Theodor Meyer, Ius naturae generale

Theodor Meyer

Theodor Meyer, Ius naturae generale

Theodor Meyer

Institutiones iuris naturalis, Pars I: Ius naturae generale

First published 1906

Theodor Meyer’s Ius naturae generale from the second corrected edition (1906), in Latin with an original English translation. Preface and proemium included; the navigational contents and publisher advertisements are excluded.


Introductio I: Preface

Introduction

Sectio I: General Ethics

Sectio II: Social Right in General

Liber I: Book One. General Sociology

Chapter I. The Nature of Society Described in General

Article 1.

On the elements that constitute society in its being.

§ 1. Its concept and definition.

347. As Liberatore rightly observes, the most general meaning of “society” commonly refers to any “union of several persons who cooperate by their actions toward some common end.” More precisely and accurately, however, society is defined from its general concept as follows:

A moral and stable union of several persons who cooperate by their actions toward some common honorable end.

For the genuine concept of society, as supplied even by common usage and the shared judgment of mankind, comprises these essential characteristics:

  1. It is a moral union, not merely external or physical. A moral union is one joined by moral or spiritual bonds, namely intellect and will. Hence the name society excludes not only any aggregation whatsoever of irrational beings but also a crowd or multitude of people united only by sharing a place or number. By “several” I understand that plurality of associates which is absolutely required for a union to exist, namely at least two.

  2. A stable union; for an association that is transient by its very nature and achieves its end in nearly a single effort would use the name society only improperly. Thus the stability of a social union at the same time presupposes and includes the stability of its social end.

  3. It is directed toward “some common honorable end.” For a necessary condition of every moral union, and its proper objective bond, consists in the end or common good. Just as intellects are united by a common object of knowledge, so wills are united by a common good intended; therefore, a common good, commonly known and intended as such, is the proper and essential ground of moral union, by which rational beings are joined in society. — The end must be honorable, because a stable moral union of rational intellects and wills can be founded only on a rational good. Hence a conspiracy of criminals or a band of robbers, although otherwise resembling a society, would wrongly claim for itself the name and dignity of society.

  4. There is also the cooperation of the associates toward the same common end, to be fulfilled socially, that is, by joining moral and physical forces. Therefore, to cooperation toward a common end, known and intended as such, there must necessarily also correspond union and cooperation in the means toward that end. For unless this external and real cooperation were added to the inner and ideal cooperation of minds, the latter would be neither true and sincere in itself nor properly social.

§ 2. On the matter and form of society.

348. When the constitutive elements of society are considered according to the notions of matter and form, it is easy to recognize which belong to the matter and which to the form of society.

Its matter, as is sufficiently clear in itself, lies in the very plurality of rational beings or persons. The matter of human society in particular is therefore a plurality of human beings, which, with reference to the constitution of society, is also called its “material cause.”

The form, by which the underlying matter is properly informed so as to constitute society, is undoubtedly that stable moral union alone of which we have spoken above, proceeding from the threefold union of intellects, wills, and powers; hence it is rightly called the “formal cause” of every society.

Furthermore, the essential principle of this same social union is understood to be the common end, commonly known and intended, since the union intrinsically depends on that end as its formal object. Hence it follows that every society is specified by its end; that is, the specific property of each society derives specifically from its end as the objective principle proper to that social union.

§ 3. On the moral personality of society.

349. Through social union, the number of beings distinguished in the social matter coalesces into a new kind of entitative unity, distinct from the being of its individual members. By this, society, although physically distinct and manifold, becomes a morally one body, which is called the social body.

This very name sufficiently suggests the analogy between society and a physical body, especially an organic and living one. For just as a body is composed of several elements which are nevertheless joined together as its parts into the unity of a physical body by some common and inward force, so a social body is formed from a plurality of rational elements into one body, distinct from its individual parts yet homogeneous in nature with them, that is, likewise rational, through some common bond of moral cohesion and cooperation. Moreover, just as an organic body remains the same even though it is subject to a continual loss and addition of elements, so society, at least when more numerous, does not perish because individual members successively leave as others join.

To this general analogy is added a more specific one, by which human society is likened to an individual man and is rightly called a moral person. For just as an individual man is a physical person insofar as he is physically one as a “rational supposit,” so a society, as a collective rational supposit or something morally one, suggests the idea of a moral person. Thus society as a moral person is not only distinct from the individual persons of whom it is composed, but is also endowed with its own vital activity, which therefore must not be confused with the activity of individual human beings living in society. Hence, as soon as the social body is constituted in such a way that it can truly be considered a moral person, it naturally becomes a subject of its own, distinct from every other, not only of moral actions but also of duties and rights.

§ 4. On social authority.

A. Its concept is constructed analytically.

350. For the social body, as such, to exist and act like an organic body, indeed like a person, it must contain within itself, besides the objective and ideal principle of union, which consists in a common honorable and enduring end, also a subjective principle of unity and personal life. A kind of vital principle of this sort, proper to society as a moral person and analogous to the rational will of an individual man, is supplied by social authority. For just as it belongs to the rational will in a man to gather into unity, through common rational governance, all the particular powers, spiritual as well as sensory, of which the whole human nature is composed, and to apply them effectively, by means of psychological command, to the common end of the whole man, so in the social body the individual associates and their activities must be directed effectively and steadily by social authority toward the common end of the whole society. Free beings cannot be effectively directed and actually and steadily applied to a common end by any means other than moral command, that is, by the bond of moral obligation.

Social authority must therefore be conceived as an active principle of final direction, intrinsic and essential to every society as such, enduring and endowed with the power to bind the free wills of its associates. If we abstract from its concrete mode of existence, this immediately gives rise to the idea of a certain moral power or right, whose objective character and measure derive from the common social end. Thus social authority, considered in itself and abstractly, is rightly defined as:

The right to bind the members of a society to cooperate by their actions toward the common good.

351. But in a real society, authority must likewise be real, that is, it must inhere in some real rational subject. And since authority, as the principle of social unity, can be only one in any society, it likewise admits only one subject—one, I say, either with physical unity, which belongs to an individual man, or with moral unity, which belongs to some college of several persons; and it must belong to that subject by exclusive right. Therefore, in the real order, social authority commonly denotes the very subject endowed with authority. By the most common designation, this same subject is called a superior, while those individually governed by authority are called subjects.

B. It is shown that authority belongs to the formal nature of a society actually constituted.

352. The very concept of social authority sufficiently suggests this intrinsic connection between authority and every social body. Nevertheless, it is useful to confirm the same explicitly in the form of a thesis, both because the matter needs some explanation lest we seem to posit a second form for one entity, and because it contains a most important and fruitful foundation of social doctrine.

Thesis XXXVIII. Although in the metaphysical order a stable moral union is rightly called the form of society, it is no less true to assert that in the real order human society is formally constituted through social authority.

Preliminary note. The first statement in this assertion expresses not so much a thesis as a doctrine already certain from another source and here presupposed as such, since it follows immediately from a simple analysis of the concept of society, as explained above (no. 348). The second part, which alone is proposed for proof, intends neither to replace the previously defined form nor to add a new form distinct from it; rather, it presents that very form in a somewhat different state of being, namely, not in a merely ideal order but in an order of real existence—that is, according to the essential condition and mode by which that form subsists actually in a real society.

353. Proof I. Human society is rightly said to be formally constituted in the real order by that through which the “stable moral union” of the members of society is itself essentially effected and subsists in reality. But this occurs solely and essentially through social authority. Therefore, and so forth.

Proof of the minor premise.

  1. From the nature of the social matter. Namely: a) Although men are carried by natural necessity toward the good and seek their happiness considered in common, they are nevertheless not naturally determined to pursue in reality any particular good, whether private or common, but are endowed with freedom of choice both with respect to intending some common end and with respect to choosing the means to that end. b) Because of individual inequality among men, there is the greatest variety of wills and pursuits, and usually the greatest divergence of judgments in evaluating the means to a common end. c) Even if judgments about the suitability or necessity of the means were to agree theoretically at some point, the indolence of many in undertaking common burdens or their prevailing concern for private advantage would certainly keep them from spontaneous, effective, and constant cooperation. — But all this plainly proves that, in the real order, a mere moral attraction on the part of the common end is not at all sufficient to gather men effectively into a truly social union—that is, a union of intellects, wills, and powers—and keep them in it constantly, unless some common moral force, intrinsic and enduring in the social body, is added to the continually uncertain spontaneity of individuals, to determine that formal union in reality and continuously. — Therefore, the very nature of the social matter essentially requires some principle of stable union that is internal to society and endowed with binding force, that is, social authority.

  2. From the nature of social cooperation. Social cooperation is not in itself one and simple, but multiple and varied, comprising many diverse functions to be performed partly by physical and partly by moral powers. Thus, in a social body, just as in a physical organism, not every member must apply the same powers to the common end, nor must they apply them equally at all times; rather, one activity is needed from some, another from others, and one at one time, another at another. — But the fitting distribution and regulation of social tasks, so diverse yet cooperating toward one end, is not determined in itself; it needs a positive determination according to contingent circumstances, which can certainly proceed from nowhere else than social authority. — Therefore, like the matter, social cooperation too can become formally one in the real order and remain constant only through that authority.

354. Proof II. From the analogy of society with a physical and personal organism.

A constituted society naturally displays a manifest analogy not only with an organic physical body but also has the character of a moral person. — But in every organic being, the unity of its being and natural activity arises from its substantial form, that is, from its inner vital principle. Indeed, its final unity too would be lost if its individual members and organs were not subject to that common principle and were not continually governed through it, according to their remarkable variety of properties and functions, and harmoniously ordered to the predetermined natural end of the whole being. This same thing appears in a higher and more perfect way in a human sensory-rational organism, whose proper excellence consists in the rational principle and governance of life, and to which society as a moral person is closely assimilated. — Therefore, by virtue of this analogy, which is founded in the very nature of society, some inner moral principle, analogous to a physical vital principle and rational, that is, social authority, must also inhere in the social body insofar as it is truly morally one and a moral person.

355. Proof III. From a constant and universal fact.

In fact, no society of men properly so called has ever been seen, however small and simple it may be—for example, a conjugal society—that did not have some authority suited to its social end presiding over it. It is no objection that societies can also arise that are commonly called “egalitarian,” that is, ones in which all associates as such are equal in rights and no one is placed over the others with power to command. For in associations of this kind, since they are entered into by the free agreement of people equal to one another and are ordered to a common end likewise undertaken freely, social authority itself by its very nature can only be contractual or conventional. Indeed, it is the very consent of wills, permanently expressed by way of a social law or statute, whose living representation, together with the direction of common affairs, is also entrusted to some elected president or board. Hence the same collective rational will, stably expressed, not only truly effects and sustains the unity of the social body in the manner of authority, but also morally binds each member by contractual right for as long as they wish to remain associates.

356. Corollaries. I. In the real order, the social body is formally made a moral person—and thus a subject of rights and duties—through authority alone. For before authority is constituted, the social body cannot be vitally and stably one, nor can it be the principle or subject of any activity of its own.

357. II. Therefore, a multitude of people, even if gathered by common agreement to constitute a society and thus already united in some way, is nevertheless not to be considered a truly constituted society and a perfect moral person until it is informed by social authority actually constituted as the real principle of moral personality and collective operation. For, to use the school’s expression, a society “in the process of coming into being” is not to be confused with a society “in its established state.”

358. III. In every actually constituted authority, two elements, as it were, must be carefully distinguished. The first is social authority itself, considered in itself, or “the right to bind the members of a society to cooperate by their actions toward the common good”; with respect to its end, this belongs essentially not to any particular member of society but to the whole social body, since it is its vital principle. Therefore, in itself, it is indifferent to this or that particular subject in which it concretely inheres. The second is the concrete mode in which that same authority exists in some actual subject, or the particular right by which it inheres exclusively in a determinate subject. By virtue of this, the very right which, with respect to its end, belongs essentially to the whole society becomes, with respect to its possession and exercise, the property of some particular person, whether physical or moral. The former, as it were, denotes the formal element of actual authority, the latter its material element; the former is specifically proper to every society, one, constant, and immutable; the latter varies according to the historical individuality of each society, is contingent, and subject to change.

359. IV. From the nature and ideal destination of social authority it follows immediately that it can never be intrinsically absolute or above the law. For it has an essential limitation and measure from the special end of each society, and therefore the exercise of authority must conform to that end if it is to be legitimate and possess objective binding force.

Article 2.

On social activity.

360. Acts that proceed from a society as a moral person are properly called social acts. In a broader sense, however, social activity comprises all operations that in some way concern society as such. In that broader sense, two kinds of social activity must be distinguished: 1. activity that does not proceed from society but takes place around society and is constitutive of it, insofar as its end is to constitute society itself in its being and it logically precedes society; 2. the other kind, which proceeds from society, already constituted, as its subject, or properly so-called social activity.

§ 1. On constitutive social activity.

361. For some society to begin to exist actually as such, some cause or activity of whatever kind is needed by which it is constituted, and which we therefore call constitutive. In concrete cases, this varies according to the different historical origins of each society. For a society arises either through some formal contract, by which men freely agree to bind one another to pursue a common end steadily, or, without any such contract, it gradually grows organically and, as it were, by a process of moral crystallization. In this case, countless and varied causes, partly natural and partly historical, conspire toward such an effect not so much formally as materially, with the multiple free cooperation of men as well, but their cooperation is indirect and in a certain way accidental. In the former case, the constitutive activity is the very free agreement of those who associate; in the latter, which can occur only in societies that are naturally necessary, it is the complex of causes that precedes every formal plan to constitute a society and, under the guidance of divine providence, works effectively to establish a society among particular people, without any free and common agreement having preceded it for this end. The general assent that usually follows such an event, or must truly be supposed to be present as prescribed by natural law, cannot rightly be called the true efficient cause of that event or its constitutive principle in itself.

However society is constituted in a particular case—for we are not now raising a question about that matter—it is certainly proper to every constitutive activity that it naturally precede society itself in its constituted being and terminate at the point where society begins. It therefore differs essentially from properly so-called social activity, which proceeds vitally from society itself and is attributed to society as a moral person as its subject, even though constitutive activity too is called social by the same name because of the term toward which it tends, namely the society to be constituted. Specifically, the very contract by which a society is sometimes formally constituted among free people must not be confused with a properly so-called social act, because, before the social body has been perfectly constituted as a moral person, it cannot be a subject capable of any collective action. Therefore, any agreement of many people of this sort, with respect to its subject, represents not one act—much less one sanctioned by social authority, by which even a dissenting minority would be bound—but rather as many individual acts as there are people freely consenting to the same agreement.

363. Corollaries. I. The right of social authority must be carefully distinguished from the right to constitute or even reconstitute society. For the proper function of authority presupposes society already constituted in its being, as is clear from the concept of authority. To constitute society, however, is first and foremost to constitute authority itself, through which society formally begins to exist.

364. II. Therefore, the cause that properly constitutes society must be sought outside society as such, namely, either in the very natural causes and contingent historical events over which divine providence alone presides, or in the free consent and agreement of individuals, or in all these together.

365. III. A closer connection between the constitutive right and the very right of social authority must nevertheless be said to exist when someone, by virtue of the title of having founded the society, also reserves to himself its government on the condition that the right of the original founder remains intact for him, by virtue of which he can legitimately modify or reconstitute internally the work he founded as time goes on. But even in this case the right of authority is in no way identified with the constitutive right; rather, both are joined in one subject by virtue of a particular title.

366. IV. Hence, apart from a particular historical title of right, the intrinsic reconstitution of a society already formally constituted, for example, by changing its fundamental form of government, belongs in itself neither to authority alone nor to the multitude of subjects alone, but to the whole social body or to authority with the consent of the associates at least legitimately presumed—unless the very nature of the society excludes any such change, as happens in the family.

367. A properly social act, by analogy with the individual human act, must be considered above all from its principle and end, and its norm of rightness must be known from these. These three, however, according to their proper character as distinct from the principle, end, and norm of the individual human act, are derived proximately from the proper nature of the social subject or moral person (cf. nos. 5, 34).

A. The principle of the social act.

368. Just as in an individual external act, so too in a social act a complete internal principle is distinguished as twofold, namely, a first principle and a secondary principle. The former is the superior himself, considered formally, and corresponds by analogy to the rational will in an individual man, insofar as this is the first internal mover of human actions. The latter consists in the social body itself or the subjects, and corresponds to the faculties of an individual man subordinated to the will, insofar as they receive from it motion toward their own acts. With respect to its principle, therefore, the difference between a social and an individual action is this: in the former, both the first and the secondary principle are by nature moral, namely, they consist in persons endowed with freedom; in the latter, freedom belongs only to the first principle. Hence, in an individual act, motion is communicated from the principle through physical influence (by the command of the will exercised over the other faculties); in a social act, it is communicated through moral influence (by moral obligation).

369. Corollaries. I. For an act to be truly social, it must proceed from its principle with knowledge of the end; otherwise, it would have to be compared only with an act of a man, not with a human act.

Different knowledge of the end is required in the first principle and in the secondary principle. Direct knowledge and intention of the social end—that is, knowledge and willing of the common good in itself and directly as such—is necessary only for the superior; for the subjects, in itself, indirect knowledge and intention suffices, by which they know and will in common only the end (not otherwise manifestly unjust or unlawful) toward which they receive motion through social authority. For nothing more is required in itself for moral cooperation toward a common end. The essential union of minds and wills in society does not consist in everyone individually judging as good and expedient whatever is ordered by authority, but in everyone recognizing the duty to carry it out and therefore being willing to carry it out.

Hence you may judge how important it is that the possession of authority rest on a right that is clear and certain in itself to all subjects and recognized by them all. Certainly no social evil can be more deadly than one that tears apart the very vital principle of society and thus social union, making all constant cooperation of the whole social body impossible. This necessarily occurs whenever either the legitimacy of authority itself or the competence of social legislation can rightly be called into question among the subjects or even lawfully denied. On the contrary, as long as the vital union between the first and secondary principles of social activity—between authority, I say, and subjects—remains intact and unshaken, society can indeed be gravely afflicted and externally injured, but in general it cannot be killed; and wounds inflicted from without, however serious in themselves, are curable over time when the body’s inner strength reacts.

370. II. Moral imputability of social acts belongs principally to their first principle, or the superior, since he alone properly knows and wills socially, that is, on behalf of society. The subjects, in turn, share in that imputability in proportion to their free moral influence on the same acts.

For, although each individual is placed under the moral influence of the superior, each nevertheless acts as a person endowed with freedom and also morally contributes by his moral acts to the social act, just as the organism in an individual man contributes physically to a human act by supplying its matter and powers. Hence it is clear that this influence is imputable to each individual in proportion to his knowledge, intention, and efficacy (cf. nos. 195 ff.).

371. III. In an “egalitarian” society, in which authority is exercised collegially by the whole body, the imputability of the social act extends directly to all the associates who consent to it by their vote, but principally to the original proposer and promoter of the decision. Similarly, the greater the part in social government that the subjects themselves are called upon to play by the constitutive form of a society—whether by electing magistrates or by cooperating in deliberating and enacting laws, and so forth—the greater, generally speaking, is the share of social imputability that falls to them.

372. IV. No society of men can exist, even one endowed with an autocratic or military government, in which all social imputability is reserved to the ruler alone in such a way that subjects obeying his command can be considered wholly exempt from it. For that principle of absolute obedience, by which subjects are bound to cooperate blindly like a machine in everything commanded, solely because it is commanded, even when it is manifestly contrary to their moral conscience, is essentially opposed to the nature and moral dignity of every social body, since it consists of persons who use reason and freedom.

B. The end of the social act.

373. As is clear from what has been said, the essential end of every society and therefore also of social acts is some common good, to be pursued by internal and external cooperation.

A “common” good is not some abstract good that perfects society only according to its abstract totality, but a good common to the associates, that is, one that is as far as possible good for all the members of society.

The same good, with respect to society considered in the natural order, must be external in itself; for only that is directly proportionate to society, as is clear when we consider the nature, mode, and means of social activity, which require not only internal cooperation but external cooperation, or the union of powers and operations. It must be noted, however, that “external” social good does not mean merely material good, but extends generally to every human good, even of the intellectual or moral order, insofar as it can in some way be considered external in human society—that is, as resulting from external conditions and operations and appearing perceptibly and measurably in its fruits. It is called “in itself” external; for, to be a true good, every common good, however external in itself, must ultimately be referred and subordinated to an internal good, namely, man’s ultimate end, or at least have a potential relation to it.

374. With respect to its end, social operation shares with the vital function of every organism the fact that it strives toward its good and appointed end through certain stages. In every organic being, the first stage of its final operation consists in self-preservation, warding off death and dissolution; the second consists in internal and external development toward a perfect state of being, to which a perfect vigor of vital operation also corresponds; the third and highest stage, finally, is the proper fruitfulness of the organic being, already perfect in itself, or its immediate adaptation to the end of its work, commonly called external, in which the final cause both of the existence and of the inner perfection of the whole being is situated proximately. Thus each of the two preceding stages is ultimately ordered to this third stage of good and is completed in it.

In a similar way, social activity in society is directed toward complete social good according to a threefold stage and mode:

  1. Insofar as it concerns the inner preservation of society itself. The proper life of society consists in the moral union of its associates. Therefore, whatever fosters and strengthens this vital union, and through it the cohesion of the whole social body, contributes above all to its preservation, provided that it does not exclude or unjustly impede the fitting sphere of spontaneity and personal freedom of the associates, which is a necessary condition of a truly moral union.

  2. Insofar as it pertains to developing and perfecting society in its own kind. This concerns in itself whatever raises social powers to greater intensity and broader effectiveness, such as an increase in real resources, an enlargement of the social body through an increase in the number of cooperating forces, and other just growth in external relations that is consistent with the nature of society and intensifies its internal activity as well. To prevent external growth of the social body from weakening society instead and endangering its vital unity, it must be proportionate to the inner moral force of cohesion.

  3. Insofar as it is directly ordered to assisting the members of society socially, by providing them the opportunity to enjoy social benefits as a true common good. It is only through this final kind of social operation that the social end is properly completed; without this completion, the end could not yet actually be a true common good or the ideal principle of moral attraction and social cooperation. For all the preceding things stand in relation to this end as laborious sowing does to a fruitful harvest, or as present sacrifices patiently offered in hope of the future are related to the anticipated receipt of compensation and returns.

375. Corollaries. I. No society can be an end in itself; like all other human things, it is subordinated as a means to man’s supreme end. Hence it is rightly said that the immediate end toward which the acts of society directly tend by their nature is an external common good, ordered, however, to the inner individual good of all the members and subordinated to their ultimate end.

376. II. Just like the individual good of man, social good can be either true or apparent, according to whether it practically presents itself as a means to that supreme end or not (cf. no. 29).

377. III. No act that is manifestly opposed to man’s essential good or his ultimate end can be validly commanded by social authority, whatever title or pretext of the common good may otherwise be used to demand it.

378. IV. From the end of the social act, the essential distinction is clear between social authority and dominion, between a superior and a master, and between subjects and slaves. By virtue of authority, a superior can bind only to the common good, whereas a master, by virtue of dominion, intends his own private good when he gives commands.

379. V. Acts that are entirely internal are not subject to merely human authority; for in themselves and as such they contribute nothing to the external common good. They are subject, however, immediately to divine authority and therefore to natural law. Thus, if an external act is justly commanded and its right execution requires the cooperation of a person’s interior faculties, an obligation to cooperate with it also exists, but not directly through social authority; it exists through natural law.

380. VI. The attainment of the fitting common good consists properly in social perfection or happiness. With respect to civil society in particular, this social perfection is called civility (commonly, civilization) in a broad sense. It can be considered in two orders, the material order and the moral order. Social perfection in the material order is properly called culture; in the moral order, civility (Zivilisation) in the stricter and higher sense, since it contains an essential part of social happiness. By nature, culture is progressive, while civility, taken in this stricter sense, is in a certain way absolute, since it consists in the perfect dominion of public justice and moral goodness (the complete absence of their violation); therefore, as such, it has, as it were, no degrees and can be equal in a cultivated or uncultivated society. In keeping with the spirit of the age, which is widely given over to pantheism and materialism, civility is commonly equated with culture, and all social perfection, or “civilization,” is wrongly sought above all in the progress of material culture.

C. The norm of rightness proper to the social act.

381. I. It is easy to infer from what has been said what the objective norm of morality or rightness proper to the social act is. It can be none other than the very norm we established for the human act in general, applied to the social act according to the specific nature proper to each society. Thus, for any social action to be rightly ordered, three things are required:

  1. That it be directed toward the common good that is the society’s specifically proper end;

  2. Toward a good that is not apparent but true, through its due subordination, at least remotely, to man’s ultimate end;

  3. That it tend toward this good in a truly social way, that is, according to the proper mode of action of a moral person and by means suited to it.

For these three things constitute the right order of action, which corresponds to the nature of society both on the part of its end and on the part of its acting subject. What has been said above makes the first and second requirements, which concern the rightness of an act with respect to its end, sufficiently clear in themselves. The third requirement, however, which concerns the rightness of an act by reason of its conformity to the nature of its principle or acting subject, needs some further explanation.

382. II. Just as a human act conforms to its subject and is therefore truly a human act insofar as it proceeds from the free will of man, with the other psychological faculties cooperating through determination by the will in different ways according to the different matter, so by analogy conformity of the social act to the acting subject from which it takes its name means above all that it receives actual execution from the inner social principle, both the primary principle (authority) and the secondary principle (the subjects), with due moral relation preserved between them and with regard for the matter to which social activity pertains.

Moreover, with respect to matter or the proximate term of all social activity, a twofold class of functions is distinguished: one that by its nature pertains principally to the physical order and demands chiefly physical social means; another that by its nature belongs to the moral order and therefore uses moral means as its proper instruments. For the external good toward which society tends directly depends in many ways on the physical order in reality; but the means by which men are moved to cooperate must be moral, that is, suited to human freedom. Thus every social operation has as its immediate term either things or persons to be applied toward the common end, with an analogous order of means for each. A social function that deals principally with things is properly called administration (Verwaltung), while the function by which persons are directed toward an end is called governance (Leitung, Regierung); although the two functions presuppose one another and variously interpenetrate, so either term, taken in a broader sense, commonly includes both.

383. Other things being equal, then, social activity is the more rightly ordered the more its choice and use of means take account of the different nature of social functions, thereby preserving the due proportion between the physical and moral orders.

Governance in particular, which is inherently more difficult than administration, is exercised more rightly the better its moral means are understood or kept readily available, and the more aptly they are applied in particular cases—means by which men are moved to the common good not only with some degree of effectiveness but also, insofar as possible, through spontaneous and willing cooperation. For although moral obligation is in itself the specific and most necessary means of governance, it would not rarely lack either due efficacy or salutary fruit unless it were further aided by fitting psychological factors.

384. Among such factors, above all those that are fitting and founded in human nature, by which members of society may be led to cooperate spontaneously toward the common good, two in particular must be named:

  1. The perceived personal interest (Interesse) of subjects joined to the social act being commanded. Therefore, insofar as circumstances allow, governance should be arranged so that most subjects, or at least a large part of them, recognize some personal interest in observing the law rather than merely feeling it as a burden. Nevertheless, for this factor not to exceed the limits of right use, it must continually be governed by

  2. Religion. And indeed: a) the pursuit of private advantage, toward which men are generally inclined by the weight of many desires, is not at all sufficient in itself to promote true social happiness unless it is tempered by the restraints of religious conscience and thus kept within the bounds of justice and temperance; indeed, it can greatly disturb that happiness. b) In difficult tasks to be undertaken at the command of society, and in those that hold no attraction for human desire, religion alone supplies a sufficient moral motive by which effective execution can be reconciled with peace of mind. c) Every power of morally binding—that is, of binding the consciences of subjects—which social authority possesses is, by virtue of its own principle, essentially religious; for no rational human will, whether individual or collective, can have this efficacy except by virtue of its derivation from the divine legislator (nos. 291 ff.). Hence in a society deprived of all religion, an essential condition of moral governance is lacking, and physical coercion and the terror of material force take its place.

385. Corollaries. I. From what has been said, it is easy to derive the duties incumbent on every social authority with respect to the right conduct of social activity. The following are recognized as the principal and fundamental duties:

  1. A superior is bound to foster religion and its sincere worship socially throughout the whole social body, both negatively, by warding off what suggests its external contempt, and positively, by promoting it through suitable means in accordance with the special nature of each society. For religion is a condition for the proper ordering of social activity, both with respect to its end, which, although proximate and external in itself, must nevertheless always be subordinated to man’s supreme end lest it fall short of the true common good, and with respect to the necessary moral influence exerted in governing subjects.

  2. To prevent social action from being undertaken rashly, the one who presides over society is bound by his office first of all to acquire suitable social knowledge, by which the exercise of authority is directed not only toward the true common good but also toward choosing the right means and the right way of carrying them out.

This particularly includes: a) prudent vigilance concerning dangers that may threaten the common good from any quarter; b) assiduous and benevolent inquiry into social needs, especially those that affect a broader part of the social body or seem by their seriousness to require more prompt attention; c) a just assessment of desires, especially common ones, expressed on the part of the subjects; d) easy access and a ready ear for those who make requests; e) careful and mature deliberation, particularly in weightier matters, with the advice of men or councils appointed for this task, and finally of those recognized as outstanding in their concern for the common good, impartial integrity, and social experience. Moreover, so that the execution of decisions and the application of means may be carried out properly and prudently in particular cases, with due regard to time and persons, the following must be well known and assessed: the rights and legitimate customs; the morals, character, and degree of “culture” of the subjects; and the present disposition of minds and the available moral and physical powers.

  1. Social authority may not impose burdens on subjects merely for the sake of exercising power over them. Therefore, the freedom and private autonomy of members of society must not be restricted more than the true demands of the common good and their right ordering toward the social end reasonably require. For man exists not for society, but society for man.

  2. The government of a society makes itself guilty of wicked usurpation and injustice whenever, setting aside the common good of the whole social body, it serves its own ambition and avarice, or conducts common affairs not for society but for some faction within society that unjustly arrogates domination to itself, and enslaves the strength and resources of the whole society to that faction’s discretion and private advantage.

386. II. Although the rightness or wrongness of social activity is defined in itself and in a certain sense absolutely with respect to its end, with respect to the means suitably chosen for attaining that end and the mode of governance in particular cases, it is nevertheless variable and recognized as relative in many ways. Therefore, proposals must never be judged in the abstract or according to some ideal order, but in concrete terms and according to the real order. For it is not abstract or ideal people who must be governed, but actual people who in many respects fall short of the ideal condition of human nature. This is expressed by the general rule: Governance with respect to its mode is more rightly ordered in any particular case the better it is adapted to the present physical and moral capacity and, in general, to the real and actual condition of the social matter.

Now moral capacity in particular depends to a very great extent on the degree of intellectual and moral culture that the social body is generally known to possess. Hence, the closer the subjects in a society approach the ideal perfection of human nature, especially moral perfection—that is, the more right reason usually restrains the impulses of the lower nature under its command—the more the mode in which moral motion is communicated to them through social authority can and should conform to this rational dignity. It is fitting that their wills be moved primarily through rational persuasion, and that recourse be had only secondarily and, as it were, as a subsidiary measure, to lower psychological factors: for example, by stimulating the passions, through which minds are inflamed with social fervor by means of the imagination; or by appealing to idiosyncratic inclinations and sensory stimuli; or, finally, by appealing to fear of punishments and coercive apparatus. Conversely, the farther the social body, or most of it, is known to be from that ideal habit of rationality, the less morally capable it must be considered of having that nobler mode of governance applied to it fittingly and with beneficial effect. Indeed, for a collection of people that is wholly uncultivated and at the same time low in moral culture, almost the reverse mode of exerting moral influence—that is, one that begins with fear and sensory affection—may be understood to be the only suitable and necessary one. Such governance, although entirely imperfect in itself, may nevertheless be judged relatively perfect, provided that efforts are also made to heal the imperfection of the social matter itself gradually through suitable means, especially the influence of religion.

Hence it follows that, in every society, the degree of freedom and private autonomy that may be granted to its associates while preserving social order must be proportionate to the degree of moral capacity of the social body.

387. Scholium. As in an individual act, so also in a social act, moral rightness can be distinguished as objective and subjective. It is subjective when the superior’s intention, conforming to the general rule of morality, is also in a particular case, after serious examination appropriate to the importance of the matter, sincerely directed according to his knowledge toward what appears to be the true common good required by present circumstances—even if he is later found to have departed from objective social rightness through an inculpable error or an unforeseen outcome.

Article 3.

The division of society and its various character.

Among human communities that share the name and general nature of society, a diversity of specific characteristics is observed, on which a division of society can conveniently be based. Accordingly, society is divided as follows:

388. 1. According to its extent: into universal and particular. A society of men is called universal when the bond of moral unity includes all men coexisting on earth at the same time. For the whole human race living together is united by some genuine, though very broad, social bond into a kind of unity of a universal family, since under the common authority of the supreme legislator, who governs through the voice of conscience, it is directed and bound toward the common and supreme good of all, namely, perfect happiness to be attained through mutual duties and assistance. This universal society certainly exists in a far more perfect way in the supernatural order, through the spiritual kingdom of Christ visibly established for the whole human race. If, as sometimes happens, universal society is understood so broadly as to extend not only to all men now living but also to all who ever existed or are yet to exist, then the name society is certainly used improperly. For in this world such a society can never exist as a whole actually, but only in parts and successively. Insofar as the same society is conceived as complete after the consummation of the age in its unity and blessed fruition, it no longer corresponds to the conditions of human society. Therefore, universal society understood in this broadest sense really signifies nothing other than an ideal relation of union founded on the community of one nature and one end.

A society is called particular when it is not universal, that is, when it includes a determinate part of coexisting men morally united with one another in relation to a particular end. It is this kind of society that we must consider chiefly.

389. 2. According to the elements of which it is immediately composed: into simple and composite. A simple society consists only of individual persons morally united, such as, for example, the conjugal society; a composite society consists of moral persons, that is, of other smaller societies. The degree of composition can vary, and the breadth of each society depends on that degree. For either simple societies or composite societies can be socially united with simple or composite societies, respectively. Thus a kind of continuous progression of increasingly complex composition appears possible, until the ultimate composite is identified with universal society itself, by which all particular societies, from the greatest to the smallest, and their simplest elements are finally reduced to the complete organic unity of the whole human race.

390. 3. According to its foundation and origin: into necessary and voluntary, or legal and contractual.

A necessary society is one that, whether considered individually or by kind, is founded either on some necessity of nature or on a positive ordinance of God, and therefore exists and continues by virtue of divine law, whether natural or positive. It is for this reason also called legal. Therefore, it must derive from the same source from which it derives its very existence its determinate end, its nature, and its essential internal constitution as already specified. Hence neither the discretion of social authority nor that of the associates may abolish or change anything substantial in these. Thus, for example, the domestic society is proved necessary by virtue of natural law, and the Church of Christ by positive divine right.

A voluntary or contractual society is one which, considered in itself, depends wholly on the deliberation and discretion of men as to whether it exists or not, and is therefore founded entirely on a free contract and subsists by virtue of it, as, for example, an industrial society. Thus, in origin as well as in its entire character and condition, it differs from a legal society. For its particular end, internal constitution, and form must all be measured by the contract alone; since the contract can be changed by the consent of the parties, the society too is subject to various changes, even essential ones.

391. 4. According to the mutual rights of the associates: into equal and unequal.

An equal society is distinguished from an unequal one by this: in the former all associates, with respect to administering and governing the society, enjoy equal rights in themselves, whereas in the latter the right of social government belongs by special right to one or some of the associates. Equality is in itself fitting only for a contractual society, whereas inequality is more suited to a legal and necessary society.

392. 5. According to internal and external independence: into complete and incomplete (also called “perfect and imperfect”). Human society can be called complete or incomplete in two different ways and degrees, namely, intrinsically and extrinsically.

a) A society is considered intrinsically complete if it is internally independent, that is, if by its nature it contains within itself a certain general sufficiency for socially procuring the simply human common good. If it in itself lacks this internal sufficiency, it is called intrinsically incomplete. Thus the whole basis of this distinction derives from the property of the end by which each society is specified. A social end that, under the aspect of the common good, comprises the generic totality of human good, without excluding any kind of it naturally fitting to man, thereby makes a society intrinsically complete. By contrast, a society is known to be intrinsically incomplete from a social end that, within that universality of human good, is restricted exclusively to some particular part of it. Moreover, simply human good itself can be the proper end of some society in an essentially different way, according as it is considered at different stages in the development of human beings toward complete perfection, or according to different relations of human affairs to the natural and supernatural order of the world. Hence societies that are intrinsically complete in themselves can nevertheless differ in kind.

Indeed, three societies are enumerated as intrinsically complete: the domestic, civil, and religious society (the Church), since each pursues in some way as its end a simply human social good, or one common to all men as such. At the same time, however, they differ from one another in kind with respect to their end and likewise use different social means. The domestic society has as its end the common good of human nature (as will be clear from what follows) at the first and most essential stage of human development, or at the level of perfection necessary to individuals. The civil society has that same good at the second stage, not so much for individual persons as for the race as essentially necessary, or according to the further degrees of perfection of human nature. The Church, finally, has the whole human good as its end at every stage of development, but formally and directly under its relation to man’s supreme supernatural end. All other particular societies—for example, military armies, literary, industrial, commercial, and insurance societies—can only be intrinsically incomplete, since, in view of their end and with respect to simply human good, they need many external supplements.

b) A society is called extrinsically complete insofar as it enjoys external independence of its power, which is therefore commonly called supreme power (suprematia, souveraineté). Accordingly, every society is to be considered extrinsically incomplete if its own authority has either been delegated only as a part by a higher power of the same order, as, for example, the government of the provinces of a kingdom, or, although originally independent in itself, has in the course of time become legally subject to another power in such a way that its essential parts of government, especially internal ones, depend on the will and consent of that power, even if the formal insignia of supreme power happen to remain with it. Nevertheless, absolute independence is not required for supreme power, since no human community can ever be exempt from the bonds of duties and an order divinely established in relation to other communities; rather, relative perfection suffices. Hence supreme power admits degrees and may in a certain way be distinguished as first and second order. Thus not every kind of dependence should at once be thought to deprive a power or society of the dignity and name of supreme or complete. Supreme power can certainly be reconciled, for example, with a special obligation toward an equal foreign power, contracted by free agreement for certain external ends. Indeed, it is not in itself opposed even to a stable and in a certain way organic dependence freely introduced by a confederation among equals, namely, with respect only to external matters and relations common to all, while the independence of the internal government of each remains intact, as happens in the political system of a confederation of states (“Staatenbund”). The more such a league of confederated states is hypothetically contracted toward the organic unity of a single social body, as happens nearly in the political system of a federal state (“Bundesstaat”), the more its individual members must necessarily fall short of the condition of supreme power properly so called and of being an externally complete community.

Finally, if these two qualities of society, by which it is called complete either internally or externally, are considered in their mutual relation, it is sufficiently clear in itself that the former contains the necessary condition and natural capacity of the latter. For every externally complete society must also be internally complete; conversely, a society that is intrinsically incomplete is thereby incapable of ever becoming externally complete as such, because, owing to its internal insufficiency, it naturally needs organic union with a more universal community to which it belongs as a partial element. Hence, in practice, the definition of an extrinsically complete society is not without reason commonly used in general to designate a society complete in every way and simply.

Thus only two human societies are considered complete: the ecclesiastical and the civil. The domestic society, although intrinsically complete, has in itself the ideal capacity for this perfection, insofar as it too could gradually expand its boundaries and grow into an externally complete (civil) society.

Chapter II. The Natural Origin of Society

Liber II: Book Two. The Essential Bond of the Social Organism, or Right

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