designates a naturally living social organism, to which the Author of nature predetermines, together with its essential internal constitution, its own end and sphere of social activity, prior to the formal existence of civil society. This is already evident concerning the first stage, which pertains to domestic society. Hence we rightly reason as follows:
Certain social organisms subsist and flourish in human society by nature’s own compelling force, prior to every positive public law and even every public society. But no such organism can subsist as such except through certain internal juridical relations by which it is constituted and preserved, and these must be prior to every positive public law—that is, they must be immediately valid and recognized as such by natural law. Therefore the organic construction of society itself requires and presupposes natural law, firm in itself and prior to the public state.
Argument 3. Because in the order of natural providence natural law is the sole and necessary juridical safeguard of personal freedom against manifestly arbitrary abuses of human law.
Even in the social order considered under natural providence alone, whose chief fruit ought to be the security of rights, it cannot be admitted that neither individual persons nor subordinate moral persons retain any legitimate safeguard, not even an ideal one, that they can confidently invoke against arbitrary abuses of human law, especially public law—even if without real effect, at least with the moral vindication of a true right impiously oppressed. Otherwise, the higher end of society, necessarily imposed by God’s holiness, could be made illusory not only in fact but also in law, which is no less contrary to right reason than to divine holiness. (See above, no. 493, where the same absurd consequence is illustrated more fully by certain examples.)
But this unworthy condition of human society follows by logical necessity from the modern juridical axiom: “There is no law except positive law.”
The minor premise is proved. On the hypothesis of this axiom, the only legitimate recourse left against the unjust claim of human positive law is to a higher human law, if one is available, and finally to positive divine law. Now, first, positive divine law, even if it were everywhere publicly recognized as such and provided sufficient legal protection to all in every case, would nevertheless not remove the essential defect of the natural order that we are arguing against, since it is known to have been introduced beyond nature by supernatural revelation. For although, by God’s free institution, the supernatural order is built upon the natural order, the natural order nevertheless retains its own integrity in its own grade and sphere; it could not have come forth from the hand of the most wise Creator as a work mutilated in its essentials. Moreover, second, although the same positive law is objectively secured by divine authority, in actual practice it cannot exercise its juridical efficacy unless among those who publicly recognize the institution of positive religion and the ecclesiastical law founded upon it.
Therefore one must finally admit recourse to the most universal divine law, established by natural law and written in rational nature, as valid in itself; or else one must tolerate the absolute juridical omnipotence of human law both in theory and in practice. It is scarcely apparent how this conclusion differs in practice from Hegelian idolatry of the state, since here, too, for the natural order, public human authority alone—that is, the public state—is constituted the supreme source and arbiter of all law; consequently even the human conscience itself must be sacrificed to it, if not morally, certainly juridically, as utterly defenseless.
561. III. The thesis is confirmed indirectly by the testimony of the opponents themselves.
Ever since natural law began to be rejected, we see the law commonly called customary law (“das Gewohnheitsrecht”) cultivated with special care, and—without lack of many benefits to jurisprudence—raised above all to the dignity of a kind of original foundation in every formation of law. This should be thought to have happened neither by chance nor without serious philosophical reason. For men consistently devoted to political conservatism had rejected natural law not in order to loosen positive law from every internal stability and henceforth leave it all the more to human choice, but, on the contrary, so that, as they thought, they might emancipate it more securely from “subjectivism.” To prevent this plan from being vain and self-contradictory, it imposed on them the necessary condition that within the sphere of positive law they find a sufficient compensating role for natural law—that is, some kind of positive law that could rightly be substituted for it as similarly fundamental, and no less reverend by reason of itself, prior to and above every written law. They boasted that they had indeed found this in “customary” law.
Yet in describing this very thing and commending it for that purpose, especially in explaining its origin and proper force as law, they ultimately returned, unawares and unwillingly, to the very point from which they had first turned away with no little disdain: namely, to true natural law as the necessary presupposed foundation of positive law, acknowledged if not explicitly, certainly implicitly.
For de Savigny himself denies that the origin of “common” law can be derived from any fortuitous cause or from human choice or deliberation, since “it is most certain that everywhere in the world, wherever a question or awareness of some juridical relation arises, a legal rule has already long existed beforehand for that matter, and therefore neither needs nor can now for the first time be discovered.” . . . The origin of positive law subsisting in the people’s conscience is “imperceptible,” so that it cannot be demonstrated by historical documents. . . . The proof of it, however, “lies in the universal and uniform recognition of positive law and in the sense of inner necessity that accompanies its concept, whose clearest expression exists in the ancient assertion of the origin of divine law or laws.”18 Moreover, he says that in the law of every people (Volksrecht) “a twofold element is found: one individual, proper to each people in particular, the other universal, founded on what is common to human nature.”19
Similar things are read throughout the writings of other authors of the same school. Thus, for example, Puchta writes: “Customary law is the law that has its origin immediately in the conscience of the people . . . and manifests itself in the custom of the people (usus, custom). . . . Customary law precedes statutory law; it receives its force as law not from the legislator’s authority, but from the same power to which that authority itself is ultimately referred. . . . It arises from the fact that the national spirit” (more correctly, natural law expressed by right reason) “implants and brings forth in human minds juridical judgments, which they recognize and feel to be common. . . . Custom is the exercise of a legal rule (des Rechtssatzes) that already exists before it.”20
From all these things, this conclusion surely presents itself of its own accord to everyone: Such “customary” law, original and “common” in itself, is either that very thing which the ancients called natural divine law, insofar as without any positive human deliberation it determines and subsists in the conscience of individuals, and consequently in the conviction of the whole people, by the force of the light of reason; or it must be presupposed, no less than human legislation, as invincibly necessary and prerequisite.21 What, then, was the reason for so carefully avoiding natural law? Was it, perhaps, to remove from rationalism the possibility of abusing it? But truth cannot be abandoned with impunity on account of its abuse. Would it not have been more fruitful to devote the efforts of learned men to distinguishing genuine natural law from its arbitrary corruption—a task for which customary law surely supplied most useful evidence?
Observations for resolving difficulties.
562. 1. We do not assert that the juridical order exists naturally and has force to the same extent to which it is understood to be necessary in human society. Rather, we readily acknowledge that, by nature, it requires completion in many respects by human authority, established for this very purpose by the force of natural law, and requires determination and application in accordance with circumstances that change from day to day (cf. no. 289).
563. 2. Rights that are otherwise proved to be natural in themselves are not to be counted as positive rights merely because people actually living in civil society are sometimes not permitted to exercise them independently. For, by the social and organic subordination of human beings, many rights must be restricted as to their use, although they nevertheless belong to them naturally in themselves and as their own. The common good, indeed the very existence of society, into which individuals are incorporated as members, requires this. Thus, for example, with respect to various matters or in various circumstances, the right to make contracts, although natural in itself, is constrained by civil law to certain legal forms; if these are neglected, the act, though naturally valid, may nevertheless lack the public force of law, and sometimes even be deprived of all natural validity. Nevertheless, the natural right to make valid contracts as such is neither given nor taken away by civil authority; rather, by the intention and authority of the supreme Author of nature himself, the necessary conditions are predetermined under which its free exercise can be reconciled with the right social order, while use harmful to the community is deprived beforehand of its efficacy. Hence it is clear that by this arrangement natural law is in no way subordinated to positive law; on the contrary, positive law is wholly subordinated to natural law, since every restriction of the former, introduced by means of the latter, is prescribed by force of a higher precept of natural law and serves its ends.
564. 3. Yet this superiority of natural law should not be thought to detract anything from the proper functions and legitimate use of positive law. Therefore, in public judgments, the proximate norm of judgment is to be drawn not from natural law but from positive law available in the case at hand, as St. Thomas expressly teaches: “Judgment must be made according to the written law; otherwise judgment would fail either with respect to natural right or positive right.” He gives this reason: “Judgment is nothing other than a certain definition or determination of what is right. Something is made right in two ways: in one way by the very nature of the thing, which is called natural right; in another by a certain agreement among human beings, which is called positive right. Laws are written for the declaration of both kinds of right, but in different ways: for the writing of the law contains natural right but does not institute it, since it has its force not from the law but from nature; positive right, however, the writing of the law both contains and institutes, giving it the force of authority.”22 For the Angelic Doctor presupposes written laws to be just, that is, such as either contain and declare natural law itself or, in keeping with the intention of natural law, prescribe something in accordance with right reason. Therefore he expressly excludes from that rule laws that are certainly unjust, adding: “One must not judge according to them.”23
565. 4. It is an essential condition only of positive law, not of law taken simply and universally, that as such it be actually and externally recognized by human beings. For the validity of natural law it is sufficient that, by force of the rational order, known by the light of reason and imposed by divine law not only on individuals privately but on the whole human race in common, it ought to be recognized by all, lest objective justice be violated with the utmost injustice. And in fact, too, all that to which each person is compelled by right reason and the inner voice of conscience to assent ought rightly to be considered commonly recognized among human beings, even if some are found who externally scorn or conceal it. For it is chiefly from this very tacit and common recognition of natural law as valid in itself that the origin of customary law, as we said above, is to be explained. Thus, in this broadest sense alone, which also applies to natural law, one may to some extent admit what F. J. Stahl emphasizes with great force: “That the eminent characteristic of (all) law is that it has continuous actual reality (‘stete Verwirklichung’).”24
566. 5. The opponents do not at all escape the philosophical necessity of natural law (Proof II); rather, they confirm it when they resort to a certain remote divine origin of human law as well, namely, one in which it is said that by a general disposition of God human society was once and for all entrusted with the task of erecting and sustaining the whole order of law from itself and by its own authority.25 Such recourse to divine authority surely does nothing to prevent human law from being granted complete juridical independence and full absolutism not only in relation to human beings but, more absurdly, in relation to God himself. The only remedy for this is natural law, divinely sanctioned before and above human law, setting forth an eternal norm and immovable limits that human law is bound not only to revere but also cannot transgress with legal effect.26
567. Scholium 1. The assertion of natural law, although it presents in itself a distinct special head of doctrine, is nevertheless bound by the closest internal kinship to the series of philosophical conclusions expounded thus far. In truth, it is nothing other than a necessary conclusion and, as it were, the final stage of that higher process of ideas which begins from “eternal law” and its immediate promulgation in the rational creature through “natural law,” then descends to its mediated emanations and particular applications, provided by divine providence through the ministry of human authority, and finally asserts that the norms of all human affairs are objective in every way and divine, either immediately or mediately. Nearly the whole controversy in which “ancient” and “modern” law continually conflict with each other turns on this same process of ideas, defended on one side and attacked either wholly or in part on the other. The cause is one in itself, but multiform according to the diversity of the matter to which it is most directly applied. For ancient law is distinguished by a theonomic character (which opponents, with hateful exaggeration, are accustomed to call “theocratic”), while modern law is distinguished by an autonomic character (commonly “antitheocratic”), in one way or another and to some degree. This is no wonder, since “modern” science boasts that it issued chiefly from the sixteenth-century “Reformation,” whose “proper effect on the social condition,” as F. J. Stahl admits,27 “consists in the destruction of the theocratic character.” And indeed, by its innate instinct, this antitheocratic spirit now turns away not only from divine authority in ecclesiastical matters (“ecclesiastical theocracy”), but, by the logical development of its own principles, from the very idea of divine law in human affairs, especially public affairs (“philosophical-juridical theocracy”), until it ends in the perfect autonomy of human society and social atheism.
567 a. Scholium 2. This political and social question, and as such eminently philosophical—whether the whole order of law subsists exclusively in positive law, or whether natural law must also necessarily be admitted—ought today, in our judgment, at least among philosophers of law who sincerely profess theism, to be considered rightly settled, after full and mature discussion, in favor of natural law. This is so especially on the philosophical view of the social organism and the logically unavoidable postulate of reason.
Therefore that recent agitation against natural law, which it has pleased people to revive again in the name of modern jurisprudence, can no longer greatly trouble us. The opponents we meet here are indeed outstanding jurists, but less versed in philosophical principles; they are armed polemically not with new and weightier arguments in support of their cause, but rather with old, long-overcome prejudices, or with a preconceived erroneous notion of true natural law and vain assumptions.
First to be named here is the professor of law Bergbohm28, a most bitter opponent of natural law, which he pursues with extraordinary zeal as the supreme peril to all legal science. How deeply, however, he has penetrated by investigation into the whole doctrine that he undertakes critically to destroy, he himself candidly tells us by asking: „Vor allem ist es eine schwierige Aufgabe, Theorien zu widerlegen, zu deren Rechtfertigung durch wissenschaftliche Gründe niemals Anstalten getroffen worden sind. Die anzugreifenden Beweise fehlen hier gänzlich.“29 One might almost suspect that the author had remained unfamiliar with the works of Catholic writers, whether Latin or German, who deal with natural law—but, on the contrary, he cites almost all of them by name as though he knew them, not omitting v. Hertling and C. Gutberlet. And yet „Beweise fehlen hier gänzlich“! On the matter itself the same jurist writes: „Jedwede Vorstellung von einem Recht, man möge es nennen, wie man wolle, ausser dem positiven, ist jedes objektiv feststellbaren, bestimmten Inhaltes bar. Es wird notwendig und ausschliesslich durch philosophische Ansichten und sittliche Überzeugungen, praktische und namentlich politische Wünsche gebildet, die bestenfalls künftig in den Bestand des Rechtes eingehen könnten.“30
He speaks as follows, however, of the pernicious consequences of this doctrine: „Diese werden erst künftig einmal, wenn auch die allerletzten spekulativen Zuckungen von der Jurisprudenz überwunden worden sind, sich ganz übersehen und genau abschätzen lassen. Es sind nicht die gewöhnlichen Folgen einer trotz ihrer Irrtümlichkeit zu einigem Ansehen gelangten Theorie, es sind die ausserordentlichen Folgen eines auf flagrant unwahren Voraussetzungen beruhenden, aus lauter Phantasmen und Sophismen zusammengewebten, allem und jedem wissenschaftlichen Denken hohnsprechenden Gedankensystems, das seine fast unumschränkte Herrschaft auf seine wissenschaftliche Unwiderstehlichkeit zu gründen vorgab, während es dieselbe doch ausschliesslich der von ihm eröffneten Perspektive in einen künftigen idealen Rechtszustand verdankte.“31
No wonder that Bergbohm feels himself in some way called „den Kampf gegen den seit langem unterschätzten Hauptfeind aller gesunden Rechtswissenschaft endlich aufzunehmen und mit nachhaltiger Energie durchzuführen“. For, as he says, „das Unkraut Naturrecht, in welcher Form es auch auftreten möge, offen oder verschämt, ausgerottet werden, schonungslos, mit Stumpf und Stiel“.32 Yet he understood something of the difficulty of this problem after laboriously examining almost the whole literature of law, including that of other cultured peoples, and finding everywhere innumerable and undeniable traces of the detested natural law. Hence he bitterly complains: „Der Glaube an ein Recht ausser dem positiven ist noch keineswegs gänzlich ausgestorben, sondern steht vielmehr in voller Blüte. Nicht allein, dass Philosophen, Ethiker, Nationalökonomen, Staatsgelehrte ihm anhangen — in den rechtsphilosophischen Werken herrscht er schlechthin vor, in dem übrigen Schrifttum der juridischen Wissenschaften ist er reichlich vertreten. Die Litteratur fast der ganzen Kulturwelt ist vom Naturrecht durchsetzt.“33 Yet this observation does not lead him to abandon his very arduous undertaking; instead, he draws from it a serious obligation to pursue it with the greatest energy he can. We state at the end of his work how successfully he did so, by citing his triumphant pronouncement: „Das Naturrecht ist vom praktischen wie vom theoretischen Standpunkt gerichtet . . . und von der Jurisprudenz in jeder Form aufzugeben.“34 Another jurist, Neukamp, acknowledges that through Bergbohm’s excellent criticism the struggle against natural law has „zum vorläufigen Abschluss gelangt“.35 Stammler, however, considers that he has by no means established his negative judgment on natural law so firmly as to make it a conviction.36
Finally, Gumplowicz professes no less contempt for natural law as a jurist than Bergbohm, relying on a similar prejudice and an exceedingly obscure notion of the whole subject under discussion. In his judgment, „Staatsroman und Naturrecht im wesentlichen ein und dasselbe — denn während jener einen Phantasienstaat schildert, der nirgends existiert, schildert dieses ein Phantasienrecht, das nirgends gilt. Gleich jenem hat daher auch dieses für die Wissenschaft keinen Wert.“37 It is enough to have pointed out, by a few examples, these deviations by learned men from the logical and rational path of science; we trust that we have already amply addressed them in our preceding exposition, discussion, and confirmation of the doctrine. To those jurists who are so secure in their opinion, we offer this friendly counsel: carefully consider what the philosopher of our modern age, H. Ulrici (Naturrecht, 211 f.), suggests that jurisprudence take into account. (See above, note on no. 560.)
Article 2.
On the division of law.
568. Just as rights are known from their sources, so their diversity depends chiefly on those same sources. Therefore, with the sources defined, nothing now prevents us from presenting an overview of the principal ways of dividing law, together with the more specialized distinctions customary in legal science.
§ 1. Law, taken as the objective norm of justice, is divided in the most general way:
569. I. into natural and positive law, according as it obtains its juridical validity immediately from natural law or from the free enactment of a legislator. Aristotle already uses this division.38 For he distinguishes two kinds of law in force publicly (τὸ δίκαιον πολιτικόν): the legal (δίκαιον νομικόν) and the natural (δίκαιον φυσικόν)—the latter subsisting as law by nature, not, like the former, by force of positive law, and doing so everywhere in the same way and independently of human opinion. Hence it is universal and common unwritten law (νόμος κοινός, ἄγραφος).
Positive law is further divided into divine and human law, according as the authority that immediately legislates positively is divine or human.
Positive divine law, which is also commonly called simply divine law, although the same name must likewise be applied to natural law, comprises law added by God’s free decree to natural law and made known by positive revelation. For the most part it also pertains to the explanation of natural law, and therefore agrees with it in matter in many ways; but it further includes the laws God imposed upon human beings as founder of the supernatural order. Accordingly, it is subdivided into the old divine law, which the divine legislator established in the Old Testament (for example, concerning ceremonies and the polity of the Jews), and the new, which he established in the New Testament (for example, concerning the constitution and governance of the Church, the sacraments, etc.).
Human law
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For the two perfect and lawmaking societies instituted for the human race in the present order of providence, it is likewise distinguished into two kinds: ecclesiastical or canon law, comprising the laws and decrees of councils and popes; and civil law, taken in the broadest sense, comprising the laws of civil powers and the institutions of civil life, whether those commonly shared in various nations (that is, “law of nations,” insofar as the Scholastics distinguished it from natural law) or those proper to particular states (“civil law” properly so called). See nos. 570–571.
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According to its various modes of origin, the same law is either customary or statutory, that is, written, according as it was introduced by legitimate custom or formally enacted by law. The two often agree in substance, insofar as what has long been in force through custom is in the course of time also reduced to the form of written law. Customary law may in turn be considered either according to the elements common in general to all peoples, or according to those that are in some way proper to individual peoples. In the former sense, customary law pertains in substance partly to natural law, partly to “law of nations” (in the Scholastics’ sense); in the latter, it pertains to civil law properly so called.
570. Explanation. For its proper use, this most general division of law requires some further clarification. One must carefully note its
twofold historical interpretation:
Today, in common usage, the terms “natural” and “positive law” not infrequently involve great ambiguity, from which serious errors sometimes arise. This can happen, for example, in the grave question whether private possession and ownership of things, or the institution of civil society, should be called natural law in itself or positive law. In fact, either claim can be affirmed with some relative truth, according to the differing extent assigned to those terms. In practice, one must distinguish especially two senses of them: one formerly common in the schools, the other more commonly used by modern authors.39
571. A. Natural and positive law according to the usage of St. Thomas and the schools. The general criterion by which natural law is usually distinguished from positive law—namely, immediate origin from natural law and hence from the necessity of nature—admits both a stricter and a less strict interpretation; modern authors generally follow the latter, the Scholastics often the former.
Accordingly, according to St. Thomas (as may be gathered from II–II, q. 57, aa. 2 and 3), only those things belong to natural law that are “fitted to a human being by the very nature of the thing and proportioned to him according to an absolute account”; such are both first principles and conclusions, whether proximate or remote, insofar as they are inferred simply and necessarily, or “according to an absolute account,” excluding those that follow from them only according to a nonabsolute account, for example utility, equity, or moral necessity, in such a way that they remain subject to human deliberation and agreement.
On the other hand, whatever is in force having been introduced proximately in some way through human agreement or deliberation is referred to positive law (human law). Since all these things, though not simply by nature, must nevertheless always be according to nature, the ancients therefore divide positive law (understand human law, except ecclesiastical law), according to its greater or lesser degree of proximity to natural law, into law of nations and civil law.
“Law of nations,” that is, law instituted in the same way by all or nearly all nations and therefore common to nations, is intermediate between natural and civil law. It closely approaches natural law, in that it too is common to all nations, though it is not instituted by the nations but received along with nature. Thus understood, law of nations comprises things that are themselves derived from natural law as conclusions from principles, but are not “fitted to a human being by the nature of the thing itself and proportioned to him according to an absolute account”; rather, they are proportioned according to utility and congruity, or even moral necessity, at least with respect to individual persons, and certainly with respect to the whole society or human race, and are therefore in some way established by human “agreement.” As the holy Doctor notes (ibid., a. 3, ad 3), this does not require a special enactment or pact, but it suffices that “natural reason declares that things which have equity by proximity” are common. Moreover, “ownership of possessions” is expressly named as an example of this kind of law.
Finally, civil law, which may vary among different states, also “arises from natural right,” but not “as a conclusion from principles,” rather “by way of determination” according to the condition of each state, time, place, etc.
Thus the Scholastics generally follow St. Thomas (and Grotius also largely agreed with them), apparently guided chiefly by the consideration40 that whatever is commanded or forbidden by natural law is intrinsically and equally absolutely good or evil; and therefore things that are not so are distinguished from strict natural law.41
572. B. Natural and positive law according to the usage that more recently (roughly since the seventeenth century) prevailed. Omitting the ancient distinction between natural law and law of nations, this usage comprises both under the common name natural law, substituting “law of nature in the broader sense” for the former law of nations and thereby restricting the scope of positive law within narrower limits.
Although this view originally proceeded from the innovators’ general opposition to Scholastic doctrine, it gradually began to spread more widely and take root, commended by certain practical advantages.42 The reason was supplied partly by the closest connection and almost mutual interpenetration of “natural law” and “law of nations,” and the resulting difficulty of strictly distinguishing the bounds of each in every subject; partly by consideration of the two respects in which human nature is known to be the foundation of natural law: as regards the individual human being and as regards society, to which the Author of nature destined the human being as naturally social. For from this it seems to follow that those things, too, should at least in some broader sense be assigned to natural law which, although proportioned to individual human beings not “by the nature of the thing” or “according to an absolute account” but only “according to utility,” are nevertheless understood to be simply necessary for society as a whole and its end, and therefore naturally prescribed for the community. Nor is it an obstacle that some cooperation of human deliberation or “agreement” is required in these matters, since, under God’s providence, such cooperation seems to be instrumental rather than positively legislative.
Added to these internal foundations of the doctrine, which are not in themselves empty, is the fact that St. Thomas himself expressly acknowledges not only the stricter designation of natural law but also a broader one, affirming generally: “Whatever follows from natural right as a conclusion must be natural right”; this therefore also applies to “law of nations,” because it truly “is derived from natural law as conclusions from principles” and “natural reason dictates the things that belong to the law of nations.”4344
573. Hence it is clear that the disagreement of the ancients with those who nowadays more commonly count certain things that they called positive “law of nations” as natural law, as happens in the example mentioned above (no. 570), is only apparent. For both sides evaluate the matter in the same way, but differ in terminology. Whatever its original introduction, this difference in terminology now seems the less objectionable because, over time, we see “law of nations,” when called positive, commonly understood and used to mean international law—something quite different from what the schools included under that term. It is very important, however, against the efforts of social radicalism, that the stability and sanctity of those institutions which “by the dictate of natural reason” prevail like the common inheritance of all nations, and are therefore by their very nature removed from human power of reform, be expressed without ambiguity in the very name natural law.
574. Another general division of law is usually drawn from its objective scope within the whole social order. In this way every law, whether natural in itself or positive, according as it concerns private or public social relations, is divided:
II. into private and public law.
Private law comprises domestic law (Familienrecht), by which domestic society, or the family, is internally constituted and ordered, and civil law in the narrower sense (bürgerliches oder Zivilrecht), by which the mutual juridical relations of individual citizens and families, as well as of other particular groups coexisting within the common civil bond, are determined.
Public law comprises the law of the state or public civil law (Staatsrecht), by which civil society is constituted and sustained as an organic unity and continually adapted, internally and externally, to the orderly attainment of its end; international law, also customarily called the law of nations, that is, the law between nations (Völkerrecht), by which individual civil societies are rightly ordered both in their external juridical relations with one another and in relation to the common law of all humanity45; and ecclesiastical law, which, since it rests upon its own public authority, to be revered by all Christian nations, must be wholly distinguished from the law of the state. Nor should it be tolerated that ecclesiastical law be considered merely a special part of the latter, “as is the preference of those jurists who refuse to recognize the character of a perfect society in the Church, so that all her rights may more easily be subjected to the arbitrary will of civil legislation.”46
575. Scholium. If law is also divided into individual and social, this is not a division of law properly or strictly so called, which is under discussion here, but of law taken in a broader sense: namely, insofar as it comprises not only juridical relations of human beings and obligations of social justice, but universally all human duties, including ethical and religious ones. Therefore individual law in substance agrees with special ethics. The term “law” is used in a similar way when the whole of moral philosophy is indiscriminately called natural law, comprising both ethics and social, or properly so-called, natural law. We too have followed this usage of the ancients in the general title of these “Institutions.”
§ 2. Law taken as a moral faculty.
576. According to this meaning, rights are usually distinguished as follows:
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Real and personal rights. The rationale for this division is not always the same among all writers. Usually, however, real right (dingliches oder Sachenrecht) and personal right (persönliches oder Personenrecht) mean the same as the ancient right in a thing and right to a thing; or they are distinguished with respect to their matter, according as someone has a right directly in a thing subject to his power or possession, or a right to a thing to be provided by a certain person or persons. At other times these terms are used to distinguish the various ways in which a right can belong and adhere to a human being. Thus personal rights are sometimes called those that affect a person in themselves and adhere to him immediately, such as the right to preserve one’s life; real rights, by contrast, are those that accrue to a person not in themselves but by virtue of some thing, and in this respect are conceived as adhering proximately to the thing. Thus whoever buys an estate to which exemption from an annual tax is attached acquires the right to this exemption as a “real” right.
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Innate rights (absolute, original) and acquired rights (hypothetical, adventitious), according as their foundation or title is constituted by the very fact of the real existence of a human being, or by some fact, necessary or free, added to that existence.
3. Inalienable and alienable rights. A right is to be considered inalienable—that is, one that a human being can never licitly or validly transfer or renounce—if and insofar as it must belong to a human being as a necessary condition for attaining the ultimate end or fulfilling a certain moral obligation; otherwise it is called alienable. Moreover, the same reference to the ultimate end and to the particular obligation that had to be fulfilled contains the objective norm and measure by which it is judged lawful or unlawful to renounce the use of any right, temporarily or permanently. Accordingly, those who say that the same rights are inalienable as are innate, and that the same rights are alienable as are acquired, do not seem to reach the true rationale of this division. For although innate rights, as long as human nature in which they are founded remains, may in themselves be called inalienable in the sense that they cannot be lost against a person’s will or outside the case of just penal deprivation, it can nevertheless happen, according to the consideration just given and depending on personal circumstances, that an innate right is nonetheless rightly called alienable either in itself or as to its use (for example, the right to acquire property), while an acquired right is at the same time rightly called inalienable whenever it is required as a necessary means for fulfilling some unavoidable duty (for example, the parental right to provide for children’s education).
Article 3.
On the supreme principle of natural law.
§ 1. Preliminary notions.
577. It is proper to natural law, as its name indicates, that it be derived from the principles of rational nature, which are known ultimately to be reducible to one supreme and most universal principle, by the method of rational deduction. Therefore, ever since the very existence of natural law began to be denied, the whole discussion of the supreme principle of law—which formerly used to occupy a prominent place in the philosophy of law—was ordered to go into exile along with natural law, making way for a broader treatment of the sources of positive law. But we, who have undertaken to restore natural law, must surely also revive, insofar as the subject requires, that inquiry inseparable from natural law.
The principles from which natural law must be derived are none other than the very principles of natural law, insofar as they concern the order of social justice. By the supreme principle of natural law (for knowing it), therefore, we mean that most general formula of natural law which implicitly comprises the whole order of objective social justice, naturally provided for and imposed both with respect to the whole social body and with respect to its individual members; from it, therefore, all human natural rights, together with their corresponding juridical duties, are scientifically derived. (Cf. what was said above in a similar way [nos. 277 ff.] about the “supreme principle of natural law.”)
578. Once the true nature and origin of law are known, and its genuine rational foundation is seen—that is, the objective and formal rationale by virtue of which our intellect knows and affirms with metaphysical certainty that the order of law is necessary by the eternal law itself and therefore exists—almost no serious controversy remains, as regards the matter itself, about discerning the true principle of law. On the other hand, wherever either the innate concept of law is corrupted or its true ideal end intended by the Author of nature, and hence its rational foundation, is unknown, every attempt to establish a truly supreme deductive principle of this kind must necessarily stray from the path. And in fact all the errors ever put forward concerning it have flowed from either or both of these corrupted sources of doctrine.
Moreover, it was demonstrated above (nos. 441–445) that the true rational foundation of law, consonant with its innate concept and end, and capable of being considered the common and most universal title of all natural law, lies in the right order of social life, willed by God and naturally prescribed. This right order requires that human society be both constituted and continually preserved according to the norm of social nature, that is, according to all the essential social relations founded and established in it. Since this norm of social life is known to have been divinely imposed and sanctioned, it is evident that no right order of society can exist that does not regard God as the ultimate and absolute end and lawgiver of every order, or that accepts the norm divinely established in advance not whole but arbitrarily mutilated, not according to the idea of a social organism but according to merely individual relations. With this twofold criterion as a guide, anyone can easily discern which of the various alleged supreme principles of law must be rejected in advance as spurious, and which must ultimately be held as true.
§ 2. The alleged spurious supreme principles of law are excluded.
579. It would take too long to list individually all the formulas of such principles, plainly false or inadequate in themselves, that have ever been proposed by various teachers of natural law. Nor do we consider this necessary, since almost all of them flow as corollaries from sources of doctrine that we have already shown in the preceding chapters to be erroneous and opposed to all sound philosophy. In general, they are founded on that “natural law” whose very concept is shaped either by materialism, pantheism, or abstract rationalism and individualism. Since “pantheistic” natural law, however, approaches partly materialism and partly rationalism through an intimate kinship, agreeing with the former in matter and objective character, with the latter in form and dialectical construction, all such erroneous principles can suitably be reduced in the broadest terms to two classes: one bearing in some way the character of materialism, the other that of abstract rationalism and individualism.
580. The first class considers the whole of law either as a part of that great mechanism of forces by which the whole world is finally constituted and governed, or—as practically amounts to the same thing—as the necessary and inevitable manifestation or evolution of the Absolute in the form of a moral world. Therefore, the ultimate basis for asserting all law must be placed in the force that prevails physically and historically, expressed by this general formula: the limits of law and of actual power are the same. And indeed every theory of this kind of natural law is reduced by logical necessity to this, however often it may be veiled in an honorable array of words; applied in practice to public law, it signifies either socialist tyranny in the name of the collective multitude or the Hobbesian absolutism of rulers. And, as we have said, this class includes not only those writers who explicitly and theoretically profess material monism, but also to some extent those who, with Spinoza, remove all moral freedom from human beings, although in other respects, by the external form of their words and method of philosophizing, they seem to approach rationalism more closely. But there is no reason to dwell longer on the materialistic and quasi-materialistic philosophy of law, in which the very names of law and justice are profaned. A more substantial consideration is required by
581. The second class of principles, which distinguishes the rationalist school of law cultivated by Kant and Fichte. All the supreme principles of law devised by writers of this school (and the earliest decades of the nineteenth century in particular produced a great many) display the individualistic character of their common origin. Indeed, with many variations of wording, most of them in substance express the very thing already set out in (no. 520) as Kant’s formula of law:
“Every action is right (conformable to law) if, or according to the maxim by which, when taken as a rule of action, the freedom of each person’s choice can coexist with everyone else’s freedom according to a universal law.” (“Eine jede Handlung ist recht, die oder nach deren Maxime die Freiheit der Willkür eines Jeden mit Jedermanns Freiheit nach einem allgemeinen Gesetze zusammen bestehen kann.”)
Or, which is the same thing, the “general juridical law”:
“Act externally in such a way that the free use of your freedom can coexist with everyone’s freedom according to a universal law.” (“Handle äusserlich so, dass der freie Gebrauch deiner Willkür mit der Freiheit von Jedermann nach einem allgemeinen Gesetze zusammen bestehen könne.”)
Hence it is concluded that all innate rights of a human being are reduced to one supreme right, namely, the right of freedom within the limits assigned above. (“Das angeborene Recht ist nur ein einziges: Freiheit . . . sofern sie mit jedes Andern Freiheit” etc.; see no. 521.)
A similar but more boldly exaggerated opinion is added by Fichte, who likewise places the supreme and original right, belonging absolutely to every person, in freedom, but in a freedom that in itself and in its concept is entirely unlimited, and must be limited only consequently, with respect to other coexisting persons. (“Der Begriff der Freiheit [in nur formaler Bedeutung] gibt den Begriff des Urrechtes . . . Das Urrecht ist daher das absolute Recht der Person in der Sinnenwelt nur Ursache zu sein.”) Cf. no. 522.
582. Accordingly, these and similar “supreme principles of law” are manifestly derived from one or the other, or both, of these sources:
“Regulate the use of your freedom in external actions so that it can be reconciled with the freedom of all others necessary for rational activity in the sensible world.” (“Mache von deiner Freiheit im äussern Handeln keinen andern Gebrauch als einen solchen, womit die zur Wirksamkeit der Vernunft in der Sinnenwelt notwendige Freiheit aller Andern vereinbar ist.”) C. H. v. Gros, Lehrbuch, etc., § 27.
“You are (rightfully) permitted to set yourself any end whatsoever to attain and to pursue it with your powers, whenever and insofar as everyone else’s personal freedom can coexist with it.” (“Du darfst jeden beliebigen Zweck dir setzen und durch deine Kräfte zu erreichen streben, wenn und inwiefern damit die persönliche Freiheit aller Andern bestehen kann.”) W. F. Krug, Naturrechtliche Abhandlungen, § 15.
“Every human being has a right to embrace by his will everything that must not be conceived as forbidden by universally valid laws.” (“Jeder Mensch hat ein Recht, alles zu wollen, was nicht als verboten nach allgemein gültigen Gesetzen gedacht werden muss.”) G. Hufeland, Lehrsätze des Naturrechts, § 94.
“Every action conforms to law which harmoniously reconciles the social value belonging to individual personality with the external freedom, equality, and security of all.” (“Recht ist jede Handlung, welche den der Persönlichkeit zustehenden sozialen Wert des Einzelnen mit der äusseren Freiheit, Gleichheit und Sicherheit Aller in Übereinstimmung setzt.”) C. A. Eschenmayer, Normalrecht, § 16.
“By virtue of human nature (or as an end in himself), a human being47 has a right to every mode of existence and action in which every other human being can likewise subsist as an end in himself.” (“Der Mensch ist vermöge seiner Menschennatur [oder als Selbstzweck] befugt zu allem und jedem willkürlichen Sein und Handeln, wobei jeder andere Mensch als Selbstzweck bestehen kann.”) v. Droste-Hülshoff, Lehrbuch des Naturrechts, § 19.
“Whatever does not contradict itself conforms to law, provided that equal and the greatest possible external freedom of all is acknowledged.” (“Recht ist, was – unter vorausgesetzter Anerkennung der gleichen und grösstmöglichen äusseren Freiheit Aller – sich nicht widerspricht.”) v. Rotteck, Lehrbuch des Vernunftrechts, I, 25.
Many other similar examples could be added to these.
583. All these formulas of law, and all similar ones, plainly agree in this common character: they place the supreme final rationale and hence the whole rational foundation of law either in individual external freedom, belonging absolutely and equally as such to each coexisting person, or in personality, the absolute root of that freedom. It is no wonder, therefore, that none of the formulas of law just presented takes any account of natural law in the “objective” sense, that is, as meaning juridical law or the objective norm of what is just; instead, the word “law” constantly means only what is commonly called “subjective” right, that is, a person’s legitimate faculty (freedom). (See nos. 433–439.)
Wherever this idea of “freedom” or “personality” is understood to be the one by which the Kantian-Fichtean concept of law itself is constructed, each of the arguments by which that concept was already critically excluded above (nos. 525–535) applies all the more forcefully to exclude all the “supreme principles of law” built upon it. A further theoretical refutation of them therefore rightly seems superfluous here.
584. Yet there are not a few writers of this school who, although they use these or similar formulas of the supreme principle, do not philosophically wish to accept their original meaning intended by Kant and Fichte without qualification, but accept it only under an implicit reservation for Christian dogma; in the philosophy of law, they thus resemble those whom we called “semi-Kantians” in moral matters. Accordingly, while they too think that all law is founded on the personal freedom or free personality of the human being, they acknowledge in neither an end that is absolute in itself, with every reference to a higher moral end positively excluded. Rather, by mentally abstracting from every such reference, they rest content with the merely abstract concept of human freedom and personality alone, and suppose that the supreme principle for deriving all law can be constructed from it.
Therefore, to close off every refuge for this illusion as well, let the following be stated:
Thesis XLIX. The supreme principle of law cannot in any way be founded on human freedom or personality as such, considered abstractly.
585. It is proved, first. For the supreme principle for knowing law, if it is to be true, must be founded upon the true (rational) foundation of law, that is, upon that which must be conceived as the objective and formal rationale on account of which God, as lawgiver of nature, necessarily wills by a decree of his will that rights and duties of right be established. But the true foundation of law is not contained in human freedom or personality considered as such and abstractly. Therefore, etc.
The major premise is proved. For, as is clear from what has been proved above, natural rights proceed immediately from natural law, and consequently obtain all their force as law from a hypothetically necessary decree of the divine will. It follows from this that knowledge of them through human reasoning can be obtained from nowhere else than from prior knowledge of this very necessary hypothesis of the divine willing, or objective rationale, which is therefore called the rational foundation of law (to be asserted).
The minor premise is proved. The true foundation of law of this kind can be nothing other than some end manifestly willed by God, which consequently, by virtue of divine wisdom, requires rights as means; for no other necessity of willing something distinct from himself can be attributed to God. But neither human freedom nor personality, considered in itself and abstractly, is an end willed by God; rather, each is so only insofar as it is positively ordered to a higher end, outside of which it has absolutely no proper rationale for existing. Therefore, all the more, neither of them, if this essential reference is abstracted from, can contain within itself the objective rationale on account of which God necessarily wills rights to be established in the world.
586. It is proved, secondly. A principle of law founded on individual freedom or personality taken abstractly cannot be universal, that is, cannot extend objectively to the derivation of all and each of the natural rights. Therefore it cannot truly be the supreme principle of law.
The antecedent is proved. 1. According to this principle, those rights must be attributed to a human being that are precisely required and sufficient for the external freedom and personality of each person coexisting with the others to be realized (insofar as it corresponds to a merely abstract idea). But such a measure is wholly indeterminate in itself, so that it could be satisfied by fewer or by more rights; for the mere concept of freedom and personality, so long as its proper extent is not defined from elsewhere, must be said to be realized strictly even by the smallest sphere of its exercise. For who denies that a person held in prison can retain some personal freedom? Therefore a principle so indeterminate in itself cannot be a suitable source from which all and each of the natural rights may be definitely derived. Indeed, the concept of personal freedom, unless with Fichte one wishes to call it absolute and “unlimited” in itself, is understood to be a determinate measure for asserting law only insofar as it is itself measured by an essential relation to the end assigned to it by the Creator.
- But even if such a principle of individual freedom sufficed to derive people’s private rights, it would still plainly lack universality, since it is by no means apparent how public rights, which are likewise natural in themselves and through which the public social organism flourishes, could also be derived from it.
587. It is confirmed that principles built upon this foundation lead to immoderate legal individualism, harmful to every social authority and public order (recall what was said at no. 527).
Observations for resolving difficulties.
588. 1. One must remember that there can be no freedom of a creature, whether internal or external, that is not essentially subject to the Creator’s law by moral obligation. Therefore, if by a mere abstraction of the mind you separate freedom from this obligation, you no longer have the true concept of human freedom, but a positively false fiction of it.
- Nor can such abstraction be justified by the empty speculative argument that freedom in human personality is conceived as logically prior, and obligation then comes in secondarily and as a logical consequence: first, because every obligation presupposes freedom as a necessary condition; and second, because in every matter the positive logically precedes the negative, so that in human personality, too, a positive quantity of freedom must be conceived first, and only afterward its partial negation, or limitation by obligation. It suffices to observe in reply:
a) Internal psychological freedom must not be confused with external freedom, the only kind at issue in the present question and according to the opponents’ own view. Only internal freedom is logically prior to moral obligation, insofar as it is conceived as its necessary condition; this is not so of external freedom, which as a moral faculty is in some way identified with right itself. For each person’s destination and obligation to the social end of this life do not logically precede but follow. Hence that same natural destination and obligation stands to the external freedom due by right not as the “negative” to the “positive,” but as an end stands to its means—which can be nothing more positive.
b) What was said above (no. 473) about the question of logical priority between rights and duties, considered in one and the same human subject, also pertains here. Right (insofar as it is a certain external freedom morally belonging to a person) precedes a human being’s obligation or duty neither really nor logically. In reality, both exist together; logically, however, the prior thing is that general and original duty which consists in the very ordering of the whole of human nature to its ultimate end. That is, first the human being is conceived as a creature wholly dependent in his being and hence essentially obligated to the end assigned to him by the Creator; then, consequently, he is also furnished by the same Creator with that sphere of right or external moral freedom which corresponds as a means necessary for fulfilling that end on earth. Hence it is clear that there is nothing truly “positive” in personal external freedom except what accrues to it from that final obligation.
§ 3. The true supreme principle of law is asserted.
589. Thesis L. The supreme principle of natural law is contained in this most universal juridical law: Preserve the right order of social life; hence the same principle is aptly stated in this axiom: The rationale and measure for asserting every natural right must be placed in the right order of social life, sanctioned by nature.
Preliminary note. The same principle of law can be stated either in the form of a universal law or as a general axiom, provided that in both cases the same formal foundation of law is preserved. The former is more directly suited to duties of law, the latter to deriving rights themselves. Moreover, “the right order of social life” here must be understood strictly according to the objective integrity of this order, without which it must be called simply not right, and indeed in a determinate matter. Thus an order is “right” or “not right” not according to the greater or lesser ideal perfection it may have within the limits of strict rightness and integrity.
590. Proof I. From the characteristics of the supreme principle of law.
By its concept and by the common hypothesis of all who raise a question about it, the supreme principle of law must be: 1. proper to deriving law or juridical relations; 2. supreme reductively, or formal, that is, displaying the formal ground of law’s objective necessity; 3. supreme deductively, or (materially) universal, that is, implicitly comprising the whole natural juridical order; 4. supreme logically, or (in its order) self-evident in itself, that is, logically first among the principles of law and not derived from anything better known; to these, as an integral mark, is added 5. that it be sufficiently determinate for scientific use. But these characteristics are plainly verified in the principle under consideration. Therefore, and so forth.
Proof of the minor premise, point by point: it is
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proper to law, because it presents the proper rational foundation of law, namely, the right order of social life commanded and sanctioned by natural law, as is clear from what was demonstrated above (no. 445). For it is not the whole moral order in its broad extent that is founded on it, but the order of justice alone, excluding even duties of mutual charity insofar as they are merely ethical. Although these duties are naturally commanded from another source, they are not understood to be individually necessary under the title of strict objective integrity of a simply right social order.
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supreme reductively, or truly formal as a principle. For in this same rational foundation is displayed not only an objective but the formally ultimate ground by reason of which we know that rights are necessary by divine law. For just as the formal object of the whole eternal law is the universal order of things, by which each thing is suitably arranged to the supreme end and which a holy and wise God cannot but will, so the formal object of natural law, insofar as it concerns the rights of men, can be nothing other than that same order applied to men to be ordered socially toward an end, or insofar as it is the right social order of men, consisting in their due juridical relations. Hence the right order of social life, proportionate to the universal order of things, is understood to be not only the proper but also the ultimate and formal reason why juridical relations must be considered established by divine natural law.
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supreme deductively, or (materially) universal. For no aspect of social justice and no natural human right, whether private or public, can be conceived that is not demanded by the objective integrity of a right social order or understood to be included in it. Therefore all truly natural rights that exist must be capable of being deduced from this supreme principle. In particular, even the right which opponents proclaim as original in itself and almost an end in itself is deduced from this principle, namely, the right of external personal freedom—not, to be sure, as “absolute” or “unlimited,” nor limited externally only by the equal freedom of everyone else, but intrinsically measured by the common social end, which is proposed to each person as such for free pursuit. 4. supreme logically, or self-evident in itself. For the right order of social life is nothing other than the objective natural order of justice, whose evident and habitual notion belongs to the essence of practical reason suitably developed, just as does the notion of the moral order considered generally. Each consists in principles of reason that are self-evident and evident in themselves and that constitute natural law in us: the one generally according to every aspect of the moral order, the other specifically according to the aspect of the order of justice.
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Finally, it is also sufficiently determinate for scientific use. For although, as a supreme principle, it can only be general and not yet applied in itself to any matter, nevertheless by its very generality it can be applied through science to every matter of natural justice, so that nothing in its terms is objectively indefinite in itself or inaccessible to rational science. Indeed, sound and sincere philosophy does not dispute either the proximate and ultimate end of social life, its essential condition on earth, or consequently “the right order of social life,” so that what conforms to it and what deviates from it can generally be measured and defined scientifically without ambiguity. If, nevertheless, a certain conclusion is sometimes unclear, this occurs not through a defect in the principle but through the inadequacy of human understanding, especially in complex applications; in that case, it must be judged that true natural law in that matter is not established.
591. Proof II. From the analogy of this principle with the supreme principle of natural law (no. 284).
From the supreme principle of universal natural law, already known and established from another source, one may reason legitimately as follows: for the supreme principle of law to display the mark of truth immediately, it must relate to the supreme principle of universal natural law in precisely the same way as the juridical order relates to the universal moral order, that is, as a special part relates to a generic whole. But this relation is plainly expressed by the formula of the principle of law, “preserve the right order of social life,” when compared with the form of the principle of natural law, “preserve the right order of rational nature as divinely sanctioned.” Therefore, and so forth.
592. Scholium. If one asks about the logical order in which the various natural rights are derived from the proposed supreme principle of law, there is no doubt that those rights which more immediately contain the character of a necessary means to the supreme and essential end of man, socially fulfilled in this world, are logically prior to the others and superior in themselves according to rational judgment. For all human affairs and the very institution of social life must serve that supreme and essential good of men according to the mind of the divine author and ordainer. Therefore, even according to the principle of “right social order,” those rights must be called first and most essential which belong to the human person as such and are therefore called innate. For the “right order of social life” demands nothing more immediately and essentially necessary than these. In order, the rights follow that are founded proximately in human society as naturally instituted and divinely sanctioned: first, those by which the family is essentially constituted, then those by which the broader civil community and public society are constituted. For this is the same order of objective necessity in which these various classes of rights are required for the right order of social life, with the supreme end as guide. The same rights must be judged in the reverse order if what is assessed in them is not so much the degree to which they are necessary as means to man’s essential end, but the degree of the social body whose moral organism they constitute. In this way, other things being equal and man’s essential end always preserved, public rights take precedence over the others.
Article 4.
On the collision of rights and duties.
593. Although in many cases it is in itself easy and clear not only to know positive rights and duties with certainty from their various positive sources, but also to conclude natural ones from the supreme principle by the aid of right reason, nevertheless the very multiplicity and variety of rights and duties can sometimes give rise to considerable difficulty in this operation through what is called their collision.
Rights or duties are said to collide with one another whenever two or more arise that cannot all be satisfied at once. Since every law, whether ethical or juridical, must be an “ordinance of reason,” and all binding force ultimately descends from the divine will, without which no right or duty could be firm, it must be held a priori as certain that there is no objectively real collision of duties or rights, but that wherever it occurs it consists in a mere appearance. For neither right reason nor the will of God can contradict itself and command or ratify at the same time things that conflict with one another. Therefore every solution of a collision consists in dispelling this appearance and discerning the duty or right that, according to right reason, must be considered to prevail over the other and hence alone to subsist actually and effectively.
§ 1. On the collision of duties.
594. It is impossible for laws that are negative in themselves to collide with other negative laws; only affirmative laws can appear to conflict with one another and with negative laws. If, however, a conflict of duties seems to arise in which two or more duties cannot be observed at once or prudently reconciled by postponing one of them, the following circumstances in particular must be carefully considered, both individually and collectively:
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The laws from which the duties arise. It is self-evident that in such a conflict the law that is in itself nobler, stricter, or more necessary for the common good prevails over those opposed to it. Hence, other circumstances being equal, natural duties are to be preferred to positive ones, negative duties to affirmative ones, duties of justice to duties of goodness, and special duties to general ones.
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The goods attained through the duties. Among these we must prefer the common good to the private good, the greater to the lesser, the nobler to the less noble, the more necessary (in itself or in the circumstances) to the less necessary, and the absolute and supreme good to all others. The goods and their order are: a) goods of the soul and b) goods of the body, which in turn may be goods of α) life, β) status, or γ) convenience; each may be necessary, less necessary, or superfluous. The degree of necessity must therefore be assessed within the same kind of goods; necessity can be extreme, grave, or ordinary.
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The persons toward whom we have duties. By their nature, duties toward God or religion take precedence over duties toward man. If affirmative, however, they can and often must be postponed to another occasion rather than omitted, so that negative and absolute obligations toward ourselves or our neighbor may be fulfilled. A similar decision must be made if duties toward ourselves and toward others seem to conflict. A more difficult and complicated question is what order should be observed in fulfilling duties of charity, given the various relations among people. (St. Thomas discusses this matter at greater length, although it seems to pertain more to a special part of moral philosophy, Summa theol. 2, 2, q. 26.)
§ 2. On the collision of rights.
595. Rights are evidently connected with duties by an individual bond. Therefore, the collision of rights can in some way be reduced to a collision of juridical duties. Nevertheless, since particular juridical duties as such are measured by the rights correlated to them, and not conversely, the collision of rights also requires special consideration.
Rights can collide with one another in different ways. Either one and the same subject claims rights for himself that appear objectively incompatible, or the colliding rights belong to different subjects. In the first case, the conflict is merely internal and occurs within one person’s conscience, just like a collision of merely ethical duties, though it is resolved much more easily than that. For since the use of a right is not in itself commanded, every difficulty disappears by not using one of the rights. In the second and more common case, the matter is subject to dispute among different subjects of rights; therefore, it is commonly called not so much a collision of right as a dispute or contest over rights.
In fact, not every lawsuit among men concerning the scope of mutual rights—which usually rests on a true or fictitious doubt about some particular positive right, and for whose resolution civil courts are established—can philosophically be reduced to a true collision of rights properly so called. In such cases, therefore, what is needed is not so much the rules of philosophy as a positive inquiry of jurisprudence.
596. A collision of rights properly and philosophically so called is understood rather as one that sometimes occurs in the speculative deduction and calculation of natural rights. For it happens that certain rights arising from different relations of the social order seem to conflict either with one another or with positive law, so that one of them must yield in favor of the other. In such a case, therefore, philosophical reason must be consulted no less than in a collision of duties; the following general rules may be proposed:
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Generally speaking, the collision of rights concerns not so much the rights themselves, considered in themselves, as their simultaneous use and actual efficacy. Therefore, to resolve a conflict, right reason does not usually require that the inferior right, otherwise well founded on a general title, be simply abolished in favor of the prevailing right; it requires only that its actual efficacy be suspended for as long as circumstances demand. For nothing prevents a right, as a moral power, from remaining intact in itself, even if it is temporarily deprived of actual use because of higher considerations.
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An inalienable right as such can no more collide with another similar right than negative natural duties can collide with one another. For the inalienability of a right immediately rests on a duty that is either negative in itself or absolute from another source, and that cannot be fulfilled except through the exercise of that same right.
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An inalienable right in itself prevails over every alienable right, just as a negative and absolute duty prevails over an affirmative and hypothetical one.
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Rights also called innate or absolute are, in themselves and other things being equal, to be preferred to acquired or hypothetical rights. The qualification “in themselves and other things being equal” is added because, when all the circumstances that may arise from concrete conditions are considered, it not rarely happens that right reason dictates a reverse order of precedence, at least with respect to the actual use and efficacy of rights. The circumstances that must guide judgment in every particular case are nearly the same as those listed above for rightly assessing duties in relation to one another (no. 594).
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If a natural right that is alienable in itself seems to collide materially with a particular positive right legitimately established, then, in view of the right order of social life, positive law must be said to prevail—not because it is in itself of a higher order, but because it is considered to establish in a particular and determinate way precisely what natural law comprehends in general and with respect to concrete determination. Hence this is to be called not so much a collision of rights as the right execution of natural law itself, provided for by the author of nature. The judgment must be entirely different when a positive legal right formally opposes a certain natural right and thus lacks inner justice; then it can never prevail in itself over natural law. (Cf. S. Thom., Summa theol. 2, 2, q. 60, a. 5.)
597. Scholium. Nothing sharpens and develops right moral judgment practically more than the continual exercise of resolving apparent collisions of duties and rights from given principles. This same exercise also gives students many opportunities to review theoretical principles, both ethical and juridical, repeatedly in their minds and at the same time to illustrate them in practice. For this purpose, as is customary in moral theology, it is useful to invent and propose various possible cases, so that the intellect may be philosophically exercised by judging them correctly. Such an exercise can certainly be established more clearly and suitably only once the particular duties and rights of man according to his various social relations have been discussed more fully, as is proposed for the second part of this work. Nevertheless, nothing prevents us from anticipating it to some extent here within the limits of matters commonly well known from experience of social life. Here is an example:
A soldier on sentry duty in wartime sees nearby a child in danger of death and anxiously hesitates over whether he may leave his post briefly in order to save the child. Although there is no present danger from the enemy, he considers the law forbidding him, on pain of death, to leave his post the stronger one, first, because it is negative and therefore always binding, and second, because the common good must be preferred to private good. On the other hand, he thinks the duty of charity, by which he must save the child as far as he can, is natural and most urgent, while remaining at his assigned post is commanded by positive law; and in the present circumstances no public good is at stake, but only whether it is lawful, or perhaps even praiseworthy, to incur the personal risk of capital punishment in order to save another person’s life. What should be thought of these various arguments, and what ought the soldier to do, or what might he lawfully do?
A young man of unimpeachable integrity, falsely accused of a most serious crime by the wicked machinations of a rival, is sentenced by a judge to life imprisonment. Later, when a chance offers him a safe escape from public custody, he declines to take it. Although conscious of his innocence and certain of his natural right to recover his freedom, he thinks that the right publicly confirmed in the judge’s sentence temporarily prevails over it, since that is a private right. But while living in prison, he notices that daily association with the worst men creates an increasingly imminent danger of moral corruption for him. Therefore, when another opportunity to escape soon presents itself, he gladly seizes it without hesitation, because the inalienable right to moral integrity must be preferred to all others. In his flight, however, he opportunely makes use of the very swift and valuable horse belonging to the unjust accuser, which he had arranged through a friend to have secretly stolen for him that same night. Finally, having fortunately reached a place of refuge, he sells the horse in order to have the means to support himself. What should be thought of the reasons and rules of law this young man followed?
Anyone can easily devise similar examples for practice by considering the various kinds of duties and rights.
Note. On p. 176, line 15, read “a reason that is relatively grave and sufficient” in place of “a sufficient reason.” Read the same on p. 177, line 8 from the bottom.