Theodor Meyer, Ius naturae generale

Theodor Meyer

Theodor Meyer, Ius naturae generale

Theodor Meyer

Institutiones iuris naturalis, Pars I: Ius naturae generale

First published 1906

Theodor Meyer’s Ius naturae generale from the second corrected edition (1906), in Latin with an original English translation. Preface and proemium included; the navigational contents and publisher advertisements are excluded.


Introductio I: Preface

Introduction

Sectio I: General Ethics

Sectio II: Social Right in General

Liber I: Book One. General Sociology

Liber II: Book Two. The Essential Bond of the Social Organism, or Right

Chapter I. The Genuine Notion of Right Analytically Established

The genuine notion of right is established analytically.

  1. Every discussion of right should rightly begin by investigating the true notion of right; this is recognized as especially necessary because all the errors that have ever infected the science of right, and consequently the social order itself, arise from a concept of right that is either false in itself or arbitrarily mutilated. The true notion of right can be suitably elucidated partly from the native meaning and traditional usage of this word, partly by philosophical analysis of the thing it signifies.

Quite so. But the question is of interest not only to the science of law but also to public welfare: from what philosophy in the end will modern jurisprudence receive its fundamental concepts—whether from Christian theism or from elsewhere, from pantheism, from some kind of monism, etc.? It seems that one can explain why A. Baumstark noted more than twenty mutually different definitions of right among various jurists in his work Was ist das Recht? (1874), as Bergbohm himself reports (loc. cit.), not by the mere absence of every philosophical influence, but rather only by the diversity of such influence.

Moreover, the idea of evolutionism has invaded the science of right today just as it has moral science. For already in 1874 A. Merkel, who founded what was nearly his own school, recognized as the “chief doctrine of the century” that “the creations of nature (including right, state, and Church) are equally placed in the stream of history and must be regarded as ephemeral formations appearing in each individual and subject to its infinite metamorphoses.” (Zeitschrift für das Privat- und öffentliche Recht I, 5.)

Article 1.

The notion of right derived from its name.

  1. The word right, both in ordinary usage and in science, is not in itself restricted to a single meaning but admits various significations. The same word plainly means one thing when we inquire what right demands of us, or when we speak of divine, natural, or human right, or of new or ancient right; another when we have recourse to right or are summoned into court; and yet another when we are said to acquire, possess, transfer, or renounce a right or rights. This variety of meaning seems chiefly to have arisen because the notion of right was soon transferred, through customary speech, from its original proper meaning to less proper senses, though analogous or objectively connected to it.

There are especially three meanings of this word to consider (Lessius, On Right and Justice I, 2; Suárez, On Laws I, 2).

  1. I°. “Right is the object of justice,” or is that very thing which is objectively considered “just.” St. Thomas interprets the word in this way, invoking the authority both of Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics V, 1) and Isidore (Etymologies V, 3), who says: “Right is so called because it is just.” — Moreover, he teaches that this is the first, original, and most proper meaning of right, from which the other meanings have been derived by usage and custom.

Hence the Angelic Doctor, in the same part of his work in which he treats the virtue of justice, also discusses right in general; certainly not because he failed to recognize the objective character proper to right, or because he insufficiently distinguished the just thing that subjectively constitutes the virtue of justice from that “just thing” said to be the same as right, or the object of justice.

For he thoughtfully wished to explain this very point, noting that the character of the object of justice is quite different from that of the objects of the other virtues. He continues as follows:

“What is right in the works of the other virtues, toward which the intention of virtue tends as toward its proper object, is understood only by comparison with the agent; but what is right in the work of justice is established by comparison with another, even apart from comparison with the agent. For that in our work is said to be just which corresponds to another according to some equality, for example, repayment of the wage due for service rendered. Thus, something is called just as having the rectitude of justice, toward which the action of justice is directed, even without considering how it is done by the agent.” “But in the other virtues, something right is determined only insofar as it is done in some way by an agent. For this reason, more than in the other virtues, justice has a determinate object in itself, which is called the just thing; and this is right.” 434. But just as justice and the just thing, so too right, insofar as it is the object of justice, can be taken either more generally or more particularly.

For justice taken in the broadest sense comprises the whole of moral rectitude and should not be called a special moral virtue but rather the complex of all virtues; this is the sense in which the word is frequently used in sacred Scripture. In the same way, right, as the corresponding object, shares an analogous generality and extends to every moral duty of man, founded in any relation whatsoever, whether to God, to himself, or to others.

In comparison, however, with justice properly so called, which is a cardinal virtue, the just thing and right are likewise restricted to designating that objective rectitude alone which is proper to this special virtue, namely, that which consists in the right ordering of human beings toward one another and toward society. For, as St. Thomas observes, “It belongs properly to justice among the other virtues to order man in those things that are toward another. For justice implies a certain equality, as its very name shows: things that are made equal are commonly said to be ‘justed’; but equality is with respect to another.”

What is said to be “toward another,” as is clear from the mind of the holy Doctor throughout his work, must be understood in the broadest sense of any social relation among human beings, both mutual relations among themselves and relations to the community.

On the other hand, neither in this expression “toward another” nor in the character of justice properly so called is man’s due relation to God commonly included, although God has an absolute right over human beings. St. Thomas suggests the reason: “Since justice implies equality, and we cannot repay God with an equivalent, it follows that we cannot render to God what is just in the perfect sense; for this reason divine law is not properly called right, but fas (sacred law), since it is enough for God that we fulfill what we can.”

  1. We intend to understand the right we undertake to examine here only according to this special and proper meaning, by which it is restricted to the object of justice properly so called, and to which the special name “social law” corresponds. Thus, right taken in this way comprises only, but completely, “the right ordering of human beings in relation to one another and to society.”

This right order consists, according to the threefold relation of order it involves, in three partial right orderings: the ordering of human beings in relation to one another, the ordering of human beings in relation to society, and the ordering of society in relation to human beings as members of society. Hence these three objects correspond to three designations of justice: commutative justice, legal justice, and distributive justice.

  1. II. The term right denotes law. This meaning is derived immediately from the first and original meaning and comes very close to it. For it belongs to the nature of law to be some rule of what is just, and therefore, in relation to its object, it is rightly equated with what is just itself, or with right. Hence it has come about that laws, whether taken individually or gathered and ordered into some body of laws, are commonly called by the shared name law both in science and in ordinary usage. Thus we are accustomed to distinguish divine, human, natural, and positive law, just as we distinguish divine, human, natural, and positive laws.

This very usage of language also clearly confirms the common persuasion of mankind, according to which it is considered to belong to the very idea of law that it truly be a rule of what is just, or at least not of such a kind that it could in no way be considered objectively just or right. Indeed, it is only under this condition and hypothesis that the name and dignity of law is rightly attributed to a law as well. For whatever is unjust by its own nature does not become just or right merely because it is commanded by law¹ (cf. nn. 291 ff.).

  1. A law can be a rule of what is just either in general or in the specific and proper sense. Hence it is clear that right, too, when taken to mean law, shares the same double breadth of meaning as right taken to mean the object of justice. Accordingly, the same term law is commonly used more broadly for all moral legislation and more strictly only for that which concerns the objective order of social justice.

Through an obvious application of this notion, a judge’s sentence is also commonly called law, since it is like a particular law, or the application of a law to a particular matter. That is why the person whose office it is in this way to declare the law, or to judge, is called a “judge”; hence the word law is not infrequently transferred to designate the judge’s tribunal itself, or the institution of a public court where law is declared.

  1. III. Right signifies a moral or legitimate power (rechtliche Befugnis). This third meaning of right, most familiar from everyday usage, seems at first glance to differ very widely from the previous two, indeed to be in some way opposed to both. Namely,

  2. Right, whether taken to mean what is just or law, denotes some objective obligation by which human freedom is restricted; whereas right as a power, by contrast, consists in the assertion of some moral freedom and, in that respect, in a certain denial of obligation.

  3. What is just and law agree in displaying the character of right as something merely objective; power, however, combines with that same objectivity a subjective relation. For right taken to mean power, in its very concept connotes some subject in which it inheres. Indeed, because of this difference, a custom has arisen among modern writers of distinguishing right taken “objectively” and “subjectively.” But this terminology, as is clear, is quite ambiguous and inadequate to designate the thing. For right taken to mean power, even though it involves a relation to a subject, is by no means something simply subjective, but must in itself be called truly and properly objective.

All this difference, whatever its extent, nevertheless does not prevent this meaning of right from being genetically connected most closely with both earlier meanings, and especially with the “object of justice.” For a certain principal element of this object, considered collectively, consists precisely in the legitimate power of human beings that is called right; this will be illustrated more clearly from what follows below.

  1. Resulting conclusion:

I. The notion of right drawn from its name is distinguished chiefly in two ways by reduction: one is primary, by which right either singly signifies any objective norm of justice expressed by natural or positive law, or collectively signifies a body of such norms (a legal order); the other is secondary, by which right is a moral power according to the norm of justice.

II. The most general division of right, by which natural law and positive law are distinguished, is founded on the same original notion of right and is inseparable from it. For every system of legislation that exhibits an objective norm of justice must be either natural or positive.

Article 2.

The notion of right is illuminated by its ideal end.

  1. To arrive at the genuine concept of right, it is considerably important to know in advance where this whole institution, which we call by the name of right and whose necessity in the moral world no one has ever seriously denied, is ultimately directed. For just as the objective end of a thing is known from its nature, so conversely an end known from another source reveals the nature of the thing and opens a way for us to penetrate more deeply into its properties.

It is useful to establish an end of this kind theoretically at this point, if only because we see false and pernicious speculations about right, which we shall encounter and critically assess in the course of the discussion, generally resting on a false or mutilated appreciation of that end¹.

  1. Thesis XLII. By its ideal end, right is destined objectively to establish a right social order and sustain it amid the vicissitudes of human freedom.

Preliminary notes. The assertion holds both of the whole legal order and of each of its parts and elements, and hence also of right taken to mean a moral power. The “ideal end” of right is understood to be that toward which right is assigned, according to the mind of the supreme ordainer of the moral world. The right social order that right is said to establish and sustain is not something arbitrary, but entirely objective and, in its essential outlines, divinely established (that is, by God as author of nature), as is clear from what was said above concerning the natural origin of human society. It includes both the right subordination of human beings to an organic social unity and the right coordination of individual members of society with one another.

  1. Proof I. From the relation of right to justice.

The ideal end of the whole of right must accord with the ideal end of objective justice itself. For right, according to its original and primary notion, denotes the very object of justice. But the ideal end of all objective justice lies in objectively establishing and sustaining a right social order. Therefore it immediately follows that the whole of right is likewise ordered to this same end.

Proof of the minor premise. The order of justice properly so called (the only kind under discussion here) by its nature belongs to that kind of rational order which consists in the “order of parts to one whole and, by reason of this, to one another.” This is applied here specifically to the moral world, whose constituent parts, as it were, are individual beings endowed with reason and freedom, or persons; this was already explained more fully above (nn. 203 ff.) in the discussion of merit and demerit. But this same moral cosmos, arising from the due proportion of persons both to one moral whole (society) and, by reason of that whole, to one another, is nothing other than the right social order intended by the divine author of society. Therefore all objective justice ultimately concerns a right social order: “legal” justice pertains to the right subordination of individual members to social unity; “distributive” justice, to the right ordering of the vital influence descending from this unity to individual members; and “commutative” justice, to the right coordination of those members with one another¹.

  1. Proof II. From the proper foundation of the necessity by which right is invincibly demanded in the moral world as a postulate of reason.

Whatever is so intrinsically and inseparably connected with a certain end of nature that it is understood to be ontologically required as a formally necessary means to that end must truly be said to have been ordered to that end of nature by the author of nature. But who would doubt that right is ontologically required as a formally necessary means to a right social order, which we otherwise know to be a most certain end of nature intended by the Creator? Therefore we rightly conclude, by that same intention of the Creator, that all right is destined to this very end: to shape and preserve steadfastly the right social order among human beings.

The major premise is sufficiently clear in itself; the minor premise is evident from constant historical experience and its agreement with the common rational persuasion by which people in every age have been accustomed to judge the right order of social life according to conformity with the norms of right, or objective justice.

  1. Corollaries: I. Universal right is therefore rightly conceived as a proper moral bond provided by God, by which the social organism among human beings, according to the idea expressed in social nature, is formally both joined together and preserved in its essential integrity. And since the moral organism displays a certain analogy with the physical organic body, we rightly conclude by a similar analogy that the order of rights, in view of its end, is to the social organism almost what the framework of bones and nerves is to the physical organism.

  2. II. A right order of social life, precisely because it is the ideal end of all right, must also exhibit the true and proper rational foundation of all right. For the rational foundation of a thing is evidently that by virtue of which it is known to follow logically and hence to be necessary a priori according to right reason. But from what has been said it is clear that the divinely intended and instituted right social order itself contains the objective ground by which it is known with certainty that the institution of right, too, was intended and willed by God.

  1. III. It further follows that the same right social order demanded by God contains the objective rational measure of all right; so that whatever manifestly conflicts with this order or lacks every final relation to it cannot, according to the judgment of right reason, be objectively true right. For every right, to be truly such, must participate in some way in the proper rational foundation of all right.

  2. IV. The doctrine established in the thesis is so fruitful that it can rightly be considered a criterion by which Christian, indeed all sound, principles of right can be most truthfully distinguished from opposing ones. And in its light, all systems of philosophy of law must be said to bear from birth a presumption of falsity if they require no rational foundation of right at all and recognize its adequate source only in the arbitrary will of human power; or if, in philosophically constructing right, they proceed from the bare individual freedom of the human being as its proper foundation; or, finally, if they wish to found the entire order of right on some blind pantheistic necessity by which absolute reason unfolds itself in the world, as it were, dialectically.

Article 3.

The nature of right is investigated from its elements.

  1. The intimate nature of right must accord with its ideal end and destiny in the moral world. And we indeed find this very thing confirmed throughout when we now descend to consider, as it were empirically, the essential elements of right itself.

Taken collectively, right, or the legal order, contains partly duties and partly rights (legal powers); duties are shared with the whole moral order, while rights are proper to it. For a human being placed in this arena of life, insofar as he is considered generally as a moral being, or as endowed with freedom, is induced by moral obligation to fulfill the moral order. But according to the aspect of his nature by which he is established not merely as a moral being in some way, but also as a social being and member of the social organism by natural destiny, he must be endowed with a twofold moral bond, by which he is effectively maintained in this order according to the will of the divine ordainer: namely, both moral obligation and moral power. The former is necessary to moderate and restrict the use of freedom with respect to the moral end and order; the latter, by contrast, is necessary to support and protect that use within the sphere due to each person (with respect to the same order), lest in the social whole either the social body itself or its members fall away from the dignity of a moral organism and be degraded to the condition of a material composite and of material parts.

To understand how closely this is bound up with the nature of society and its right order, useful light is shed by the obvious consideration both of the analogy and of the essential difference between a material body and a moral body, mentioned elsewhere already (nn. 203, 349). For in the composition of persons into a single moral body, such as society is, just as in a materially and physically one composite, the common condition of internal order lies in the quantitative proportion of parts both to the whole and to one another. But because the two composites differ in nature, both the quantity taken into consideration and its proportion must also differ correspondingly. In a physical body the quantity of the component parts is merely material, and only the proportion produced by the equilibrium of material forces under the sole dominance of the stronger force is fitting to it. But in a moral or social body the quantity of the parts is likewise moral, and consists precisely in rights, whose just proportion requires that both the individual members, in their mutual relation to one another and to society, and society as a whole in relation to all its members, have a legitimate sphere of power and free activity that is morally inviolable.

Thus, what the voice of each person’s conscience elsewhere proclaims with certainty by direct evidence is also proved with equal certainty by reasoning: namely, that a human being, considered in his relation to other human beings and to society, must by the force of rational order be considered not only bound by moral duties but also endowed with rights, by which, as so many moral protections, he preserves and defends against the arbitrary will of others the proper sphere of his moral existence and activity. This is what the common maxim of justice “to each his own” means.

§ 1. On duty in general.

  1. Duty (Pflicht), taken generally and abstractly, means any obligation by which someone is bound by force of rational order to do or omit something; concretely, however, it denotes the very action or omission to which that obligation refers. In addition, the same term is commonly used to designate some social office or position, public or private, by virtue of which special obligations (duties) fall to the person to whom it has been entrusted; this generally corresponds to the German words Amt, amtliche Obliegenheit, and Pflege (from which Pflicht also seems to be derived). For the present subject, however, we intend by duty any obligation of a human being.

With this definition established, two things in particular are to be considered concerning duty in general:

  1. I. The common and essential character of all duties.

All duties must necessarily agree in this essential respect: that they are understood to belong to the essential character of every obligation. Now, as has been established with certainty from what was shown above (nn. 252 ff., 291 ff.), there can be no obligation of a human being that is not founded, mediately or immediately, in an objective rational order and hence ultimately in the natural law itself. Hence, by way of a corollary, this certain principle is established:

General principle:

It belongs to the internal character of duty that it be ethical, that is, morally binding on the will in the forum of conscience. Therefore, there can be no true duty that does not in some way participate in this character.

  1. II. The manner of distinguishing various duties.

The common ethical character of duties, although it rules out the division by which ethical and nonethical duties are distinguished, by no means prevents them from differing from one another in various other respects. Hence:

Duties are divided:

  1. By the law from which they arise proximately: into natural and positive. Natural duties are further divided into negative and affirmative, according as they have as their object the omission or performance of an act (cf. nn. 233 ff.). As far as the matter itself is concerned, this scarcely differs from the division by which some duties are called absolute and others hypothetical. For (natural) negative duties, because they “bind always and for all time,” are thereby absolute; affirmative duties, however, because they “do not bind for all time,” that is, do not by themselves extend their obligation to particular cases until concrete circumstances have determined them to do so, can in a certain way likewise be called hypothetical.

  2. By their proximate foundation: into connatural (original) and adventitious (derived). The former are duties founded so immediately in human nature and its essential relations that no fact other than the real existence of a human being is required to determine them; the latter arise proximately from relations added to common nature and contingent (with respect to individuals), for example, through the intervention of a contract or some other determining fact distinct from simple human existence, in which all human beings are equal.

  3. By the terminus of their relation to which they refer: into duties toward God (religious), toward ourselves (immanent), and toward other human beings (transitive, or social in the broader sense).

  4. By their relation to the order of justice: into juridical duties, or duties of justice (Rechtspflichten), and merely ethical duties (rein ethische Pflichten). Since duties of justice, for reasons to be explained below, have this distinctive character: they can legitimately be enforced to their real effect even by the use of coercion, they are commonly called duties subject to coercion (erzwingbare Pflichten), while the others are called duties not subject to coercion (nicht erzwingbare Pflichten). The division of duties into perfect and imperfect differs from this terminology only in name; it is likewise used to signify the same distinction. Namely, duties subject to coercion are also called “perfect,” and the rest “imperfect,” not because the former impose a perfect moral obligation and the latter an imperfect one (which would be contrary to the common character of duties), but because the genus of duties not subject to coercion can be considered, as it were, imperfect with respect to the complement it lacks.

This last division of duties, above all, pertains especially to our present purpose. Its proper character and use will naturally be illustrated by what is to be added concerning right and the relation of right.

§ 2. On right taken to mean juridical power.

  1. The idea of right as a certain power exists in the conscience of all human beings who use reason, constant and indelible; that is, it is known to reason by the same direct evidence by which the supreme principles of the moral order and the idea of moral obligation cannot be unknown to it. This idea too can indeed be despised by a human being, like other moral notions, and deliberately denied, or externally corrupted for a time as if by force imposed upon it; but it can never be erased from human hearts. This common conscience of humanity itself, then, since it reports the voice of God the Creator uttered in rational nature, is the first and principal source of knowledge from which philosophical inquiry into this idea must proceed. What is usually established in the philosophy of law rests especially on this foundation.

  2. Definition. Right taken to mean power (Recht, rechtliche Befugnis) is rightly defined according to the common conscience of humanity as:

*An inviolable moral power to possess, to act, or to demand something.*¹

Each of the elements listed here exhibits an essential characteristic by which the true concept of right is constructed. Indeed, it is called:

  1. Power or faculty (Befugnis), by which right is distinguished from obligation or duty. The former attributes some capacity (ein Können), whereas the latter imposes something that ought to be done (ein Sollen).

  2. Moral power, to distinguish it from physical power, which is a capacity or force to exercise influence on matter or to overcome obstacles of physical forces. Moral power therefore denotes a capacity whose entire foundation lies in the spiritual or moral order, and by virtue of which influence is exercised on spiritual natures, proximately on intellects and through them on wills.

  3. To possess, to act, or to demand something: these designate the matter or objects of right, concerning which it may be exercised. Such things are either things or human operations, and these are either one’s own or another’s. Therefore, according to this diversity of matter, every right is a moral power to possess a thing, to exercise freely a certain activity, or to demand some performance, active or passive, from other persons.

  1. An inviolable moral power: this expresses the proper efficacy of this moral power, namely, to bind rational wills ineluctably in matters of right, partly negatively, so that they do not oppose an obstacle to the legitimate use of the power, and partly affirmatively, so that they also positively perform the service, whether real or personal, that is demanded of them by virtue of the right. This inviolability of right (as will be shown more particularly in its proper place) has this distinctive feature over and above ordinary moral inviolability: it is further fortified by some new subsidiary moral power to enforce the real effect of the right by means of coercion (adapted to its end and right order) against a resisting arbitrary will of another.

  2. Corollaries: A moral faculty, so long as it lacks that distinctive inviolability of right, cannot be considered a strict or properly so-called right. Therefore:

I. Negative permission, which in itself means nothing other than the absence of a positive prohibition and in that respect is some moral faculty, must not be confused with a true right. Indeed, this kind of negative faculty, considered in itself, contains nothing by which other wills are understood to be bound by a positive moral obligation to comply with it. Nevertheless, permission often has the force of right whenever it has been granted by some positive act of jurisdiction.

  1. II. What is commonly called a right of “equity” likewise does not pertain to the character of right properly so called. For a requirement of equity, or of some general rational fittingness, although it can in itself exercise a more or less efficacious moral influence on rational wills, lacks the individual and real determination in which alone the objectively defined and, as such, ineluctable demand of rational order can be founded.

  2. III. Finally, what is commonly called a precarious right is likewise not included in the definition of strict right, although it participates in its character in some imperfect way. For the moral power that constitutes it, although by itself determinate as to matter and scope, is nevertheless, as its very name indicates, revocable at the will of the person from whom it is received; consequently, with respect to that same person, or insofar as it is precarious, it cannot introduce any obligation subject to coercion. Nothing, however, prevents a precarious right from having the force of a true right in another respect, for example, against all those who neither granted it nor can legitimately revoke it.

  3. Scholium. The right of social authority is distinguished from other rights especially by this prerogative: it can not only bind rational wills by a duty concerning the matter of right (namely, obedience in relation to the social end), but also contains in itself an efficacious power, by the very exercise of which it generates new rights in them in addition to obligations. Thus, for example, in a just war a commander can by virtue of his command confer on his soldiers the right to inflict harm on enemies, which they otherwise would by no means have. This is also suggested by the name “jurisdiction,” by which social authority is commonly designated.

§ 3. The juridical relation.

  1. Every right, by its concept, involves an essential relation to some duty correlated with it, which is therefore called a duty of right or juridical duty. For no inviolable moral power with which a human being is endowed by virtue of right moral order can exist or be conceived without there being imposed by virtue of that same order a corresponding moral obligation on other human beings to omit or perform all those things necessary to prevent him from being frustrated in the exercise of that power.

Right and its correlated duty, considered as a single whole, therefore constitute what is commonly called a juridical relation (Rechtsverhältnis). Hence as many such relations are counted among human beings as there are distinct rights with their correlated duties. From the whole of juridical relations—which are extremely diverse according to the social inequality of human beings and the organic nature of human society—there arises the juridical order, or right taken collectively.

Therefore it is not so much rights and duties considered separately as the juridical relations themselves that are the particular proximate constituent elements of the juridical order. Accordingly, to judge its intimate nature rightly, we must dwell a little more carefully on a deeper examination of the juridical relation.

A. Its ontological analysis.

  1. In every juridical relation these four are distinguished: the subject, the terminus, the matter, and the title of right. Something must be said about each.

I. On the subject and terminus of right.

  1. The subject of a right is whoever is endowed with some right; its terminus is the person or persons with respect to whom the subject has the right, or on whom the duty of right falls. Hence, from the nature of the thing, these certain principles are established:

First principle.

Neither the subject nor the terminus of a right can be anything other than a rational being, or a person, either physical or moral.

For right is a power not physical but moral, and thus proper only to spiritual natures; it implies a moral relation by which a duty corresponds to it at the terminus, that is, by which the subject of the right has the will of the terminus directly morally bound to him.

  1. Corollaries: I. It is therefore also erroneous to attribute true rights against human beings to brute animals, or duties of right to human beings toward them; this doctrine is not the only absurdity owing its origin to modern pantheism¹. There certainly are human duties—not toward but concerning brute animals, just as concerning the other created things that have been handed over for human use and service. If someone abuses these through irrational arbitrary action and thus against the Creator’s intention, he indeed does an injury to the Creator, but not to those things themselves.

  1. II. From this you can easily infer the solution to the moral question publicly debated toward the end of the last century: whether at all, and under what condition, the use of what is called animal “vivisection” to enrich physiological science and the art of medicine can be considered morally licit. For it is clear that such an experiment, although, considered in itself and used moderately, it is neither injurious to brute animals nor otherwise contrary to right reason, since it consists in the legitimate use of human dominion, can nevertheless be morally illicit by reason of the manner and circumstances. Surely to this belongs deliberate cruelty that is useless or disproportionate to the hoped-for results, by which a human being not only subjects a creature endowed with the sensation of pain to exquisite torments without a truly rational end and rashly abuses it, but must also dull in himself the natural feelings of humanity and compassion toward his fellow human beings¹.

  2. Second principle.

The subject and terminus do not contribute in the same way to determining a right in the order of real existence. Namely, for it to exist in reality, it always requires a real subject in which to inhere; but it does not necessarily require the terminus toward which it is directed to exist already in reality, but admits a merely possible and hypothetical terminus in itself.

Indeed, nothing prevents a person from having a right with actual moral efficacy to bind other human beings as soon as they exist, even if in the here and now they are supposed to be only future. Thus, in reality, the first human being must be said to have been endowed in reality from the first moment of his existence with all those rights founded in common human nature—not, to be sure, without relation to a social terminus, but according to a natural relation to a future society.

  1. Corollary: From this you will infer in what sense the assertion often invoked ambiguously and incorrectly by exclusive legal positivism against the existence of natural law is true: “All right is founded in human society.” Namely, all right is founded ultimately in human society rightly ordered according to the law of nature, as was explicitly demonstrated above; but to be founded in human society as an efficient and determining cause is proper not to “all right,” but only to positive human law.

II. On the matter of right.

  1. That in which, or concerning which, someone is said to have a right is commonly called the matter of right. This can only be a thing in the broader sense, namely, an object in itself subject to physical or moral possession, such as creatures destined for human use; actions, over which the command of one’s own will and the exercise of natural faculties naturally extend; and operations or performances that depend proximately on the command of another’s free will. For something to be an object of human power, it must by its nature be subordinate to the human being as a rational being; but every and only thing of this kind is a thing, or whatever, like a thing, has in itself the character of a means to human ends (Lessius, loc. cit., II, c. 4, d. 9). Hence it follows:

  2. General principle:

No person, as such, can be the matter of human right.

If, then, in everyday speech someone is sometimes said to have a right over a human being, this must be understood just as if it were said that he has a right against the human being to some performance on his part. Therefore, absolute slavery, by which a human being is subjected like a thing, can be legitimate by no right (St. Thomas II–II, q. 104, a. 5).

  1. It should also be noted that a different relation of the matter to the subject of the right determines a different character of juridical duty, namely, either negative or affirmative. For a negative duty, that is, one prohibiting what is contrary to the right, manifestly corresponds to a right concerning a thing or an action directly subject to the command of one’s own will (“to possess or to act”); whereas an affirmative duty, that is, one commanding a due performance, corresponds to a right concerning a thing or operation directly subject to another’s will (“to demand something”). The difference between an affirmative juridical duty and a merely ethical affirmative duty is that the former is perfectly determined by the right itself to which it corresponds, whereas the latter requires some determination from circumstances for an actual obligation. Therefore, in practice, as to its proper binding force, the former must be said to approach more closely the character of a negative duty (which “binds always and for all time”) than that of an affirmative duty.

III. On the title of right.

  1. The title of right, taken in the philosophical and strict sense, is that in which the power of right and its corresponding duty are proximately founded morally, or the objective reason from which the moral efficacy of some right determined in an individual case arises proximately in rational intellects and wills.

Thus, philosophically speaking, every title of right is a kind of practical presentation of truth, which a sincerely rational mind, once it is clearly presented to it, cannot fail to recognize. For there is no other way to exercise moral efficacy on rational intellects and wills. The intellect can be bound directly only by known truth, and the will only by practical truth, or a dictate of reason presented to it through the intellect. For a presented practical truth to be considered the title of a determinate right, it must be such that the assertion of the right in question rests on it as its rational foundation through an ineluctable consequence. Hence it must contain, as it were, in the manner of an abbreviated syllogism, two elements of truth: one general and the other particular, indeed individual; the former must exhibit a general principle of reason, the latter its application to a particular case. Thus, for example, the title of a right of ownership over a specific thing consists in the following premises of a reasoning: Every thing legitimately acquired by its possessor must be recognized and respected according to right reason as his own. But this thing has been legitimately acquired by this person N.N., for example, by purchase. The conclusion that follows is itself the assertion of this particular right, necessary and commanded by virtue of the rational order.

The title of right is therefore, as it were, a spiritual instrument by which some particular right is shown to be individually connected with the universal rational order itself, divinely sanctioned and revered by all; and by this alone can it exercise its moral influence on the terminus of the right and bind him to its object. Hence it appears that all this efficacy of the title of right ultimately reduces to the fact that, in the manner of a dictate of reason, it exhibits the force of natural law. Indeed, anyone who confidently uses, invokes, or claims his right thereby implicitly appeals to the common order of reason and divine law, in itself known and irrefragable to every human reason.

  1. In common usage, however, and according to juridical practice, the title of right is commonly taken in a broader sense to mean the particular fact by which that dictate of reason can be applied to the particular case and the right as such is thereby determined in an individual case. Thus, for example, a purchase properly made or a gift is alleged as the title of right to prove legitimate possession of a thing. We use this abbreviation not without reason, since no rational person can be ignorant of or call into doubt the general principle implicitly presupposed, and nothing else is required except to prove its present particular application.

From this ontological consideration of the title of right, the following things plainly follow.

  1. Corollaries: I. Although the entire juridical relation, namely, both a right and the duty of right correlated with it, as to their moral efficacy clearly arise from one and the same common higher source, namely, the objective rational order divinely sanctioned, they do not, however, flow from it in precisely the same way. For right is founded on that order directly, by virtue of its own title alone, whereas juridical duty is founded on it more indirectly, namely, through the correlated right itself, already morally valid in that order. Hence the metaphysical genesis of the former is logically prior, that of the latter posterior; accordingly, right is the ground of duty, while duty is grounded in right. It follows, therefore:

  2. II. Juridical duty, although as a moral obligation it primarily binds the conscience of the terminus to God as author and vindicator of the whole moral order, nevertheless, insofar as it is juridical, truly and proximately binds him to the subject of the right, and in proportion to the measure and scope of that same right.

  3. III. A legitimate conclusion can indeed be drawn from either one of these two correlates, namely, either from the right or from the duty of right, to the other; nevertheless, by itself and according to logical reason, correlated rights are to be known and measured not from duties but from rights.

  4. IV. But if, setting aside the special juridical relation by which a right and a duty of right establish a certain mutual relation between different persons, the question is raised whether, generally, even in one and the same human person, who by virtue of rational order is endowed with both rights and duties, rights can be considered ontologically and logically prior to duties, the answer must be entirely negative and the contrary asserted. For no right of a human being, however original, can exist or arise except by virtue of its proper rational foundation, which lies in a true title of right. But every title of right presupposes certain prior general duties of the human being and must be founded on them. Indeed, we conceive that a human being is endowed with some inviolable power to dispose freely of things and actions neither as a fact in itself indemonstrable nor as an end in itself necessary by reason of itself, but only as a means necessarily required for a higher end. And this higher end, as is clear from what was shown above, consists proximately in the right social order itself, according to the mind of the divine legislator, to whose fulfillment a human being, by his rational and social nature, is essentially destined and obligated. Therefore, the objective reason why it is acknowledged as necessary under natural law that certain rights belong to a human being finally comes down to this: because right reason understands that a human being cannot fulfill his most original and essential natural duty, by which as a rational, free, and social being he is obligated to strive toward his ultimate end, unless certain powers suited precisely to this purpose in relation to others are continually available to him as inviolable¹.

  5. V. It further appears from this that human duties and rights do not rest on the same condition in common rational necessity and divine law. By virtue of this law, duties are imposed, while rights are granted; duties must be fulfilled as obligations, while rights must be available as a certain provision necessary in view of duties, not for a particular use in an individual case that is per se determined and commanded, but for a possible use left to the free judgment of the human being, while always subject to both the negative and affirmative moral law. Therefore, in each case, with regard to the matter of each right and the other circumstances, reason must judge according to the norm of moral law whether and to what extent the actual exercise of a right is commanded, counseled, permitted, or prohibited; and consequently whether and when someone can or cannot renounce the use of a right, or even (where its nature permits) the right itself. Hence:

  1. VI. Right itself and the use of right must be carefully distinguished according to their moral qualification. Right itself considered in itself, as long as it rests on a legitimate title, cannot fail to accord with right rational order, and it preserves this inner sanctity independently of its particular use, whether morally good or evil. It would undoubtedly be absurd to say that, by virtue of an objective order sanctioned by God, a human being could ever have a right to undertake a morally evil action as such, since the divine legislator cannot contradict himself. Nevertheless, nothing prevents it; indeed, it is necessary by the nature of the thing that in some moral power, even though granted by the intention of the supreme ordainer only for reasonable use, there is thereby implicitly contained the possibility of some contingent irrational and morally illicit use, since its exercise is entrusted to the free judgment of the human being. This same condition inseparably accompanies all human freedom on earth. Therefore, just as the natural gift of free choice is neither lost nor made evil in itself by a contingent evil exercise, so too a right, when it rests on a true title, neither ceases to exist nor is itself made evil if it happens to be applied by a human being to some use materially compatible with the right but illicit for another reason. Thus it happens that an action may sometimes be legal in itself, that is, not contrary to strict right in itself, and nevertheless be contrary to the moral order and dishonorable on some other ground. But however often a human vice may cause a disagreement between the particular use of a right and the moral law, there is never any internal conflict between right itself and the moral order; on the contrary, their harmony with respect to a common higher end is complete.

B. The coercive inviolability of right.

  1. A properly juridical relation, compared with every other moral relation among people, such as charity, friendship, gratitude, and so on, has this distinctive character: it subsists not only in a true moral bond, revered by force of divine law, but also in an inviolability coercive with respect to other people (Erzwingbarkeit). Indeed, according to the common judgment of mankind, the most proper character of strict right is commonly recognized to consist precisely in its being coercive, that is, in its having a corresponding duty subject to coercion. This property of right, therefore, is not so much to be proved here as first explained from its philosophical foundations; then its practical condition is to be understood, and above all its genuine nature and significance determined without any ambiguity.

I. In what objective ground is it founded?

  1. Two principal fundamental grounds spontaneously come to mind on consideration, by which the coercive inviolability of right is understood a priori to belong to it not merely extrinsically and accidentally, but intrinsically and essentially. Hence it likewise appears that the common judgment of mankind, by which this same character is constantly attributed to right, reports nothing other than a certain voice of rational nature itself.

  2. The first ground is drawn from the notion of right, according to which right is a power essentially relational, that is, legitimate not only before God but also in relation to other human beings, and as such morally inviolable and exempt from their arbitrary will. Hence it follows that juridical obligation is also essentially relational, directly binding one human being to another who possesses that power. Now, someone who has another human being’s will directly obligated to his own power with respect to a certain matter of right—that is, in relation to a real and external effect either to be performed or not to be impeded—must rightly be said to have the organism naturally subordinated to that will indirectly obligated to himself as well, insofar as its instrumental cooperation is necessary for that due effect. For the subject of right has direct dominion over this real effect as over his own thing, and that dominion is not extinguished by the fact that the same thing happens to be unjustly withheld from its owner. Therefore, juridical power, precisely because by its nature it is morally inviolable proximately in relation to the very terminus of the right, must also be coercive; that is, it must be sanctioned under the condition that, as the matter requires, the unjust resistance of the terminus can be overcome by suitable coercion and the due effect of the right, whether negative or positive, can legitimately be exacted in reality.

  3. The second ground is derived from the ideal end of the entire juridical order. For all right “is destined by its ideal end objectively to establish a right social order and sustain it amid the vicissitudes of human freedom” (Thesis XLII, n. 441); this must be said not only of right taken collectively but also of its particular elements, or juridical relations. Therefore, by the very institution of nature, every right must have such moral efficacy as is understood a priori to be necessary for it to be proportioned to that end in itself, and to be fitted to provide the social organism, which God willed to establish on earth, with truly sufficient moral support and an effective basis of stability. But unless the moral inviolability of right were also coercive, given human freedom, which is subject to the manifold influence of desires and passions, it would be not merely accidentally and as it were exceptionally insufficient, but often insufficient, indeed illusory, and intrinsically incapable of effectively attaining that end. It therefore cannot be denied that the very essential end of right clearly requires right to be coercive.

  4. Hence it is not unreasonable to consider this same property of right as a kind of sanction proper to every juridical obligation precisely as such, added to the common ethical sanction. For the ethical sanction, in keeping with its end, requires that the right moral order be asserted and effectively vindicated against the disordered excesses of human freedom in such a way that a certain and adequate triumph remain for it, yet be truly completed not in the present life (on the way) but in the immortal future (at the end). But the whole of the right social order is contained within the limits of this life, and therefore, according to the mind of the divine ordainer, it must plainly be truly completed already on earth and proximately for the fruits of the present life. It is easy to understand that, so that this immediately necessary end of nature cannot be frustrated in its real effect by the inconstancy or malice of human choice, there is need, besides the common ethical sanction, of another whose efficacy is continually present or imminent for protecting or restoring the right order of justice. And this is plainly exhibited by the coercive inviolability itself with which juridical relations are especially fortified. Indeed, although this sanction of social order may not be sufficient, given the common fallibility of human affairs, to ensure that right and justice always and everywhere prevail over injustice in the concrete society of human beings, nevertheless, while this protection of right generally remains in force, it is altogether impossible for the structure of society as a whole to collapse and thereby for the essential end of social nature to be deprived of its reality.

II. To which subject does the power of coercion belong?

  1. The coercive inviolability of right means, according to what has been said, nothing other than that another subsidiary power, no less legitimate, is essentially joined to the legitimate power that primarily constitutes right: the power to enforce the duty corresponding to the right, even by coercion if necessary, to its real effect. It can therefore be asked: does this subsidiary power of coercion naturally belong to the same subject in whom the right itself inheres as his own?

The truest answer to this question is supplied partly by the nature of the thing, partly by the necessary condition of the right social order, to which all right is ultimately directed.

  1. From the nature of the thing considered per se and in the abstract, there can be no doubt that the power of effectively enforcing one’s own right belongs per se and primarily to the person whose right and use of right it is; it belongs to others only secondarily and as it were in a vicarious capacity. The blind impulse of nature itself confirms this: everyone feels himself impelled to defend or even vindicate, by his own strength where available, above all his own essential rights against unjust impediments.

  2. But if a human being endowed with rights is considered concretely as a member of society, right reason demands the opposite in practice. Namely, by force of the social order it is understood to be necessary that the exercise of coercive power required to protect and enforce both public and private rights belong primarily only to social authority; as for individual members, it can return to them in their own cause only secondarily and accidentally. For lest the coercive power of right contradict the very end to which it is naturally adapted, and disturb rather than actually fulfill the right social order, it must first of all be exercised according to the conditions of that same order, that is, through social authority, to which this care has been assigned as a special duty by natural law. Secondarily and accidentally, however, even in a well-ordered society the right to use defensive coercion can sometimes return to the subject of the right itself and in some way revive as his own personal right. This should be considered to occur when, in a case of urgent necessity, every recourse to the intervention of authority is excluded. For it is clear that human beings exist not for the sake of social authority, but social authority for the sake of human beings.

  3. The adversaries of this opinion are nearly as numerous as those who, departing from the traditional common conviction of Christian philosophy, contend that no rights are naturally valid for a human being, but that all are positive, that is, derive their whole force as rights from the public order established and sanctioned by human society. Among these especially belongs a recent theory of right, commended and widely propagated on various grounds as conservative in its character, commonly included under the name “historical school,” whose chief herald and interpreter among legal scholars was F. J. Stahl. Beginning, then, from that common principle, he says: “The subject of right is the people considered in its unity, or the public state, but not the particular human being as such.”¹ It follows all the more that the coercive power of right belongs per se and primarily to the public state alone, while it belongs to individuals, just like rights themselves, only by derivation and delegation. It is enough to have indicated this much here, since the fruitful principle itself from which these and many other things flow requires its own special critique elsewhere.

III. With what necessity does the coercive inviolability of right require a physical power of coercion to accompany it?

  1. This is a question among those that pertain most directly to determining the genuine notion of right. For in it, as in a preliminary summary, nearly the whole character of the conflict is already contained by which the modern mechanism of legal right differs from the Christian-philosophical idea of right; fuller understanding of this will be reserved for another chapter.

Meanwhile, in keeping with the purpose of this first chapter, it is useful to establish the true solution here in advance, so that it may provide a safe norm of judgment as a certain and general principle of doctrine for any concrete applications.

The answer to the question proposed consists partly in affirmation, partly in denial:

    1. To be affirmed:

a) That a real and sufficient power effectively to exercise coercion is a necessary external condition by which the real and external effect of a right can be safely expected, not only under certain circumstances and often, but also generally and simply. This assertion is sufficiently clear in itself and is not called into doubt.

b) That, with a view to the essential end of the entire juridical order itself, it is necessary that there generally not be lacking in human society a public protection of objective justice sufficiently powerful in itself to sustain or promptly restore the integrity of the social order, at least in its essential aspects. It is clear that this necessity has truly been provided for by God through the naturally established and sword-bearing public social authority. Hence this second affirmation too appears sufficiently manifest in itself, and it follows logically from what was said above (n. 479) concerning the objective ground of the coercive inviolability, and already earlier (nn. 289 ff.) concerning the natural requirement of positive legislation. But indeed:

    1. To be denied:

that it belongs to the essential character of right that it always also have real external efficacy.

This exaggeration, which is in practice not harmless (to say nothing of others who, recognizing no matter beyond the subject itself, directly confuse right with physical power) is also insinuated by Fr. J. Stahl himself, in support of his exclusive legal positivism, when he writes: “The most prominent character of right is above all its continual actuality in reality (stete Verwirklichung), that is, its ineluctable execution in each particular case and its ever-invincible subsistence as a whole. Right is not a mere norm but an order, that is, a norm endowed with real actuality and always effectively observed. This necessity of ineluctable execution, which therefore lies in the essence of right, manifests itself against the resistance of individuals as physical coercion. . . . Thus right is partly an ethical precept touching the will and partly a mechanically subsisting institution.”¹ 488. If this doctrine said nothing more than that every right contains an ideal destiny to obtain a real effect as well, and that, in view of the end of the juridical order to be fulfilled in social life, it is necessary for right, or the juridical order, not to be frustrated in its real actuality and efficacy as a whole, then it would agree with all Christian philosophy. But when this kind of external efficacy is declared to be of the essence of all right, either in general or in particular, this finally amounts to saying that there can be no true right unless it is fortified by positive legality and supported by public human authority, and that right itself fails to exist precisely when the physical power to protect it effectively happens to be lacking. It is certainly important at all times, but especially in this age, to exclude such a pernicious ambiguity from the outset when defining the genuine idea of right. Therefore, it must be expressly established:

  1. Thesis XLIII. The coercive inviolability that constitutes an essential mark of right subsists independently of the physical power to exercise coercion effectively, so that right otherwise founded on a legitimate title remains firm and intact in itself, even if accidentally deprived of every physical protection, public or private.

Preliminary notes. The assertion that coercive inviolability pertains to the essential marks of right is made not as a part of the thesis to be proved, but rather as a supposition already certain on other grounds and exaggerated rather than denied by adversaries; hence in demonstrating the thesis one may proceed from it as a principle commonly admitted.

  1. Proof I. From the essentially moral nature of right.

Right is a power essentially moral and therefore essentially distinguishable from every physical power. But unless that character of right by which it is coercive inhered in it independently of the physical power to exercise coercion effectively, right would be degraded to the nature of physical power. Therefore it must be said to subsist independently of physical power.

Proof of the minor premise. A power whose not only exercise but being and essence itself depends on a physical and material condition is rightly called not a moral but a physical power. But right, whose coercive inviolability belongs to it only insofar as it has a sufficient material power added for effectively enforcing coercion, is in reality a power that in its very being depends on a merely physical and material condition. For everyone agrees that coercive inviolability is not an accidental or externally added property of strict right, but is plainly essential and intrinsically constitutive; if it is removed, right itself is removed. In that hypothesis, therefore, by logical necessity right is degraded to the nature of a merely physical power, or, which is the same, is entirely denied.

  1. Proof II. From the per se absolute moral efficacy of the title of right.

All the moral force by which right subsists as true right, that is, as a relational moral power fortified as such by coercive inviolability, is founded proximately on the title of right and determined in reality by it. But the efficacy of the title of right, since it properly consists in a dictate of practical reason, is entirely moral in itself, and indeed not hypothetically suspended but absolute, and thus dependent on no condition of the physical order. All this is manifest in itself from the nature of the matter and from what was said above (n. 468). Therefore it is necessary that, as long as a legitimate title of right remains, the force of right likewise subsist independently of such a condition.

  1. Proof III. From the nature of all legitimate power.

It belongs to the nature of legitimate power that, although it essentially involves a final relation to actual exercise, it can nevertheless subsist intact in itself without any actual use, and in fact does so. But right for which there is no sufficient power available for effective execution is a per se legitimate power whose actual use, to which it indeed contains a final destiny, is accidentally impeded. Therefore this kind of external condition, which in itself can affect only the exercise of right, leaves right itself entirely untouched when considered in itself.

  1. Proof IV. From the absurd consequences.

Surely nothing more unworthy and injurious to God the holy ordainer can be conceived than that all the rights of a human being, even the most essential ones, depend not only with respect to their exercise and the external success of enforcement but also with respect to their substance and juridical binding force on uncertain and contingent circumstances, and even be objectively subordinated to and sacrificed to the perverse will and arbitrary choice of human beings. This would be so simply and precisely because the will opposing the rights, whether private or public and legal, prevails over them in strength and power, or refuses to recognize them. But under the hypothesis contrary to our thesis this unworthy consequence cannot be avoided at all. Therefore that hypothesis itself is proved to be false and must likewise be rejected.

Proof of the minor premise. Given the fallibility and vicissitudes of all human affairs, it can undoubtedly sometimes happen that the demand of objective justice, per se evident and most certain, as defined by a title of right, or natural rights founded immediately in human personality itself and therefore essential, such as the very right to live, enjoy neither the positive protection of public law nor any effective defense in some perhaps less civilized state, for whatever reason. For who would deny that even public social authority, since it is exercised by human beings, can sometimes so forget its duty that, in place of natural objective justice, it supports unjust arbitrary power with legal sanction and public force? Now whenever this occurs, according to the aforementioned hypothesis it must thereby be said that all those demands of objective justice, not publicly recognized, are deprived of the name and character of true right; that human beings themselves are objectively deprived of their rights, even their inalienable rights; that is, the unworthy consequence we have argued follows. If this is applied to concrete historical examples, it appears even more unworthy and intolerable to every rational order. For example, who could seriously endure someone saying that enslaved people, formally excluded from the protection of civil laws and given over to the avarice and cruelty of their masters without any possibility of resistance, are thereby not endowed with the common rights of human beings; or that newborn infants abandoned and cast out by their own parents in those regions where civil law and public custom allow such impiety (as is reported to have been the custom among the Chinese) do not possess a strict right to life, inviolable as such among all human beings, simply because they are deprived of external efficacy? Who could persuade himself that what is perpetrated against such unhappy people should be considered neither properly injustices or violations of some right actually subsisting, nor true crimes against the order of justice, but only sins against the moral law of charity? Indeed, how much such a conclusion opposes right reason is evident from this very fact: unless accidentally blinded by some passion, the common sense of justice among human beings is naturally more prompt and constant in recognizing, asserting, and defending no right than the right that we see, though unequal in strength, unjustly succumbing to someone’s more powerful arbitrary will.

  1. Corollary. The general principle established in this thesis already and indirectly proves false the recent juridical axiom, to be refuted directly below: “There is no right except positive right,” that is, right established and sanctioned by civil society; on this axiom rests as its proper foundation the theory of right professed by the “historical school.” For if it were true that all right is essentially positive, it would follow that human beings living perhaps still free from every civil bond had absolutely no rights before any public lawmaking society existed in that region that could establish positive law. But who would call into doubt that each of these people confidently attributed rights to himself, especially personal rights and those commonly called connatural, and did so as rights endowed with coercive inviolability; hence they did not hesitate, in case of necessity, to defend them even with weapons against unjust denial. And indeed, they claimed these rights not as hypothetical, for example, presuming their future ratification by positive public laws, but as absolute and valid in themselves, because established by natural law and known with certainty as such by the light of reason. Therefore, true and perfect natural rights exist before human law and positive right.

Remarks for resolving difficulties.

    1. The proper force of right (Rechtskraft), which is entirely moral in itself and founded on evident practical truth, must be carefully distinguished from the external efficacy of right, which depends on physical forces and various circumstances and hence cannot be an essential quality of right.
  1. Nothing prevents the external efficacy of right, valid in itself and morally effective, from failing at times so that it does not attain the end to which it is directed proximately; for this fallibility is common to all human affairs, especially those subject to the influence of human freedom. But, generally speaking, and with regard to the essential end that concerns the vital structure and stability of human society, the most wise governor of things, God himself, will never fail his own work, even if human beings are unwilling.

  2. It is indeed true that it belongs to social authority as a duty to protect publicly and fortify with positive sanction even those rights called natural. If, in undertaking this duty, that authority were at the same time to be considered infallible and impeccable in advance by divine testimony, and never to lack the forces necessary to enforce right, scarcely any practical use would remain for our thesis. But this is an empty supposition; and therefore it will not have been idle, either for the science of right or for life, to have learned that those things understood with certainty to be immutably sanctioned by the eternal law with a view to right social order do not, in human society, obtain the force of rights only when it pleases human beings to ratify them and finally to establish them by their own authority and public force.

Article 4.

The genuine idea of right and its inseparable connection with the objective moral order are brought to a conclusion.

  1. Having gathered into a single bundle, as it were, the particular teachings that analytical investigation has so far established with certainty, it will not be difficult finally to define the character of right by which the genuine idea of right is most clearly distinguished from its corruptions. Indeed, this common and decisive character of right is none other than that which constitutes its native sanctity: I mean its essentially moral character, by which right must be conceived not as something merely external to morality but as intrinsically and substantially connected with the objective moral order, and divinely sanctioned along with it. This doctrine, just as it is the common and sacredly guarded inheritance of all Christian philosophy, is also understood to be the most solid and entirely necessary foundation of human society. Therefore, we consider that it must be raised as a standard in advance against all theoretical attempts of pseudophilosophy to profane right.

Moreover, this native and inalienable dignity of every true right is demonstrated with equal certainty both by its essential origin and by its objective relation to the moral order. Therefore, we suitably comprise it under these two aspects in two corresponding assertions.

§ 1. Right shares a common divine origin with the whole moral order.

  1. Thesis XLIV. Every right formally as such—that is, considered according to its irrefragable force—whatever its immediate source, and wherever in a particular case it receives its real determination, ultimately descends from divine authority alone and subsists by that authority alone.

Preliminary notes. 1. When the question of the origin of right is raised, the two elements by which every right that exists in reality is constituted must first be carefully distinguished. One is formal and exhibits the common essential character of every right; the other is in a certain way material, by which each right individually has its own proper real determination and thus differs from all others. The proposed assertion concerns only the first. As for the material element of right, by which it is specifically determined in reality not in the character of right but in the character of this particular right, both as to object and persons, no one is unaware that there can be as many different causes and modes of origin as there are contingent facts on which that determination necessarily depends. Thus, for example, innumerable rights derive their particular and definite reality entirely from free contracts among human beings, while others derive it from some ordinance of divine or human authority. — 2. Right considered formally can descend from divine authority either immediately or mediately, and divine and human right differ not so much in origin as in their mode of origin. This is what the thesis asserts when it affirms that all right, even if it is in itself human and subject to the conditions of human right, must nevertheless, insofar as it has the force of right, descend in some way—that is, at least mediately and ultimately—from divine authority, and cannot subsist otherwise. 3. The assertion is universal and therefore holds whether the term right means a law or a body of laws, or a moral power.

  1. Proof I. (Right taken to mean a law or body of laws.)

All right understood in this way consists either of divine laws, whether natural or positive, or of human laws. Divine laws (divine right) include a divine origin in their very notion; therefore, the present question concerns only human laws, whether they are written and explicitly established by social authority or are in force by legitimate custom (human right).

Now, it was clearly demonstrated long ago that no human law can subsist as objectively valid unless it is founded on divine law with respect to its binding force, or formally. What was set forth and confirmed above (nn. 292 ff.) concerning the necessary connection of positive legislation with natural and eternal law, and the essential properties of positive law derived from that connection, pertains directly to this matter. Therefore, just as it belongs to the character of objectively binding human law, so it must belong to the character of every true human right that, as to its moral force, it descends from and continually depends on the same divine authority.

  1. Proof II. (Right taken to mean moral power.)

Argument 1. From the internal correlation between right and its duty.

Right and its duty do not mutually require one another through some merely external or accidental relation, but through an entirely internal and metaphysical correlation, such that neither right without a correlated duty nor juridical duty without the right to which it corresponds can exist or be conceived by the mind; and in this very correlation consists the proper moral efficacy of right. From this alone, then, it is concluded with certainty that these two correlates, namely, right and juridical duty, can have only one and the same original source, and that nothing more absurd can be conceived than for one to derive from an objectively necessary metaphysical order and the other from a contingent cause; one ultimately from the lawgiving will of God, and the other from the will and arbitrary choice of the human being. But every duty, of whatever kind, provided it is a true duty—that is, morally binding on a rational will—derives as such immediately or mediately from divine authority, as was shown above (nn. 252, 256 ff., 292 ff.) by invincible arguments. Therefore no right can objectively arise or subsist unless its moral force ultimately rests on that same divine authority.

Argument 2. From the proximate foundation of right, or the title of right.

Every power of right draws its moral efficacy proximately from a legitimate title of right, by which it binds the terminus of the right under an inviolable obligation. But by its nature a legitimate title of right always exhibits some divine law, either immediately or mediately, evidently applied to a particular case and a determinate matter. Therefore every juridical power derives all its moral inviolability ultimately, through its title, from divine authority.

Proof of the minor premise. By its nature every title of right is some truth, or dictate of practical reason, per se universal and evident, applied to a particular case by logical necessity, and as such to be revered by every rational being under moral obligation (see n. 468). But a dictate of practical reason has the force of truly binding morally not absolutely in itself, but only insofar as it certainly declares the natural divine law implanted in the human being by way of rational nature and sanctioned by God. (Cf. the arguments by which the true principle of obligation is established against Kant’s “autonomy of reason,” nn. 252 ff.) Therefore every objectively legitimate title of right in reality reports divine law itself, ultimately natural law, applied to the particular matter.

  1. Corollaries: I. This doctrine is entirely analogous to the Christian dogma that “there is no power except from God.” What the Apostle states here concerning some special right, namely, the right of social authority, must certainly be acknowledged to apply to this authority in a particularly eminent way, since every authority, by its object and end, is a certain participation in divine right itself for ordering human society. According to the general character of that origin, however, this dignity is common to all rights, so that the following axiom likewise holds more generally: There is no right except from God.

  2. II. Whatever, under the pretended name of human right, per se and manifestly conflicts with divine right, whether positive or natural, cannot for that very reason be considered true right, or objectively valid, since it is per se incapable of receiving from divine authority any force that morally binds. (See what was established above, no. 294 ff., under the guidance of St. Thomas, concerning a manifestly unjust law.)

  3. III. Nor can the opinion be reconciled either with this fundamental truth or with the genuine idea of right—an opinion not infrequently admitted, together with exclusive legal positivism, in modern (“conservative”) jurisprudence, which, having made a distinction between formal and material law (formelles und materielles Recht), does not hesitate to maintain that a human law formally subsisting, even if materially impious and ethically impossible, and therefore rightly met by the private conscience of individuals with passive resistance or disobedience, must nevertheless be publicly recognized as “formally valid law” and revered as such so long as it has not been repealed by legal means. Although this doctrine commends itself through a certain moderation and reverence for private conscience, in itself it nonetheless rests on the same principle of the emancipation of human right from divine right, euphemistically called the “objectivity” of law, and displays the characteristic by which “modern” law is opposed to the old, and the “modern” public order to the Christian order. In particular, however, it manifestly suffers from this twofold error:

a) In supposing that nothing more is required for a law “formally subsisting” than the external form of legality, that is, that it be enacted by a power legitimate in itself and according to legal procedure. But it is clear that the essential and common “form” of every law, whether divine or human, by which law is made “formal” and subsists, consists above all in its own moral efficacy and inviolable binding force, which have their origin in God.

b) Consequently, it either imagines that the objectively reverend moral force of law is derived from that external condition of legality alone, without regard to its matter, or says that the proper force of law, by which it subsists formally, consists in mere physical coercion without any moral effect. Both, however, are philosophically false: the former because it conflicts with the essential origin of moral obligation, the latter because it conflicts with the essentially moral nature of law.

Observations for resolving difficulties.

    1. No one, surely, will deny that in a well-ordered society even “human law” that is objectively invalid and morally ineffective may nevertheless, by reason of its legal origin and form, rightly demand some reverence; but reverence is properly due not to the pretended law itself, as formally subsisting and recognized, but only to the legitimate authority considered in itself. For nonrecognition of such a law, or passive resistance opposed to it, per se detracts nothing from the reverence owed to the otherwise legitimate social order as a whole by virtue of divine law. The practical rules to be observed concerning an unjust law agree with this (see no. 298). Thus the true “objectivity” of law is not removed, but rather asserted and defended in what is most essential against subjective arbitrariness.
    1. The proper efficient cause of law (whether understood as a rule or as authority) is divine authority alone, mediately or immediately. Therefore those particular and contingent facts by which rights and legal relations are specifically determined and individuated are rightly called determining or occasional causes, and in that respect real conditions of law; but they can in no way be admitted as simply efficient causes, that is, causes through which rights themselves are thought to arise even according to their essential entity. Although, then, people are commonly said, for example, to bind themselves mutually in law by free contracts and thus daily to create new rights and legal duties, they are not to be considered as truly effecting these themselves, but as supplying only real conditions upon which, once posited, rights and duties become morally valid and inviolable in the individual case and begin truly to obtain by virtue of the divinely established rational order.
    1. Finally, the reason sometimes adduced against the divine origin of law—that genuine rights sometimes seem objectively to belong to a person even though they per se conflict with the divine moral law and therefore cannot in any way derive from it—rests on a false hypothesis and is sufficiently refuted by what was said above (no. 475) about distinguishing right from the use of a right. Without doubt, it can happen that an act by which someone exercises some genuine right of his, although per se conforming to right and strict justice, nevertheless conflicts gravely in another respect with the moral law, for example, the law of charity. Thus a miserly landlord of houses would indeed use his right immorally if, compelled by no need of his own, he exacted the rent owed to him with such severity that, knowing the tenants unable to pay because of their present poverty, he suddenly cast them out with their families and did not hesitate to deliver them to utter misery. But who would say that the right of ownership itself, which he legitimately possesses—that is, the right freely to dispose of his property in general—is likewise per se evil and contrary to divine law? One could conclude this only insofar as the moral evil that accompanies a particular use of a right and thereby makes it illicit were in some way its proper and formal object of right, by which it would rightly also be named. Now, although people can abuse right just as they can abuse freedom in order to do evil, who has ever said that they possess a formal right to do evil?

§ 2. Right is a constitutive part of the objective moral order.

506. No one can deny—or does deny, unless he wishes to strip the name of law of all its ideal dignity and reduce it to mere realism of power—that law is connected in some way with objective morality and the divine order. But when they come closer to defining this connection, there is not equal agreement among all about the true or entire inner reason by which alone both orders, the juridical and the moral, are united by an inseparable bond and continually share in the same objective sanctity.

In particular, the same “conservative” philosophy of law which, rejecting the common ancient notion of law that extends the term to everything objectively just, teaches that no true law exists except positive law, established and subsisting by human authority, consequently tries to establish an analogous theory of the relation between law and morality. Among others, F. J. Stahl clearly professed it in the work already mentioned above. His account comes down to this: Law is undoubtedly connected with moral law by the essential bond that the common original source of both is understood to be divine. Otherwise, however, it does not belong to the essence of law that it continually retain its original and ideal harmony with morality in the real order; indeed, it can happen that law is openly contrary to the divine order, and even then it remains true law and continues in force.

Indeed, mixing what is true and Christian with what is false and fictitious, he writes: “The moral sphere (das sittliche Gebiet), taken in the broadest sense, comprises two aspects: in part it regards the image of God in man (to be perfected), and in part God’s world order in the human race (die Weltordnung Gottes im Menschengeschlechte). The former is sanctification, to which each person is called for himself; the latter comprises the external condition and order in which God wills the whole human race to be formed according to the social communion of life and the unity of collective existence; . . . virtues (moral) . . . are founded in the former, institutions (social) . . . in the latter; both are in mutual harmony and unity. It belongs to God alone to preserve the image of God in man, namely, through his commands and his power, which he exercises inwardly in conscience and through man’s free obedience. But God’s world order in the human race must also be preserved. through human society, and indeed by a human order, which it itself establishes and to which it subjects everyone through external power; and this very order is — law. . . . It presents itself as an ‘external kingdom, founded on the authority and ordering of human government’—distinct from that kingdom (of morality) founded on God’s immediate commands and immediate power within conscience. Hence arises the dualism of moral and juridical precepts. In God himself, indeed, there is no dualism. . . . But because (the order of the world to be preserved in the human race) has also been entrusted to human government as something subsisting in itself, (selbständig) and thus in the fallen state even apart from God, another moral order arises in addition to the first, namely the juridical order, separated from that original divine order, departing from it, indeed often contrary to it (ch. 1) . . . and even in this quality opposed to God, law retains its binding authority” (ch. 2, § 12).

It is in no other sense that the same author defines law: “Law is the order of life of a people, or of a community of peoples, for the preservation of God’s world order. It is a human order, but destined to serve the divine order, having its norms in God’s commands and founded on power granted by God.”

Thus many learned men and sincere lovers of public order have thought that sufficient provision had been made both for the sanctity of law and for the foundations of Christian jurisprudence. The more this new error avoids openly revealing itself as such, the more it must be opposed by the ancient truth:

507. Thesis XLV. It belongs to the nature of law that it be continually connected with morality not merely by some original and ideal kinship but by an essential unity, that is, that it subsist not outside but within the universal objective moral order as one of its constitutive parts.

Preliminary note. The assertion applies primarily to law understood collectively, and secondarily and consequently to its particular elements as well. “It belongs to the nature of law” means that this is an essential condition of every law, whether natural or positive, established either immediately by God or mediately, that is, through human authority. By “moral order” we mean the universal order of the moral world, consisting of creatures endowed with reason and freedom, as opposed to the physical order.

508. Proof I. From the final unity of the universal moral order in the world.

Whatever comprises objective norms of action by way of legislation, by which rational creatures are ordered to the supreme end of creation according to some essential aspect of rational nature, must necessarily be contained within the objective moral order sanctioned by the supreme creator of the world as an essential part of it and, as it were, a special province. But law clearly displays this character. For it is wholly concerned with rightly ordering men, not according to the entire scope of rational nature, but specifically according to the objective demands of social nature. Therefore, by its very concept and essence, law is contained within the universal objective moral order as a special part of it.

Proof of the major premise. The universal order of the world, which is the object of eternal law, is partly a moral order and partly a physical order, according as it concerns the right ordering of rational or nonrational creatures to the one supreme end of all creation. Thus, just as the physical order comprises the whole physical world, both in its particular elements and in its collective integrity and harmonious unity, so the moral order extends, in the Creator’s design, to the right ordering of the whole moral world (on earth, the human race), both in individuals and in its social complex and organic unity, partly through God’s immediate legislation and partly mediately, that is, with social authority cooperating by God’s command and power.

509. Proof II. By excluding the contrary hypothesis.

Those who wish the connection of law with morality to be original but not perpetual in the nature of law assume as certain the following two points: 1. that no law in force exists except positive law, established by human authority; and therefore 2. that the condition of human fallibility is inseparable from it, so that it can at some point directly contradict the moral order commanded by God, without thereby losing its force as law and its binding power, since it still rests, through legitimate human authority, on power received from God (“gegründet auf Gottes Ermächtigung”). But whatever may be said about the first hypothesis, which will be examined more fully below, the second certainly cannot be admitted and plainly contradicts divine holiness. Therefore, the doctrine built upon it must share the same character.

Proof of the minor premise. Human authority can indeed fail so far in its duty and divine commission as to presume to establish and enforce perverse human discretion as law, against God’s law. But to think that what is thus established and enforced by man against God is true law retaining its binding power (“sein bindendes Ansehen”) is either to be wholly ignorant of the nature of obligation and confuse it with the physical power to coerce, or to make God himself directly a participant in human wickedness, commanding and sanctioning by divine authority the very thing he absolutely forbids by that same authority. The former view is unworthy of the science of law; the latter, moreover, objectively contains blasphemy against God, the author of every obligation and of the moral value of rights.

Could any human king of moderate justice and integrity ever so cast aside his dignity as to communicate once and for all to some magistrate he had delegated an absolute power to command at will in the king’s name, and to wish to have publicly ratified in advance whatever that magistrate might presume to decree, even against royal majesty? But should we seriously suppose that God himself, the most holy ordainer of the world, forgetting his eternal dominion, gave to human authority or to any creature such unlimited power that whatever it decrees, whether in accordance with or against God’s express command, must be considered divinely ratified and sanctioned? (!)

510. Corollaries. I. The internal and essential relation between law and objective morality is adequately expressed by the following assertion:

Law, or the juridical order, stands in relation to the universal moral order exactly as objective justice, or what is just, stands in relation to universal objective moral goodness (rightness).

What is just is manifestly contained within what is morally good as a part in a whole. For moral goodness denotes objective moral rightness according to every aspect of rational nature, whereas what is just comprises that same rightness partially, or according only to a special aspect of that nature, presenting the objective moral rightness of human relations with one another and with society according to the order strictly necessary for social life. Therefore, nothing can be simply morally good (in conformity with the moral order) that is otherwise unjust (contrary to the juridical order). But one cannot immediately infer the complete moral goodness of a thing from its conformity with the juridical order. A part is indeed contained in a whole, but the whole is not contained in a part taken by itself. Hence what is just, considered in itself and strictly, although it participates in something of universal moral goodness, nevertheless falls short of moral goodness simply so called so long as it does not fulfill every aspect of rational rightness, in accordance with the familiar axiom: “Goodness results from a complete cause; evil from any defect.”

511. II. It does not at all follow that these two orders, namely, law and universal moral goodness, must everywhere be considered as one or identified in every respect, without regard for any distinction. On the contrary, they must be carefully distinguished. This is required not only by the relation of part to whole but also by the special character by which law, as a part of the moral order, surpasses every other part through its objective, actual demand and its coercive inviolability. But just as one must be distinguished from the other, so it is wrong to sever either from the other. For an essential part of a whole cannot be completely separated and emancipated from that whole without mutilating the whole and corrupting the part’s inner nature.

512. III. As a kind of conclusion to this entire analytical inquiry, the following or a similar definition finally results:

Definition of law (taken collectively):

Law is that province of the universal moral order which comprises the objective norms of strict social justice.

Since this statement presents the “proximate genus and ultimate difference” of the thing being defined, it qualifies not as just any description but as a true definition. For from what has been demonstrated, the proximate genus of law is most truly objective morality taken generically, or the moral order, which comprises the divinely sanctioned objective norms of universal rational rightness. If this generic character is then narrowed to that special objective morality which contains only the objective norms of social rightness strictly so called, or strict social justice, we have the ultimate and specific difference of law within its genus, on which every characteristic property of law, including in particular its coercive inviolability, is founded.

We call it “strict” justice to distinguish it not only from justice in the most general sense but also from social justice improperly so called, that is, from social duties of equity and goodness, since these are not subject to coercion. This distinction pertains to commutative, legal, and distributive justice alike. It is important to mention this because the terms “strict” or “rigorous” right, used to signify the object of “strict justice,” are often used in a much narrower sense, almost exclusively of right understood as a moral faculty. In this way something is sometimes called a strict or rigorous right only insofar as, in addition to coercive inviolability, it also concerns a particular, determinate matter such that, in the event of its violation, a definite measure of just compensation is likewise known by law itself. Thus a rigorous right is understood to pertain only to commutative justice.

Moreover, this same definition expresses the very idea of law that has long been found throughout St. Thomas and the whole Christian school, with Aristotle already pointing the way, whether explicitly stated or silently presupposed as evident.

513. Scholium. The discussion so far also conveniently illustrates the genuine relation between the science of law and moral science, or between “Law” and “Ethics”; this relation must be perfectly analogous to the relation between the proper objects of each. Hence it follows that within the scope of universal moral science, or Ethics in the broad sense, the science of (social) law is contained as a special part and cannot be separated from it without impairing its integrity.

If, however, the term law is not restricted to aspects of social life alone but is extended to norms of justice taken in the broadest sense, or to the laws of the universal moral order, it is clear that in this way law objectively comprises not so much a part of the whole moral discipline as its entire scope, and therefore differs from Ethics in the broad sense in name alone. Thus St. Thomas and the ancients generally, when they specifically distinguish natural law from positive law or inquire into what is forbidden or commanded by natural law, commonly understand by this designation not only natural precepts of social justice but natural legislation in its broader scope. By consistently following this custom, Hugo Grotius and the other interpreters of natural law who preceded Thomas in this way testified to their common agreement about the inseparable connection of every kind of law, including social law, with objective morality, and hence about the connection of the science of law with ethics. For all of them likewise professed that, in law so understood in the broader sense, law strictly so called, or the order of strict justice, is contained as a special part.

Thomasius was the first, by arbitrarily limiting and determining the sphere of each order, both moral and juridical, to lay the theoretical foundations of that separation by which the discipline of social law thereafter began to seek complete emancipation from moral science and objective independence.

Chapter II. The True Idea of Right Critically Confirmed against Its Various Corruptions

Chapter III. Knowledge and Appropriate Division of Right

↑ Top of work