Theodor Meyer, Ius naturae generale

Theodor Meyer

Theodor Meyer, Ius naturae generale

Theodor Meyer

Institutiones iuris naturalis, Pars I: Ius naturae generale

First published 1906

Theodor Meyer’s Ius naturae generale from the second corrected edition (1906), in Latin with an original English translation. Preface and proemium included; the navigational contents and publisher advertisements are excluded.


Introductio I: Preface

Introduction

Sectio I: General Ethics

Liber I: Book One. The Natural Elements and Conditions of Human Action

Liber II: Book Two. The Moral Attributes of the Human Act

Liber III: Book Three. The Complete Norm of Human Acts, or Law

Chapter I. Law in General

Chapter II. Eternal Law and Its Temporal Promulgation through Natural Law

Chapter III. Positive Law

Prologue.

287. Here we intend to speak not specifically of positive law, whether divine or human, but in the most general terms, considering only those conditions of it that are implicit in its common philosophical concept itself, and through which positive law is intrinsically connected with the very natural law of God and is understood to be a necessary complement to it in the moral world. Especially in these times, it is of great importance that this internal connection be not merely hinted at in passing, but also foreshadowed by the very order of the topics to be treated. Therefore, although most of what must be said about positive law in general objectively concerns law enacted by human social authority, whose philosophical foundations remain to be established more deeply only below (Section II), we have nevertheless judged it more suitable to set forth here already the most general character of positive law.

This seems all the less inconvenient because what remains to be completed concerning human law in particular concerns almost exclusively civil law, which will be discussed more clearly in the other (special) part of natural law. Nor is it a great obstacle that we cannot here treat positive law generally according to the analytic order of science without provisionally presupposing, as it were hypothetically, both the fact of positive divine legislation (which fundamental theology demonstrates) and the legislative power of legitimate human authority (not yet proved). For both these hypothetical assumptions certainly have some basis in the present philosophical foundation, insofar as they have as their witness the historical conviction of the ages and the constant practice of the human race.

Article 1.

The notion and necessity of positive law.

§ 1. Various senses in which law may be called positive.

288. Positive law is distinguished above all from natural law by the fact that its proximate origin is not God’s necessary will but the free ordinance of one who has care of some community; consequently, as such, it is not known from the principles of reason a priori, but is promulgated to subjects by the legislator’s positive expression or signification. Indeed, its proper mark as positive law consists in this mode of promulgation, which differs from natural promulgation. Thus it may happen that a law that is otherwise natural is also positive, namely whenever positive promulgation is added by the legislator’s free decree to natural promulgation. It also often happens that a law, positive by reason of its positive promulgation, is nevertheless founded, by reason of its matter taken commonly and indeterminately, either in part or wholly in the necessary order of nature; so that, apart from its mode of promulgation, the legislation adds nothing positive to natural legislation except a more definite determination of the matter, together with a positive sanction suited to it. Therefore, not all laws called positive are positive in the same way; rather, according to the difference of their matter, this designation is taken more narrowly or broadly.

Moreover, as we observed above, positive law is distinguished as divine and human according as it is enacted proximately and immediately by divine or human authority. In this matter it should be noted that not everything done through a human being, or by a human being as minister, is done by human authority; only what is established by a person in his own name, by virtue of power entrusted to him from above, is. Therefore, even that law must be considered truly divine which is promulgated through human beings, but as instruments or heralds of the divine will, in God’s name. The theocratic governance and guidance of the Hebrew people belongs in this category, although it was carried out through human ministry.

§ 2. The natural requirement for positive legislation.

289. Although every human being who is a member of a community is already bound by the law of nature to observe the whole moral order suited to human nature, and hence also the social order—that is, to promote the common good to the best of his ability—nevertheless, for several reasons, according to the order of providence, positive law too must necessarily be added to natural law. For:

  1. natural law comprises many things that can be derived from it and applied to particular cases with difficulty, especially by the less educated;

  2. its precepts are universal in themselves and indeterminate; hence, according to differences of place, time, and other circumstances, they need various forms of practical determination, and this must not be arbitrary but, at least in matters that immediately concern the social good, stable and, as far as possible, common. Such determination cannot be obtained without the intervention of positive law;

  3. especially in those social duties on whose observance the preservation and order of social life immediately depend, it is necessary that human inconstancy and desires be restrained by the sanction of temporal punishments as well.

Positive law meets these needs by explaining natural law, determining it, applying it to concrete circumstances, and enforcing it through a new sanction.

290. But although it is known a priori in general that some positive legislation is naturally necessary and required by the force of natural law itself, this cannot be asserted in the same way either of each particular positive law or of every kind of positive legislation. Indeed, as regards positive divine law in particular, which the Christian religion attests, it is clear enough in itself that, insofar as it is adapted to the supernatural order, it cannot be founded on the necessity of nature. Nor should the very positive promulgation of natural law, solemnly made on Mount Sinai, be said to have answered a truly natural requirement so much as the weakness contracted through the original fall of nature.

The reasons listed above (no. 289) sufficiently prove that the necessity of some positive legislation is truly natural and founded not so much in the condition of fallen nature as in the very natural economy of the moral order. From this it is no less apparent that such assistance is required not as a passing act but as a stable institution, continually present to the human race and its successive generations. Who would not understand that this ideal need of nature is fully confirmed by the very universal fact of history—that everywhere in the world and at every time the institution of social legislative authority is actually found to exist—and recognize the provident hand of nature’s supreme author and ruler? — Accordingly, although such an institution of legislation depends proximately and in particular on the legislator’s free decision, it is neither arbitrary or merely accidental nor in itself alien to the purpose of natural law; rather, it is certainly known to be its ideal requirement and a necessary complement in view of its end.

Article 2.

On the obligation of positive law.

§ 1. Its origin.

291. It belongs to the common character of law to obligate; therefore positive law, if it truly is law, cannot lack this efficacy (nos. 219 ff., 233). Nor is there any question about the proximate origin, or efficient cause, of positive obligation, since its concept presupposes that it proceeds proximately from the free decree of the legislator (whether God himself or a human being possessing legitimate authority), and by this very origin is essentially distinguished from natural law (no. 288). We therefore intend here to discuss only its remote origin. It is not without purpose to ask whether positive law, divine or human, should be considered distinct from natural law and thus wholly detached from it, or whether it must nevertheless be considered in some way founded on it. —

To say that some positive precept is founded on natural law can mean two things: either with respect to the matter positively commanded or prohibited, or only with respect to the form by which it has the common efficacy or binding force of law.

Positive law founded on natural law in the first way, with respect to matter, is truly natural law and is positive only by reason of its contingent positive promulgation. Hence there is nothing to prevent it, like all other natural precepts, from being derived through the light of reason by way of deduction from the supreme principle of natural law. We have already observed elsewhere that many positive laws of this kind truly exist; nevertheless, it by no means belongs to what is common to all positive laws that they be founded on natural law in this way. Rather, what commonly belongs to all of them is that they can also command or prohibit matters that are in themselves morally indifferent.

In the second way, however, namely with respect to form or reductively, all positive laws without exception must have their common foundation in natural law. It follows that the supreme principle of natural law, insofar as it is formal and reductive, although in itself and directly it pertains only to natural duties, nevertheless indirectly and mediately extends at the same time to all positive duties as well, by which man may be bound either divinely or humanly. This truth is fruitful and momentous in practice at all times, but especially in our age; indeed, in itself it is the sole impregnable bulwark of the genuine and inalienable freedom of human beings and peoples, and must be raised steadfastly against those well-known dogmas of modern legalism that recognize no other essential source of positive law, at least human law, than the will of men. Therefore, let it be

292. Thesis XXXIII. There can be no positive law that is not founded at least formally and reductively—that is, with respect to its binding force—ultimately on natural law.

Preliminary remark. You will gather the meaning of the terms “formally and reductively,” to which “materially and deductively” are opposed, partly from the preceding explanation (no. 291), partly from nos. 278 and 285. Although the assertion concerns human law in a special way, it is nevertheless general and comprises every kind of positive law, because the sense in which positive law is “founded” on natural law is taken in the broadest sense. That is, something is said to be founded on another either as on its cause or principle, or as on a necessary condition. The assertion about positive law, including divine law, holds only in this latter way. — Moreover, every positive law is said to be founded “ultimately” on natural law, that is, at least mediately and as its final ground.

Proof I, from the nature of moral obligation. To obligate rational creatures belongs in itself to God alone, the supreme and essential ordainer of the moral world. Therefore no one can enact a law for a community that is objectively valid, or binding, except either the divine legislator himself or one who, and insofar as he, has this power communicated to him by divine mission; and this is so either by force of the natural order (from God as author of nature) or by force of some divine manifestation made beyond the order of nature (from God as positive legislator). — But under any such hypothesis concerning its proximate origin, positive law must rest, with respect to its binding force, on the logically presupposed natural legislation. Therefore every positive law whatsoever, human or divine, is founded formally and reductively ultimately on natural law.

Proof of the major premise from the very concept and essential end of all moral obligation (nos. 223 ff.). Indeed, who but God alone, by his own authority, could impose on a rational creature an ineluctable disjunctive necessity by force of which an action or omission, although in itself morally indifferent, would nevertheless, solely through the intervening will of the legislator, become a necessary condition and means of attaining the ultimate end? — Who could so absolutely order man toward the end of the world, except the one who establishes the end and is the author and essential guardian of the whole order? — Or who could authentically declare or prescribe conditions between the Creator and creatures, on which the attainment or nonattainment of eternal reward depends, except an agent acting in the Creator’s name, who promised it by way of nature?² — Moreover, it is clear, as the Apostle also testifies (Rom. 13:1), that all power is from God; this will also be shown more fully below, where social authority, and especially public civil authority, is discussed.

Proof of the minor premise. If positive law is supposed to have been enacted by human power by force of the natural order, that is, legitimately granted by God as author of nature, the minor premise needs no proof. For it is evident in itself that on this hypothesis all the binding force possessed by positive law is derived directly from natural law through the very legislative power.

Hence the minor premise must be proved only for the following two hypotheses: positive law has been enacted either 1. immediately by God, the supreme legislator, beyond the order of nature, or 2. by human authority, but established beyond the order of nature through a positive intervention of God (such as the Catholic faith testifies ecclesiastical authority to be). And indeed, even under both these hypotheses, positive law is certainly proved to rest, though less directly and in some broader way, on natural law as its ultimate ground with respect to its binding force. For:

As to 1. For positive law, even divine law, to have the effect of obligating man, natural law is presupposed at least as a necessary condition. For through natural law man can consider himself obligated only insofar as everyone already knows antecedently, and thus naturally, that obedience must be rendered by obligation to God when he commands something. Thus natural law is the presupposed foundation on which divine positive law itself must rest with respect to its binding force.

As to 2, this clearly follows as a corollary from the preceding point. For this whole second hypothesis immediately reduces to the first. Since human legislative authority and the binding force proceeding from it rest proximately on positive divine law, they must, together with it and through it, likewise rest ultimately on natural law.

Therefore we rightly conclude that there can be no positive legislation that is not founded in some way, at least reductively and ultimately, on natural law.

But if we set aside that divine legislation which has directly as its object only the supernatural order, this same doctrine is further illustrated and confirmed by St. Thomas through special consideration.

293. Proof II, from the formally one and common end of all legislation (within the limits of the natural order). — Every positive law must agree with natural law at least in the common character of law, namely, that it be “a certain ordinance of reason for the common good.” Therefore, with a view to this essential end, which is to order man rightly according to reason, it in some way essentially participates in the intrinsic form of natural law: namely, rational order, which natural law comprises most universally and simply, while positive law takes up that same order by sanctioning it in a qualified way and as specifically determined. This can occur in positive laws in either of two ways: either some matter belonging to natural law, derived by way of conclusion from more general precepts, is explicitly and positively sanctioned by social authority; or what natural law comprises under some common and indeterminate (contingently determinable) aspect is determined according to the requirements of things and time. Thus, for example, the law of nature, which indeterminately calls for the punishment of crimes, is positively determined if positive law establishes a certain kind and measure of penalty for certain crimes. In the first hypothesis, positive law is contained in natural law with respect to its matter, and to that extent already derives its force from the same source. In the second case, it is founded on natural law as the specific form of a thing is founded on its common form. — Therefore, positive laws of this kind have a foundation in natural law not only through the authority from which they proceed but also, in some way, by reason of the common and formal end.

§ 2. Essential conditions required for the objective validity of positive law.

294. From the universal principle already established in the preceding thesis, essentially required conditions immediately follow, as so many corollaries, for any positive law, as such, to be objectively valid, that is, to be able to have binding force. They can all conveniently be reduced to three heads. For what is required is:

  1. On the part of the legislator:

Legitimate power, both a) with respect to the subjects for whom the law is enacted, and b) with respect to the particular law enacted. For the binding force manifestly cannot extend beyond the authority divinely received for this purpose; but this authority in every human legislator is circumscribed by certain limits, partly natural and partly established by positive law. Therefore, insofar as a law exceeds these limits, it lacks binding force.

  1. On the part of the matter, the law must be:

a) just. The reason is that otherwise it cannot be founded on natural law in any way. Hence St. Augustine says: “A law that is not just does not seem to be a law.” But St. Thomas, citing this testimony, adds: “(Law), insofar as it has justice, has the character of law.” Moreover, the justice of law implies two things:

α) so that it conflict with no higher obligation of the subjects, or, as the ancient jurists taught with Isidore, so that it be “honorable” and “in accord with religion.” St. Thomas also aptly adds: “In human affairs, something is said to be just because it is right according to the rule of reason. But the first rule of reason is the law of nature. Hence every law established by human beings has the character of law insofar as it is derived from natural law. But if it disagrees with natural law in any respect, it will no longer be a law but a corruption of law.” Now whatever conflicts with a higher obligation of the subjects, even if not in itself a natural obligation, thereby reductively contains a disagreement with natural law itself as well.

β) so that it be necessary or useful for the common good, or, as the maxim of the ancients has it, “contribute to the safety.” For it belongs to the essence of law that it be ordered to the common good (no. 230). A law that lacks this proportion to its essential end must therefore fall short of the very form of law, or of the justice of law. To this also pertains what the author of On the Governance of Princes professes, in the mind of the holy Doctor, concerning the difference between just and unjust rule: “If a multitude is ordered by its ruler to the common good of the multitude, the rule will be right and just; but if the rule is ordered not to the common good of the multitude but to the private good of the ruler, it will be unjust and perverted.” Moreover, a law that is not unjust in itself can nevertheless fail this requirement of justice in its manner of application, if “the burdens are distributed unequally among the multitude,” even if they are ordered to the common good. — What St. Augustine says is to be understood of both these elements of justice, by which law is both just and justly made: “What is done according to right is done justly. But what is done unjustly cannot be done according to right. For unjust enactments of men ought not to be considered or called laws (that is, valid laws), since even they themselves say that only what has flowed from the source of justice is right.”

b) possible. A law can be said to be possible or impossible to observe in two ways, either physically or morally. It is physically impossible if what it commands simply exceeds the subjects’ powers; morally impossible if, considering the subjects’ powers and also the proper end toward which the law naturally directs them, it is excessively difficult to observe. It is evident in itself that possibility in the former sense belongs to the essential character of law, not only human but also divine, because moral obligation cannot concern an object in no way subject to man’s freedom. Hence the general maxim: “No one is bound to do the impossible.” — Moral possibility belongs to the character of human law. In practice, this condition cannot be applied to divine law, because if God should perhaps command something beyond the powers of human frailty, he can make up for nature’s deficiency by the help of grace. Nevertheless, as Suárez aptly observes, we see that this same condition is in fact always observed even in every divine law enacted for a community of human beings. Thus, in the Gospel law, things that would be morally impossible for human nature in view of the whole human race, such as evangelical poverty, are not commanded but proposed by way of counsel.

  1. On the part of legal form, it is required that the law be sufficiently promulgated by the public authority of the legislator (no. 230).

295. Each of these requirements follows with such necessity and evidence partly from the idea of law and partly from the notion and essential origin of every moral obligation that, once the common principle has been demonstrated, it needs no further confirmation. — In addition to the invincible force of these reasons, there is also the agreement not only of the whole of Christian philosophy but of the sounder pagan antiquity as well. Suárez shows that the Isidorian rule, commonly received by ancient jurisprudence, can be reduced almost entirely to the same conditions. It denies that anything else can have the force of law except “what is established by reason, accords with religion, is consistent with discipline, and contributes to safety.” Isidore then explains this judgment more fully as follows: “A law will be honorable, just, possible, in accordance with nature, in accordance with the custom of the country, and suitable to the time and place.” In particular, note:

296. Among all the conditions of law, justice commonly holds the principal place among the ancients. For they rightly considered the essential form of law, and as it were its soul, to be contained in justice, as is sufficiently clear from what has been said. And although there was sometimes room for differences of opinion even among Scholastic doctors about what, in particular, belongs to the essential justice of law, this profession of the whole of Christian science has always stood firm and will continue to stand firm:

A human law commanding anything manifestly contrary to divine law is, precisely to that extent, invalid, or has no binding force.

This conclusion is confirmed not only by reason but also by sayings of sacred Scripture, examples of martyrs, and the constant authority of the Church, as is clear from Acts 5:29 and Exodus 1:17; — from innumerable passages of canon law in which the same doctrine is constantly impressed, for example these and similar judgments: “In dignity, natural law likewise prevails over custom and enactment. For whatever has been accepted by custom or recorded in writing, if it is opposed to natural law, must be considered vain and invalid.” — “No one may do anything against natural law.” — “Custom must yield to truth and reason.” — “Custom is vainly opposed to reason.” — “One must follow God’s truth, not human custom.” — “The laws of rulers ought not to prevail over natural law,” etc. — Add the solemn documents of the Roman Pontiffs, such as the encyclical Qui pluribus, 9 Nov. 1846; the encyclical Quanta cura, 8 Dec. 1864, together with the Syllabus of Errors, and others of the same kind.

Indeed, it follows with the same certainty that, universally, no law commanding something manifestly unjust can have binding force.

Accordingly, Suárez, having professed this thesis concerning the justice of law (with respect to its matter), “It belongs to the character and essence of law that it command what is just,” immediately adds of the same point: “The assertion is not only certain according to faith but also clear according to natural reason.” Namely, a) every human legislator’s “power is from God . . . therefore it is given for good and edification, not for evil or destruction”; b) “No inferior can obligate against the law and will of a superior; but a law commanding an evil act is against God’s law prohibiting it”; c) “Just as eternal law commands only what is just, because it is justice itself by essence, so true human law must be a participation in it, and therefore it cannot validly command anything except what is just and honorable, according to [Prov. 8:15]: ‘By me kings reign and lawgivers decree what is just.’ Therefore a human legislator has no power to obligate through unjust laws; and so, even if he commands unjust things, the command is not a law, because it has no binding force.”

We have most trustworthy witnesses that this same doctrine is to be regarded not as peculiar to Catholic or ecclesiastical schools, or as their private possession, but rather as common to all sound philosophy. Among the many, let these be named:

Hugo Grotius, the most celebrated Protestant teacher of natural law, indeed praised by some of his own people, with exaggeration, as virtually the founder of this science, writes as follows: “Among all good men, this is beyond dispute: if those holding supreme power command anything contrary to natural law or divine precepts, what they command must not be done. For when the Apostles said that one must obey God rather than men, they appealed to the most certain rule inscribed in the minds of all”—that is (as Gronovius comments on this passage), “against civil law, which commands obedience to superiors, they invoked natural law as a higher tribunal.”

Henricus Cocceius (H. von Cocceji, 1644–1719), a man once among the most confidential advisers of King Frederick I of Prussia, in his extensive commentary Grotius Illustratus, while explaining the passage from Grotius cited above and confirming it at length with his own arguments, concludes by way of summary: “Whatever is contrary to God’s command lies outside the bounds of human rule.” And, on the same chapter of Grotius, § 2, he professes: “A magistrate, with respect to manifest excess, is to be regarded as a private person. For example, if he commands laws contrary to natural or divine law, or contrary to morality, or decrees something harmful to the commonwealth, and this is manifest. For it is absolutely certain that this is invalid and null and gives rise neither to a right nor to an obligation.”

Samuel Cocceius (1679–1755), son of Henricus and grand chancellor of the Kingdom of Prussia under Frederick II, in his Introduction to Grotius Illustratus, or Preliminary Dissertations, with which he augmented the edition of Grotius’s work and his father’s commentary that he edited, not only does not disagree with his father on this point but further, by establishing that “the one and adequate principle of natural law is the will of the Creator,” recognizes in this alone the decisive reason and measure of obligation, right, and legitimate human freedom, since “no creature in itself has the right and power to bind or to take away the powers granted to human beings by the Creator.” And “a creature can do nothing beyond the limits assigned to it by the Creator, and outside its right every capacity for action ceases.”

Among more recent writers, Bluntschli himself, although otherwise a patron of modern public law, is nevertheless compelled by the force of truth to recognize theoretically the same bulwark of human freedom. For in his works Staatswörterbuch and Staatsrecht, in several places he reproves all “absolute obedience” to human laws, denying that “human authority which exceeds its limits still has the force of authority.” Indeed, he acknowledges that public officials are obligated to refuse obedience whenever they are asked to do anything contrary to their moral or religious duties.

Finally, add the splendid testimonies of pagan antiquity, some of which were already indicated and quoted above (no. 251).

297. The doctrine contrary to this is characteristic of the despotism and absolutism of every age, taking root partly in materialist and partly in pantheist philosophy. In earlier centuries it was taught by: Machiavelli (1469–1527), who in political affairs substituted the utility of rulers for the rule of justice; Hobbes (1588–1679), who “says that supreme rulers cannot sin and can never reasonably be blamed. . . . Kings make just what they command by commanding, and unjust what they forbid”; Spinoza (1632–1677), who judges that only what is naturally possible is naturally just, since “the power of nature, he says, is the very power of God”; J. J. Rousseau (1712–1778), who substituted for Hobbes’s royal despotism a no less absolute despotism of democratic rule. In our own age, besides the theory of ideal socialism, which is commonly based on Rousseau’s principles, we have as a chief opponent a certain modern school of public law, descended from Hegel’s pantheist philosophy. Since it conceives the state really to be God himself, it is no wonder that it also attributes a kind of omnipotence to public legislation. For from this arose that modern mechanism of positive law which requires nothing whatever for the validity of law except its external form and, as it were, its legal appearance; thus, substituting a kind of pantheistic legality, dignified by the name “public conscience,” for true morality, it strives to subordinate and subject the private consciences of citizens to itself.

In recent decades, the contagion of this most pernicious error has so pervaded more recent jurisprudence that even among men otherwise sincerely devoted to the Christian cause some are at times found not entirely free from its traces. They do not deny that subjects have the right to refuse obedience to laws they cannot observe with a clear conscience; nevertheless, they think that such laws—even if manifestly unjust, provided they have otherwise been enacted according to legal forms—still have and retain formal validity until they are lawfully abrogated. For this reason they consider public officials as such to be bound by their office to execute and judge according to them, and to be exempt from all personal “responsibility” for this merely official obedience.

But they do not observe that no firm obligation at all, whether of officials or private persons, exists unless it is ratified by the will of God, and nothing can be ratified by God that is contrary to divine right. They are also mistaken if they think that a rational human being, because public authority supposes him to be a machine, is thereby also regarded before God as a blind machine, entirely lacking the imputability of his actions.

To these most weighty reasons, further confirmed by the light of faith, it is useless to object that in this way a “pernicious subjectivism” is introduced into public law, so that neither the “majesty of law” nor the essential “objectivity” and invincible efficacy of right can be preserved. We reply:

  1. It must be flatly denied that, according to the doctrine set forth, any subjectivism is introduced into public law, as will be clear at a glance from the practical rules given below. Indeed, the contrary is most truly to be said: the subjectivism of human discretion is replaced with the one true and immutable “objectivism.” For what is more objective than the eternal principles of justice, founded on God’s eternal law and evident to man through his nature as a rational being?

  2. Nothing is taken away from the “majesty of law”; rather, proper provision is made for it. For law must be just if it is not to lose its majesty; to claim majesty for manifestly unjust law is to blaspheme majesty.

  3. Right must not be confused with a merely legal and arbitrary fiction of right. Every true right has its essential objectivity and invincible (moral) efficacy from no other source than the rational order divinely sanctioned; but a law that manifestly contradicts this order can and ought not to have the objectivity proper to right, however vainly it may display the outward form of a right. If, nevertheless, it arrogates external efficacy to itself, that efficacy is not the efficacy of right but merely physical coercion and tyranny.

We reserve for ourselves the fuller refutation of this entire error of modern legal mechanism, partly in a general treatise on social right and partly in a more specialized discussion of public law.

§ 3. Rules to be observed in practice concerning these same conditions.

298. 1. These conditions, being essential, objectively pertain to every positive law, divine or human, but they cannot be applied indiscriminately as criteria to both kinds. For:

a) As soon as we know that a divine command exists, we need no further criterion for its fully legitimate character; indeed, it would be wrong to call it into question in any way. Therefore it must be accepted and carried out at once and without hesitation.

b) With respect to human law, however, there is nothing wrong with investigating each of its requirements by right; indeed, for our obedience to be reasonable, this is often necessary. — Which marks characterize the superior as legitimate, what is the scope of his power, and what mode of promulgation is necessary must be gathered partly from the object of the law and partly from the purpose and constitution, or fundamental laws, of each society.

  1. Whenever it is established that a law has been enacted and promulgated in lawful form by an authority competent for the subject matter, a reasonable presumption arises in favor of the law, including its intrinsic form. Then the maxim is valid and must be observed in practice: “An ordinance of a legitimate superior must be considered just until the contrary is established.” The same holds for the law’s sufficient “possibility.”

  2. But if a law’s injustice is established with certainty, then, following the teaching of St. Thomas, two cases must be distinguished in practice. For an unjust law can be:

a) either “contrary to the divine good,” for example, when it commands something contrary to divine law, so that the subject cannot obey it without morally participating in the injustice contained in the law; then it is not only deprived of binding force, but, in addition, “such laws may in no way be observed, because, as Acts 4 says, one must obey God rather than men.”

b) or “contrary to the human good,” either “in its end,” as when a ruler imposes burdensome laws on subjects that do not pertain to the common good but rather to his own greed or glory; or in its author, as when someone enacts a law beyond the power entrusted to him; or also in its form, for example, when burdens are distributed unequally among the multitude, even if they are ordered to the common good. All laws unjust toward their subjects belong here, because they impose an unjust burden on them, even if they can be observed without sin. The holy Doctor does not hesitate to assert of these too: “Such things are more like acts of violence than laws. Hence such laws do not bind in the court of conscience, unless perhaps to avoid scandal or disturbance; for this reason a person should also yield his right”—that is, on occasion there may arise an obligation to accept or perform what they command, but accidentally, not by the force of the laws themselves, only through consideration of some natural duty that may arise from elsewhere because of the circumstances.

Nevertheless, Suárez, explaining this passage of St. Thomas according to his meaning, rightly observes that for a law in itself useful to the common good to be considered invalid for everyone because of a lack of justice in its manner, it is not enough that there be some kind of injustice or disproportion in distributing public burdens, as if through an exception inherent in the law; rather, the injustice must be of such a kind that it “redounds to the common detriment and to the grave and unjust burden of several of its members.” — Moreover, the justice of law with respect to its manner must be measured solely by the manner of the work, not by the manner of the agent, that is, by the subjective moral disposition or motive of the one enacting the law.

§ 4. On the extent of obligation.

299. The extent of obligation can be considered either according to its internal quantity, by which it is judged heavier or lighter, or according to the range of persons bound by it. From the nature and origin of positive law, the following corollaries about both are likewise legitimate:

I. The quantity of positive obligation depends

  1. on the gravity of the object. This must be assessed both from the law’s proximate end and from the object’s usefulness or necessity for that end.

  2. on the legislator’s will, since it is the efficient cause of obligation. Yet he cannot validly produce this effect by absolute discretion, but only within the limits set for him in advance by the essential end of law and the nature of obligation. Otherwise the law would cease to be “an ordinance of reason.” Therefore, in a grave matter a human legislator can obligate either gravely or lightly, according as one or the other seems more expedient; but in a matter light in every respect, he can obligate only lightly.

II. With respect to persons, obligation extends

  1. for divine positive law, once promulgated, to each and every person to whom it pertains by God’s ordinance;

  2. for human law, to all and only subjects who possess the use of reason and are present in the place for which the law was enacted.

Article 3.

On the cessation and change of positive law

300. Human positive law is subject to every kind of change that can befall a law. Divine law, however, admits only those changes that presuppose no imperfection on the legislator’s part and do not contradict the stability intended by God. With this preliminary, the following can be established in general:

I. A law ceases to exist wholly and simply

  1. through abrogation by a superior, either express or tacit. The latter occurs whenever a contrary law is enacted.

  2. when the adequate final reason for the law ceases to exist. This also occurs with respect to human law when it is established with certainty to have become harmful or useless to the whole community. — Human law is likewise removed

  3. through a legitimate contrary custom, which is, as it were, an unwritten law expressed through people’s practices. Among jurists it is beyond dispute that custom, when supported by certain conditions, has the force of law in human society and hence the efficacy both of introducing and of abrogating valid law; this is also philosophically founded in the very nature of social right. For custom to be considered legitimate and equal to law, it is required that it be a) honorable and useful to the community; b) introduced by the community itself through repeated public and voluntary acts (with an implicit intention to obligate, when the custom is introduced as law); c) of long duration and continued for a notable time without objection from social authority.

II. A law or the obligation of a law is removed in part chiefly by these acts, proceeding immediately or at least mediately from the legislator or his successor:

  1. derogation, which is a partial abolition of a law;

  2. suspension, by which the efficacy of a law is halted temporarily;

  3. dispensation, which is a relaxation of obligation with respect to certain persons in a particular case, while the obligation remains for others;

  4. exemption, which is a dispensation granted permanently.

A favorable law, called a “privilege,” pertains in some way partly to dispensation and partly to exemption. By force of it, something special is granted either against or beyond the common law, temporarily or permanently. Thus privilege in itself extends more broadly than dispensation and exemption, insofar as it can also confer a special favor that entails no relaxation of any common obligation. Moreover, privilege is distinguished as real or personal, according as it “is granted directly to some thing, office, or condition distinct from a person,” or “is directed immediately to a person on his own account.”

Although these things are in themselves common to positive law, in practice they are not applied in the same way or under the same conditions to every kind of law in particular. To set forth their specific rationales pertains partly to civil law and partly to canon law.

301. Scholium. Although the law itself remains unchanged, it can happen that it does not obligate in a particular case or with respect to certain persons. Above all, moral impossibility, or excessive difficulty arising in a particular case, must be referred here. This is a legitimate ground for excuse from positive obligation, unless by its nature the law justly extends to the undergoing of such heavier burdens, as occurs in military duty to defend one’s country.

Likewise, “epieikeia,” that is, a prudent and morally certain presumption that, in the legislator’s mind and because of circumstances he did not foresee, the law does not extend to the present case, sometimes legitimately excuses one from observing human law. The reason is that the correct interpretation of law must be drawn not only from its words and rationale but also from the legislator’s mind, which is rightly presumed to be just and reasonable. And although interpreting a law does not in itself belong to every private person, nevertheless in a case of necessity, when recourse to authority is not available, everyone may legitimately use this kind of prudent judgment. By far the most serious kind of epieikeia, theoretically and practically, is that in which, in a public society, a presumption of higher right is sometimes invoked against observing the fundamental law itself, and which is commonly called an act for public safety (Staatsstreich — coup d’état). But public law treats this subject.

Liber IV: Book Four. The Human Being’s Subjective Moral Formation

Sectio II: Social Right in General

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