Theodor Meyer, Ius naturae generale
Institutiones iuris naturalis, Pars I: Ius naturae generale
First published 1906
Theodor Meyer’s Ius naturae generale from the second corrected edition (1906), in Latin with an original English translation. Preface and proemium included; the navigational contents and publisher advertisements are excluded.
Introductio I: Preface
Introduction
Sectio I: General Ethics
Liber I: Book One. The Natural Elements and Conditions of Human Action
Liber II: Book Two. The Moral Attributes of the Human Act
Liber III: Book Three. The Complete Norm of Human Acts, or Law
Liber IV: Book Four. The Human Being’s Subjective Moral Formation
Chapter I. Conscience, or the Subjective Application of Law
Chapter II. Virtues and Vices, or the Human Being’s Subjective Relation to the Moral Order
On virtues and vices, or on a person’s subjective relation to the moral order.1
Prologue.
- This part of moral doctrine receives its chief illumination more from theological than philosophical sources. Indeed, Christian philosophy must be convinced that in the present order of human affairs neither the exercise of moral virtues worthy of a human being nor happy freedom from the slavery of vices can ever in reality be separated from the intervention and fatherly guidance of God, the author of the supernatural order. Therefore, leaving a fuller treatment of this matter to theology, we shall briefly set out only the common philosophical teachings from which it must proceed as from its rational foundation—not as though such merely philosophical precepts, taken alone and with the higher Christian teaching disregarded, could already suffice for a perfect moral life as divinely proposed, but in such a way that the light of reason may indicate in them a kind of preliminary step of nature by which to ascend to a summit above nature.
Article 1.
On moral virtue and vice in general.
§ 1. On the nature of each.
- The freedom of the human being and the imputability of human acts cause the moral goodness and evil found in acts to redound to the acting subject itself according to degrees of imputability, so that the human being is considered good insofar as he acts well and evil insofar as he acts badly. This occurs much more fully and abundantly, however, when good or evil acts proceed according to their moral character not merely from the free will in some way but also from a habit.2 For in this way the subject, through a habit that derives its moral specification from the acts toward which it inclines, and that inheres in the subject together with its faculties as a quality, likewise participates in a lasting moral quality or character; thus in a more proper sense (because habitually) it becomes good or evil.
Moral habits of this kind are called, as it were by excellence, virtues or vices, according as they intrinsically dispose the subject to embrace or violate the right order of reason. The very names seem to imply that a good habit contains a new support of rational nature for pursuing its end (a virtue), while an evil one contains a corruption of that same nature (a vice). Accordingly, virtue can rightly be defined: A habit inclining the mind and will to acts conforming to rational nature; or, more explicitly: A constant and efficacious disposition of the mind to order all inward affections and outward actions according to the norm of honorableness.3 Nevertheless, virtue is not infrequently taken to mean moral perfection itself, which strictly speaking is more properly the fruit or proximate end of virtue. To this pertains the definition found in St. Augustine: “Virtue is the equality (conformity) of a life in every respect agreeing with reason.”4
The description of virtue also conveys indirectly the very character of vice: for it is a habit opposed to virtue, that is, one inclining the mind and will to act wrongly. From it a moral quality is derived in a human being called viciousness, which Cicero describes as follows: “A habit or disposition throughout one’s life that is inconstant and at variance with itself.”5 Therefore, someone who sins unexpectedly once or twice is not properly considered vicious, but someone who is accustomed to fall through a disposition already acquired. Nevertheless, sins are also not infrequently called vices in a less proper sense.
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One virtue is called infused, another acquired. An infused virtue is obtained through a supernatural divine operation, such as supernatural faith, hope, and charity, which theologians discuss; an acquired virtue is produced through instruction, practice, and exercise, and produces ease and readiness in frequently performing acts that accord with it. This discussion concerns chiefly only the latter virtue, since it alone shares the common character of natural habits.
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In a moral virtue of this kind, taken completely, according to the command that the rational will exercises over the other faculties, a sort of twofold part can be distinguished: one like governance, the other like service. The former consists in the mind’s affection and habitual disposition, by which, with due regard everywhere to persons, times, and places, it is inclined to the honorable measure of action; the latter, by contrast, is an acquired ease in acting honorably, which is found proximately in the faculties subject to the command of the will, and depends not only on suitably ordered intellectual representations but to a great extent also on the manifold configuration of the bodily organism. Thus in virtue itself, too, a certain analogy of the human composite, namely, soul and body, is reflected. For just as the body must be informed by the soul in order to be a human body, so this lower part of virtue must necessarily be informed by the higher lest it fall away from the character of virtue. And just as the soul can exist without a body, so virtue in its essentials can indeed exist without this lower element, at least temporarily, but it is incomplete according to the full character of human virtue. Therefore, neither should a person be considered devoid of the virtue of temperance who has a constant and efficacious inclination of will toward it but experiences less ease in exercising the outward duty of temperance, nor should someone be considered endowed with this virtue who perhaps acquired great ease in performing outward acts of temperance from avarice or another motive alien to moral virtue.
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The well-known axiom that virtue lies in a mean is founded on the same point, that is, in conformity with the rule of reason.6
For by “mean” is understood the measure and manner that must be imposed on every human operation by the governance of reason if it is to attain moral rightness. Hence acts that would otherwise be acts of virtue can, through the lack of this governance and reasonable measure, deviate by excess into the character of vice.
Moreover, virtue admits various degrees and is more excellent and sublime: 1. the nobler the motive by which the will is led to pursue it; 2. the more obstacles it has to overcome, whether from contrary inward inclinations or outward impediments; 3. the more good it strives to accomplish; and 4. the more readily and eagerly it accomplishes it.
§ 2. On the necessity and condition of moral virtues.
- Just as, in general, besides his natural faculties, a human being needs habits in order to act perfectly and efficaciously, and is spontaneously furnished with them by nature’s very benefit, so virtues are necessary to him for acting perfectly in the sphere of morality—all the more so the more and greater the obstacles he must overcome on this path. For a human being, both sensitive and rational, does not attain this perfection of action unless he is inwardly and permanently disposed toward honorableness so as to practice it readily, delightfully, and constantly; this is achieved through moral habits.
On this point St. Thomas aptly says: “We need habits of virtue for three reasons. First, so that there may be uniformity in operation. For things that depend on operation alone are easily changed unless they have been stabilized by some habitual inclination. Second, so that perfect operation may be readily available. For unless a rational power is in some way inclined by a habit toward one course, inquiry into the operation must always precede whenever it is necessary to act; as is clear of someone who wishes to contemplate but does not yet have the habit of knowledge, or who wishes to act according to virtue while lacking the habit of virtue. Hence the Philosopher says in the fifth book of the Ethics that things done suddenly proceed from habit. Third, so that perfect operation may be completed delightfully, which comes about through a habit. Since a habit is in the manner of a certain nature, it makes the operation proper to it something like a natural operation and consequently delightful. For fittingness is a cause of delight. Hence in the second book of the Ethics the Philosopher gives delight in the work as a sign of habit.”7
- But just as moral action, to be perfect, must be supported by virtue, so virtue itself, to be genuine, must necessarily be informed by religion. Indeed, we are endowed with virtue only if we are habitually disposed to live in conformity with the rational order that, taken completely, corresponds to our nature; but anyone who is not so disposed as to profess and pursue with all his heart and soul his dependence on God in all things, and thus does not worship God religiously, certainly lacks this disposition. For religion in general consists in service and worship of God. — Moreover, our virtue is not genuine unless acts conforming to the moral order or divine law proceed from reverence and love for the law itself; but reverence and love of the law cannot be separated from love and reverence for God. For even reason itself, which rationalists have tried to substitute for God the legislator, can claim no other dignity or reverence of obedience than that which belongs to it as the voice of a herald announcing to us God’s absolute goodness and most holy will. Hence the moral virtues of the impious, in which those who despise religion sometimes glory, may rightly be called, with St. Augustine, “splendid vices.”
Likewise, no one can accurately know the nature of vice without considering it in relation to God. For it is impossible for someone to hold virtue in contempt without thereby, as it were, despising God; or to neglect the dictate of conscience without violating the authority of the supreme legislator. Those, then, understand the matter poorly who locate the baseness of vice solely in its opposition to human dignity and perfection. Entirely foolish, however, is the complaint of some that the ancients regarded sin chiefly as an offense and injury inflicted on God. Indeed, it did not escape the ancients that no evil can be inflicted on God by a creature, just as virtue brings him no good; but they rightly judged that it is one thing to hold in contempt the excellence of a human being and another to try to evade the authority of divine majesty by means of the “imperative” of human reason. Therefore, even in a merely philosophical order, no genuine virtue can exist that is entirely lacking in religious formation (cf. n. 258).
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Scholium. In the actual order of providence this very truth is more closely defined. For after God willed the Christian religion to be established by law, no virtue other than Christian virtue can be acceptable to God or salutary for a human being. Moreover, this virtue itself enjoys so many and such great prerogatives that those who stubbornly reject it and take satisfaction in mere rationalism and naturalism are condemned by the testimony of natural reason itself. For the superiority of supernatural virtue, practiced with the aid of the Christian religion, over natural virtue shines forth especially in the following respects:
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By reason of the end. The more exalted the end to which the whole pursuit of virtue is referred, the more sublime virtue itself must be. But the end proposed by Christian revelation far surpasses every natural destiny. For by God’s free disposition we are now called not only to knowledge but also to the vision of the divine essence and to the regeneration of the whole human being through the mighty power of the Savior.
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By reason of the motive. The motive of natural virtue consists in rational knowledge of honorableness and law; the motive of Christian virtue, however, is drawn from divine faith. This knowledge is not only clearer and more explicit for use, but also more certain, since it is supported by the wisdom and truthfulness of the supreme God, rather than acquired through abstruse and often uncertain reasoning, especially in the discipline of morals. Beyond doubt, our virtue will be all the stronger and purer the more clearly and certainly we know both the law itself and the force of obligation. Moreover, our virtue cannot fail to grow in intensity and efficacy with an increase in love and reverence toward God. How could a Christian fail to revere and love God more, when he knows what may be called God’s very inner mysteries, and contemplates him not only as Creator and Lord, but as a most loving Father and Redeemer, who out of love became human and suffered the utmost?
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By reason of the object. Whatever is the object of natural virtue is also an object of Christian virtue, according to St. Thomas’s saying: “Grace does not destroy nature but perfects it”8; but Christian virtue, by divine institution, also embraces many other and more exalted objects.
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By reason of the aids. The exercise of natural virtue requires no powers other than those of nature itself. But for us to be able to exercise virtue suited to a supernatural end, God has wondrously bestowed aids inaccessible to nature and established most salutary laws about which reason is silent. How far the virtues called theological—faith, hope, and charity—surpass every character of natural virtue, whether one considers what God does to infuse them or what a human being does on his own part to cultivate them! — All Christian virtue is founded and informed by these.
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By reason of merit. Supernatural virtue also has a corresponding merit of the same order, namely, an increase of sanctifying grace and an eternal reward, which natural virtue does not equal. — Finally, one may add:
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By reason both of its innate beauty and nobility and of its efficacy in elevating all human nature and the whole of human society to the true splendor of culture and genuine happiness already in this life. As for the intrinsic loveliness of virtue, the saying of Plato, and after him Cicero, is well known: if virtue could be seen with the eyes, it would awaken incredible love. What if those pagan philosophers had known Christian virtue, and contemplated it made visible and offered for imitation in its divine exemplar, Christ the Lord, God and man! — Historical records and daily experience speak to the power of Christian religion and virtue to ennoble human conduct and promote true civilization, and to what natural and merely philosophical virtue has ever been able to accomplish in itself, or can accomplish even now.9
Article 2.
On the distinction of virtues and vices.
§ 1. Various modes of distinction.
- Virtues and vices, like laws and duties, can be distributed into various genera and species.
The first and most generic distinction of virtues is drawn from the two principles of human action, namely, the intellectual and appetitive powers. In this way virtue, taken in general as a habit perfecting a human rational power for acting well, is commonly divided into intellectual and moral (strictly or properly moral) virtue. Thus, on this subject, after Aristotle10, St. Thomas says: “Human virtue is a certain habit perfecting a human being for acting well. But the principle of human acts in a human being is twofold only: intellect or reason, and appetite; for these are the two movers in a human being. . . . Hence every human virtue must perfect one of these principles. If it perfects speculative or practical intellect for a good human act, it will be an intellectual virtue; but if it perfects the appetitive part, it will be a moral virtue. It follows, therefore, that every human virtue is either intellectual or moral.”11
Vices opposed to the virtues admit a similar division into two kinds.
Properly moral virtues are further divided generically by their matter, that is, what they concern: some concern operations, others passions. Namely, “operation and passion can be related to virtue in two ways: in one way, as an effect; and in this way every moral virtue has certain good operations of which it is productive, and some delight or sadness, which are passions. . . . In another way, operation can be related to moral virtue as the matter with which it is concerned; and according to this, there must be some moral virtues concerning operations and others concerning passions.”12
- The more common division, already customary among the most ancient writers, reduces all moral virtues to four principal species: prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude. Thus we read already in Cicero: “Everything honorable arises from one of four parts: either it consists in the discernment and skillful pursuit of truth; or in preserving human society and giving each person his due, and keeping faith in agreements; or in the greatness and strength of a lofty and unconquered spirit; or in the order and measure of all that is done and said, in which moderation and temperance are found.”13 Hence these same virtues, and these alone, are commonly called cardinal, because, as St. Thomas observes, other virtues are fixed upon them as a door is fixed upon its hinge.
St. Thomas proves that these four virtues are cardinal or principal in this way: “The number of certain things can be taken either according to formal principles or according to subjects; and in both ways four cardinal virtues are found. The formal principle of virtue of which we are now speaking is the good of reason, which can be considered in two ways. In one way, insofar as it consists in reason’s own consideration, and thus there is one principal virtue, called prudence. In another way, insofar as the order of reason is established concerning something, either concerning operations” (which regard external relations among human beings and in social life), “in which case there is justice; or concerning passions, in which case there must be two virtues. For the order of reason must be established concerning passions, considering that they resist reason. This resistance can occur in two ways: in one way, insofar as a passion impels someone toward something contrary to reason; in this case the passion must be restrained, and this gives its name to temperance. In another way, insofar as a passion draws someone away from what reason dictates, as fear of dangers or hardships does; in this case a person must be strengthened in what reason dictates so as not to depart from it, and this gives its name to fortitude. — The same number is likewise found according to subjects. For there are four subjects of this virtue of which we are now speaking: the rational by essence (reason), which prudence perfects; and the rational by participation, which is divided into three: the will, subject of justice; the concupiscible appetite (sensitive appetite), subject of temperance; and the irascible appetite, subject of fortitude.”14
Thus it is understood not only that all other moral virtues are reduced in their respective orders to these as cardinal virtues, but also that a similar distribution by opposition is found among the corresponding vices.
§ 2. On the cardinal virtues in particular.
- I. Prudence is commonly defined as “right reason concerning things to be done”15, or as a habit of applying universal moral principles to particular conclusions concerning actions. “Prudence,” says St. Thomas, “pertains to applying right reason to a work, which is not done without right appetite. And therefore prudence not only has the character of virtue possessed by the other intellectual virtues, but also the character of virtue possessed by the moral virtues, among which it is also numbered.”16 It is, in itself, an intellectual virtue, belonging to practical reason and having its seat in the intellective faculty; yet, since it concerns the rightness to be imparted to moral acts and presupposes a will rightly ordered toward the end, it also participates in the character of a true moral virtue.17
Indeed, prudence is a kind of queen among the virtues, since it pertains to defining the due manner and measure in all the others, so that they “always remain in the mean” and do not deviate through deficiency or excess into contrary vices.
Its three principal acts are enumerated as deliberating, judging, and commanding concerning things that lead to the proper end. Hence, as constitutive parts of prudence, St. Thomas identifies Eubulia, which signifies goodness in deliberation; Synesis, which signifies right judgment concerning particular things to be done; and Gnome, which signifies a certain perspicacity of judgment.18 Its chief supports, as it were, are therefore memory, understanding, foresight, docility, circumspection, and caution.19
Vices opposed to prudence are, 1. by deficiency: negligence, precipitancy, obstinacy, inconsiderateness, inconstancy; 2. by excess: what is commonly called carnal prudence, excessive solicitude and anxiety, craftiness, and deceit.20
- II. Justice, as a particular virtue taken in the strict sense, is commonly defined: “A constant and perpetual will to render to each his due right.” It therefore immediately affects the will and resides in it. But for each person’s due right to be rendered under every aspect required by right reason, a human being must be considered not only in his social relations to other human beings taken individually, but also as a member of society, considered as a whole in itself and rightly ordered in relation to its parts. Hence again St. Thomas21 says: “Justice,” he says, “orders a human being in relation to another, which can happen in two ways. In one way, in relation to another considered individually; in another way, in relation to another in general, namely, insofar as one who serves a community serves all the human beings contained in that community. Justice, therefore, according to its proper character, can relate to both. It is manifest, however, that all who are contained in some community are related to the community as parts to a whole. But a part is what belongs to the whole; hence the good of any part can be ordered to the good of the whole. Accordingly, the good of any virtue, whether it orders someone to himself or orders him to other individual persons, can be referred to the common good, to which justice orders. And in this way the acts of all virtues can pertain to justice, insofar as it orders a person to the common good; with respect to this, justice is called a general virtue. Since it belongs to law to order to the common good, it follows that justice of this kind, general in the aforesaid way, is called legal justice, because through it a person agrees with the law ordering the acts of all virtues to the common good.”
Besides legal justice, commutative and distributive justice are distinguished. Commutative justice is so called insofar as it concerns an arithmetical proportion, or strict equality, between one person’s right and the corresponding debt of another; its end is therefore the right order of one person in relation to another. Distributive justice is so called insofar as it concerns the distribution of rewards and punishments according to merit, or the imposition of social burdens and the conferral of goods, and intends the right order of the community in relation to its individual members. It concerns a geometric proportion of a thing to a person according to social merit or demerit, and is therefore subdivided into remunerative and vindictive justice.22
The following are in some way coordinated with justice: religion toward God, piety toward parents and country, obedience, gratitude toward benefactors, truthfulness, respect toward people distinguished by dignity and virtue, and so on; opposed to these are corresponding vices, such as irreligion, superstition, impiety, and so on.23
For the ways in which injustice, as a special vice, can be opposed to the virtue of justice are sufficiently clear from this distinction. For “injustice is twofold. One kind is lawless, opposed to legal justice; in essence this is a special vice insofar as it concerns a special object, namely, the common good, which it holds in contempt; but in intention it is a general vice, because by holding the common good in contempt a person can be led to all sins. Likewise, all vices, insofar as they conflict with the common good, have the character of injustice, as if derived from injustice. In another way, injustice is spoken of according to a certain inequality in relation to another, insofar as a person wants to have more of good things, such as wealth and honors, and less of bad things, such as labor and losses; in this way injustice has a special matter and is a particular vice opposed to particular justice.”24
- III. Temperance is the virtue that moderates sensual inclinations and allurements according to right reason and the ends of honorableness. It therefore shines forth especially in the use of things pleasant to the senses, in which the “concupiscible” appetite needs the moderation of reason. In this way it denotes a special cardinal virtue distinct from the others. Nevertheless, the term temperance is not infrequently used more broadly to signify the whole moderation that reason imposes on human actions and passions, which is common to every moral virtue.25
The following are commonly enumerated as constitutive parts of the special virtue of temperance: abstinence and sobriety, which concern moderating the natural appetite for food and drink, and in general the things that pertain to preserving the individual’s nature26; chastity and modesty, which restrain pleasures unworthy of rational nature in those matters that concern the preservation of the species.27
Moreover, the virtues annexed or coordinated to temperance are counted as continence, humility, meekness, modesty, frugality, austerity, simplicity, eutrapelia, and so on28; opposed to them are vices such as intemperance, lust, shamelessness, buffoonery, cruelty, and so forth.
- IV. Fortitude is “the deliberate undertaking of dangers and endurance of hardships”29, or strength of mind in fearlessly undertaking hardships, enduring dangers and bearing adversity and difficulties for an honorable end. Thus, as a special virtue, it orders the “irascible” appetite by overcoming the greater obstacles and difficulties that could draw the will away from following the dictate of reason. It too is sometimes taken in a broader sense insofar as it implies that firmness of mind which is a condition of all virtues, since it pertains to them to act firmly and constantly.30
Fortitude occupies, as it were, the mean between timidity and daring. For, as St. Thomas explains, “it pertains to the virtue of fortitude to remove an obstacle by which the will is drawn back from following reason. But being drawn back from something difficult pertains to the character of fear, which implies a certain withdrawal from an evil that involves difficulty. Hence fortitude is chiefly concerned with fears of difficult things that can draw the will back from following reason. But the impulse of such difficult things must not only be firmly endured by restraining fear; they must also be moderately attacked when, that is, they must be driven away in order to secure safety for the future, which seems to pertain to the character of daring. Fortitude, therefore, concerns fears and daring, as a kind of restraint and moderation of fears and daring.”31 Hence it is concluded that not every daring of mind, by which fears are despised through blind impulse or without the application of any moderation of reason, can be equated with the virtue of fortitude. For “the virtue of a human being is that which makes the human being good and renders his work good; but the good of a human being is to be according to reason.”32
The chief companions, as it were, of fortitude are magnanimity, which “by its name implies a certain stretching of the mind toward great things”; patience, through which “the good of reason is preserved against sadness, so that reason does not succumb to sadness” in enduring pressing evils; and perseverance, which “makes a person persist firmly in the good against the difficulty that arises from the very duration of an act.”33
Finally, other vices oppose fortitude by deficiency, namely, timidity, smallness of spirit, cowardice, sadness, and despair; and others by excess: rash and thoughtless daring, or even boldness in carrying out criminal plans; and presumption, or excessive confidence in one’s own powers, which in particular is opposed to magnanimity by excess.34