Theodor Meyer, Ius naturae generale

Theodor Meyer

Theodor Meyer, Ius naturae generale

Theodor Meyer

Institutiones iuris naturalis, Pars I: Ius naturae generale

First published 1906

Theodor Meyer’s Ius naturae generale from the second corrected edition (1906), in Latin with an original English translation. Preface and proemium included; the navigational contents and publisher advertisements are excluded.


Introductio I: Preface

Introduction

Sectio I: General Ethics

Sectio II: Social Right in General

Liber I: Book One. General Sociology

Chapter I. The Nature of Society Described in General

Chapter II. The Natural Origin of Society

On the fiction of an original “state of nature” without society.

393. The same spirit of negation and destruction that had not hesitated to cast off, under the title of original evangelical freedom, the religious heritage handed down by divine authority in the Church of Christ could be restrained even less by reverence for any other antiquity or tradition from calling it into question and subjecting it to debate under the title of natural freedom. For nearly two centuries, almost all the efforts of the pseudophilosophers were directed toward this. They eagerly sought to reconstruct new foundations for everything—religion, science, the arts, and social institutions themselves—substituting for the treasure of the experience of so many centuries, and for the safe path of nature, history, and providential order, an unbridled and inflated license of opinion, which they called “philosophy” and finally “liberalism” (Freisinn). What wonder if among reformers of this kind there were some who thought that man’s original and natural condition would be restored only if, with all social life abolished, he returned to a bestial freedom? The doctrines of Hobbes and Rousseau must be referred above all to this view. Both denied the natural origin of human society and asserted that it had been invented by men and introduced by free contract. They differ from one another in that Rousseau imagines man’s natural and original state as extrasocial, namely, wild and bestial, whereas Hobbes imagines it as antisocial, or a state of “war of all against all.”

394. Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), tutor to King Charles II of England, systematically encompassed the whole science of natural law in three published books entitled De Cive (1643), De corpore politico (1650), and Leviathan (1651). He thought that, in order to assess correctly the social institutions that have historically existed among men, the philosopher must return to investigate man’s “natural” and original state, or, as he supposed, the state in which man had not yet been bound by any social ties. By this method he cultivated above all the pernicious theory of “man’s natural state,” which thereafter became widespread in legal philosophy, especially with the support of materialism. Considering man in this state, he recognized in him above all two impulses implanted by nature from the beginning: one of egoism and unlimited desire to acquire and enjoy, the other of concern to ward off death and preserve oneself. He says that the “war of all against all” arises from egoism in the state of nature, and gives this reason: “Nature has given each person a right to everything: that is, in a merely natural state, or before men had bound themselves to one another by any agreements, each was permitted to do anything and to anyone, and was permitted to possess, use, and enjoy all that he wished and could. . . . Yet he could not enjoy (this right), because a neighbor, with an equal right and equal force, claimed the same thing as his own.” He says that from the natural mutual fear there arises the desire to leave this state and seek associates. “Men placed in (this) state of war cannot expect to preserve themselves for long. Therefore, the dictate of right reason is that peace must be sought; that is, the law of nature.” Soon he also defines this law as follows: “A dictate of right reason concerning things to be done or omitted for the preservation, as far as possible, of life and the body.” Accordingly, Hobbes holds that the association of men must be conceived at its origin as a mutual agreement for peace, entered into not from goodwill but from fear and necessity, comparable to a truce between enemies. But, he says, for such a union of wills to suffice for the stable preservation of peace, “the will of all must be one”; this “cannot happen unless each person so subjects his own will to the will of one other, namely, one man or one council, that whatever that person wills concerning matters necessary for the common peace is to be regarded as the will of all and each.” He wishes to attribute to this public will “a power over individual citizens as great as each person has over himself outside the state, that is, supreme or absolute, limited by the strength of the state and by nothing else.” In his Leviathan he exaggerates this power still further and subordinates even moral conscience to it. Thus Hobbes successfully derives unlimited royal absolutism from man’s natural state by means of a social contract. Nearly a century later, Rousseau derived from the same source a similar political absolutism, but democratic.

395. Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778). Among his writings relevant to this subject, one must name Discours sur l’origine et les fondements de l’inégalité parmi les hommes (1753) and, especially, Du contrat social, ou principes du droit politique (1761). Like Hobbes, and even much more explicitly than he, Rousseau imagines a certain state of man prior to all social life (that is, not only civil life but also stable domestic association), which he properly calls “natural,” and which social life supposedly succeeded as an adventitious and almost artificial condition. In the preface to the work cited first, he admits that he presents this entire inquiry as a mere philosophical hypothesis and by way of conjecture; nor does he claim to investigate the historical origin of the human race, but only the manner in which man “must have emerged from nature” if one sets aside every supernatural gift and subsequent influence of art. In the course of his work, however, he treats the matter quite assertively. Investigating man in this sense of the original state, he finds him not naturally wicked and hostile to everyone, as Hobbes once did, but, on the contrary, naturally good and happy in his own native and uncultivated simplicity and freedom. Thus he recognizes no natural necessity to exchange this state for the social state; rather, he accuses society of corrupting man, naturally good, and robbing him of his primitive happiness. One might say that the man called, above all, the “philosopher of the eighteenth century” had suddenly descended to recite again the ancient fables and dreams of pagan poets. But one may admire both the modesty and taste of the man upon learning what this native happiness was that he laments having lost: nothing other, it seems, than the condition of almost a brute animal living a wild life, enjoying complete freedom without any moral ideas or laws, indeed without articulate speech, and “taking food beneath an oak, drink at the first stream, and nightly rest under the very tree that supplied him with food.” He also attributes to man a capacity for perfection, by which through varied experience he could gradually discover new skills either for warding off dangers or seeking the conveniences of life; yet, he says, nature led man only to transient associations with his kind and never to obligatory ones. Nevertheless, once agreements had been made among men who were not very far-sighted and were deceived by many illusions, various stable social bonds gradually gained ground along with property in things, at the cost of common freedom and equality. — In Du contrat social, however, he turns his efforts to developing the practical fruits of this fiction. From it he concludes that society could have been legitimately instituted among men only on the condition that the original freedom and equality of rights, which he calls essential and inalienable, remained intact within it. He seems to have found this sole legitimate form of human society in his perfect democracy, or in the essential and absolute supremacy of the people, formally sanctioned by the social contract. But a more detailed discussion of the political side of this doctrine belongs elsewhere.

396. By radically denying the stable foundation of the whole social edifice and substituting human discretion for it, these two men in different ways and by different methods to a certain extent inaugurated the modern “social and political Revolution” as it is commonly called, and represent its two aspects, as it were: one monarchical, the other democratic. Hobbes outlined the former, philosophically completing Machiavelli’s ideas, and left it to the pantheism and naturalism of the following century to develop it further. Rousseau chose to cultivate the latter, to be completed and crowned, finally, by this age’s “socialism,” that is, the open and practical profession of social atheism.

397. Note. The expression commonly adopted among scholastics, by which, for the sake of abstraction and scientific discussion, they distinguished the “civil” (not society in general) from the “natural” state, has nothing in common with this theory of the “state of nature.” For, besides including stable domestic society in the “natural” state, they in no way opposed the civil state to the natural state as though it were artificial and instituted at man’s discretion. Rather, they distinguished them in much the same way as the institutions of “law of nations” are commonly distinguished among the ancients from institutions of “natural law” properly so called (more on this below). All agreed that both proceeded from nature itself, though not equally immediately. They usually called only that “natural,” or “of natural law,” which is founded immediately in nature (the individual nature of man), and they regarded domestic social life as of this kind. They said that those things belong to the “law of nations” which derive from nature (as social) not immediately but through mediate necessity, that is, by a legitimate conclusion of reason, and which therefore are not instituted of themselves according to nature or under nature’s compulsion but by human deliberation; they counted the institution of civil society among these.

Similarly, the doctrine of Hobbes and Rousseau must not be confused with the “social contract theory,” proposed by Grotius and developed by Pufendorf, which thereafter became widespread and is to be discussed more fully in the special part of this treatise. For although these authors thought that civil society was contractual in origin and that a transition from the independent state of families to civil institutions could legitimately occur only through some free contract, it never occurred to any of them to doubt the natural institution of at least domestic society. Nor did they deny that nature itself morally impels men to enter into civil bonds. In much the same way, those who follow Kant’s footsteps commonly hold that the social contract is needed not for social bonds of every sort but only for civil society, and contend that its origin is founded not historically but juridically.

Therefore, setting aside for now the controversy specifically concerning the mode of natural origin, the sole purpose of this present chapter is to establish firmly against social radicalism the very fact of the natural origin of human society. Once this is established, it follows of itself that the order of social life, insofar as it is natural—that is, intended and instituted for the human race by the author of nature—is also sanctioned by natural law and cannot be abolished or transformed at will by human discretion.

Article 2.

On man’s sociality by nature in general.

398. Thesis XXXIX. Man is impelled by the force of nature to live socially.

Preliminary note. For now, the subject is social life considered only in general, setting aside every particular form of it. Not only is a natural aptitude for social living asserted; in addition, nature is said to possess an effective force by which men are necessarily impelled toward it. In this way, the thesis directly opposes the fundamental principle from which all the error of Hobbes and Rousseau reviewed above proceeds.

Proof I. Social life considered in general consists in entering into moral bonds with other human beings, united in order to pursue common goods through their combined strength or mutual assistance. But man is effectively impelled by the force of nature to enter into such bonds. Therefore, and so forth.

Proof of the minor premise. This force of nature is present not as one simple and individual factor, but as something composed of several factors cooperating together in some way toward one effect. Taken collectively, four such factors of particular efficacy are enumerated.

  1. The sharing of the same human nature and the same end. For among men conscious of this shared nature, which is a kind of most general foundation of kinship, some social bond, likewise general, must arise, by which all and each of mankind are morally united at least in the broadest way. And since the same common good, God, is naturally proposed to all as the common end, a certain community of pursuits and efforts and a cooperation of humanity (especially religious cooperation) must also arise with respect to him. Moreover, the natural duty of mutual love is founded in this common nature, as will be proved in its proper place. The more this universal bond of kinship is narrowed in a particular case to a bond of special closeness (consanguinity properly so called), the greater efficacy it also exerts in inducing social bonds.

  2. The mutual and manifold need of individual human beings, both physical and moral. a) Physical: No animal is born in greater need of the help of others even to preserve its very life than man. b) Moral: The powers of our minds would not be able to attain a development worthy of man—that is, suited to the rational and moral destiny of his nature—if the influence of social intercourse were excluded. “A development worthy of man” is specified here; for we do not agree with those who think that man’s intellectual and moral ideas must be derived almost entirely from the source of social tradition or from human speech, since psychology teaches us that a man endowed only with the use of his senses can nevertheless attain intellectual operations and thus some degree of moral development. Yet it is no less certain psychologically that this very degree of development will lack due sufficiency and proportion to human nature until the use of society comes to it as a necessary complement. Experience sufficiently confirms this, as shown by the history of those unfortunate people whom we read of as having grown up, from infancy, confined in the solitude of a prison and cut off from all human intercourse.

  3. The impulse of mutual benevolence and the sense of compassion toward the needy and wretched, naturally implanted in man, accompanying and gently urging the natural duties of doing good. That such an impulse, correlated with the manifold individual need just mentioned, is congenitally natural to man in itself is shown by the common esteem of people, who customarily honor it by the name “humanity.”

  4. The faculty of speech with which man is naturally endowed. For however man in fact first came to possess speech, speech nevertheless, considered in itself, is truly natural, as being due to human nature for its integrity. This is apparent from the fact that it is known to be necessary for the worthy intellectual and moral development of man and is also ordered to complete physiologically the very faculty of thought. Now the use of speech by its nature pertains wholly to social life, not only equipping the individual person with the capacity to live socially but also generating and enlarging the manifold necessary forms of social communion.

With all these elements of nature cooperating, it is absolutely necessary that human beings, beyond the most universal social bond by which they are already joined through the unity of the race, be effectively compelled to form particular moral bonds with one another, and thus to lead a social life.

Proof II. The same efficacy of social nature, understood beforehand as necessary by reasoning, is invincibly confirmed by empirical anthropology. For nowhere and never has there been seen on earth either the human race or any part of it living without any society and displaying not even the first rudiments of some social formation. This universal and constant fact excludes every accidental cause of itself and can be derived only from the common nature of human beings.

399. Corollaries. I. The broadest social bond, which proceeds from “sharing the same nature and the same end,” by itself alone constitutes only that ideal society of human beings commonly called “universal,” of which all human beings begin to be members by birth and, as such, are perfectly equal. For the essential features of human beings, considered abstractly, contain no foundation of inequality or mutual subordination.

400. II. The remaining elements of social nature that have been listed necessarily presuppose that first and essential bond of unity and tend toward the formation, within the universal society itself, of still closer groups, that is, “particular” societies bound by a moral union that is not simply universal or common to everyone in the same way. Considered, therefore, in view of the efficacy of social nature that proceeds from these particular elements, human society in concrete reality cannot but become unequal in many ways.

401. III. Nevertheless, every association of human beings, naturally arising from individual insufficiency and various mutual needs, is at the same time a kind of remedy of nature, in itself ordered to mitigating that inequality. Although equal in specific nature, human beings necessarily differ as individuals in many disproportionate ways, both physical and moral. For unequal elements complement one another through their very conjunction, some having in abundance what others lack, and conversely. Likewise, human beings joined together in society, with a view to common sufficiency, are thereby brought back approximately from individual inequality toward specific and ideal equality.

402. IV. In every real society, two elements of moral union must be distinguished: one universal, necessary, equal and constant with respect to all, since it is founded on communion in the same specific nature; the other particular, and, although more or less necessary in general, nevertheless contingent, unequal, and changeable in individual cases and with respect to individuals. Thus, considered in general, the manifold natural need is indeed common to all, but in particular it is entirely different in each person, partly with respect to its object and partly with respect to its manner and degree.

  1. V. No human being can ever lawfully consider himself released or exempt from the universal bond of society and the social duties founded on it; for as long as he lives, he cannot cast off the common nature he shares. Conversely, the actual natural obligation by which someone must be or remain a member of a particular society, precisely because it is contingent and changeable with respect to individuals, must be measured by each person’s particular circumstances, personal as well as local, and by the relation of necessity between the end of the particular society and the social duty common to all.

  2. Having established man’s sociality in general, by which his natural destiny for society is immediately marked, it remains to inquire further about it in particular: whether and to what extent the very social organism that we see historically prevailing among human beings is to be considered to have arisen from the same natural root and to have grown naturally. For, if we set aside the Church, instituted supernaturally, we see human beings existing constantly and everywhere in two principal societies, the domestic and civil. We must therefore investigate in both the traces of social nature that impels and acts, and examine the part nature has played and continues to play in forming and continually sustaining them. Nearly all recent philosophers, along with the ancients, agree in theory that neither form of social life was instituted rashly or by the mere choice of human beings, but is founded in nature—if we except the socialists of Rousseau’s school. Indeed, just as in the physical order all organic formations, each wonderfully adorned both for its own ends and for the end of the whole visible world, praise the wisdom of the divine author, so in the moral world the structure of human society, as a kind of moral organism that is one and yet varied in itself and, if we abstract from human vices, perfectly adapted to moral ends, clearly reveals the same hand of God the ordainer, gently and effectively acting also through free secondary causes.

Yet we do not undertake here to investigate all the particular rationales of either domestic or civil society, which must be reserved for Social Law in particular. For now we are concerned only with the most general and, as it were, ontological foundations of social right. Hence, at present, it is important to establish and secure this one point: that both domestic and civil society truly exist, introduced into the customs of the human race by nature’s institution, not by chance or solely through human effort.

Article 3.

On the naturally instituted domestic society.

  1. Domestic society taken completely is organically composed of three simpler societies: namely, the conjugal, which consists in the union of husband and wife; the parental, which exists between parents and the children born of their marriage; and the master-servant, which arises from the relation between a master and servants or household attendants engaged to perform domestic work. In the view of the ancients, these three elements constitute a complete family.

Marriage (the conjugal society) is rightly defined as a stable union of two persons of different sexes, lawfully entered into for the procreation and proper education of offspring. Since this is the first and essential foundation of the other elements, it is sometimes itself alone called domestic society, to which the parental relation is added as a connatural fruit. The master-servant relation, although joined by a less intrinsic and necessary bond, nevertheless belongs to its natural integrity. Once the natural institution of stable marriage has been proved, its natural origin immediately extends to the whole family.

  1. We do not consider it necessary to repeat here everything false and repulsive that has been expressed either in the customs of peoples or in the views of philosophers concerning the origin or character of the family. It will rather suffice to note this in general: because the family is rooted in human nature on a twofold foundation, namely physical and moral, the truth has chiefly been departed from in two ways. Marriage has been considered either as a mere “sexual function” or as a kind of “contract” subject to the conditions common to contracts. From the first a priori evaluation of marriage arose a long series of pseudophilosophical inventions that assimilate rational human beings to brute animals, and to which Darwinism has in our age brought new support. The other opinion, however, indirectly leads to similar results, rashly entrusting to human discretion and the vicissitudes of desire what nature established as stable and sacred. For although marriage is lawfully entered into only through the mutual free consent of the spouses, it by no means follows that it can be equated with institutions freely established by human beings, or that it is a contract free in substance, whose essential conditions and obligations rest, as if they were contractual, on the discretion and consent of those contracting. For in marriage the character of a truly natural institution, entirely necessary in its kind, is perfectly reconciled with the character of a society free in the individual case, that is, one which is entered into by free consent under the guidance of nature itself. In this way, all the Scholastics, following St. Thomas, declared marriage a natural institution, to which a special conjugal natural law must therefore correspond. At present, however, it matters only to establish beforehand the natural foundation of this law and of domestic law as a whole:

407. Thesis XL. The family is to be called a truly natural institution, not only in its elementary form, consisting in stable marriage, with its immediate development by which it is naturally extended into parental society, but also insofar as the master-servant relation externally completes it as an integral household or domestic society.

Preliminary remarks. Corresponding to the three elements of which complete domestic society is composed, the thesis contains three assertions, each to be proved separately. Although each elementary relation is said to be naturally introduced, they are not introduced in the same way or with the same degree of immediate necessity or natural determination. For this diminishes in degree as we descend from the first element to the last. Moreover, although the master-servant relation is necessary in general and introduced through natural causes, nature provides for it not as for the other relations—as an intrinsically constitutive part of the household—but as an integral part that completes it externally.

  1. Proof of Part I. On stable marriage.

Argument I. It cannot be denied that the propagation and education of the human race, and indeed both in a manner suited to human nature and rational dignity, are an essential end of nature intended by the Creator. Therefore, whatever is proportioned to this end as a necessary means must be considered ordered and instituted among human beings by the author of nature for that end. Now any kind of association would by no means suffice for such an end; rather, a stable union of spouses, and therefore a true conjugal society, is required. And this is so:

  1. With a view to the worthy and secure propagation of the human race. For what could be more unworthy of a) rational human nature than an indiscriminate association, by which man would excel not even the lowest brute animals; and what could be more destructive of the preservation of the race itself than such license? Some definite restraints must therefore have been naturally established in this matter, by which blind desire is kept within the limits of rational dignity. Everyone will readily agree that this can be done in an orderly way and with respect to all only through the stability of marriage. b) The great and enduring need of children also requires this stability, since their nourishment, preservation, and protection for many years demand the most immediate, continual, and provident care of both parents.

  2. With a view to education worthy of man. With respect to their children, spouses are charged with a most serious natural duty derived from the essential end of marriage (this will be explained more specifically in Domestic Law): to provide them with physical, intellectual, and moral education (formed religiously) suited to human nature and its destiny. For education is generally defined as the careful and continual provision of all the supports necessary for the proper development of children’s physical, intellectual, and religiously moral life. This duty therefore includes not only support and care immediately suited to the present needs of children, but also the provident preparation of the resources with which they ought to be equipped so that even in the future, after reaching adulthood, they may be able to lead a life worthy of a rational human being. Above all, this includes the constant formation of their minds in humane learning, good morals, and religion.

But no one is unaware that, in general, all these things cannot be sufficiently provided either by one spouse’s efforts or by the cooperation of both for a few years; rather, they require parental care made effective through social union, daily, watchful, diligent, and continued through a long series of years—indeed, especially as a numerous family grows, often lasting only until old age and life itself end.

Add moreover that the moral and religious teachings necessary for the right formation of the human race, in order to be continually available to parents for use in education through successive generations and to be preserved in their genuine purity, presuppose as a necessary social condition an enduring institution of the family. For according to the natural order of providence, it is necessary that these teachings not be taken up as if they had to be newly discovered by each generation through its own investigation, but that, once received, they be preserved thereafter by way of perpetual tradition, transmitted from ancestors to descendants. But if the stability of marriage were removed and the unity and permanence of the family thereby dissolved, the natural vehicle of this tradition, so necessary for educating the human race, would plainly fail.

Argument II. The specific character of the bond by which marriage is joined by nature’s institution sufficiently indicates that its permanence as well as its stability is intended by the author of nature. For spouses are joined by the closest bond of love. Every union joined by love and friendship is in itself perpetual and admits no predetermined limit of duration. Therefore, this social relation between spouses during their lifetime cannot cease except through a kind of violence done to the order of nature.

  1. Proof of Part II. On parental society. It is sufficiently clear in itself that marriage naturally extends into the parental relation; that this relation likewise has, by nature’s institution, the character of a stable social union follows invincibly as a corollary from the first part, and can also be considered proved directly by nearly the same arguments. Nor does it lack, for the same reason, the mark of a true society, namely its end, whatever those who wish every true society to be contractual may vainly object. For education and its fruit, proposed to it as its natural end, toward which parents and children must each contribute in their own way, truly constitute a common good, although proximately it is one good for parents and another for children.

  2. Proof of Part III. On master-servant society. Here this name is generally understood to mean any service involving a truly social relation to the household; in this sense it is asserted that master-servant society was naturally introduced as an integral part of domestic society.

Argument I. In the common social nature there are moral causes from which that social relation necessarily results in itself and generally speaking, as a corresponding effect. This moral efficacy is certainly exercised by twofold natural need: one of the household itself, already constituted in its intrinsic relations, the other of those who are taken into the family bond from outside.

For a) the household generally needs the strength and assistance of outsiders, who cooperate in an orderly way with the original members of the family, to attain its complete state and properly and providently fulfill the end suited especially to parental society; on the other hand, b) there are always many people whose lot is less prosperous and who, for whatever reason, are unable to establish a household by themselves and thus securely provide for what is necessary for life, even for their future old age. If all such people do not socially join another household, they are almost wholly deprived of the moral support and consolations of the spirit that continually nurture and sustain those living in the bosom of domestic society; thus they are compelled to languish in both physical and moral need. Therefore it cannot but happen that, by this very individual need—which occurs contingently with respect to particular persons but by necessity of nature with respect to the race—many people are morally impelled to serve another household, join themselves to it socially, and thereby share appropriately in its social goods as well.

Argument II. This is confirmed by the historical experience of all ages. For although, under the varying influence of times, master-servant society has sometimes degenerated by excess into degrading servitude, as commonly among pagan peoples, and sometimes by defect has been more or less drawn away from the genuine character of true social union, as has happened in our age through modern legal individualism and the gathering of workers into various industrial institutions, nevertheless the work of nature in it, however disfigured, is continually recognized in its substance.

From all these considerations it follows invincibly that the universal family, which naturally and organically coalesces from these three elements into a social unity and, under one head, the head of the household, forms a complete domestic society, was naturally instituted.

411. Corollaries. I. Complete domestic society, considered with respect to the objective scope of its natural end, is rightly counted among intrinsically complete societies. For there is no kind of social good naturally suited to man on this earth that this end does not in some way and to some degree include and present as attainable socially within the sphere of domestic life. For through the household, by means of marriage, man is provided with existence, or being itself; and likewise through the household, by means of parental and master-servant society, he is provided with more perfect being, or relative perfection—namely, every kind of human physical, intellectual, and moral cultivation suited to domestic limits (cf. no. 392).

412. II. By reason of its end, the family occupies the first and most essential level in the natural structure of the social organism and is the original foundation of the whole of human society. Hence nothing can be more harmful to human society as a whole than whatever is directed either to profaning and loosening the most sacred bond of marriage, and thus undermining the internal unity and stability of the family, or to morally corrupting the education of offspring. For when the foundation of society is cut away or weakened, the ruin of the whole structure is prepared, and deadly poison injected into the common source of social life must immediately spread into all the veins of the whole body.

413. III. From the fact that conjugal society is naturally instituted, it certainly follows that, with respect to the human race, it is so necessary and commanded that its end—namely, the worthy propagation and education of the human race—be secured without interruption. It by no means follows, however, that celibacy is naturally prohibited with respect to individual persons; on the contrary, when preserved from love of virtue, it is readily understood to be even more praiseworthy than the married state and highly conducive to a higher order of social good.

414. IV. The master-servant society, considered in itself and apart from human abuse, must be said to be a provision made by nature for society as a remedy against the calamity of poverty—not only an obvious and universal remedy but by far the most effective. Therefore, some part of what is called the “social question” undoubtedly consists in restoring it appropriately (that is, in some form suited to the times) and reforming it according to the model of the Christian household. From this same institution of nature one may generally learn how poorly the inventors of modern liberalism have served the true and common happiness of human beings: since the eighteenth century they have sounded almost nothing but personal “rights of man” (Menschenrechte), proclaiming individual “equality” and social “independence” as a gospel, while destroying the very natural condition of true social happiness and freedom, namely, the organic form of society.

Article 4.

On civil society, likewise founded in nature.

§ 1. The elementary notion of civil society.

  1. Civil society, or the state, arises from families multiplying and being gathered together, just as individuals are gathered into a family, into something like a family of families. It likewise pursues man’s complete good insofar as it responds to external cooperation, but with an expanded sphere of activity and resources. Hence it is easily inferred that the state admits very different degrees of development and differs according to the stage or degree at which it is considered, as happens in every natural organism, which gradually develops from small beginnings toward its perfection.

Therefore, without regard to any particular degree of developed perfection, civil society can be described roughly as a perfect association of many families, organically united for the sake of enjoying rights and the common good. In this sense, every city or community consisting of some considerable number of families, provided it forms within itself one complete and hence independent social body, is already in some way a civil society, as the ancient name city (πόλις) sufficiently indicates. Indeed, even those unstable tribes of barbarians who settle nowhere except temporarily, but nevertheless pursue common security and the common good under some shared supreme head (cazique), can to some extent—that is, only incipiently and imperfectly—be included under the name civil society.

  1. But if this expression is taken in the narrower sense, it presupposes not only fixed places of residence and the boundaries of a country but also a certain degree of civil development, and denotes only what is generally called a commonwealth or civil state (Öffentliches Gemeinwesen, Staat).

We do not venture here to establish a definition of this social institution, which would adequately comprise its true and entire idea, all the less because this cannot be done on a certain scientific foundation until, through analytic investigation into the origin, nature, and end of the state, we have drawn out its true idea. Now this very general idea of civil society, just as it has usually differed among pagan philosophers and Christian teachers of public law because of their different evaluations of human affairs, is once again today subject to the gravest controversies, since modern paganism prevails for the most part in both philosophy and public law. Both ancient paganism and paganism revived have this in common: they adorn the moral personality or abstract totality of public society with unlimited fullness of right, or even divinity, to the detriment of the personal dignity of individual citizens and the freedom of particular communities. The distinctive mark of Christian philosophy, by contrast, is to harmonize the very idea of public society with the moral dignity of citizens and the legitimate freedom of all its members. Thus, in defining the state, some chiefly consider and exaggerate a necessary work of nature, divinely ordered, to which the character of society is added, as it were, only secondarily; others, while recognizing the civil organism as divinely ordered, nevertheless carefully state the formal and essential character of true society in it, lest private rights of members and legitimate spheres of freedom be allowed to be swallowed up by vague and pantheistic fatalism in the name of “the public state.” Further, they dispute again about determining the state’s true and proper end. These controversies, on which a legitimate definition of civil society certainly depends, must be treated expressly in the special part of natural law.

417. For the present question concerning the natural origin of the state, we need no other notion of it than the ordinary one drawn from the common judgment of human beings, to which the following description seems sufficiently to correspond. The state is:

A perfect association of many families, communities, and tribes inhabiting a defined region of land, organically united for the sake of enjoying rights and attaining the common good.

In these words the primary and proper elements of the state are indicated: namely, a people naturally constituted from organic parts—individually united to the portion of land they inhabit—joined into a perfect and independent association, and thus under some supreme authority, joined organically, as it were in imitation of an organic body—with a social end in view, that of enjoying rights securely and of attaining, through the combined strength of its members, a fitting common good in general, for which individuals or a few would not suffice, while for now setting aside the question of what, objectively, this common good should ultimately consist in.

§ 2. The natural origin of civil society is demonstrated.

418. Today scarcely any philosopher of sound mind doubts that, besides domestic society, civil society too exists among human beings not by chance or by mere human invention but by the necessity of social nature; indeed, many who have absorbed the pantheistic poison of Hegel exaggerate it beyond measure. Accordingly, in this question, as in the one immediately preceding, we have almost only social radicalism directly opposed to us. Against its subversive fantasies, it is important, if not polemically then certainly by way of positive exposition, to mark the true root of civil institutions, all the more because the correct evaluation of the whole juridical order is founded on it as well.

Thesis XLI. Civil society too, although in particular it is constituted through the manifold contingent and free cooperation of human beings, nevertheless, considered in its kind, follows with invincible necessity from the common social nature of the human race.

Preliminary remarks. It is not asserted that every particular civil society, or one considered historically, is of natural origin as such. For the thesis readily grants and presupposes as evident that individual states, both in their particular existence and in the concrete form of their existence, depend in many ways on contingent causes. Therefore, it says “considered in its kind,” that is, taken according to the specific character common to every civil society. Consequently, the assertion is nearly equivalent to this: Given the common social nature of the human race, it cannot but happen that associations arise among human beings which we call civil societies.

  1. Proof I. From the universal and constant historical fact. An institution that always and everywhere appears inseparable from the human race as it has multiplied on earth, and that, although subject in every way to the vicissitudes of the human race and often shaken by violent storms of anarchy, has nevertheless remained indelible among human beings, cannot but be the effect of causes situated in human nature itself. But no historical or ethnographic fact is more certain and constant than that the human race, as it multiplied on earth, has always existed in some civil association, at least an incipient one, and a more perfect one to the extent that a people has departed less from the dignity and awareness of human nature. Moreover, although individual states could perish and be destroyed, the very civil society could never be destroyed, but persisted in the societies that continually succeeded the earlier ones. Therefore, civil society must be considered founded on the necessity of nature.

  2. Proof II. From the internal causal proportion of social nature for introducing civil bonds. Nearly all the factors by which we proved above (no. 398) that human beings are effectively led by nature’s institution to social life in general do not exhaust their efficacy in forming domestic society alone; they are likewise effective in joining families and households into further and organically enlarged groups that we call civil societies. Now a moral impulse of this kind, proceeding from the common nature of the whole human race, although it may sometimes fail to produce its proportionate effect among human beings in a particular case and by accident, can never fail to do so generally and simply. Therefore, by force of social nature itself, civil associations must arise throughout the human race as it spreads and multiplies through different families.

Proof of the major premise. These social factors above all certainly exercise an invincible moral efficacy even in families:

  1. Blood relationship, by which families descending from a common stock are joined to one another by a special and closest bond. For from this arise proximately neighborhoods of households, villages and towns, then whole tribes living within the boundaries of the same region, which, as they multiply further, spontaneously expand into national unities or nations. The entire history of patriarchal chiefdoms confirms the efficacy of this kinship. In addition there is:

  2. The insufficiency of particular households or even tribes to protect themselves and their settlements effectively by their own strength against various dangers. In this is founded the moral necessity of securing common safety against common evils by socially combining efforts and assistance. And since very different dangers of this kind can arise for those dwelling together in a region, sometimes from the natural influence of the elements, sometimes from hostile foreign tribes., and since they are not only present and transitory but are usually to be feared in the future as well, it cannot be denied that in this very condition of human affairs a new and indeed most powerful motive is contained, by which broader social groups, usually already consolidated by the bond of blood, are united more strongly and stably, or, when necessity compels, first coalesce from elements of different national origin.

The same result is favored by inequality, by which individual human beings, and likewise individual families and tribes, differ from one another. This often causes the smaller and more needy to attach themselves voluntarily to the greater and more powerful for protection and subordinate themselves to them, or to be joined and subjected to them by force. Although none of these things necessarily occurs in every particular case, it is nevertheless clear that, in general and considering the actual condition of the human race, they are founded on a certain necessity of nature.

  1. The natural perfectibility of man and of human good, in this life, is in itself indefinite, that is, not circumscribed in advance by any limits of determination. This is an individual companion of rational nature itself. For by its force, just as man can be ultimately completed and perfected only by an infinite good, so in this present life, in which he must strive toward that blessed end, he endeavors to subject the whole universe of created things, as it were, to his dominion, so that from it, as from an inexhaustible treasury of natural means, he may continually draw resources through his rational effort, not only those necessary but also those useful for his continual perfection in view of that end. Given this certain foundation of nature, we may reason invincibly as follows:

The natural sociality of the human race is founded in itself and by nature’s institution on man’s natural perfectibility, and corresponds to it; therefore sociality itself must also be in itself indefinite. For every human society by its nature aims to make up, through the combined strength of many, the insufficiency of individual power in attaining the goods suited to perfecting man; and since society can expand from the simplest to increasingly complex forms, and thus its efficacy can in itself be increased and extended in some way indefinitely, the Creator must be said to have provided through man’s sociality that man’s capacity to attain human good more abundantly on this earth should be proportioned in some way, at least with respect to the whole race, to the in itself unlimited perfectibility of human nature—that is, similarly made in itself unlimited through society. Now domestic social life, absolute within its own limits, does not adequately correspond either to the perfectibility of nature, which is in itself indefinite, or to human sociality founded on it; it reaches only that portion of social goods that is immediately necessary to all human beings. It is therefore in itself insufficient to provide that portion of goods which requires the varied and stable cooperation of a larger multitude, such as the security of living together, dwelling, and enjoying rights in an orderly way, as well as goods of a higher human culture. On the other hand, by force of its own perfectibility and sociality the human race also has a natural capacity and destiny to attain these goods, so that, as befits God’s wisdom and goodness, the abundance of resources for attaining the ultimate end and glorifying God may be greater and worthy of a rational human being for each person. Therefore, from man’s natural perfectibility and sociality, and hence by nature’s institution, individual families and then individual tribes must be gathered into broader and finally organically composed groups of families and tribes, or civil societies.

Together with these various social factors, each considered individually, there is already such great moral efficacy that all of them taken together, a fortiori, constitute an invincible necessity of nature from which the human race cannot withdraw by its own choice.

421. Moreover, the same conclusion implicitly contains the point that civil authority itself, considered in itself, derives not from the free pleasure of human beings but likewise from the necessity of nature. For whether in particular it arises organically from domestic authority itself as the family’s offspring and its servant retinue gradually multiply, little by little—as we see happened in patriarchal chiefdoms—or is established directly by human decision under the compulsion of nature, as is also known to have occurred at times, in either case it must be said to be founded on the necessity of nature and thus of natural origin. This manifestly follows from the fact that civil association, which we have proved arises among human beings by necessity of nature, with equal necessity requires a fitting authority as its essential element (cf. nos. 352 ff.). Moreover, it is consistent with the organic structure of civil society, and is generally known actually to happen in history, that the social material is not first gathered into a political body and then, by a decision, given its form through the creation of a government. Rather, the social body begins from a preexisting nucleus of authority, as it were—such as a more powerful or prominent family—and then, since this authority arose long before it was constituted, grows together with it through successive organic developments.

422. Corollaries. I. Although the present thesis intends directly to defend here only what, following Aristotle, is expressed in these words according to the mind of St. Thomas: “it is natural for man to be a social and political animal,” that is, destined by nature to live socially even in a political community, nevertheless the force of the arguments is such that they scarcely leave intact even the opinion of those who consider that civil society, although naturally necessary, can nevertheless be merely contractual in its formal and juridical origin (cf. no. 397). This conclusion is certainly very difficult to reconcile with the very character of civil society as in itself and naturally organic, which the same arguments show; moreover, it is rightly ruled out by other certain reasons to be presented elsewhere.

423. II. The truly natural state of man includes not only domestic life but also civil life. Nevertheless, domestic life shares this dignity to a far greater degree than civil life: the former derives its origin immediately from nature, the latter mediately and remotely; the former is immediately ordered to ends of nature essential for individual persons, the latter to ends necessary for the whole race but in themselves useful only, or only hypothetically necessary, for individuals.

424. III. From the natural necessity by which civil associations cannot fail to exist among human beings in general, no natural obligation can be derived by which all and each of them are bound to live in civil society or to remain in it constantly. For just as, with respect to individuals, the necessity for this is only hypothetical, so too the obligation can only be hypothetical: that is, actually binding each person in particular only insofar as he wishes to live in common with a greater multitude of people or is morally obligated to do so by personal circumstances.

Points to note for resolving difficulties.

425. 1. What sense Scholastics usually give to the distinction between the civil state and the state of nature has already been sufficiently explained above (no. 397). For by this manner of speaking they indicate little other than what we likewise professed in Corollary II just presented. St. Thomas’s mind on this subject is clearly evident both in the passage cited above for Corollary I and elsewhere, especially when he expressly observes that something can be called “natural” in either a narrower or a broader sense, as, for example, in Summa theologiae 1, 2, q. 41, a. 3; q. 51, a. 1.

426. 2. Even if it were granted (which we deny can be true) that every civil society formally and only as such arises from some common human consent, or at least some implicit agreement, this would by no means weaken the assertion defended here. For it would also have to be shown that people generally come together freely to give such consent, that is, without being compelled by any necessity or obligation of nature. Moreover, not every kind of human cooperation, even if individually free, nor private contracts successively entered into by many people solely for some private advantage, from which civil associations can certainly coalesce organically and gradually quite unintentionally by the individuals, should be considered the “common consent” of the people or a “free social contract” whereby all have conspired directly to this end, namely, to establish civil society. For natural causes belonging to the moral order usually produce their general effect among human beings in such a way that in their particular elements they do not exclude either the multiplicity and contingency of actions or freedom, but on the contrary presuppose them entirely. But what results through human cooperation or with their consent in this way should not for that reason be said to be done by their will and by agreement, much less to be an invention of human discretion.

427. 3. No one denies that states can sometimes also be constituted in a certain way artificially, that is, by an express human decision and free agreement; indeed, in certain circumstances this must be done to satisfy the ends of nature. This certainly happens whenever, in a particular case, even though a multitude of people may dwell somewhere, social nature has been unable through some accidental impediment to complete its work by the ordinary or organic way; or when an organic work of nature that formerly existed has again perished through an accidental event, such as complete anarchy. But this does not invalidate the thesis; it confirms it.

428. 4. The opinion of St. Augustine and several other writers of the Christian age, who taught that civil rule is founded more in the fall of human nature than in nature, seems to oppose our thesis, but rightly understood it is perfectly reconcilable with it. For this opinion presents a wholly true meaning in two ways, neither opposed to our thesis, namely:

a) By understanding civil rule not so much according to its idea as according to the historical form that we sometimes see it actually take on, in which it is chiefly erected as a defense of order and rights armed with the sword and terror against the audacity and untamed passions of criminal people, which threaten common security. This special form of civil rule is certainly adapted more to fallen nature, prone to evil, than to nature simply considered.

b) By comparing civil rule and civil institutions with the social state that would have fallen to the human race had it not destroyed by sin its original and supernatural happiness in paradise. Indeed, there is no doubt that in that most happy state of human innocence, human society would have exhibited some form of the kingdom of God, or of a great and most peaceful family of the children of God under his immediate and paternal rule, in which there would have been no need of the ordinary apparatus of civil society or almost any coercive human government. In this way it can certainly be said with complete truth that the civil rule to which nations are now subject derives its origin from sin. And this seems to be the way St. Augustine is truly to be understood when, distinguishing the kingdom or city of God from the earthly city, he teaches that the latter was properly instituted for earthly human beings (that is, those turned by sin from God and heavenly things toward earth). Similarly, after him, medieval writers commonly and not without reason said that historical civil rule was a consequence of sin.

But on the other hand it is no less rightly asserted that the same institution is founded in nature, insofar as civil society is considered not according to some accidental form of development but in itself, and not in relation to human nature adorned by divine supernatural gifts but in relation to pure nature (which, after the Fall, remained unharmed in its essentials). For in human nature accepted in this way are rooted all those factors that prove the civil order to be simply necessary for the human race once it has sufficiently multiplied. This also includes man’s moral freedom, by which he is able to choose good or evil at will, as well as the internal conflict of the passions, to which a sensitive-rational being is naturally understood to be subject. Given this condition of nature alone, even if we do not reckon with that sad flood of vices that truly followed the Fall, the common order of justice and security would still not be sufficiently provided for unless that same order were continually strengthened by public social cooperation against the evil use of individual freedom. Then, most important of all, alongside the consideration of security comes another factor inseparable from human nature, which by itself would suffice effectively and gently to impel human beings into larger civil associations: the very great perfectibility of human nature, to which a corresponding sociability answers (see no. 420, under 3).

  1. Scholium. Civil society, since in itself it is not unequal to the task of socially procuring a sufficient supply of goods and resources that human beings in general may need in the natural order to establish a relatively perfect life, is undoubtedly endowed with a certain subsistence in itself as well. Therefore, according to its kind, a civil association is rightly called not only intrinsically but also extrinsically complete (sovereign) (cf. no. 392).

Yet it does not follow from this that the whole social organism of the human race, as it corresponds in the ideal order to the fruitfulness of social nature, is in reality brought to completion and fulfillment in the civil association as its supreme summit. On the contrary, considering the perfectibility of human nature, which is not defined by fixed limits on this earth, and which is served by a sociality that is likewise in itself unlimited (no. 420), one cannot deny that the efficacy of social nature, striving toward the social perfection of the human race, is not fully exhausted even in the state as such. For who would doubt that, just as political union adds a new increase of capacity to individual families and tribes, so the international union of individual states would naturally add a new increase in the capacity for perfecting humanity? No one is unaware that the need for mutual assistance can arise among different peoples, just as among families. Added to all this is the fact that the first and most ideal element of sociality is not particular but universal, and consists in the very unity of the human race (nos. 398–399). It must therefore be said to occur through the moral impulse of social nature itself that particular states are stably joined into further associations or confederations of various peoples, especially neighboring ones. Indeed, the social structure of the human race is understood to fall short of its ideal integrity, as outlined by the author of nature, as long as it has not become a complete universal international society, organically embracing the whole human race in the broadest communion.

And indeed, before the coming of Christ the Savior, the necessary condition for bringing about or pursuing this communion, together with its very ideal foundation, had almost everywhere disappeared among human beings. For through sin, the human race having been alienated from God, its common creator, legislator, and end, the bond of communion and fraternity among human beings had also been loosened and almost broken. But the Lord Christ, having become the reconciler of all with God, brother, and king, undertook to repair this same bond of unity and bind it more firmly than ever before. He also laid the surest foundations for actually bringing about the universal communion of human beings, especially by inculcating the law of universal charity and by establishing his Church as a universal and Catholic kingdom, catholic in not only space but also time. Therefore, the original destiny of the human race to establish a universal society, natural in itself but as if deadened by sin, was revived by Christ alone, who at the same time increased by a supernatural development nature’s capacity for this end. Hence, just as this ultimate summit of social structure is understood to be possible in itself only on the foundation of the Christian religion and the Catholic Church, so it must be obstructed and frustrated by peoples’ falling away from Christ or from the Church’s catholicity. For this reason, not only the conspirators of international socialism, boasting of their atheism, but also modern interpreters of public law who profess mere naturalism or deism, though guided by some obscure instinct toward that idea which is natural, nevertheless dream in vain of someday erecting a universal and single commonwealth of all humanity. We say “in vain” so long as, in ungrateful pride, they spurn the one true center of this unity, established by God—the see of Christ’s vicar on earth—and proclaim in its place the merely abstract phantom of an ideal “humanity,” independent of every positive religion, as the pledge of future union.

Moreover, this ideal politics, once it is emancipated from Christ and set against him, scarcely differs from the politics that has been before our eyes for more than a century, marked by modern revolutionary signs. The ideas of political and social reform that, from the first decades of the past century, emerged from the hiding places of sectarians (among whom Mazzini was prominent) and circulated in the form of a program for European revolution, certainly agree well enough with it. They contained roughly these proposals: 1. To create in Europe as many democratically constituted political bodies (republics) as there are great nationalities distinguished by their principal languages (Bildung grosser Nationalstaaten nach den Sprachgrenzen, mit je einem republikanischen Regierungskomitee an der Spitze), namely, a Franco-Gallic, Italian, Iberian (Portuguese-Spanish), British, German, Scandinavian, and Slavic republic. 2. To establish a confederation of all these, named the “United States of Europe,” likewise governed by a collegiate European government with some central seat, for example Berne in Switzerland. From this a further international union was to be joined with the remaining parts of the world, etc. (!) — Cf. the historical commentary in which various political events have meanwhile illustrated this revolutionary idea. Moreover, the philosophical-political forecasts and predictions professed more recently by Ed. von Hartmann, Philosophy of the Unconscious, 337 ff., agree remarkably with these same ideas.

We therefore do not fear to assert that the organic association of the whole human race, although foreshadowed and required in itself by social nature, can be expected to become real either never at all or only at some time in and with the Catholic Church of Christ.

The Middle Ages, through the providential and magnanimous policy of the Roman Pontiffs, already saw some beginning of it, full of promise—the Roman-Christian Empire, I mean, in which the idea of a law of nations worthy of that name and of the Christian world was first outlined. For this whole idea aimed at gathering all Christian peoples into one Christian commonwealth of nations under the protection and rule of one supreme emperor, just as they formed one flock of Christ under one supreme shepherd; yet in this very catholic—that is, universal—communion of justice and charity, each people’s particular character, its social institutions, its internal rights, and its freedom were to remain intact.

How many public and social calamities would have been excluded from the beginning; how many disagreements and wars among Christian rulers, how many bloody rebellions, would have been deprived of both reason and opportunity! How many resources and treasures of the peoples—now exhausted before war by the need to feed and arm six hundred armies—would have been preserved for works of peace; how many political and social problems by which we are continually agitated and distressed would have remained unknown, if an institution so great and salutary in itself had not collapsed before reaching its true maturity, whether through a power hostile to the human race or through human depravity together with unforeseen folly! If only its memory might someday show future generations, taught by richer experience, the way that leads to peace and the true progress of humanity!

Liber II: Book Two. The Essential Bond of the Social Organism, or Right

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