Theodor Meyer, Ius naturae generale

Theodor Meyer

Theodor Meyer, Ius naturae generale

Theodor Meyer

Institutiones iuris naturalis, Pars I: Ius naturae generale

First published 1906

Theodor Meyer’s Ius naturae generale from the second corrected edition (1906), in Latin with an original English translation. Preface and proemium included; the navigational contents and publisher advertisements are excluded.


Introductio I: Preface

Introduction

Sectio I: General Ethics

Sectio II: Social Right in General

Liber I: Book One. General Sociology

Liber II: Book Two. The Essential Bond of the Social Organism, or Right

Chapter I. The Genuine Notion of Right Analytically Established

Chapter II. The True Idea of Right Critically Confirmed against Its Various Corruptions

Prologue.

514. All the philosophies of law that depart from its genuine notion established so far agree more or less in this: they are directed in themselves toward profaning in some way or even entirely removing the native sanctity of law.

Above all, by its very nature and logical necessity, this applies to every materialistic and atheistic philosophy of law throughout the ages, since it removes even the possibility of any bond between men that is truly moral, and has nothing to substitute for it except the law of brute matter, that is, the dominion of the stronger force.

To this is added the theory of law begun by Thomasius and developed by Kant, by which law is wholly severed from morality and conceived as a merely external condition of individual freedom. On it is founded the “legal individualism” that thereafter became the principal source and philosophical basis in political and social matters of what are commonly called “liberal ideas.”

By a different method, but one no less disastrous, Hegelian philosophy likewise destroys the true sanctity of law, substituting its absolute “objectivism of law” for Kant’s “individualism.” By this, law is again joined to morality in a certain absolute unity, but is severed from the law of the living God, author and governor of the world, and wholly surrendered to the state alone, as the supreme deity of human affairs, drawing from it as its sole source. This principle above all supports the claimed omnipotence of the “modern state,” hostile to both ecclesiastical and private freedom, and, by the logical law of its development, growing into full “socialism.”

It is especially this threefold corruption of law that we propose to discuss in the present chapter.

In addition, the recent “historical-positive” theory of law, which broadly dominates the “conservative” jurisprudence of our time, could with some justification be referred here. For although, by a salutary instinct, it tries to combat rationalistic legal individualism as an incitement to political and social revolution, and to substitute for it an “objectivism” that is not so much pantheistic as historical and providential, it must nevertheless be said to corrupt the genuine idea of law by a mutilation born more of imprudence than hostility, because it seeks to restrict it to positive law alone. The subject of the third chapter itself will naturally provide the proper place to examine this opinion.

Article 1.

The materialistic appraisal of law.

515. Certainly there is no need to delay here in refuting the materialistic philosophy of law, since it must necessarily collapse of itself along with all its theoretical apparatus, which has already been refuted on other grounds. Besides, for a man conscious of his rational dignity, merely to point out its shameful follies in passing is more than enough to refute them. Indeed, it is enough to demonstrate plainly that the life of human society, like that of man, is sustained not by bread of a merely material kind but above all by heavenly truth and spiritual nourishment received from God.

And indeed, when questioned about law and legal obligation, all materialism (to which atheism is not unreasonably joined), whatever appearance of science or hypocrisy of civilized humanity and morality it may assume, is logically compelled to converge on this conclusion:

There is no real distinction between law and physical power.

Some do not disdain to profess this doctrine, so destructive of all society, directly and explicitly; many others more modestly and tacitly presuppose or elegantly disguise it. In reality, however, they present one and the same kind of jurisprudence as those who avow it, a jurisprudence rightly compared to a mechanical art, presided over as its supreme rule by utility and a prudent assessment of forces.

516. I. Among its advocates, above all, must be named all who openly profess material monism, whose ignoble succession is recorded in both ancient and more recent histories of philosophy. Their views not only on the juridical order but on the whole moral order are sufficiently shown by their well-known sayings, already mentioned elsewhere, which allow not even a trace of an ideal end or a spiritual efficient cause to be recognized in the world.

517. II. Closely akin to these are those who, although they do not theoretically proceed to material monism, nevertheless derive every distinction between good and evil, just and unjust, not from an internal and immutable reason but from a human valuation externally introduced.

To a great extent, the ancient “Sophist” school seems to belong here. Although it began from sounder origins, it soon veered toward that pernicious skepticism by which neither truth nor a universally valid law was recognized, but both were held to be measured only by subjective opinion. For from this view followed readily conclusions that were plainly antinomian, which we read were charged against several disciples of this school by Plato and Aristotle. For if what is true and just is whatever appears so to each person, it is easy to conclude that by natural law each person is entitled to follow his own opinion and discretion in everything, while traditional laws and customs that hinder him are to be scorned, as violent obstacles to natural law, whenever he has the power to do so. Thus in Plato, among others, Callicles is presented as teaching that according to nature no right exists except the right of the stronger; and if public customs and laws disagree with this, it is because the great majority, conscious of their own weakness, thought it useful to make some agreement about law in order to protect themselves against the more powerful. Men of stronger character, however, are not thereby prevented from following the true law of nature, namely, the law of utility. Similarly, Thrasymachus, a speaker from Chalcedon, says that rulers sanction as law what is useful to them, and that law is nothing other than the advantage of those who possess power.

Among philosophers of the modern age, Hobbes holds first place in this class; the principal points of his doctrine have been reported above (nos. 144 and 394). One might certainly say that he used the sophist Callicles himself as his teacher, since he proceeds from precisely the same concept of natural law, saying: “Nature has given each person a right to everything” . . . From this it is also understood that, in the state of nature, utility is the measure of right. Nor does he differ from him when he explains the origin of the first positive community of rights among men and of civil subjection. For here too he seems to have no other reason than the fear of the weak and a prudent arrangement by which individuals might seek protection by mutual agreement against the “natural right” of the more powerful. He surpasses Callicles only in that he does not allow such a civil agreement, once established, to be breached thereafter by anyone’s particular utilitarianism under the title of “natural law.” Therefore, he wishes it to be fortified by some absolute public power (“sovereignty”) that no private resistance can overcome. And in this very supreme and physically invincible power of civil sovereignty, according to Hobbes, is contained the source and ultimate ground of all law and objective justice. For “before sovereign powers, just and unjust did not exist . . . Legitimate kings make just what they command by commanding it, and unjust what they forbid by forbidding it.”

Add to these the modern Hobbesians, whom atheistic-naturalistic philosophy multiplies continually in our age, and whose example was described above (no. 144).

518. III. Finally, although Spinozism in itself presents the primary form of modern pantheism, it is by its nature no less akin to materialism than to idealism. For just as it destroys every condition of true morality by abolishing all freedom of indifference, thereby making the names good and evil, virtue and vice empty (see no. 109), so too it leaves no other measure of law than the forces of nature and physical necessity. That is, God, or the absolutely infinite being, the sole substance of the world and the immanent cause of all things, necessarily wills whatever he wills; hence whatever exists or happens, being necessary, is also just. Law, therefore, is the same as natural power (force).

Spinoza himself expressly states this in his Theological-Political Treatise. Above all, the relevant passage is ch. 16, entitled “On the foundations of the republic; on the natural and civil right of each person; and on the right of the sovereign powers.” For, like Hobbes, he distinguishes two states of man: one original, natural (“the right and ordinance of nature”—“the dominion of nature”), the other adventitious, civil (civil right and dominion).

Following in Hobbes’s footsteps, he describes natural law as follows. “By the right and ordinance of nature I understand nothing other than the rules of each individual’s nature, according to which we conceive each individual as naturally determined to exist and act in a certain way” (§ 2). “It is certain that nature, considered absolutely, has the highest right to all that it can . . . for the power of nature is itself the power of God” (§ 3). “But because the universal power of the whole of nature is nothing other than the power of all individuals together, it follows that each individual has the highest right to all that it can, or that the right of each person extends as far as that person’s determinate power extends” (§ 4). “For whatever each thing does according to the laws of its nature, it does by the highest right, namely, because it acts as determined by its nature and cannot act otherwise” (§ 5) . . . “Natural right, therefore, is determined not by sound reason but by desire and power” (§ 7). “Therefore, whatever each person, considered under the dominion of nature alone, judges useful to himself, whether by the guidance of sound reason or from the impulse of his passions, he may by the highest right of nature desire and seize by any means he can most easily, whether by force, deceit, pleas, or any other means; and consequently he may regard as an enemy anyone who wishes to prevent him from satisfying his desire” (§ 8). “It follows from these things that the right and ordinance of nature, under which all are born and live for the most part, forbids nothing except what no one desires and no one can do; it does not prohibit quarrels, hatred, anger, deceit, or absolutely anything that appetite recommends” (§ 9).

But even the civil state, whose contractual origin Spinoza explains in a way scarcely different from Hobbes’s opinions, recognizes no other measure of law than the utility and power of each person once again. In the same chapter he continues as follows:

“Men necessarily had to unite in order to live securely and as well as possible, and therefore arranged to hold collectively the right that each one had by nature to everything, so that it would no longer be determined by the force and desire of each person but by the power and will of all together” (§ 13). “But (according to the universal law of human nature and the law of nature) no one will promise without deceit to surrender the right he has to everything, and absolutely no one will keep promises unless from fear of a greater evil or hope of a greater good” (§ 16). “But because natural right is determined only by each person’s power, it follows that to the extent that each person transfers to another, by force or willingly, the power he possesses, he must also surrender that much of his own right to the other, and that the one who has supreme power, by which he can compel everyone by force and restrain them through fear of the supreme punishment universally feared, has the highest right over all. He will retain this right only so long as he preserves the power to carry out whatever he wishes; otherwise he will rule precariously, and no one stronger will be bound to obey him unless he wishes” (§ 24). “Otherwise we are bound to carry out all commands of the supreme power absolutely, even if it commands the most absurd things; for reason too commands us to carry them out, so that we may choose the lesser of two evils” (§ 27). “The subjects ought to recognize no other law than what the supreme power declares to be law” (§ 31). “Sin, therefore, can be conceived only under (sub) sovereignty, where what is good and what is evil are determined by the common law of the whole sovereign power.”

Article 2.

The idea of law founded on subjective rationalism. (Kant—Fichte.)

§ 1. Its specific character is explained.

A. Kantian philosophy of law.

519. Kant’s “critical” philosophy, rightly considered the common source and foundation of modern rationalism, breathed the same poison into the science of law with which it infected moral doctrine. Thomasius had taught that morality concerns the production of inner peace, while law concerns the establishment and preservation of external peace, and that internal obligations pertain to the former and external obligations to the latter. What Thomasius had suggested rather than definitely established in this statement—namely, the dogma of the mutual internal independence of the moral and juridical orders—Kant tried to establish analytically from his own philosophical principles, meanwhile erecting the idea of personal freedom in place of the idea of “peace” as the fundamental principle.

For just as, according to Kant, all morality is properly rooted in the inner freedom of a rational being and terminates in it as an end in itself, so every juridical order has its rational foundation in the external freedom of man.

For inner freedom, as Kant himself conceives it, although, as he says, it is consequently known from the moral law (of reason), in reality seems to be little other than the “autonomy of reason,” from which, as its principle, every moral obligation is said to arise. It follows that moral duties formally as such, whatever action they take as their object, whether internal or external, can only be internal, that is, proceeding from the inner law of reason and to be observed solely out of reverence for it.

But Kant considers the external freedom of a rational being, together with its really necessary conditions, as a necessary consequence and complement of inner freedom—a move not without an empirical leap alien to “pure reason”—and recognizes it as a “postulate of reason” that “requires no further proof.” He then concludes that the only necessary condition under which external freedom can actually subsist among all coexisting persons is some coercive legislation, by which the freedom of each individual is restrained in favor of the freedom of all. And this legislation must necessarily be external in itself, wholly distinct from internal or moral legislation, since nothing is more opposed to the latter than coercive obligation.

Hence a twofold legislation, essentially distinct, is distinguished: one internal and ethical, the other external and juridical. External legality, through coercion, corresponds to the former, while internal morality, from an ethical motive, that is, reverence for the law (of reason), corresponds to the latter; juridical duties are only external, while ethical duties are both internal and also those that extend to external actions, insofar as in them only the moral duty as motive is considered. Indeed, individual duties that are juridical in themselves can become ethical through something else, insofar as they are thereby also elevated to that dignity by the inner legislative authority of reason. Hence it is concluded that the ground of distinction between the ethical and juridical orders consists not so much in the diversity of duties as in the diversity of the legislation (namely, internal or external) to which they correspond; so that even a law proceeding from the divine will, since it is external (heteronomy), is excluded from the character of ethical legislation. But according to Kant’s distinction it cannot be truly juridical either, since, although it is in some way coercive through its pathological sanction, it does not demand mere legality but inner morality.

520. Thus Kant’s idea of law resembles a certain legal mechanism by which the external freedom of individual men can be made compatible with the equal freedom of other men coexisting with them. For he defines law in general as follows:

“Law is the sum of the conditions under which the choice of one person can be harmoniously united with the choice of another according to a universal law of freedom.”

Moreover, since all strict right is known to be coercive, he adds this explanation:

“Strict right can also be conceived as the simultaneous possibility of the mutual coercion of all according to universal laws, together with the freedom of each person.” Kant calls that which “has nothing ethical mixed into it,” that is, “which demands only external motives for determining freedom,” “strict” or “pure” right; . . . hence he concludes that “law and the authorization to coerce mean one and the same thing.”

The “general principle of law” agrees with the definition of law:

“Every action is in conformity with law if, or according to the maxim by which it is accepted as a rule of action, the freedom of each person can coexist with the freedom of every other person according to some universal law.”

Similarly, the “general juridical law” is:

“So act externally that the free use of your freedom can coexist with the freedom of everyone according to a universal law.”

521. Having established external freedom in this way as the proper philosophical foundation of all law, Kant further concludes: “Man’s one innate right is freedom” . . . “and innate equality is included within it.” From this original right, in which juridical personality is founded, all the other rights that belong to a man in a certain given hypothesis in relation to other coexisting persons, such as, in particular, the right of property, are then derived. From the same principle of freedom, the institution of civil society is constructed a priori as a “postulate of reason.” For, lest “freedom according to universal law” lack its necessary external determination, and lest the rights that, by virtue of that freedom, belong to each person, especially concerning “external mine and yours” in relation to others, be merely “provisional” rather than “peremptory,” a positive and common mutual recognition of everyone’s sphere of freedom must intervene. By this social pact, made for the purpose of asserting and preserving for each person his own sphere of external freedom, civil society is constituted.

B. J. G. Fichte (1762–1814).

522. Just as he pursued Kant’s footsteps above all in constructing his own new system of philosophy (subjective idealism), so too he did so in his doctrine of law. Accordingly, at nearly the same time that Kant’s theory of law appeared, Fichte himself professed similar principles of law, methodically adapted to his own system, however, and developed to the extreme of subjectivism.

For, likewise proceeding from the freedom of the rational subject as an adequate principle, he derives by an analytical operation of the mind the concept not only of law and juridical law but also of civil society and public authority. According to Fichte, freedom, even as free causality outward, is not merely a postulate of reason consequent upon inner freedom, as Kant taught, but an immediate and essential element of rationality itself.

The same freedom, considered merely formally and abstractly—that is, before it is thought to be limited in some other way—is conceived as absolute in itself, or unlimited independence, and to that extent presents the “original right” (das Urrecht) of every rational person.

But necessity forces reason to recognize, in addition to its own “I,” other personal beings as well. From this there immediately arises a relation called juridical, and with it the rational necessity (juridical law) that each person restrict his freedom only as much as the possibility of that same freedom for others requires. But since a free being imposes this law on itself only on condition that it be imposed in turn by the other beings coexisting with it, every juridical relation among particular persons exists actually and determinately only insofar as it is founded on mutual recognition. Hence arises the necessity of joining a community of free beings as such, without any violation of freedom. This can be done only through a free contract, by virtue of which the community is established and each person’s freedom is limited according to the idea and norm of everyone’s freedom. Moreover, this law must be some kind of power, because the freedom of all cannot actually and safely be obtained and preserved against the discretion of individuals except by invincible physical coercion, to which corresponds the institution of public civil power. Finally, only through this institution are a determinate measure and real definition given to the freedom and rights of individuals. Thus, with a state and civil power constituted democratically in almost complete accordance with Rousseau’s precepts, Fichte thereafter attributes to it a hardly tolerable sphere of political power (under the title of protecting common freedom). In the whole system, finally, nearly the same independence of law from moral law is presupposed as was noted in Kant; just as in both cases the philosophy of public law plainly bears traces partly of Rousseau and partly of Hobbes.

C. The Kantian school.

523. By the very slogan of freedom that it put forward, the new philosophy of law commended itself sufficiently to its contemporaries; it immediately found very many imitators and adherents. From it arose the school of natural law that bears Kant’s name and held sway widely from the last decade of the eighteenth century until nearly the fourth decade of the century just past. Most treatises and books on natural law that appeared chiefly in Germany during that period share its common character. To enumerate them would be lengthy. In these works, Kantian principles of law are found widely expressed in various verbal formulations or modified to a greater or lesser extent, partly according to Fichte’s philosophy, partly according to theories conceived elsewhere. In some of them a praiseworthy effort is also apparent to reconcile these principles, if possible, with moral and Christian conscience, though with more subjective than objective success. Thus, above all through these channels, the social and political rationalism that we commonly call liberalism flowed from that common source into the first generation of the previous century in Germany; from there, at the expense of historical positive law, it introduced a vague movement for reform into the whole science of law and especially into the science of public law.

§ 2. Kant’s idea of law is critically refuted.

524. As is sufficiently clear from the exposition above, the concept of law introduced by Kantian rationalism is rightly said to cohere with the highest principles of Kantian ethics (the autonomy of reason) by a connection that is not arbitrary or merely external, but wholly internal and logically necessary, and to be derived from them as a corollary. But principles that we have long since shown to be false in themselves and opposed to the true rational order can yield only similar corollaries; once their origin is established, those corollaries are rightly judged by that very fact. Nevertheless, it is useful also to point out in the corollaries themselves the principal features by which they are recognized as the fitting offspring of false principles.

A.

525. Thesis XLVI. A philosophy of law that conceives by the name of law nothing other than a “sum of the conditions under which the freedom of each person can be reconciled with the freedom of others according to a general law”—or that in any way teaches that the supreme ideal foundation of law is situated in personal freedom alone, considered in itself and absolutely—entirely destroys the genuine character and native sanctity of law.

Preliminary note. The assertion concerns primarily the concept of law proposed by Kant himself; through its other part, however, it also extends to all analogous notions of law that have since proceeded from him as their common source and that comprise the distinctive character of the Kantian school. For their common criterion consists roughly in this: in constructing the concept of law, they begin from the idea of freedom or free personality considered in itself and absolutely, as the supreme ideal foundation of law. Certainly, the freedom divinely bestowed on rational beings is a true and fundamental reason why the institution of law among men is certainly concluded to be necessary and divinely intended from the outset. But freedom naturally granted to a rational being can only be essentially relative, that is, essentially ordered by the very creator of rational nature toward the supreme end of life, to be freely fulfilled according to the norm of law. Therefore, to set up man’s freedom, considered absolutely, as an end in itself and necessary by virtue of itself is to erect an empty idol on which nothing can be philosophically founded. Moreover, it is already sufficiently clear that man’s freedom, even when truly and fully understood, cannot in itself present the supreme and adequate foundation of law, because all legitimate freedom of a rational creature has its objective measure not in itself but receives it from the order divinely established in the moral world.

526. Proof I (direct). It belongs to the genuine character and sanctity of law that the juridical order, although it must be carefully distinguished from the rest of the moral order, nevertheless remain connected with it by an inner bond, both with respect to its origin and moral efficacy and through a common relation to the one supreme end of the whole moral world. But the doctrine noted in the thesis excludes all these conditions from the concept of law. Therefore, it must be said truly to destroy the genuine character and native sanctity of law.

The major premise is established by what was demonstrated in nos. 496–513.

Proof of the minor premise. Law is severed from morality:

  1. With respect to origin. Kant explicitly professes this by claiming that moral duties have an essentially internal origin, while juridical duties as such have an essentially external one: the former he derives solely from the internal legislation of reason, absolutely reverenced for its own sake; the latter from an externally coercive legislative power. In this respect he has his disciples agreeing with him, either explicitly or implicitly.

2. With respect to moral efficacy. Since, according to the Kantian dogma, the sole source of all moral obligation is the legislative authority of reason taken formally, it immediately follows that juridical duties, being alien to it, in themselves share no moral efficacy or binding force. Hence Kant presupposes that all juridical efficacy is in itself merely external, binding wills only through the momentary force of physical coercion, to which only an external “legality” likewise corresponds in human actions. For although it is not denied that juridical duties can sometimes also be moral, it is pointed out that this does not belong to them as such but is added from another source and secondarily, namely, through the intervention of ethical law, the formal precept of reason dictating precisely what materially also accords with a juridical duty. Indeed, those who follow Kant usually insist so strongly on this very character of law—essentially coercive and effective in itself only as “legal,” as they say—that they often think they can legitimately infer from this fact alone that law and morality have different origins.

3. With respect to the end. According to the same theory, the whole reason for being and the whole objective end of law consists in securing man’s individual freedom, limited by nothing other than its general law, or the equal condition of freedom of all others coexisting with him. This is individual freedom, I say, considered in itself and absolutely, having every measure of itself within itself, either with the essential relation to the moral end, divinely established for free man to fulfill socially, positively excluded or at least disregarded through an abstraction of the mind. But in this way law, with respect to its end, is not merely ununited with the moral order but must be said to be wholly emancipated from it, as is sufficiently clear from what was observed above under “Preliminary note” on this subject. Therefore, nothing remains by which such a concept of law could in any way share in the common sanctity of the moral order.

Finally, to present its inner nature in summary, we rightly conclude that, in place of true law—made socially inviolable and hence coercive by God’s law—it substitutes mere legality and service to terror; in place of a juridical order that constitutes a part of the moral order itself, it substitutes a certain external mechanism by which the problem of the free coexistence of many persons is solved, as it were, by mathematical proportion.

527. Proof II (indirect, or from its logical consequences). The note of condemnation pronounced in the thesis is further confirmed and illustrated more fully if the logical fruits of the same doctrine are considered. For:

  1. A concept of law confined to the external condition of freedom to be preserved in the mutual relations of persons immediately admits practical conclusions from which not only public decency but, we trust, the moral sense of its own proponents must recoil. For who could tolerate any shameful acts whatsoever—for example, those undertaken against the sanctity of marriage, immoderate usury, suicides, or even mutual killings—being called and counted as lawful acts in conformity with law in themselves, on the sole condition that they happen to be committed by mutual and common free consent! And yet this conclusion cannot be avoided so long as the sphere of legitimate freedom and law is supposed to have no limits other than those demanded by the necessity of not impeding the freedom of others. Nor should they say that Kant himself sufficiently guarded against such a consequence by adding the phrase “according to a general law” to his definition of law. For by those words he understands no other law than the “general law of freedom,” as the author’s German text explicitly reads (“nach einem allgemeinen Gesetz der Freiheit”). And indeed, lest he openly contradict himself, he could not invoke here any general law of the ethical order.

  2. Add to this the fact that it is in itself hostile and harmful to the consequences of right social order, whose moral support by its nature must be law. For it cannot be denied that this philosophy of law in particular, as its proper theoretical root, gives rise to that abstract idealism which, under the attractive name of “liberalism,” has spread through modern society like a ferment since the end of the eighteenth century. Under its influence, not only have the moral foundations of political order been shaken, but the naturally organic structure and vital members of the social body itself have been dissolved into their first elements, namely, into equal personal atoms. Finally, it was necessary to build a political machine out of this supposedly inorganic multitude of individual freedoms, to replace the living social organism and to be governed almost solely by the law of the equilibrium of forces. To understand this, it is sufficient to note in particular that the primary and most fruitful dogma of the modern revolution, namely, the dogma of the essential supremacy of the people, although devised elsewhere by Rousseau, can nevertheless be derived no less as a legitimate corollary from the Kantian and Fichtean principle of law. For, as the authors themselves admit, no public right can be founded in individual freedom considered absolutely and in itself except through freedom and for freedom, that is, by means of a “social contract”; hence the public power constituted from it is understood to be wholly a contractual product of human freedom, representing nothing other than the collective will of all the contracting parties (the people), fortified by the strength of them all equally. Thus, while the abstract idea of individual freedom is exaggerated, real freedom is sacrificed to blind democratic despotism.

528. Corollaries. I. Although Kant’s principle of law may in some way be distinct in itself when compared with his principle of morality (the autonomy of reason), it nevertheless plainly displays the same common philosophical tendency. For by their very nature both are clearly directed toward formally emancipating man from divine law and constituting him as his own absolute legislator, although not both under the same aspect. That is, by the principle of morality man as a rational being, and by the principle of law man as a social being (that is, human society), is raised to this prerogative of independence. If possible, all this must be charged even more strongly against Fichte, since he not only made Kant’s ideas his own but tried to complete them logically.

529. II. From these sources, then, modern “liberalism” too, considered objectively, or insofar as it denotes a system of political-social doctrine corresponding to that legal rationalism, has the same philosophical character inherent in it from its origin. Thus it too is most truly characterized by this slogan in its objective tendency: The political and social emancipation of humanity from every law that transcends the authority of human reason and will.

B.

The following most weighty conclusion is added partly as a corollary and partly as a complement to the thesis just demonstrated:

530. Thesis XLVII. The alleged axiom concerning the origin of law, by which it is absolutely asserted that no properly juridical relation can be introduced among free persons, and consequently no right can be determined in reality, except through a free act—that is, the consent of those same persons—is proved erroneous in its universality.

Preliminary note. The intrinsic connection of this axiom with the philosophy of law just examined is sufficiently clear in itself. Its beginnings, however, are earlier and broader. For this is nearly the common, explicit or tacit, hypothesis of the whole “social contract theory,” whether it is said, with Hobbes and Rousseau, that all social life whatsoever, or with Grotius and Pufendorf, that civil society could have arisen only from some contract admitted at least ideally. For the common principle from which they all proceed is some original right of external freedom belonging to each person (or at least to independent heads of families) as such, which, considered in itself or abstractly, is understood to be equal in all. They therefore conclude that, for a transition from this state (abstract) of original freedom and equality to the concrete society and state of the manifold juridical dependence of men upon one another to occur legitimately, that is, while preserving the original equal freedom of each person, at least some tacit common consent is necessary.

Indeed, Fichte holds that the binding force of external laws can be conceived to derive from nowhere else than a contract of this kind.

In all such reasoning, however, as is clear, the principle is man’s original freedom, not according to the objective integrity of its essence but in an abstract and mutilated way, namely, by considering only its relation to the similar freedom of other men while omitting, or at least not positively considering, its essential relation to the supreme creator and lord of the physical and moral world.

For the thesis does not deny that individual juridical relations, in order to exist actually among men, must be determined by some particular fact on which a particular title of right is founded (cf. nos. 468 ff.); nor do we deny that this happens most often through a free act, that is, through some contractual intervention. But we oppose the opinion that claims for this way of determining law the exclusive universality of an axiom, asserting, on the contrary, that not infrequently juridical bonds are determined immediately also by nonfree facts, namely, by natural events that take possession of the individual’s freedom by necessity, and that these must be regarded as valid by the sole authority of the supreme one to whom all human freedom is subject.

531. Proof I. By simple deduction from the preceding thesis.

The objective reason why juridical obligation and dependence among free persons cannot be determined and legitimately subsist from any other source than their freedom is manifestly drawn from the claim that the external freedom of a rational being is either wholly an end in itself or, at least, when considered in itself or abstractly, is the supreme ideal foundation and principle of the whole juridical order. But this very reason has been shown to be contrary to the truth. Therefore, the same must follow for the conclusion drawn from it.

532. Proof II. From the genuine and complete concept of human freedom. The original equal freedom and independence rightly attributed to men in the abstract, that is, when considered only according to their common rational nature, concerns in itself only the mutual relation of men to one another, and that relation in the abstract. But this relation is neither the sole nor, in the order of essential points, the first aspect conceived in rational nature even when considered abstractly; above all, it presupposes the relation of the creature to the creator. If this is neglected, the concept of freedom and mutual independence founded upon it lacks its true objective limitation and definition.

But with respect to this fundamental relation, the original external freedom belonging to man can be only such that it is continually accompanied by an equally or even more original absolute subordination and dependence on God. In other words, from the first instant of his existence every man is bound by absolute divine right to undergo all the conditions, modifications, and restrictions of his external freedom demanded by the divine order established in the moral world and made manifest, whether generally or in a particular case. Therefore, it is entirely possible that, besides contractual obligations freely undertaken among men, there may also arise other obligations imposed by God and determined in an individual case by nonfree events, namely, by events that must be attributed, apart from human discretion, to God their author, whether he acts through nature or beyond nature.

Both premises of the argument are as certain as the existence of God, creator and lord of all things, demonstrated elsewhere and also theoretically admitted by most opponents. Hence the conclusion is legitimately inferred; and if it needs further explanation, it is both illustrated and confirmed by what we set out below.

533. Proof III. From the actual condition of every individual determination of rights.

For a right to be considered specifically determined, it is required and sufficient that the hypothesis or condition be actually fulfilled under which, in relation to certain persons and a certain matter, that right is known with certainty to be an actual demand of the objective rational order divinely sanctioned; that is, which is the same thing in itself, under which it begins actually to subsist as a sufficient title of right (with some actual event intervening). But a real condition of this kind can by its nature be fulfilled no less by some event that occurs necessarily with respect to man and through God as its author than by a free human act. Therefore, and so forth.

The major premise is clear from the essentially moral character of law and from the true concept of a title of right (see nos. 468, 499).

Proof of the minor premise.

  1. Negatively. Those who contend that a juridical relation among men can exist in a determinate way only through free consent, at least tacit, rely more or less on the following argument, as we already noted in advance: Every determinate juridical relation, they say, involves some restriction of personal freedom and a particular dependence of one person on another. But, given the natural equality of men and the equal personal dignity of all, it does not seem that such juridical and therefore coercive dependence can legitimately be introduced unless the consent of the person who assumes such an obligation intervenes in some way, either explicitly or tacitly. But this reasoning is weakened on more than one ground. For:

a) In exaggerating men’s “natural” equality by looking only at their specific nature, it takes no account at all of the equally natural inequality introduced in the real order through individual nature. As a result, a man, bound from his first beginning by manifold physical and moral dependence, is not at all free to dispose at will of his entire external freedom in his mutual relations with others. For although men are conceived as equal in kind, they are not born equal as individuals; indeed, they are most unequal physically and morally. This happens not accidentally but by the constant institution of nature and therefore by the express ordinance of the Creator.

b) It at least implicitly assumes that, by virtue of his personality, man is so much his own master that not even God can ever subject him, with binding effect, to some external order that he himself has not ratified, with an obligation of juridical force, that is, inviolable even before other men, or reduce him, even against his will, to some social dependence. But, apart from the fact that this hypothesis rests above all on Kant’s very principle of “autonomy,” long since refuted, it is certainly absurd to say that God, the founder of human society and absolute legislator, cannot effectively do for society by a certain declaration of his will precisely what man can undoubtedly do by intervening through his own will; or that mutual moral bonds among men, clearly determined in particular cases by divine causality, cannot be considered juridically legitimate until they have been graciously accepted by the free choice of men.

2. Positive. There truly exist juridical relations in human society that no sane person would doubt are determined immediately by a merely natural fact, apart from every assent of freedom. The parental relation in domestic society must certainly be counted here; even the opponents themselves are compelled by sound reason to admit this, and therefore most of them explicitly restrict their principle that law originates essentially by contract to civil bonds alone. Indeed, who would deny that this relation is in itself not merely one of piety and ethics, but also juridical, by force of which mutual rights and duties of right intervene between parents and children, naturally—that is, immediately determined by the very fact of the children’s birth?

But this single certain exception to the alleged axiom destroys its objective foundation, which consists in the general assumption that the personal freedom of a human being cannot be juridically bound to another except by itself, that is, by some free consent of its own. For human nature, taken specifically, has the same character, and the same dignity of freedom and natural equality founded upon it, in whatever state human beings are considered. If, therefore, a genuine juridical relation can be established and subsist in domestic society without any causal influence of freedom, then surely nothing in the nature either of freedom or of law can be said to prevent the same thing from occurring in other circumstances as well, wherever a similar divinely determining fact intervenes. Therefore, etc.

The major premise of the argument scarcely needs further proof. Nevertheless, if someone, in order somehow to save the general validity of that axiom, unimpeded by the common sense of humanity, should go so far as to contend that even in the case just mentioned it is verified in some way, asserting that the parental relation, although necessary ethically in itself by force of nature, nevertheless receives genuinely juridical force only from the children’s legitimately presumed consent, let him take care lest he either contradict himself or dissolve against nature the family he recognizes as a necessary institution of nature. This consent is called legitimately presumed precisely because by nature’s determination it is necessary and due. But one may ask: on what condition is it to be presumed? Is it that children, once they have attained the use of reason, must be considered bound by it whether they will or not? In that case something plainly superfluous is presumed, since in truth the law of nature alone is declared to make the juridical obligation firm prior to every consent. Or, on the contrary, must the condition be presumed that at least the future tacit ratification of the children when grown is necessary? But such a condition endangers the very stability of the parental relation, against nature’s institution. For what if a son, as he grows up, impatient of paternal discipline and exercising his personal freedom, explicitly rejects his consent, by which he has learned that paternal right is formally grounded? By what strict right, then, according to the stated principle, could his father coerce an unwilling son to obey?

534. Corollary. Yet, once this false pretension of human freedom is rejected, nothing is taken away from its true and just dignity; indeed, that dignity is asserted all the more. For this most true axiom must be substituted for it: Every juridical obligation and dependence among human beings that has not already been definitively imposed by divine authority, whether manifested immediately or mediately, can be legitimately introduced and determined in the individual case only by the free consent of human beings. This statement perfectly agrees with the definition of external freedom that all Christian philosophy teaches belongs to a human being by innate right, namely: “Freedom from the arbitrary will of others in external actions.”

Observations for resolving difficulties.

535. 1. Anyone who does not wish to profess either pure naturalism or atheism must undoubtedly admit that God can and truly does manifest his will concerning human affairs in many ways, even through nature, not only in general but also in particular. When this occurs according to the judgment of right reason, human freedom is not free to disregard the ordering of the divine legislator at will or, if it directly touches the social relations of human beings, to regard it as juridically ineffective.

  1. It is one thing to say that a juridical relation is determined by free consent alone as its formally efficient cause; it is another to assert that for the actual external force of a right already determined in itself, generally speaking—that is, among adult human beings who enjoy the use of reason—some tacit acknowledgment of it and, in that respect, consent is required, for example, not as the cause of determination but as a condition for applying the right in practice. For in this way we truly see juridical obligations arise, even those imposed on freedom by a higher law, usually not without the cooperation of freedom, whether accompanying or following them. But who would say that everything done in any way whatsoever with freedom is done by means of freedom?

Article 3.

The idea of law derived pantheistically from the absolute principle of the world (Schelling—Hegel).

§ 1. Its character is explained.

536. The subjective “legal individualism” widely propagated by Kant and Fichte, which by philosophical abstraction undermined almost the whole historical reality of law through an ideal revolution, already carried within its own bosom the seeds of a future reaction. The philosophy of Schelling and especially Hegel subsequently brought that reaction in with no less sweeping success. This would have been fortunate if truth had succeeded error, rather than error succeeding error. But the false “legal individualism” was succeeded by an equally false “objectivism,” which in a different way, but with equal danger, contaminates the genuine idea of law and its original sanctity. For just as in the former, every construction of law proceeds from individual personality, either autonomous in itself or at least freed by abstraction from the objective and divinely sanctioned order of the world, so here, although beyond and above all individuality, the source and principle of both law and morality is found not in the eternal law of God the ordainer, but in some objectively necessary and absolute process of the world. On both sides, an attempt is made to emancipate the human being and the human race from a personal and provident legislating God: in the one case, the reason of the individual is decorated with the usurped dignity of a divinity; in the other, the public reason of the human race. On both sides a deadly evil is inflicted on the very body of society: in the one case, anarchic or mechanical atomism in the name of personal freedom and equality; in the other, the absolute omnipotence of public authority in the name of rational “objectivity,” substituted for the vital organism of society against God’s institution.

537. I. F. W. J. von Schelling (1775–1854), although he himself did not set out a philosophy of law as a proper system, nevertheless presented its outlines adapted to his speculative discourses in various writings, and at the same time supplied almost the first foundations for the new Hegelian construction. He followed in the footsteps of Kant and Fichte in similarly positing individual autonomous and absolute freedom in itself, but, in order to bring it into harmony with the freedom of others, he substituted for a contractual union of wills a pantheistically conceived universal and absolute will. This is attested by his first studies on natural law (1796).

His writings that followed at the beginning of the nineteenth century announce the new path more clearly, namely, the “System of Transcendental Idealism” (1800) and “Lectures on the Method of Academic Study,” first published in 1803.

In these works, following what seems an obvious consequence of that “system,” he rejects the abstract rationalist method of treating natural law and commends a historico-philosophical method in its place. And indeed, in his so-called “transcendental idealism,” the whole philosophy of law is reduced proximately to a philosophy of the absolute moral organism in the form of the public state, and together with it occupies its own place within the philosophy of history. Almost the whole remaining field of knowledge is occupied by the philosophy of nature. This division of philosophy corresponds to the two forms in which, in the real world, τὸ absolute (the identity of subject and object—the absolute reason, sometimes also called the world soul, “Weltseele”), conceived as identical with all being considered in itself manifests itself by ideal necessity: namely, in history and nature. In history, τὸ absolute manifests itself in the form of freedom in time, and presents the public state as an “objective organism of freedom” or “harmony of necessity and freedom” and the order of law within it as its objective condition. Neither is the result of the free wills of individuals; rather, both are the immediate form in which universal reason and will appear. Therefore, the public state is to be understood philosophically not merely as a political institution for protecting individuals’ freedom, but through the ideas of the “absolute organism.”

Everyone can see that through this kind of pantheism the original legal individualism is not so much brought back within its legitimate bounds by sound objectivism as every foundation of personal dignity and freedom is removed, so that in the name of “objective law” some blind fate, weaving all history from an inner necessity, may finally demand absolute reverence for itself. And so the way was opened wide on which Hegel later proceeded with greater and partly new apparatus, and systematically completed his philosophy of “modern” law par excellence, that is, absolute idolatry of the state.

538. II. G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831) methodically reduced Schelling’s transcendental idealism, from which he began, to the form of a rationalism not subjective but objective and absolute. It is the same pantheism in both, and the same necessity of the world and of everything that is and happens in it, but under a different form. In the former, the world is the very life of the Absolute unfolded through real movement; in the latter, it is merely a process of thinking, or the logical analysis of absolute thought. This absolute thought (das absolute Denken) is imagined to be substantial in itself, yet neither personal nor inherent in a subject: it is absolute thinking without a thinker (!). Hence it is established as an axiom that the absolute rules of thinking (logic) also exhibit the norms of being, and that whatever is or happens, therefore, is or happens by logical necessity. Guided by this principle, philosophy as a whole is divided into three parts: a) the science of the idea in and for itself (“Wissenschaft der Idee an und für sich — Logik”); b) the science of the idea in its being-other, opposed to itself (“Wissenschaft der Idee in ihrem Anderssein — Naturphilosophie”); c) the science of the idea, alienated from its own being, returning into itself (“Wissenschaft der Idee, die aus ihrem Anderssein in sich zurückkehrt — Philosophie des Geistes”).

This last part—“philosophy of spirit”—is itself again threefold, according to the three stages, as it were, of development in which “spirit” can be considered. It is divided into: a) “subjective spirit,” insofar as it is considered only in itself and for itself (“der Geist in der Form der Beziehung auf sich selbst, in seiner Unmittelbarkeit — der subjective Geist”); b) objective spirit, that is, in the form of reality or the world (“der Geist in der Form der Realität, als einer von ihm hervorzubringenden und hervorgebrachten Welt, in welcher die Freiheit als vorhandene Notwendigkeit ist — objectiver Geist”); c) absolute spirit, gathering itself again, as it were, from that distinction within itself into its perfect unity as absolute truth (“der Geist in an und für sich seiender Einheit der Objectivität des Geistes und seiner Idealität oder seines Begriffes, der Geist in seiner absoluten Wahrheit — der absolute Geist”).

The philosophy of law in particular is contained within the sphere of the philosophy of “objective spirit.” The principle from which all law proceeds is established as the universal and objective will of the absolute idea, and thus as a will that is substantial and absolutely rational, but impersonal in itself. This will is its own end; or, since the concept of will, as he says, includes freedom, its internal end is freedom, while its object is the external world, in which freedom takes on external reality. But when freedom is thus brought into the reality of the world, it assumes the form of necessity as a system of determinations of freedom (“System der Freiheitsbestimmungen”), whose unity appears as power and positive recognition (“als die Macht, das Anerkanntsein”).

Thus, according to Hegel, law in general is nothing other than “the existence of the free will” (“Dasein des freien Willens”)—that is, in the sense explained, the existence in the world of the universal, absolutely rational will, which alone can be called the true will, and outside of which individual wills with their particular inclinations have no true being. Therefore, he warns that law “is not to be understood as the restricted juridical law” (“als das beschränkte juristische Recht”), but insofar as it expresses the existence of all determinations of freedom.

“These determinations, in their relation to the subjective will (that is, the will of individual human beings), in which they must obtain their existence as universals, are that will’s duties (Pflichten); insofar as they exist in it by way of custom and character, they constitute ethical life (ethos—Sitte). The rights of the subjective will are the same as its duties, and vice versa, for both are founded on the same ‘free substantial will.’”

Having thus established the general concept of law, Hegel next considers law according to a threefold mode of being, namely: 1. in and for itself, or according to its concept, and thus as formal or abstract law; 2. insofar as it subjectively determines the wills of individual human beings—and in this way is subjective morality itself, “Moralität,” as well as the “right of the subjective will” (“das Recht des subjectiven Willens”); 3. insofar as it manifests itself through historical objectivity in the life and social institutions of peoples—and is called ethical life (“Sittlichkeit”).

Hegel’s abstract or formal right, if one leaves aside his own method of deduction, presents approximately what among Kant’s disciples is called “pure natural law.” The concept of the person (“Person ist die Einzelheit der Freiheit im reinen Fürsichsein”) is proposed as its foundation. The capacity and concept of right are contained in personality; hence the supreme principle of natural law, or highest juridical law, is: “Be a person and treat others likewise as persons” (“das Rechtsgebot ist daher: sei eine Person und respektiere die Andern als Personen”). — From the personal will in relation to external things (“das von dem freien Geiste unmittelbar Verschiedene, . . . Unpersönliche, Rechtlose”) is derived the right of property; from that same will, considered in its relation to other persons, arises contract. — To these are added the concepts of wrong and crime, which arise from the opposition of the personal will to the universal will, or objective law.

“Morality” as a whole concerns the subjective determinations of the free will, in which the will is no longer identical with the universal and absolute will, but strives and ought to strive for identity with it; it is thus called “the right of the subjective will.”

According to Hegel, ethos (“die Sittlichkeit”) is “the unity (as it were, the concrete identity) of subjective and objective good (des objektiven an und für sich seienden Guten), or the idea of freedom become a real world (“der zur vorhandenen Welt und zur Natur des Selbstbewusstseins gewordene Begriff der Freiheit”). — Ethos, therefore, in its objectivity contains within itself necessary determinations, elevated above every subjective opinion and will, as laws and institutions existing in and for themselves, to which, as such, rationality belongs (“Die an und für sich seienden Gesetze und Einrichtungen . . . dass das Sittliche das System dieser Bestimmungen der Idee ist, macht die Vernünftigkeit derselben aus”).

— The moments of this objective necessity are those “ethical powers (sittlichen Mächte), which govern the lives of individuals and have in them, as their accidents (!), their representation, apparent form, and reality.”

Only ethos, as the unity of the singular and the universal (“Einheit des Einzelnen und Allgemeinen”) and as that which exhibits substance, whose accidents are individuals, is properly “spirit” (“der als eine Welt lebendige und vorhandene Geist, dessen Substanz so erst als Geist ist . . . als sich Wissendes und Wirkliches, indem er die Objektivierung seiner selbst ist”).

As it were, three stages of it are distinguished: family, civil society, and the public state.

Family is the immediate or natural ethical spirit (“der unmittelbare oder natürliche sittliche Geist”), and its end is unity through love.

Civil society arises from the dispersal of the family into a plurality of families. In it, the apparent dissolution of individuals as persons independent of the ethical unity of the family passes once again into a higher unity through their common relation to universality, but this unity is not yet perfect, insofar as universality is understood almost solely as a necessary condition enabling individuals to pursue and attain their particular ends without hindrance. Thus this stage, although it already belongs to some imperfect form of the public state, does not yet correspond to its true idea.

In the public state (Staat), finally, objective ethos attains its highest degree of reality. “The state is the reality of the ethical idea . . . the reality of substantial will . . . τὸ per se rational . . . an absolute end in itself, in which freedom attains its highest right, and which has the highest right over individuals, whose highest duty is to be members of the public state. . . . The state is spirit standing in the world and realizing itself therein as self-conscious, whereas in nature it realizes itself only as other than itself, as sleeping spirit. . . . The state is the divine will, spirit present, unfolding itself into the real and organic form of the world.”

539. From this distinctive description of the state it is sufficiently clear that, according to Hegel’s philosophy, all right is ultimately identified with the public state itself, and that the state is the common source of all rights, including those of individuals. That is, the particular freedom and rights belonging to individuals as members of the family and civil society are also recognized and remain intact in the public state, “insofar as they pass of themselves into what is universal,” and insofar as each person recognizes this very “universal” (the absolutely rational) “as his own substantial spirit and subordinates his activity to it as the ultimate end.” And so, as Hegel boasts, the personal freedom of citizens can attain its fullest development, namely, in a harmonious unity, recognized and willed, with the universal will actually expressed in the state. For “the state is the sole condition for attaining particular ends and prosperity.”

Public law (das Staatsrecht) is divided into three kinds: internal, external, and absolute, or the law of universal history. This division follows whether the idea of the state denotes an individual organism considered in relation to itself, passes to the relation of one state to others, or is “the universal idea of the state as a genus, and thus an absolute power exercised over individual states, that is, spirit realizing itself in the process of world history” . . . and therefore is “the sole absolute judge.” Thus “the spirits of particular peoples” (Volksgeister) attain their supreme unity in the “spirit of the world” (Weltgeist).

Finally, it is not difficult to infer from what has been said what place is left in this whole system for religion and especially ecclesiastical freedom. The relation of religion and the Church to the public state can surely be nothing other than partly one of identity and partly one of subordination. For each appears as one and the same “absolute idea,” the same “spirit”; but in religion it is veiled, as an internal and subjective moment and hence objectively indefinite, whereas in the public state it has attained external, real objectivity. Hence it is concluded that “the governance of affairs must not be entrusted to religion.” In the Catholic Church in particular, Hegel recognizes a hostile opposition to this divine supremacy of the state, and therefore denies that it can be tolerated peacefully by the state.

540. III. The master’s doctrine was widely received in Germany by the Hegelian school, which, although it soon split into various and mutually divergent factions, according to the greater or lesser daring with which it interpreted him, nevertheless widely propagated Hegel’s common legacy in countless subsequent philosophical-theological, juridical, and historical writings.

This new concept of right exerted an exceptionally extensive influence in particular, not so much through its theoretical as through its practical and, above all, political fruitfulness. Many politicians were especially drawn to it because they expected from it a timely defense of public order against the dangers of anarchy arising from subjective rationalism about right—a defense that was purely philosophical and one that, in modern society, could take the place of the despised positive religion. Moreover, the same system would supply new principles and titles for public law and the art of politics, by which the scope of public authority could be expanded enormously and magnified into a kind of omnipotence of law. Finally, the already widely dominant social naturalism, commonly called “liberalism,” though it had developed almost solely through defending and exaggerating personal and civil freedom, did not object when universal freedom—that is, the will of the public state—suddenly took absolute precedence over individual freedom. Armed with this plenitude of right, the civil state seemed especially suited to carry out with invincible power all the designs of naturalism—namely, the formation and culture of society as purely natural and released from the law of Christ—against the stronghold of the Catholic Church, while itself meanwhile imbued with and serving naturalism. This is above all the origin of the “modern state,” as it is emphatically called, which, after many imperfect stages of development, is now for the first time, they boast, conscious of itself and its full supremacy (“der vollen Souveränität”). And indeed, who could fail to recognize immediately in the idea of the “modern state”—as the source and supreme arbiter of all right, as an omnipotent legislator, as the universal educator of the human race and provider for all culture, whose final stage of development by logical necessity can be nothing other than absolute socialism—the Hegelian public state, in substance, itself, holy and divine, indeed the only real divinity on earth?

541. Indeed, no feature of the new system more than this very political character won it favor above all others. It also found, among foreign peoples, many receptive minds who would disseminate its substantial elements in books and public lectures, intending to lay the foundations of “modern law.” Thus it happened that Hegelianism, having nearly collapsed as such in Germany itself,, revived to new life outside its borders, especially in the newly born “Kingdom of Italy”; and this happened not by chance, but through the deliberate design of a political faction and above all with the cooperation of those whose interest it was to establish in people’s minds and public opinion the work of revolution, already crowned with success.

§ 2. Critical reflection.

542. Everyone can see that the philosophy of law we have examined is founded speculatively in its entirety on pantheism, and is shaped by it in its deductions. Once the true personal God—the free creator of the world, the providential and holy ordainer and legislator of all things—is removed, it likewise leaves absolutely no place for man’s genuine freedom, moral imputability, or the immortality of the individual soul. These fundamental errors, already decisively excluded on other grounds, are not to be refuted anew here, but must be set in advance before the whole system under evaluation as a most certain criterion of its falsity. Even setting these aside, however, the very method of philosophizing by which the system is constructed, at the very outset, clearly presents itself to every sound philosophy less as an attempt by an intellect seriously seeking truth than as some splendid fantasy of a dreaming imagination. For who of sound mind would not despair of that peculiar “logic,” however much it may be called “absolute,” whose entire dialectical process begins from a monstrous logical absurdity—namely, that pure “thinking,” without a thinking subject and without an object thought, which is therefore at the same time identified with nothingness?!

543. Accordingly, setting aside every other critical digression, it is preferable to point out the common and supreme source of such errors, so that, by contrast, the precious philosophical inheritance, continually handed down and preserved in the Christian school but rashly cast aside by these thinkers, may shine forth in a new light. Both Schelling and Hegel rightly judged that philosophy should be recalled from barren subjective idealism and reconciled with the real objectivity of the world; and, to this end, they tried to have recourse to some objective, one, universal, and absolute principle of the being of things, from whose highest summit it might be possible to survey the whole world and, as it were, to construct it through a synthetic comprehension. But in this very effort, in itself worthy of all philosophy, they miserably erred through an unfortunate itch for novelty. From common theism, not only Christian but partly pagan as well, they had learned that the one ontological principle of the world, the one center and supreme summit of the philosophical encyclopedia, lies in the idea of God as creator and provident ordainer of the universe; and likewise that the ultimate objective source and immutable norm of all morality and right lie in that same personal God’s “eternal law.” Yet this ancient truth, no less obvious than harmonious, displeased them—perhaps because it subjected all human things not to man’s law and judgment, but to the law and judgment of God who commands. In its place, then, they devised a kind of deity endowed not so much with true as with imaginary objectivity; insofar as it is real, however, it is substantially homogeneous with the world itself and, in man, seems to awaken into conscious personality; at the same time, as “universal will” and (divine) “spirit,” it is most perfectly and really present in the public state and world history. And so, with the idea of creation and the law of the living God “happily” eliminated, we see the principle of “autonomy,” by which Kant had emancipated the individual human person, though created, from divine law, not only logically completed as the principle of autonomy of all humanity, that is, of public human authority, but also erected on a higher foundation, namely, the title of its own divinity.

What such an apotheosis of the public state entails in human society, both civil and religious, and what theoretical and practical corollaries can be drawn from it, especially for public law, both internal and external, or international, is clearer than daylight. For who does not see that this pantheistic valuation of law, as has already been observed concerning Spinozism, agrees completely in substance and in practice with the materialistic philosophy of law? According to both, every human fact, once publicly and historically accomplished, is for that very reason to be considered to have the force of law and to justify itself by itself Thus on either side an equal juridical omnipotence of power is set up, signifying in civil legislation legal despotism, and in international relations the right of the stronger and of fortunate success.

In its formal character, however, the pantheistic principle surpasses the materialistic only in this: by making use of God’s sacred name, it seems also to display a kind of hypocrisy.

544. To sum up, then: so gross a corruption of true law certainly needs no refutation here beyond that already anticipated in the most solid foundation of doctrine, which, with the Angelic Doctor, we established concerning the “eternal law” as the supreme and absolute norm of every right order in the world, whether physical, moral, or juridical. Indeed, once the idea of eternal law has been restored in place of that empty “absolute idea” and pantheistic “universal will,” and thus the primary source of error has been removed, a fitting correction will, as it were, follow of its own accord for not a few deductions of this philosophy that materially approximate the truth.

545. Scholium. We judged that these systems of modern philosophy of law deserved more careful examination than the others, not so much because their authors are accustomed to be more celebrated by name, as because they primarily represent the two stages in the philosophy of law of which we spoke: the first, in which the subjective individualism of law is established; the second, in which an ideal objectivism is indeed established, but by means of pantheism. The other philosophies of law that appeared at about the same time mostly move between these two poles, as it were, approaching now one, now the other, according to the principles on which they rest, and sharing in a similar critical rejection through their association with either error. This is most clearly true of those that posit the pantheistic principle in whatever form.

Therefore, there is neither time nor advantage in proceeding here to a critical examination of each one individually. It will suffice instead to mention in passing some of those that seem more important:

Frederick Krause (1781–1832), whose speculative principles are almost analogous to Schelling’s, substituted for common pantheism what he calls “panentheism,” differing from it more in name than in reality. For although he attributes to God absolute being, conscious of itself and transcending the world, he nevertheless thinks that the world is contained in God in such a way that in its being it seems to be identified with him. Thus, in the human being, who lives his own life, God at the same time unfolds his divine life, as though through his own instrument. This idea then presides over both ethical and juridical principles. According to it, Kantian purism is established in moral matters (“Do good for the sake of the good itself”), while law is conceived as the totality of the temporal conditions of rational life, or of attaining the rational end both within the human being and externally in social life.

Among his disciples the principal ones to name are H. Ahrens (Cours de droit naturel, Paris 1838; Philosophie des Rechts und des Staates, 6th ed., Vienna 1870–1871) and C. D. A. Röder (Grundzüge des Naturrechts oder der Rechtsphilosophie, 2nd ed., Leipzig and Heidelberg 1860–1863).

Fr. D. E. Schleiermacher (1768–1834), professing in philosophy a new form of Spinozism, in many respects approaches partly Schelling and partly Hegel. For him too, the whole universe, both nature and the ethical world, displays a perpetual process by which absolute reason, impersonal in itself, continually realizes itself: in the ethical world through human activity, as personality, then as family, public state, and Church. Thus the whole ethical end consists in the unification and, as it were, interpenetration of nature and reason. The public state is also ordered toward fulfilling this end in human community, and within it law is the ethical mutual relation of individuals with respect to external objects of nature.

Joh. Fr. Herbart (1776–1841) undertook to lead philosophy away from idealism and back instead to empirical realism, and gave his name to a new (“Herbartian”) school. He acknowledges a personal God as theologically necessary, as well as the immortality of the soul in his own way. But although he holds that one must begin the philosophical search for truth with a certain methodological skepticism and use metaphysics only as an intermediary to empirical knowledge, he nevertheless does little to commend either his empiricism or his metaphysics by his countless arbitrary assertions and fictions. He considers ethics a special part of aesthetics, since it is concerned with judging what in free activity is pleasing or displeasing in itself, and its rules therefore bear the character of universal and necessary law because they pertain to the common and natural end of all human existence. He considers all law among human beings to be of contractual origin and therefore positive by its nature—that is, introduced by mutual agreement in order to settle conflicts that have arisen and to prevent future ones. Later, however, he seems also to have admitted some natural law. In the public state he recognizes a society supported by power and animated by ethical ideas, whose purpose is to express these ideas publicly and in reality. — Many writers followed Herbart’s school while rejecting Hegelian philosophy; among them are Th. Allihn, M. W. Drobisch, G. Hartenstein, H. Nahlowski, L. Strümpell, Th. Waitz, Rob. Zimmermann, H. Steinthal, F. Ziller, and others.

Other systems exercised a less direct influence on the philosophy of law, although their authors also acquired some renown during roughly the same period. Among them are to be named:

Fr. H. Jacobi (1743–1819), who attempted to oppose Kant’s rationalism with a philosophy of “faith” founded on a vague rational instinct; Fr. Baader (1765–1841), inventor of a new theosophical system by which he presumes to penetrate even the mysteries of revealed religion; A. Günther (1785–1861), who likewise systematically encompasses speculative theology by way of philosophy, but recklessly informed by Hegelian ideas; Fr. Ed. Beneke (1798–1854), who teaches that all philosophy, and metaphysics itself, must be founded on psychological experience alone, thereby approaching English empiricism; Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860), who, setting out from Kantian idealism, reshaped it into a new form better adapted to modern materialism (“Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung,” 1819), adding to it an ethical principle founded on the pessimism of the world and analogous to Buddhist teaching, according to which rest from the misery of life is to be sought in the cessation of the “will” to live. Ed. von Hartmann revived much the same ideas; Herm. Lotze (1817–1881) combines a kind of panpsychism with pantheism, as though exaggerating the scholastics’ idea of “substantial form.”

For the rest, the practical philosophy of the present age (emancipated from Christian traditions) increasingly displays the common character of “modern science,” that is, a merely empirical-naturalistic character. Thus, especially among Darwin’s admirers, many today strive with all their might to reconstruct on Darwinian principles and shape according to modern “scientific” atheism not only all ethics (cf. no. 166), but sociology and the philosophy of law as well, freed from all “dogmatism” and “metaphysical prejudice.” For, rejecting every method for science, including moral science, except the psychological-empirical and inductive one, and proceeding partly from the ideas of Herbart, Beneke, etc., partly following the footsteps of the Englishmen Bentham, Stuart Mill, and especially Herbert Spencer, they finally agree on one supreme principle of all practical philosophy, namely the principle of utilitarianism, adapted to the successive evolution of the human being and social life. Therefore, nearly all that was said above in criticism of materialistic or quasi-materialistic philosophy applies with almost equal force to these attempts.

Meanwhile, on the opposing side, not only the Catholic (“Neo-Scholastic”) school, growing strong through its solid inheritance, but also many philosophers among non-Catholics vigorously defend the ancient rights and foundations of metaphysics and theism against this kind of skeptical positivism and materialistic realism. Among them, those who seem especially worthy of mention are:

Hermann Ulrici (1806–1884), founder of his own theistic system, in which he does not hesitate to call upon recent advances in natural science as witnesses. He also attempts to restore the closer connection of law with moral law; and he teaches that law has no other end than to supply “means and conditions” by which “the fulfillment of moral law may be made possible” on this earth.

Adolph Trendelenburg (1802–1872) judged that, in order to reconstruct philosophy, one must return to the teachings of the ancients, especially Aristotle, and promoted the study of them with new impetus. Just as he recognized that ethical considerations are founded in the teleological order of the world, so he attempted to construct the philosophy of law on ethical foundations. In outlining the idea of law, he follows Fr. Krause almost entirely. “Law is the complex of those general determinations of action by which the moral order, in its organic totality (das sittliche Ganze und seine Gliederung), can be preserved and perfected.”

We omit similar attempts by which modern philosophy in other European nations has likewise endeavored to adapt the idea of law to itself. Almost all can in some way be referred to one or the other of the two classes noted above, according to the various turbid sources from which they drew their nourishment chiefly: either the pseudo-philosophical and pseudo-political ideas of the eighteenth century’s final years, or English realism and utilitarianism, or German idealism and pantheism, or finally the common naturalistic source of modern positivism. Meanwhile, among peoples with a Catholic historical tradition, especially in France, Italy, and Spain, a truly indigenous philosophy in the science of law has never ceased consistently to defend the teachings of the Christian school and oppose foreign novelties.

Chapter III. Knowledge and Appropriate Division of Right

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