Theodor Meyer, Ius naturae generale

Theodor Meyer

Theodor Meyer, Ius naturae generale

Theodor Meyer

Institutiones iuris naturalis, Pars I: Ius naturae generale

First published 1906

Theodor Meyer’s Ius naturae generale from the second corrected edition (1906), in Latin with an original English translation. Preface and proemium included; the navigational contents and publisher advertisements are excluded.


Introductio I: Preface

Introduction

Sectio I: General Ethics

Liber I: Book One. The Natural Elements and Conditions of Human Action

Liber II: Book Two. The Moral Attributes of the Human Act

Liber III: Book Three. The Complete Norm of Human Acts, or Law

Chapter I. Law in General

Chapter II. Eternal Law and Its Temporal Promulgation through Natural Law

On eternal law and its temporal promulgation through natural law.

Article 1.

Eternal law considered in itself.

§ 1. Its notion.

238. Since the most general notion of law consists in its being a certain rule of reason for operations directed toward an end, the teachers of the Christian schools, following St. Augustine, recognized in divine reason itself, the ordainer of all things, the most universal law and exemplar of all things, and called it “eternal law.”

And indeed it cannot be denied that divine reason is the supreme and at the same time eternal rule of all things to be done, since it assigns their ends to individual things from eternity and (as divine will) disposes each nature toward its ends. Let us hear the Angelic Doctor on this subject: “Law is nothing other than a dictate of practical reason in a ruler who governs some perfect community. But it is clear, on the assumption that the world is governed by divine providence, that the whole community of the universe is governed by divine reason. And therefore the very reason for the governance of things, existing in God as the ruler of the universe, has the character of law. And since divine reason conceives nothing in time but has an eternal conception, it follows that a law of this kind must be called eternal. . . . Thus the eternal conception of divine law has the character of eternal law, insofar as it is ordered by God to the governance of things foreknown by him.” — A little later he develops the same conception as follows: “(God) is the governor of all acts and motions found in each creature. Hence, just as the reason of divine wisdom, insofar as all things are created through it, has the character of art, exemplar, or idea, so the reason of divine wisdom moving all things to their due end has the character of law. Accordingly, eternal law is nothing other than the reason of divine wisdom insofar as it directs all acts and motions.”

In substance, this definition of St. Thomas agrees with the one proposed by St. Augustine, according to which eternal law is said to be “the reason or will of God commanding the natural order to be preserved and forbidding it to be disturbed,” or, as it is given elsewhere: “the highest reason, which must always be obeyed.”

Eternal law must therefore be conceived as an immanent act of God by which he necessarily and from eternity wills that all creatures to be created by him be ordered appropriately toward their end. It follows that eternal law is in itself so universal that it extends not only to the proper ordering of the moral world, or of rational beings, but also to the physical world, and indeed comprehends not only the natural order but also, given God’s free institution, the supernatural order. Yet it is usually considered with respect to the moral order alone, and then only the natural order.

St. Thomas further elucidates eternal law by distinguishing it from divine providence. “Providence in God does not properly name eternal law, but something consequent upon eternal law. For eternal law is to be considered in God as principles of things to be done, naturally known, are conceived in us; from these we proceed in deliberating and choosing, which is the work of prudence or providence. In this way, therefore, the law of our intellect stands to prudence as a principle in a demonstration. Likewise in God, eternal law is not providence but, as it were, the principle of providence. Hence the act of providence is appropriately attributed to eternal law, just as every conclusion of a demonstration is attributed to its indemonstrable principles.”

§ 2. It is shown that eternal law exists.

239. That eternal law, according to the meaning just explained, exists is as certain as the existence of God himself, creator and ordainer of all things, and requires no proof beyond the one we presuppose from metaphysics.

Only this may to some extent be called into question: whether what is called eternal law truly and properly merits the name of law.

For the reason for doubt seems chiefly to be that eternal law is essentially an immanent act of God and hence lacks that requirement of law which consists in promulgation.

The answer to this difficulty is gathered partly from what we stated above (232), following Suárez, concerning the promulgation of law, and partly from St. Thomas’s explicit explanation. Promulgation does not pertain to the essence of law with equal necessity or in the same way in every state of law; it pertains differently according to its internal state and its external state. But eternal law, as such, has no state of existence other than the internal one, and thus it does not have promulgation insofar as it is to bring about its cognition in subjects; nevertheless, it does not lack the promulgation that can pertain to it according to its state. For, as St. Thomas says: “eternal law has promulgation on the part of God who promulgates it, because the divine Word is eternal” (that is, uttered immanently in God from eternity) . . . “but on the part of the creature hearing or beholding, there cannot be an eternal promulgation.”

Suárez rightly observes in this regard that this “singularity” may be admitted in the case of this law: it “is considered consummated and perfect precisely because it has been established in the legislator’s mind; other laws, however, are not consummated until they are promulgated.” He gives the reason: “because God’s eternal decree is immutable and obligates at its appointed time without any change in itself, whereas a human decree is mutable; hence, as long as it has not been promulgated as a law, it always has the character more of a proposal to enact a law than of a law firmly established and enacted.”

240. It is no wonder that Christian philosophers commonly call eternal law the wisdom of God ordaining all things, whose true and absolute character as law Cicero himself acknowledged along with the wisest of the ancients. For he expressly bears witness: “I see that this was the opinion of the wisest men: law was neither devised by human intellects nor some decree of peoples, but something eternal, which would govern the whole universe with the wisdom of commanding and forbidding. Thus they said that it was the first law and ultimate mind of God, compelling or forbidding all things by reason; from this the law that the gods gave to the human race was rightly praised . . . . For it was a reason derived from the nature of things, urging us to act rightly and turning us away from wrongdoing; it does not begin to be law only when it is written, but from the moment it comes into being. And it came into being together with the divine mind. Therefore the true and first law, fit to command and forbid, is the right reason of Jupiter supreme.”

241. Scholium 1. The objections raised by Christian Thomasius (1655–1728) and other detractors of the Scholastics against their doctrine “of eternal law,” by which they compared it to the pagans’ fiction of uncreated matter, do not merit a serious reply, since they arise either from a hostile eagerness to slander or from incredible ignorance of metaphysical matters. — More surprising is that even F. J. Stahl, who otherwise likewise insists that all moral philosophy must take its beginning from recognition of the truly personal God, creator and ordainer of the world, seems to have understood Aquinas’s discussion of eternal law very imperfectly; while agreeing with him in part, Stahl mingles in an accusation that the traditional way of conceiving this law affords an occasion for “restricting the freedom of divine counsels (die innere Freiheit des göttlichen Ratschlusses zu schmälern).” — Did this critic ever read the passage of the Angelic Doctor already cited above: “Thus the eternal conception of divine law has the character of eternal law insofar as it is ordered by God to the governance of things foreknown by him”, that is, things foreknown by God from eternity as to exist in time according to his free decree of creation? Where, I ask, is any diminution here of divine freedom in his acts ad extra?

Perhaps it is useful to recall that this same writer, from a kind of instinct of “orthodox Protestantism,” professes in his works no less aversion to the “theocratic philosophy” of the Middle Ages, as he calls it, than to the principles of modern liberalism.

241 a. Scholium 2. On the other hand, H. Ahrens reproaches medieval philosophy with precisely the opposite and notes as its most serious defect above all that it placed the foundations of the entire moral and legal order in God’s (free) will (“Der Grundirrthum der mittelalterlichen Anschauung . . ., welche alles auf Gottes Willen zurückführt”—“The fundamental error of the medieval view . . . which traces everything back to God’s will”). In so doing, he too sufficiently shows how little he understood the mind of scholastic philosophy, as is apparent even to a casual reader of the words of St. Thomas cited above. This philosophy certainly taught that the real existence of the whole universe is founded on God’s free creative will and that, by reason of this, “eternal law also involves a free relation,” although in itself it is founded on the divine essence and is the absolute standard of all rightness. Hence St. Augustine: “Can that law, which is called the highest reason, which must always be obeyed, through which the wicked merit a wretched life and the good a blessed one, and according to which, finally, the law we have called temporal is rightly enacted and rightly changed—can it appear to anyone who understands not to be immutable and eternal?” By what right, then, does someone infer that, in this way, “indeed the concepts of good and evil, just and unjust are founded on the divine will,” and that consequently the governance of the world lacks objective stability? Cf. what was said at no. 151, ad 2, and Suárez, On Laws bk. 2, ch. 6, nos. 11, 23.

241 b. Scholium 3. In the meantime, we hold as certain that this one chapter of Christian philosophy, “on eternal law,” contains such a treasure of light and true knowledge that no teaching of either ancient or modern philosophy can justly be compared with it. Once this is admitted and rightly understood, the wondrous unity and harmony of the whole work of creation, both physical and moral, can be seen as if from an elevated vantage point; if it is neglected or unknown, however, all philosophy consists of insoluble riddles and is driven by a kind of necessity either to pantheism or to blind naturalism and atheism. For example, replace that Hegelian “absolute reason,” devoid of any proper personality, with “eternal law” of the true and living God, and you have remedied most of Hegel’s errors. In our age, it seems preferable to commend this as a preventive remedy to every human intellect, so that it may wisely turn aside from that modern “anarchy of minds” about which not a few learned men today complain bitterly, although they too stray from Christian theism. For since the principle of perpetual “evolution” (Darwin–Spencer), and hence nearly every form of actual “relativism” of truth, now prevails very widely in almost every branch of learning, it is no wonder that grave warning voices are already being heard, foretelling a sad shipwreck of the glorious modern science in our twentieth century as a result of the philosophical inheritance it has assumed from the nineteenth century, namely, the denial of all absolute and immutable truths. If you ask by what historical process modern philosophy has in fact reached this truly critical state, Professor Dr. Fr. Paulsen himself describes it for us at least in part, beginning with the opposition that first appeared between Hume and Kant: “Das Ziel der kritischen Erkenntnistheorie ist, die Möglichkeit absoluter, ewiger Wahrheiten nachzuweisen. Sie behauptet gegen Humes Relativismus, dass es Natur- und Sittengesetze von absoluter Allgemeinheit und Notwendigkeit gibt. Ich glaube, dass das wissenschaftliche Denken der Gegenwart hierin Hume näher steht als Kant. Das 19. Jahrhundert hat sich von der an der Mathematik orientierten rationalistischen Denkweise des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts abgewendet, es hat sich einer historisch-genetischen und damit relativistischen Denkweise zugewendet. Die Hegelsche Philosophie ist darin vorangegangen; die entwicklungstheoretische Anschauung, die in der Biologie und Kosmologie nicht minder als in der geschichtlichen Welt herrschend geworden ist, hat den Umschwung vollendet . . . . Die historisch-genetische Denkweise hat die absoluten Wahrheiten überhaupt aufgegeben: es gibt, abgesehen von der Logik und Mathematik, nur relative, nicht ewige Wahrheiten. Die Wirklichkeit ist in beständigem Fluss, ihr folgt die Erkenntnis. . . . Die ersten Voraussetzungen dieser Denkweise liegen in dem seit der Mitte des vorigen (18.) Jahrhunderts von England her vordringenden Empirismus. Er kennt keine absolut gültigen Wahrheiten, nicht in der Naturwissenschaft, . . . noch in der Moralphilosophie . . . . Unter dem Einfluss dieser Gedanken, wie sie Hume zuletzt formuliert hatte, kam es dann in Deutschland zu jener grossen Revolution in den Geisteswissenschaften, deren Anführer Herder war, und die dann im saeculum historicum alle Gebiete der geschichtlichen Forschung durchdrang. Sprache, Religion, Sitte, Recht sind nicht absolute, feste Wesenheiten, . . . sie sind nur, als lebendige Funktionen des Volkslebens, mit diesem selbst im organischen Wachstum entstanden und sich fortwährend wandelnd . . . . Wie das Recht und die Sprache, so haben auch Moral und Religion unter dem Einfluss der historisch-anthropologischen Betrachtung ihren starren, absoluten Charakter eingebüsst“ — „In der Hegelschen Philosophie hat diese Denkweise zuerst ihre philosophische Formel gefunden; der logische Evolutionismus der Dialektik relativiert alle Wahrheiten. Am bezeichnendsten ist vielleicht hierfür die Darstellung und Beurteilung der Geschichte der Philosophie: jedes System ist an seinem Orte die Wahrheit (?), natürlich nicht absolute, wohl aber relative Wahrheit.“ — „Die zweite Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts hat dann die evolutionistische Anschavungsweise auch in die Natur hineingetragen oder den logischen Evolutionismus der Dialektik in den der Naturwissenschaft umgewandelt. Die gesamte Natur wird unter den Gesichtspunkt geschichtlicher Betrachtung gestellt: das geschichtliche Leben der Menschheit wird eingeordnet einer umfassenden geschichtlichen Entwicklung des organischen Lebens; dieses bildet einen Ausschnitt aus der Entwicklungsgeschichte der Erde; der Lebensprozess des Planeten ist wieder eingefügt dem Entwicklungsprozess des Sonnensystems und mit ihm der unserer Erkenntnis und selbst unserer Phantasie sich entziehenden kosmischen Entwicklung überhaupt. Und damit ist gegeben: wie alle Formen des Lebens und Daseins, so sind auch die Formen des Denkens selbst nicht absolute, sondern ‚historische‘ Kategorien.“

This is indeed a fairly faithful general picture of the state of modern science wherever and insofar as it has completely renounced Christian antiquity. Yet among the causes mentioned here one must rightly add the powerful influence of the theory of Karl Marx and his associate Friedrich Engels, who tried to establish “scientific” socialism with the aid of a “purely materialistic conception of history.” But can what is called science still be recognized as such in this kind of “relativism”? Dr. Paulsen does not tell us. We, however, recommend as its sole remedy a serious and reverent study of “eternal law.”

Article 2.

On eternal law promulgated naturally, or on natural law in general.

§ 1. The notion of natural law.

242. Natural law (das natürliche Sittengesetz) is defined by St. Thomas as “the participation of eternal law in a rational creature.”

Further explaining this participation, he says: “Since law is a rule and measure, it can be in something in two ways: in one way, as in that which rules and measures; in another, as in that which is ruled and measured, since something is ruled or measured insofar as it participates in some way in the rule or measure. Hence, since all things subject to divine providence are ruled and measured by eternal law, it is clear that all things participate equally in eternal law, insofar as they have from its impression inclinations toward their proper acts and ends. But among the rest, the rational creature is subject to divine providence in a more excellent way, insofar as it is itself a participant in providence, providing for itself and for others. Hence in it too the eternal reason is participated, through which it has a natural inclination toward the due act and end; such participation in eternal law by a rational creature is called natural law. This participation in eternal law by a rational creature is properly called law, because the rational creature participates in it intellectually and rationally, since law is something belonging to reason. But eternal law is not participated rationally in an irrational creature; hence it cannot be called law except by likeness.” To this is similarly relevant what he adds shortly afterward: “All knowledge of truth is a certain illumination and participation in eternal law, which is immutable truth.” Elsewhere, distinguishing natural law from the law of concupiscence, he says of the former: “It is nothing other than the light of intellect implanted in us by God, through which we know what must be done and what avoided. God gave this light and this law to man at creation.”

243. Natural law must therefore be conceived as a manifestation, or external promulgation, of eternal law itself, made in time and specifically for and in a rational creature; not as something added externally to that creature, but in such a way that rational nature itself, through its natural inclination (divinely impressed) toward its proper acts, is a participation and promulgation of eternal law, just as it is a certain image of created divine reason.

That the direction of natural law is found in this very “natural inclination” is because “every operation of reason and will in us is derived from what is according to nature. For every process of reasoning is derived from naturally known principles, and every appetite for things ordered to an end is derived from the natural appetite for the ultimate end; and so too the first direction of our acts toward an end must be made through natural law.”

244. Natural law therefore differs from eternal law:

  1. as law promulgated externally to subjects differs from law existing in the legislator’s mind; 2. in respect of scope, for eternal law is not participated in a rational creature according to its entire scope as its promulgation, but only according to what pertains to rightly ordering that same rational creature;

  2. although natural law refers objectively to eternal law, it is nevertheless temporal in itself. For the very act of creation, by which the existence of a rational creature is actualized, is at the same time the act of legislation by which natural law, as such, is enacted and promulgated.

§ 2. It is demonstrated that natural law exists.

245. The existence of natural law includes two things: 1. that some promulgation of eternal law has truly been made to man, so that he is obligated to observe it; 2. that this promulgation was made by way of a natural law, that is, one not only founded in nature but also known through the natural light of reason. In the former respect, we have as adversaries chiefly atheists, followers of materialism, and all who wish to exempt man entirely from God’s providence. In the latter respect, at least insofar as the question concerns fact rather than right, even the traditionalists disagree in some way, if not in words then in fact: they teach that natural law, although by its nature destined to be known naturally, in fact, that is, in man’s present fallen state, is by no means made known by the natural light of reason, but only by supernatural light.

On the natural promulgation of law, such as is available to man in his present state, we must speak more specifically below. For now, it is asserted in general:

246. Thesis XXVII. Natural law exists in man.

It is proved, first, from the essence of human reason, considered together with the concept of eternal law. By the very force of his rational nature, a manifestation of eternal law exists in man, insofar as that law concerns the right ordering of man to his end. But the law we call natural consists in such a manifestation; for this is precisely what the definition of St. Thomas cited above (no. 242) states. Therefore, and so forth.

Proof of the major premise. By the same essential light of reason by which we distinguish good from evil, and by which we are properly called rational, we know that some actions are in themselves contrary to the ultimate end and to right order, while others are in themselves necessary for attaining that end and preserving that order. By that same rational light by which we know God to be holy and wise, we likewise know that God seriously wills us to strive toward the end and preserve right order, and therefore to avoid those former actions and perform these latter. Thus the ordering will of God himself, or eternal law, becomes known to us by way of our rational nature, insofar as it concerns the right ordering of man.

247. It is proved, secondly, from its hypothetical necessity. Given the creation of man, natural law is as necessary as eternal law itself. Therefore, its existence must certainly be affirmed a priori.

Proof of the antecedent. For on this hypothesis, God's most holy will, by which he wills all things to be rightly ordered, must first of all establish that man himself is to be rightly ordered; and a means suited to this will must correspond to it, by which this ordering of man may in fact be brought about. But the only means in itself suited to ordering man in this way is law, and primarily natural law. — I say: law alone; for no bond of order other than moral obligation can be fitting for a man endowed with freedom. But this law must be primarily natural, that is, laid down by way of nature and made known to man by natural light. This is required by: a) the analogy of all other created things, all of which are ordered to their end through their very nature; b) the end of law, which is wholly natural and therefore requires means of the same order for its fulfillment; and c) the very rational nature of man, which is wholly adapted to perceiving order and could not receive any effective positive law unless a law known by nature were presupposed. For who would feel himself immediately bound morally by a positive law, even a divine one, unless he had first, that is, by the natural light of reason, perceived that absolute obedience is owed to God, whatever he commands?

248. It is proved, thirdly, from man's inner experience. Even setting aside eternal law and the other arguments that establish a priori the existence of natural law, all men endowed with the use of reason carry within their own conscience the most certain proof of natural law. For rational nature itself, insofar as it is revealed to us through the facts of daily inner experience, displays all the marks of a true moral law laid down and promulgated by God. Therefore, natural law is also confirmed by the testimony of inner experience.

Proof of the antecedent. Rational nature, as it becomes known through each person's inner experience, is

  1. an objective and stable rule for rightly ordering human actions to the end essential to man and common to all men, and indeed a) speculative, or directly guiding the intellect; for it belongs to the essence of reason to be the proximate norm of morality, that is, to distinguish objectively moral good from moral evil (Thesis XIX, no. 184); b) practical, binding the will to right order by moral necessity. For, as inner experience testifies, with the same evidence inseparable from the use of reason with which we judge some things invincibly to be morally good and others morally evil, we at the same time and just as invincibly apprehend that all evil actions are thereby illicit, while some good actions are necessary to the integrity of right moral order and are therefore commanded. Thus we feel ourselves in fact bound by way of nature, as it were imperatively, to omit the former and undertake the latter. If we readily follow this inner authority, whatever its nature may be, we experience peace of mind; if we disregard it, we experience pangs of conscience as the voice of an inner judge condemning us. 2. a rule which, through this very power to guide and bind, proceeds from divine reason and will, as the absolute ordainer of things. Unless one wishes to lie to oneself, each person is certainly persuaded of this divine origin by: a) the very objective universality and absolute validity which our reason invincibly claims for its evident principles and dictates, thereby revealing their derivation and formal dependence on divine reason; b) the manner in which this inner authority to bind, whether commanding or judging, manifests itself in each person's conscience. We feel ourselves subject to it against our will, not by our own choice; we revere it with awe as a majesty distinct from us and superior to us, an inexorable and most holy guardian of universal order. When we violate order, we fear that very authority, as though it had been injured and were threatening retribution in the inner voice of conscience, with invincible dread. This fear accompanies not only public crimes but also hidden crimes beyond the reach of human courts.

But these two characteristics of rational nature contain the whole account of true natural law, and indeed they show it to be a) a true law, because they clearly denote a genuine “ordinance of reason for the common good”—namely, the common end of all men, indeed the common and most universal good of the entire moral world—“promulgated by one who has care of the community”—namely, by God, the supreme ordainer and governor of the moral world; b) natural law, since it is laid down and promulgated through rational nature itself.

Therefore, the existence of natural law is confirmed by man's inner experience, or by the voice of conscience.

Historical experience further illustrates and confirms this very point:

249. It is proved, fourth, from the common persuasion of mankind. The Apostle bears witness concerning the nations (Rom. 2:14–15): “Though they do not have (the written) law, they are a law to themselves: they show the work of the law written in their hearts, while their own conscience bears witness to them.” And in fact, there are almost as many testimonies as there are historical records of the customs and religions of peoples, in private and public life, showing that this law, naturally implanted in them, has always been recognized by men as truly divine. For these records repeatedly reveal both the common effort of mortals, after committing crimes against the inner law of conscience, to regain peace for themselves by appeasing the deity, and the common agreement by which all nations at all times have worshiped the gods as rewarders of the good and avengers of the wicked, even for deeds that might escape human justice. In this agreement, then, the voice of rational nature itself, and hence a certain truth, must be recognized.

Observations for resolving difficulties.

250. 1. The “hypothetical necessity” invoked in Proof II a priori in support of the existence of natural law admits no exception once the hypothesis has been posited. For it must be observed that neither a merely natural counsel (without the bond of strict obligation), nor a merely directive rule naturally implanted in human reason and illuminated by any increase of natural light, by which evil is known as hateful in itself and good as lovable in itself, can be considered a suitable and sufficient means for rightly ordering a free creature in a manner consonant with divine holiness. For God’s most holy will, by which he wills the right ordering of creatures from eternity and necessarily, cannot be indifferent or ineffective under any hypothesis. But it would have to be called so if a free creature were not bound by God to fulfill that order through a genuine disjunctive necessity, that is, through the strict obligation of law.

  1. The moral necessity of pursuing right rational order, which each person experiences in his conscience (Proof III), considered in itself, certainly does not yet manifest natural law immediately as divine law. Rather, a further inference is needed, by which we conclude that this empirical obligation, although founded proximately in rational nature, can nevertheless have its true origin and sufficient cause only in a higher lawgiving will, to which man is absolutely subject. That very psychological experience, if we consider its manner and natural efficacy, plainly supplies a sufficient basis for making this inference legitimately. To this pertains above all that reverential fear and invincible anguish which usually accompanies every deed committed against the admonishing voice of conscience, and which thus intimates a certain lawgiving majesty and avenger of violated order, distinct from one's own rational nature and absolutely prior to it. Hence, in the same way, an argument can be drawn from natural law known empirically to demonstrate the existence of God without begging the question: namely, by analytically considering that same empirical fact of conscience and concluding that its author is God the legislator. Indeed, there seems to be no other way by which man acquires the notion of God more readily and more originally than through the voice of conscience that morally obliges. For anyone who has attained the use of reason and recognizes himself in his conscience as truly bound must already have at least an obscure notion of God as legislator.

251. Scholium. We also possess many monuments of pagan philosophy which not only abundantly illustrate that common persuasion of mankind concerning the law of nature divinely inscribed in our hearts, but even show that the ancients, though using only the natural light of reason, nevertheless were not ignorant of this law’s own dignity and origin derived from eternal law, nor of its absolute immutability, nor of its power to bind, prior and superior to all human laws. One might almost say that these documents have been preserved for our times for no other purpose than that all who today, repudiating even rational nature itself along with Christian light, seem neither to feel nor to know any higher binding authority than civil law, may be judged even by the voice of pagans. Therefore, it will not be without purpose to present here a modest selection of them, as a kind of crown to this discussion.

Sophocles (in Oedipus the King, vv. 863–871) introduces the chorus singing as follows:

Εἴ μοι ξυνείη φέροντι
μοῖρα τὰν εὐσέπτον ἁγνείαν λόγων
ἔργων τε πάντων, ὧν νόμοι πρόκεινται
ὑψίποδες, οὐρανίαν
δι’ αἰθέρα τεκνωθέντες, ὧν Ὄλυμπος
πατὴρ μόνος, οὐδέ νιν
θνατὰ φύσις ἀνέρων
ἔτικτεν, οὐδὲ μὴν ποτε λήθα κατακοιμάσει
μέγας ἐν τούτοις θεός, οὐδὲ γηράσκει.

[, “Would that fortune be mine to attain the holy purity of all words and deeds, for which laws have been set forth, lofty laws, born in the heavenly ether, whose father is Olympus alone; mortal human nature did not give them birth, nor will forgetfulness ever lull them to sleep: a great God dwells in them, and he does not grow old.”]

The same poet (in Antigone, vv. 446–460) presents her not only asserting that divine laws were laid down by nature, but also claiming their absolute precedence over all human laws. When she explains the reason for this to Creon, she replies:

Οὐ γάρ τί μοι Ζεὺς ἦν ὁ κηρύξας τάδε
οὐδ’ ἡ ξύνοικος τῶν κάτω θεῶν Δίκη,
οὐδὲ σθένειν τοσοῦτον ᾤμην τὰ σὰ κηρύγμαθ’ ὥστ’ ἄγραπτα κἀσφαλῆ θεῶν
νόμιμα δύνασθαι θνητὸν ὄνθ’ ὑπερδραμεῖν.
Οὐ γάρ τι νῦν γε κἀχθές, ἀλλ’ ἀεί ποτε
ζῇ ταῦτα, κοὐδεὶς οἶδεν ἐξ ὅτου ’φάνη.

[, “For it was not Zeus who proclaimed these (the ruler’s laws) to me, nor Justice, who dwells with the gods below. Nor did I think your proclamations had such force that you, a mortal, could override the gods’ unwritten and unshakable laws. For they were not ordained just now or yesterday, but live for all time, and no one knows from when they appeared.”]

Similar sayings of Plato are well known. Among others, see Apology of Socrates (ed. Stephanus), p. 29 D, elsewhere ch. 17; Republic, bk. 4, p. 427; Gorgias, p. 483 e, p. 488 b, p. 491 e ff.

Above all, the works of Tullius Cicero abound in splendid testimonies to the same point; it will suffice to note a few:

Pro Milone 4, 10: “For this is a law not written but born” etc.

Philippics 11, 12, 28: “For law (established by nature) is nothing other than right reason, drawn from the divine will, commanding what is honorable and forbidding the contrary.”

De legibus 1, 6: “Law is the highest reason implanted in nature.”

De legibus 2, 4. See the passage quoted above at no. 240.

In place of many examples, however, here is a fragment from book 3 of On the Republic, preserved in Lactantius (Institutes 6, 8):

“Indeed, true law is right reason, in harmony with nature, diffused among all, constant and everlasting; by commanding it calls us to duty, and by forbidding it deters us from wrongdoing. Yet it neither commands nor forbids the good in vain, nor does it move the wicked by commanding or forbidding. It is not permitted to repeal this law, nor may anything be derogated from it, nor can it be wholly abrogated; nor can we be released from this law by the Senate or the people. Nor must another interpreter or expounder of it be sought; there will not be one law at Rome and another at Athens, one now and another hereafter, but one everlasting and immutable law will bind all nations at all times; and God alone will be the common, as it were, master and ruler of all. He is the inventor, judge, and giver of this law. Whoever does not obey it flees from himself and, having spurned human nature, will thereby pay the greatest penalties, even if he escapes the other punishments that are commonly supposed.”

Article 3.

On the principle of the obligation of natural law.

252. Both from what has been said about the notion of natural law and from the arguments by which its existence is proved a priori, it is sufficiently clear that the obligation of natural law can formally proceed from nowhere other than a decree of the divine will, necessarily, under the hypothesis (that is, on the hypothesis of creation); namely, from that same decree which constitutes eternal law, insofar as it concerns a rational creature to be created in time.

Although no reason for doubting the truly and formally divine origin of natural law now remains, nevertheless an error raised against this same doctrine by Kant, the patriarch of modern rationalism, at the end of the eighteenth century is of considerable use for further elucidating it. This error seems all the more in need of explicit refutation here because most of the errors that have marked modern philosophy, especially practical philosophy, for several decades have flowed from it, either directly or remotely, as from a common source.

§ 1. Kant’s “autonomy of reason.”

253. Kant’s ethical doctrine, whose summary you have already seen expounded in the preceding book and refuted with respect to its “principle of morality” (modern Stoicism) (nos. 170 and 180), must be considered here once again only insofar as it concerns the proper account of moral law, or the principle of moral obligation. To this belongs the central doctrine commonly designated by the name “autonomy of reason,” by which Kant, substituting the law of reason for divine law, dissolves every inner bond between religion and morality. Thus he laid the foundations of his “independent morality,” that is, morality emancipated from all religion, which is now widely promoted as a new pedagogical slogan and is no less harmful to morals than to religion. The principal elements of this view are roughly these. Kant teaches:

  1. The moral law, which we call the (divine) natural law, is to be derived from a merely formal and universal dictate of practical reason as its sole source and adequate principle.

For, he says, the dictates of reason, or “practical principles,” must be distinguished as material and formal. “Material principles, that is, those which presuppose some object (matter) of the appetitive faculty as a motive by which the will is determined (als Bestimmungsgrund des Willens), are all empirical and cannot be practical laws. . . .” “For all of them are reducible to the principle of self-love, or one’s own happiness”; therefore they “can indeed be subjective practical rules (maxims), that is, rules that hold for the will of the subject.” But it belongs to the nature of a “practical law” that its condition be known to be objective, that is, valid for the will of every rational being. Kant argues that this objective and universal validity belongs to the practical principles of reason that are formal; these therefore are truly “practical laws,” that is, principles which in themselves possess a “determining ground of the will” (Bestimmungsgrund des Willens) of wholly universal validity. He calls those principles of reason “formal” which “contain a motive determining the will, not through their matter (object), but solely through their form (that is, through the very fact that they are dictates of practical reason).” Practical reason, considered according to these merely formal principles, is called “pure” and, as such, is “legislative” in itself; indeed, it “by itself alone gives man the universal law that we call the moral law (das Sittengesetz).”

  1. The law of pure practical reason is absolute (“unconditional”) and, by its very nature, worthy of absolute reverence, so that “at its voice even the boldest wrongdoer is compelled to tremble and, as it were, hide from it.”

  2. Therefore it presents itself to us as a simply original law (“so I will, so I command”), in the form of an imperative, specifically a categorical one.

For, he says, a distinction must be made between reason’s “categorical or moral imperative” and its “hypothetical” imperative: the former commands something as necessary in itself, while the latter commands something as necessary only as a means to some end.

  1. The “categorical imperative” is a “fact of reason,” not empirical but presented and known “a priori,” “because it imposes itself on us by itself as a synthetic a priori proposition (als synthetischer Satz a priori).” Therefore, no further account can or should be given of its ground as a law that is practical in itself (that is, binding in itself).

  2. Therefore, rational will is said to be “autonomous,” that is, bound by no law other than the one it imposes on itself as rational. Its entire dignity and “freedom” are founded on this “autonomy of the will”; and this is “the sole principle of all moral laws.”

  3. Indeed, the “human will,” in this way purely rational, is said, by virtue of its merely formal and universal principle, to be truly “universally legislative” (allgemein gesetzgebend).

254. From what has been set out, it is sufficiently clear in what respect Kant, when discussing moral law, agrees with us to some extent and in what respect he disagrees.

He agrees to some extent: 1. in asserting a law of morals founded in rational nature and naturally known, universal and endowed with perfect binding force, which, considered objectively and materially, is nothing other than the “natural law” we have explained; 2. in recognizing that human reason is finite and created. For Kant admits neither atheism nor pantheism, although he must be said to have furnished his disciples with premises from which the latter can be logically deduced. And indeed, he explicitly says that the imperative form of the law of reason is suited only to a created will, not to the divine will, since the divine will, apart from any obligation of law, is already essentially holy in itself. Moreover, consistently with the law of practical reason and on the basis of its prior establishment, he attempts to assert both the existence of God and other transcendent truths, such as free will, the immortality of the soul, and so forth.

But he disagrees most sharply concerning the formal account of natural law, teaching that the adequate principle of its obligation is situated in “pure practical reason,” or, in accordance with this, in the rational “will” of man insofar as it is “autonomous” and at the same time “universally legislative.” And indeed, although Kant does not deny that all human nature depends on God as the first cause, he nevertheless claims that the legislative authority formally belongs not to God but to human reason, to such an extent that even regard for God’s will (inasmuch as it introduces “heteronomy”) must not be considered the proper motive for moral action; only reverence for the inner law of reason should be so regarded.

255. This is that celebrated philosophy of morals which, when it first appeared, won over all the more noble minds that were less cautious about novelty, because it seemed to offer a new defense against the crude sensualism and materialism then dominant and to reclaim the dignity of rational nature. At the outset, very few suspected the whole progeny of errors it carried within itself. Many, too, who were not unaware of the fruitful seeds of impiety contained in the new system, preferred, if they could, to deter people from Kant’s ethical principle by some counterpoison rather than reject the principle itself; at the time they thought they had done enough if they surrounded it with certain external clauses and reservations in defense of Christian truth. From this arose that “semi-Kantianism” in the teaching of moral philosophy, which from the first decades of the preceding century we saw spread through Germany, even in quite a few books by Catholics and in certain academic chairs otherwise devoted to Catholic truth. This philosophy certainly accepted Kantian “autonomy” to the extent that it believed that, prior to the notion of God as supreme legislator and while temporarily setting that notion aside, both morality and moral obligation could be founded on reason alone.

But no one has ever undertaken with impunity to join truth logically to a false principle. The experience of our own time already demonstrates this plainly. For what is the emancipation of civil society and public life from religion and divine law, if not the logically necessary completion of the Kantian principle by which individual human beings are emancipated from religion and divine law? Thus modern social naturalism, commonly called “liberalism,” while striving with all its might toward that end, is putting into practice precisely what has been philosophically outlined in the “autonomy of practical reason.”

§ 2. The same doctrine is subjected to critical examination.

256. Thesis XXVIII. The autonomy of reason introduced by Kant is opposed to sound philosophy.

Proof. That doctrine certainly cannot be reconciled with sound philosophy which 1. is opposed to the true concept and essential end of every moral obligation, 2. rests on a false foundation, 3. involves manifest contradictions, and 4. leads logically either to fatalism or to pantheism. But all these things are rightly charged against the “autonomy of reason.” Therefore, and so forth.

Proof of the minor premise, point by point.

  1. It is opposed to the concept and essential end of every moral obligation. — Unless we wish to admit a created effect without any final cause, the moral obligation to which a rational creature is subject must necessarily be conceived as a bond whose essential end is the right ordering of a rational creature (no. 152). Kant himself cannot deny this on his own principles. But rightly ordering a rational creature is ultimately the work of an uncreated reason and will, that is, of one that does not itself need to be ordered, but must necessarily, just as it gave existence to each creature, set an end for each and arrange and order each according to that end. Therefore, the “autonomy of reason,” which excludes all reference to God from the reason that legislates, is opposed to the concept and essential end of moral obligation.

  2. It rests on a false foundation. Kant sets up this principle as if it were the foundation of his doctrine: Man, as a free rational being, is an end to himself, or an end in himself (Selbstzweck). — But this principle, taken without qualification as Kant proposes it, is false and has already been refuted in the treatise on man’s ultimate end. — I say: taken without qualification, because it is indeed true in a certain restricted sense (namely, insofar as man is compared with the things of this world subordinated to him, and insofar as he can set ends for himself, specifically ends as agent); but in this way it is in no way of use as the foundation of Kant’s doctrine.

  3. It involves manifest contradictions, namely:

a) It makes human reason absolute and unlimited, since its dictate, in and for itself, demands unlimited and wholly absolute reverence, while at the same time making it limited and nonabsolute, because its existence is created and therefore wholly derivative and relative.

b) It makes human practical reason—and hence, as Kant himself explicitly explains, the “rational will”—legislative, and indeed categorically so (unbedingt), yet at the same time subject and often rebellious; willing absolutely, yet at the same time unwilling whenever it freely turns aside to sin. Nor should anyone say that the legislative will is one will and the subject, rebellious will another. The will that in an actual act makes law is certainly a real and personal will, not something that has universal existence merely through abstraction. It is therefore the very will of man, really one, at once willing and unwilling. Nor does it avoid contradiction to say that the same subject wills and does not will something absolutely, but under a different aspect. For one who wills something absolutely already excludes every aspect under which he could also not will that same thing; therefore, to will something absolutely (unbedingt) and to be unwilling to will the same thing under some aspect are mutually exclusive in the same subject. To avoid this inconsistency, then, it is entirely necessary to attribute that absolutely legislative command not to the rational will of man but to a higher, absolutely holy will, to which the human will must be understood to be bound through reason, while still being able, in its freedom, to contradict it.

  1. It leads logically either to fatalism or to pantheism.

a) To fatalism, because an absolute necessity (unbedingte Notwendigkeit) is asserted to subsist in human reason, for which no further explanation can or should be given, and it is posited as independent, apart from every reference to God.

b) To pantheism: For, by an inescapable consequence, this autonomous reason, which in and for itself displays absolute authority, must be called a necessary being, or God, unless it is called fate. Therefore, and so forth.

257. Scholium. The controversy against modern rationalism just discussed has nothing in common with another dispute about the same subject, once debated among scholastic philosophers. For since all of them fully agreed on the divine origin of obligation, they used to raise and debate this question in both directions: whether the formal principle of natural law must be placed in reason (ultimately, for example, in divine reason), or rather in the decree of the divine will, necessarily determined by reason.

Concerning this controversy, which today should be considered settled in favor of the latter opinion, only this seems worth noting: all the arguments that can be brought forward for the former opinion do indeed prove that some moral necessity is derived from that source into us, which may be called “imperfect” or “speculative” obligation, but by no means the “perfect” and truly practical obligation that alone belongs to law, whose function is to bind the whole man, in his free activity, to order—not by persuasion, but by a genuine bond so strong that the rebellious will too is understood to be subject to it, whether it wills or not. For such a bond must proceed not only from reason, which presents right order as necessary, but also from a will that absolutely wills it.

258. Corollaries. I. Not only can there be no contradiction between the dictates of reason and any divine precepts, but there is also no merely philosophical obligation, that is, one which is not at the same time theological and in some sense religious. — It follows that every human act formally contrary to the moral dictate of reason is thereby also a sin against the divine law expressed in human reason, and that no “merely philosophical sin” can be admitted, that is, one which, although contrary to reason, nevertheless incurs no guilt toward God.

Likewise, whatever is done formally according to the dictate of reason (when reason is accepted integrally and with its essential relations) must be considered to be done at least virtually or implicitly according to the will of God the legislator, and therefore to be naturally meritorious in some way (nos. 207–212).

II. The definition of natural law proposed by St. Thomas, according to which it is called “the participation of eternal law in a rational creature,” may, without loss of truth, also be rendered as follows: “rational nature, by participating, expresses eternal law.” The difference between the two is that in the former the formal character of natural law occupies the primary place, whereas in the latter its material character does.

III. Hence it is concluded that every nature is, in some way, divine law when understood in a broader sense, while rational nature specifically is moral law in the sense explained above (nos. 8 ff., 219 ff., 242, 248).

IV. The nature of each thing, therefore, considered not in a bare and abstract way but according to its formal relation to eternal law, is its own objective rule of action: not only theoretical, by which it is judged what is right and what is not right in its action (a norm of the order of knowing, whether physical or moral), but also practical (a norm of the order to be observed in accordance with the divine will, imposed, that is, by either physical or moral necessity); provided, however, that the nature of each being is taken completely. For a nature that is only partial or abstracted from its essential relations is equivalent to a false or mutilated nature (no. 32).

V. Finally, the last and most weighty conclusion, which follows by logical necessity from the true principle of moral obligation, already established both affirmatively and polemically, is the certain and irrefragable rejection of the axiom invented by modern rationalism: “Morality is connected with religion by no inner bond, and subsists independently of religion by the force of human reason alone.” In opposition to this, the invincible principle of Christian philosophy is set forth: No true morality, no moral obligation, without religion—that is, without reference to God as the absolute principle and at the same time the upholder of rational order, and the supreme legislator.

Article 4.

On the sanction of natural law.

§ 1. Preliminary notions.

259. Like law, the sanction of law can be considered either actively or passively. Considered actively, it is the legislator’s decree by which he establishes rewards, or goods to be obtained, for observance of the law, and penalties, or evils to be undergone, for its violation. Understood passively, it is these very rewards and penalties proposed for observance or violation of the law. We shall speak here only of this sanction.

Sanction is distinguished as follows:

  1. According to its matter: an internal sanction, consisting of goods and evils internal to man, especially the testimony of conscience or its remorse; and an external sanction, consisting of goods and evils that come to man from elsewhere.

  2. According to its foundation: it is either essential, founded in the very nature of either the law or the rational creature, or accidental, added by the legislator’s discretion.

  3. According to its efficacy: it is either sufficient or insufficient, and each of these may be so either absolutely or relatively. A sanction is called absolutely sufficient if, of itself, it is valid with respect to every person and in every case for impelling a rational will to observe the law. It is only relatively sufficient if it is effective only for certain circumstances of persons or for certain cases. In the same way, conversely, a sanction is called insufficient either simply or relatively.

  4. According to its proportion to merit or demerit, it is perfect or imperfect, according to whether or not it is proportionate to each.

260. The intrinsic end of every sanction is the same as that to which reward and punishment have been shown above (no. 215) to be naturally ordered: namely, 1. to provide for the preservation of moral order, by proposing an effective subjective motive to the free will, so that the will, bound by God’s will to observe that order, may be induced to do so; 2. to complete that same order objectively in the order of justice, by establishing just retributions for merit and demerit. Nevertheless, just as reward and punishment are distinguished in three ways with respect to their end, so too is sanction, according to whether it directly and principally regards the individual, social, or universal order as its end (no. 216). In this respect, the sanction of law properly so called and the sanction of a particular precept must differ with respect to their primary end whenever a precept is imposed not on a community for a particular case, but only on particular persons for their own good. Such, for example, are the disciplinary precepts customarily used in the office of educating the young. Since these are ordered directly and primarily only to the individual order, that is, to the moral good of the one who is commanded, and only mediately and secondarily to the social and universal order, they require a corresponding kind of sanction. Therefore, disciplinary penalties ought to be adapted primarily to the correction and moral benefit of the offender, and only secondarily to social benefit, that is, insofar as this is compatible with the principal end. Hence they are also called corrective or medicinal punishments. — The contrary is true of the sanction of law properly so called, since it is enacted for a community (whether universal, as natural law, or particular, as civil law) in order to order that same community to its end, that is, the common good. Therefore, the order whose preservation and completion in the order of justice are the concern of legal sanction is primarily social order (whether universal or particular), to which individual order is added only secondarily. It follows that the penalties by which law properly so called is sanctioned are imposed primarily to deter and justly punish social offenses, and only secondarily to secure the offender’s amendment. In public penal justice, then, the latter may be neglected to the extent that it cannot be reconciled with the primary and essential end. Some offenses are social offenses with respect to human social legislation, and others with respect to universal divine legislation. For the penal justice of the latter is concerned with everything that has the character of sin, whatever its other order may be; whereas the objects of human justice can only be crimes, that is, deeds against the social order, externally committed or attempted.

261. As for the sanction of natural law in particular, two questions are asked above all: 1. Is natural law at all endowed with a natural sanction as well, and if so, how? — 2. In what way does this sanction belong to the character of law: as an element of its metaphysical essence, or only as a necessary attribute of law?

In answering the first question, or at least that part of it which concerns the existence of a natural sanction, nearly all sound philosophy of every age agrees almost as fully as it does in affirming natural law itself. The other question, which was debated for some time in both directions among Christian scholars and exercised metaphysical science more than moral philosophy, seems all the less in need of reconsideration here because scarcely any practical point for moral matters depends on either answer. It will therefore suffice to note the following few points:

If the word “sanction” is understood so broadly that you call the very essential object of every obligation—the right order of action, which is at the same time the essential good of rational nature—the reward proposed to one who observes the law, and likewise call the will’s aversion from that same good the punishment to be undergone by one who transgresses the law, then the opinion that sanction is so essential to law, indeed to every moral obligation, that the latter cannot be conceived without it seems not merely more probable but certain. For, understood in this way, sanction is nothing other than that very disjunctive necessity by which every moral obligation is constituted (no. 222). The other opinion, by contrast, will seem more correct to one who understands “sanction” in its more obvious and common sense.

Having passed over these matters, then, we turn instead to investigate the first question and answer it from philosophical sources.

§ 2. The existence of a natural sanction is shown.

262. Thesis XXIX. A sanction of natural law exists that is likewise natural: in the present life it is only partial and imperfect, but with respect to the future life it is sufficient in itself in efficacy and perfect in justice.

Preliminary note. It is not asserted that there are two sanctions, one for this life and another for the future life; rather, there is one and the same sanction, simply suited to natural law, which pertains in part already to the present life, but in its fullness to the future life. See above no. 259 for the meaning of a “sufficient” or “perfect” sanction.

Proof of Part I. Some sanction of natural law already exists for the present life, but it is only partial and imperfect.

  1. Everyday experience sufficiently shows that some such sanction exists. To it certainly belong a) the voice of conscience itself, which accompanies good deeds with inner approval and a perceptible consolation of mind, but condemns evil actions with its judgment and a sense of ensuing sadness, and does so not accidentally but by way of rational nature; b) that causal connection founded in the nature of things, by virtue of which (of itself and apart from accidental impediments) many individual and social goods, as natural effects, are joined to the observance of moral order, whether individual or social, while many evils are similarly joined to its violation, especially grave violations (see no. 217).

Hence Seneca rightly observes: “Wickedness itself drinks down most of its own poison”; and St. Augustine: “You have commanded, Lord, and so it is: every disordered spirit is a punishment to itself.”

  1. It is no less clear that this same sanction is only partial and imperfect. In itself, it is neither sufficiently effective or sufficient, nor perfect according to the rule of justice:

a) It is not sufficient. This can certainly be inferred from the following summary point: for the observance of moral law, it is not rarely necessary to expose not only all the goods and comforts of the present life but life itself to certain danger. But what motive capable of effectively keeping the will on the path of law could be found in those goods when the law itself may forbid preserving them? Now, for the sanction of law to be called sufficient in itself and equal to the task of protecting moral order, it must be understood to be such in every case and for every precept of the law. — But even apart from such extraordinary cases involving life, given human nature surrounded by so many enticements of the senses, the sanction of law as suited to the present life appears so far from sufficient in itself that Isocrates already complains of men “who, though they think justice to be more beautiful in itself and more pleasing to the gods than injustice, nevertheless imagine that human affairs are so arranged that more profit is gained from wickedness than from moral goodness.”

b) Nor is it perfect in the order of justice. For although even in this world the inner happiness of the mind is recognized as the attendant of virtue alone, nevertheless we often see virtue afflicted with many external evils, which scarcely ever cease throughout an entire lifetime, and sometimes with the very evils incurred through good deeds and faithful observance of the law. On the contrary, vice in this world often boasts of manifold and fairly constant prosperity, at least outwardly. Hence the sanction of law, as it in fact appears in the present life, seems not merely inadequate to merit and demerit but plainly imperfect.

263. Proof of Part II. With respect to the future life, the sanction of that same law exists as both sufficient and perfect.

Argument I. From the divine perfections. Both parts of the assertion are established. The sanction is said to be:

  1. sufficient; for this is required by the holiness and wisdom of the divine legislator. For, insofar as God is a holy and wise legislator, he is known a priori to have willed, with the same necessity with which he gave a law to rational creatures, a suitable and effective means by which, while preserving their freedom, he would restrain those same creatures from moral evil and move them to actions commanded by the law. Otherwise, he would have to be called either not to have willed the end of law seriously, or not to have employed a suitable means for an end he willed seriously—and hence either unholy or unwise. But the only means suitable to that end is the sanction of law, and not just any sanction, but one sufficient in itself. For the sanction alone—that is, reward for moral good and punishment for evil—supplies a motive to the human will that is suited both to its freedom, to its natural desire for happiness, and to balancing the difficulties of virtue against the enticements of vice. But unless it were sufficient in itself—that is, unless it contained a motive for observing the law that was in itself stronger and prevailing over all reasons either deterring one from it or enticing one toward what is forbidden, and did so absolutely for every kind of human being and every case of obligation—it would be a means inherently inadequate to attain the end to which it is ordered, and hence unworthy of divine wisdom. Therefore, by the force of divine holiness and wisdom, whatever is lacking in the sanction of law for this sufficiency in the present life must be reserved to be supplied in the future.

  2. perfect; for this is required by divine justice. Indeed, if divine justice is considered absolutely and simply, no necessary inference a priori can be made by which it is affirmed that a reward for man’s merit or a punishment proportionate to his demerit is required simply by justice. For man has no merit (right to a reward) before God except “in a certain respect,” that is, only by virtue of some prior divine ordinance or promise (see no. 208); nor is the adequate exercise of punitive justice known to be absolutely necessary in itself, since, as theology also teaches, God could have restored the violated moral order by remitting punishments, while preserving justice. — If, however, divine justice is considered not absolutely but according to the hypothesis divinely established and expressed in the free creation of the moral world, we cannot but recognize in it a true basis for an a priori inference. — It is in this sense, then, that we assert: divine justice requires a perfect sanction of natural law

a) with respect to reward. By virtue of that kind of promise expressed in rational nature, by which God willed the eudaemonological order to be objectively joined to the deontological order in man’s final striving, so that each person must advance in his own true good only to the extent that he freely pursues moral goodness (nos. 31–33), every good action of man is a merit before God, that is, a right to a reward in proportion to that merit (no. 209 ff.). Therefore, God already owes it to himself, according to this rule of justice generously established by himself, to bestow rewards in the future life in proportion to their merits on all who faithfully persevere in pursuing the moral order until the end of this life.

b) with respect to punishment. The author of nature willed an indication of punishment in proportion to demerit to be expressed in rational nature, just as he willed a promise of reward proportionate to merit. For we know with certainty that, insofar as we freely turn away from rational order, we necessarily depart from our true good and from the happiness naturally proposed to us; therefore, whoever, when he could and ought to have done so, definitively refused to secure that blessed end by observing the law will be entirely deprived of it, and will suffer a sharper sting of pain in proportion to the more perfect knowledge of the good he despised and to the greater subjective guilt with which he scorned it. But God can neither deceive nor contradict himself by changing the condition of what he announces in a stable way to all men through nature. Therefore, the sanction of law naturally intimated, perfect also in the order of punitive justice, must be considered firm and established for the future life, since it cannot take effect in this life.

264. Argument II. From the common persuasion of mankind, founded in the inner voice of conscience. The universal persuasion of mankind, by which people agree in recognizing the natural law divinely inscribed in their hearts (see nos. 249, 251), is joined to an equally universal agreement concerning its sanction proposed by God. For conscience itself invincibly testifies this very thing to each person: not only does one seem to hear within oneself the voice of God as legislator, but one also reveres and fears him at the same time as the holy and just rewarder of good and avenger of evil. And although among various pagan peoples there were at times very vague opinions, or opinions less worthy of God, about the manner of this rewarding and avenging, nevertheless it is clear that this was the common understanding of all times and nations: not only do men living this mortal life often experience the favor or stern judgment of a just deity, but souls that survive the body are also reserved for the same judgment, and therefore the future lot of the wicked will be very different from that of the innocent. For almost all the records of religious rites everywhere make this plain. Nothing is detracted from the universality and constancy of this persuasion by the fact that there have always been some who, corrupted either by skepticism or materialism and degenerate from rational nature, have disowned this common voice of nature.

265. Corollaries. I. The same natural happiness which, in its relation to human nature, constitutes man’s ultimate end, also, according to the disjunctive condition by which it is proposed to human freedom as something to be attained either by observing the law or lost by violating it, displays the essential and complete sanction of natural law.

II. It is proved with certainty by the light of reason that the reward thus proposed to a man who perseveres in observing the law is essentially everlasting. For the very concept of happiness implicitly includes perpetuity and unfailing continuance.

III. Similarly, the essential punishment corresponding to the reward in the opposite way, which consists in the loss of the ultimate end, or in deprivation of the supreme good, is known to be in itself and by the nature of the thing everlasting. For once the human will’s deviation from the true end is wholly complete and definitive, attainment of this end is understood to be impossible by the necessity of nature, and equally so absolutely and definitively.

IV. If, then, the question is asked generally whether the eternity of punishment can be demonstrated a priori by the light of reason alone, the question of right and the question of fact should first of all be distinguished. The question of right is this: Is the punitive sanction intimated by way of nature and known naturally such that it in itself requires perpetuity, so that it could be exempted from this only by a special and positive intervention of God? Understood in this way, the question must without doubt be answered in the affirmative, as is clear from the argument already given in Corollary III. It may also be added that many think the same kind of punishment seems necessary for the sanction to appear absolutely effective and sufficient in itself. — The question of fact, however, is this: given the necessity of right, can philosophical reason alone prove with certainty that the punishment in fact will necessarily be everlasting in its execution in every case, just as it is intimated as such by right in its natural promulgation? Philosophy can certainly urge this as worthy of a divine legislator infinitely holy and wise and can thus lend its support to the truth, which is already known from another source by the testimony of faith. Indeed, philosophy establishes at least this much as most certain a priori, consistently with the divine perfections: the punitive sanction can neither be frustrated simply and universally in its natural perpetuity, nor be set aside by way of a special intervention of divine mercy in those circumstances in which the essential integrity of the sanction’s end would thereby fail.

Observations for resolving difficulties.

266. 1. Even a cursory metaphysical notion of God suffices to refute, as unworthy of sound reason, the common impious sayings against the sanction of law, especially its punitive sanction. Such sayings include, for example: God cannot be offended by the actions of creatures or provoked to anger and vengeance; it is an insult to God to attribute such cruelty to him that he would prefer, as a consequence, to punish sins as violations of his will rather than prevent them beforehand, when he could easily have done so; for, as the author of the “code of nature” says, “the idea of an infinitely perfect and infinitely good being cannot be reconciled with the idea of a being who loves vengeance.” — But who does not know that God is indeed affected by no passions, yet cannot have a will indifferent to good and evil? God punishes a creature’s rebellion against his most holy will not cruelly, but justly. That he chose not to prevent sins by his omnipotence but to forbid them as a holy legislator established an order most worthy of his wisdom and of human freedom, “judging it better to bring good out of evils than to allow no evils to exist.” Finally, hear St. Thomas on what is meant by “the idea of an infinitely perfect and good being”: “It belongs to the perfect goodness of God to leave nothing disordered in things. . . . Under the order of justice, which reduces things to equality, are included those things that exceed their due measure. Man exceeds the measure due to him when he prefers his own will to the divine will, satisfying it against God’s order; and this inequality is removed when man is compelled to suffer something against his will, in accordance with that order.”

  1. Those who attack the eternity of punishment in particular as inherently contrary to reason usually rely especially on these pretexts: a) a punishment cannot be considered reasonable if it is in itself merely vindictive and essentially fruitless for the offender’s amendment; b) God’s mercy absolutely requires that he eventually put an end, somehow, to the sinner’s misery.

To answer the first point, what was explained above (no. 260) about the intrinsic end of sanction and the three principal relations it can have to individual, social, or universal order is sufficient. For from this it is clear that once the course of this life, assigned to amendment, has ended, the execution of a punishment whose principal end is to restore violated universal order requires no further reference to amendment; no other end remains to be fulfilled except the vindictive one, which is itself essential, as is clear from the passage of St. Thomas in Contra Gentiles cited above. — As to the second point, it must be denied outright that such a debt of divine mercy is owed to the guilty person who, after freely scorning in everyday life the gifts of divine goodness and mercy, thereafter suffers a punishment just in itself and, by its everlasting duration, in some way proportionate to the demerit of sin, which is infinite. Its execution in God is no sign of a defect of mercy but manifests divine holiness and love of order, to which even created reason recognizes that all particular goods must be subordinated as to the most universal good.

Article 5.

On the principal properties of natural law.

Among these, universality and immutability must be named first. We shall say something about each.

§ 1. Universality.

267. A law can be universal in two ways: 1. considered in itself, or with respect to its foundation and end; and 2. with respect to its promulgation.

That natural law is universal in the first sense—that is, by virtue of its foundation and end it extends to absolutely every man and at the same time objectively includes every part of the order that is fitting to man according to eternal law—requires no proof, since this universality inheres immediately in the very concept of natural law and cannot be limited to a narrower sphere than rational nature itself, which is the foundation of natural law.

268. It is no less certain that the universality consisting in universal promulgation also belongs to natural law of itself. For a priori we rightly conclude that natural law, precisely because it was laid down by the most wise God, was also promulgated in human reason to the extent required by the law’s end. But if we set aside the question of right and consider only the question of fact, consulting men’s actual experience, the matter requires some explanation.

Natural promulgation (that is, by means of reason) can take place only through general principles that are self-evident, from which conclusions are then drawn through the activity of reason, proceeding from more general to particular and remote matters. For this is the only mode of knowing suited to rational nature.

Therefore, for the promulgation of natural law on the part of the legislator, two things are required and sufficient: 1. that the law’s most universal principles, in which the whole law is contained virtually, cannot be unknown to man once his reason has developed; and 2. that man also be naturally endowed with the faculty of reasoning by which, when the internal and external conditions of nature—particularly social conditions—are observed, he can in general derive even practical conclusions, at least those essentially necessary for living a life in accordance with reason. It is by no means required that all men be able to acquire these notions with equal ease and breadth, or that every accidental ignorance and error concerning individual conclusions, however remote and complex, be naturally excluded. For that would contradict the limitations of nature itself and the natural inequality of men.

With these points established, the question now arises: What kind of promulgation of natural law should be considered naturally available in general under the present state of nature, according to psychological and historical experience?

To this question, we first answer in general as follows: The promulgation of natural law, in accordance with its essential requirements established above from the nature of the thing, exists in every man through the natural light of reason, so that no one who uses reason once it has developed lacks the physical capacity to know it sufficiently. Nevertheless, although this capacity is physically complete and sufficient, in the actual condition of the human race it does not seem ready for use with the practical ease that the efficacy of law appears to require, if it is to be not only physically but also morally sufficient for all men. Theology shows, from the source of divine revelation, that this deficiency originated not in divine institution but in man’s moral fall; it also points to a remedy provided beyond the order of nature, by which merciful God willed most generously to repair it.

269. And if the human race had ever been destined to observe natural law in a purely natural state, there is no doubt that God would have sufficiently provided for the promulgation of the law within that same order, in accordance with practical and concrete need, by adding a special and providential natural assistance to repair accidental and particular defects of nature. But through revelation we know that man was elevated to a higher order and also equipped with supernatural lights and aids, which abundantly supplied that natural assistance—or rather, as aids far more excellent, in a certain way contained it eminently within themselves. But through Adam’s fall, man was deprived of these gifts of grace and thus, at the same time, was weakened in the efficacy of his very natural faculties, though not injured in them, and turned toward what is worse. From this there arose innumerable internal and external difficulties both in knowing and in observing the law, as was fitting. In fact, men would not have overcome such obstacles unless merciful God had helped them by an extraordinary intervention. The human race brought this moral insufficiency upon itself through sin, against God’s antecedent will. I say moral insufficiency, since it arises only from great difficulty and must not be confused with physical inability. Nor is it permissible to exaggerate this very moral difficulty to the point of saying, with the traditionalists, that in the present state man has no knowledge of the moral order except what is drawn from God’s supernatural revelation; as will be clear from what follows.

If, then, the question is asked in particular how much the natural light of reason still avails for knowing natural law, Christian philosophy answers without doubt as follows:

270. Thesis XXX. Natural law, considered in itself, that is, according to the general principles of which it consists, becomes known in its essence to a human being whose reason is suitably developed according to the condition of nature, so that its most universal (“first”) precepts can in no way be unknown, while those (“secondary”) immediately derived from them can be ignored only vincibly; particular or more remote conclusions drawn from them, however, do not exclude even accidental, invincible error.

Preliminary note. In substance, this thesis reports the doctrine of St. Thomas (Summa theol. 1, 2, q. 94, aa. 4 and 6; q. 100, a. 1).

For the holy Doctor distinguishes two classes of precepts of natural law: 1. “first” or “common” precepts, that is, the supreme and most universal principles of law, from which all the rest must necessarily be derived as conclusions from things self-evident. Although several of these are numbered in the same sense in which several first demonstrative principles are distinguished in speculative matters, they nevertheless reduce to one common root of all. 2. “Secondary, more specific” precepts, which are, as it were, conclusions close to the principles. They are called “more specific” because they apply the rational order, which the first precepts comprehend in the most general way, to some special matter or to a special aspect of rational nature, though not to an individual case but generally. Therefore, although they are not the most universal, they too present general principles of law. Such are the precepts of the Decalogue, insofar as they are understood to be founded in nature. The whole law, considered in itself, consists in these two classes of precepts or principles. — After these come more remote conclusions from the same principles, by which law is applied to more particular and concrete matters through human reasoning. — The two parts of our thesis correspond to this distinction: the first concerns the principles of law themselves, both first and secondary; the second concerns particular and more remote conclusions. — In the assertion of the first part, the qualification “reason suitably developed” is added in order to exclude the hypothesis of a man imagined as existing outside all social influence, or otherwise deprived of nearly every natural aid to rational existence. For it can happen accidentally that, in respect of the use of reason, an individual human being deserves to be called a man almost potentially rather than actually. Indeed, the same would hold no less of an entire people which, through an age-old degeneration of rational nature, seemed to approach the nature of beasts more closely than human nature. Therefore, in such a great deficiency of nature itself—which can sometimes occur in the moral order no less than in the physical order, through either internal or external impediments—we do not deny that even the secondary precepts of natural law may be obscured more or less invincibly in people’s minds.

271. Proof of Part I. 1. The “first” principles (precepts) of natural law cannot be ignored, either invincibly or vincibly, by a man who uses reason.

This is certainly demonstrated by their nature itself. For, as the holy Doctor observes, they “stand in the same relation to practical reason as the first principles of demonstrations stand to speculative reason; for both are certain principles self-evident in themselves.” Moreover, just as the principles of speculative reason ultimately reduce to one, namely the principle of contradiction or the evidence of known truth, so the principles of practical reason reductively are one, analogous to the principle of contradiction and consisting in the evident practical judgment that moral good necessary to the order of reason must be done. — Therefore, just as no one who uses reason can ignore even vincibly the first principles of speculative reason, so the first precepts of natural law, which are the very first practical principles of reason, must be known essentially to all. For both similarly constitute the nature of reason and therefore essentially govern its operations. Hence it plainly follows, as St. Thomas concludes, that “the law, as to its common principles, cannot in any way be erased from the hearts of men universally,” although “it can be erased in a particular practical case.” Besides, the history of peoples and everyday experience fully agree with this same truth.

2. The “secondary” principles of law can be ignored only vincibly by a man whose reason is suitably developed.

If principles of this class are considered only in themselves, in their abstract generality and apart from actual application to particular subject matter, as the meaning of the assertion clearly presupposes, then in a man whose reason is suitably developed there can be no internal cause arising from the intellective faculty—much less an invincible one—by which the secondary principles could be ignored once the first principles were known. For since these are “conclusions close to the first principles,” which are self-evident and evident to everyone, they flow necessarily, obviously, and by an easy inference from them; they therefore cannot escape a reason that has developed and is ready for its proper acts. If, then, we nevertheless see that these principles are sometimes in fact ignored or seem to be ignored, some cause external to the intellect itself must have intervened: namely, a persuasion arising proximately or remotely from a perverse will, then nurtured in many ways by passions against sounder judgments and sustained by a long-standing or widely spreading custom. Thus, among the causes by which natural law can in some measure be erased from the hearts of men with respect to its secondary precepts, St. Thomas especially lists “evil persuasions, vicious customs, and corrupt habits.” Now such ignorance, proceeding from a vice of the will and from the rejection of the prior light of reason, is not invincible but vincible, though in one degree and manner in those who first introduce it, and in another in those who have absorbed the error from a custom already established. For in the latter (unless perhaps through inherited corruption they have departed almost entirely from the integrity of rational nature itself and thus from the condition presupposed in our thesis), it is not so much the ignorance itself as its persistence that must be called vincible and culpable, insofar as, with reason shining before them through the first principles of law, they cannot fail repeatedly to feel the testimony of right reason in applying those principles; and, if they are willing to follow it faithfully, with God’s providence they will also make further progress in their knowledge of the law. Indeed, even in the native darkness of such customs, frequent doubt about the lawfulness of their actions must at least arise in every sincere mind. But doubt gives rise to awareness of an obligation to investigate further. If this is obeyed, God is faithful and will not allow so accessible a light of reason to be lacking to one who seeks it. If, on the contrary, that obligation is neglected, the resulting persistence in ignorance cannot thereby be free of guilt. Hence the Apostle (Rom. 2:12–16) testifies generally that the nations will be liable to judgment according to “the work of the law written in their hearts, while their own conscience bears witness to them.”

272. Proof of Part II. Particular or more remote conclusions do not exclude accidental, invincible error. This assertion needs not so much proof as some explanation, since everyday experience itself sufficiently shows it to be certain. Indeed, although such fallibility is accidental in individual cases, it is readily seen to be inseparable in general from the condition of human nature. For, besides the fact that a principle otherwise perfectly clear in theory can be practically obscured as soon as it is applied to particular and concrete actions, through the many persuasions and pretexts of the passions, and thus bent away from its rigor in favor of lower appetites, another frequent occasion for error must arise from the natural limitation and relative inadequacy of human understanding itself. This occurs in more remote conclusions of law, and all the more as the application of law descends more subtly to particulars and as the many circumstances of things and the diversity or apparent conflict of moral considerations make the subject matter of reasoning complex. It is therefore no wonder that a common and equal knowledge of these matters cannot be attained by all. — Nevertheless, God has in some measure provided a natural remedy for this natural disadvantage as well, in that he willed the relative inadequacy of inner promulgation to be externally supplemented to some degree through social life, naturally established. For as the holy Doctor aptly observes: “There are certain things which the natural reason of every man immediately judges in themselves to be done or not done, such as ‘Honor your father and your mother’ and ‘You shall not kill.’ . . . There are other things which the wise judge, upon a more subtle consideration of reason, should be observed; and these too belong to natural law, yet require instruction by which the less wise are taught by the wise.”

Observations for resolving difficulties.

273. 1. Historical and ethnographic examples which, considered superficially, seem to contradict the first part of the thesis or at least its second assertion, and which opponents commonly invoke to prove invincible ignorance even of the principles of law, are easily shown on closer examination to be of a kind that instead confirms the thesis. In general, they show that the principles of law themselves, even the secondary ones, were widely known when considered in themselves, but perversely applied amid concrete circumstances. Thus the errors that gradually grow strong through custom are for the most part to be referred not so much to the first part of the thesis as to the second. If, however, some of the secondary principles themselves seem at some time to have been obscured temporarily and in part, the history of morals certainly persuades us that this must be attributed not to invincible but to vincible ignorance, more or less culpable.

Thus the error of polytheism, so widely spread among fallen mankind, presupposes that the general law of nature commanding the worship of God was commonly recognized, but that over time it was obscured and corrupted insofar as it substituted a plurality of deities for the worship of one God, and often bestowed this honor on the most base creatures or human works. Who does not know that men did not descend from the former purity into this corruption of divine worship until they had horribly disfigured the image of the true and holy God in themselves by their wicked vices? It is therefore no wonder that wills hardened in vice, yet not degenerate enough to scorn every form of religion, gradually came to invent gods for themselves in place of the one true God, whom each person experienced in his conscience as legislator and judge, fashioning them according to their own desires and in their own likeness. Nor should the persistence of such darkness, handed down from ancestors, be considered free of the influence of a perverse will; for “men loved darkness more than light” (John 3:19). Moreover, we see that even the unity of God was not wholly unknown in pagan superstition, but was often asserted, to some degree implicitly and indirectly, even by the unwilling, when the light of right reason prevailed. The various grades and orders of deities they imagined certainly make this plain enough, since in that hierarchical subordination they distinguished one supreme deity at the top, excelling all the others in power and rule. Add, moreover, the explicit testimonies of pagan philosophy wherever it devoted itself to the sincere pursuit of truth. The Apostle therefore rightly says of the nations: “Though they knew God, they did not glorify him as God” (Rom. 1:21).

Still less can those accidental errors against moral precepts seriously be brought against the thesis to undermine it, whereby certain barbarian peoples are said to have considered it lawful either to remove their aged parents or, under certain conditions, to lie, steal, or commit robbery. In all these cases what appears is not so much ignorance of a common principle as a false practical interpretation of it, usually prompted by particular circumstances, whether local or personal. Thus, specifically, the custom of parricide, practiced among certain savage and uncivilized tribes, is rightly attributed rather to the crude benevolence of children than to impiety toward their parents, since they considered the hardships of old age less tolerable than death amid the continual toil of travel. Besides, we deny that it is necessary to learn from barbarians, who have scarcely anything human beyond birth and bodily form, what reason means by “suitably developed in accordance with the condition of nature.” — We confidently deny that lying, theft, robbery, or any such crimes, considered in themselves, have ever been counted by any people among honorable and praiseworthy actions. That in some places, through circumstances and under the prompting of human desires, they came to be commonly regarded as excusable, and thus gradually passed into use and custom as relatively permissible or at least as not publicly infamous, is nothing other than what we readily acknowledge in the second part of the thesis. For the cause or occasion of these errors is not ignorance of the general principles of law, but a certain perplexity in applying them concretely: that is, some apparent consideration of good or even necessity, by which the inherent dishonor of an action is falsely thought to be in some measure removed or compensated. Therefore, although those same misdeeds were sometimes considered not unlawful when committed against foreigners or for some common benefit of relatives, we never read that they were likewise considered permissible when indiscriminately committed even against relatives or fellow members of the same tribe.

  1. Against those opponents who profess the principles of “traditionalism” in philosophy, and for that reason deny that the law of nature becomes known to us naturally, saying that nearly all moral ideas which reason seems to attain in the present order of things in fact derive instead from an originally positive revelation of God, the truly natural character of promulgation may rightly be considered invincibly established by the same arguments with which the system of traditionalism is refuted in logic and metaphysics.

§ 2. Immutability.

274. Every change that can generally belong to a law consists either in some addition or subtraction, or in both together. A mere addition, however, is called a change of law only improperly, since it leaves the law’s antecedent integrity wholly untouched. Therefore no one would say that the law of nature underwent a change merely because God wished to declare it more fully and determine it more particularly by adding a positive law. A true change of law, then, must be considered to occur only through simple subtraction or substitution, that is, subtraction together with addition. This can befall a law either intrinsically, because the very foundation of the law, or the objective reason for which it was enacted, changes—that is, ceases to exist wholly or in part—or extrinsically, namely through the will of the legislator or of his successor in the same authority, whether by full abrogation or only by suspension, derogation, or dispensation. The natural law is known to be immutable in both these ways.

This doctrine is opposed above all by the whole of “moral positivism,” refuted already above (no. 148 ff.). In particular, the error of Pufendorf is contrary to the intrinsic immutability of natural law: he traces everything that is good or evil in human acts wholly to God’s positive decree, although he does not deny that the law of nature, once freely established, continues immutable (cf. nos. 147, 162).

275. Thesis XXXI. Natural law, considered in itself, is immutable both intrinsically and extrinsically.

Preliminary remarks. 1. The immutability attributed to natural law is hypothetical insofar as it presupposes the existence of a rational creature; hence it must not be confused with the attribute of “eternity,” which belongs only to the law immanent in God. 2. Natural law considered in itself consists of universal principles and is thus distinguished from conclusions and more remote, particular applications of those principles.

Proof. Natural law considered in itself is immutable:

  1. Intrinsically. For a) the proper foundation of natural law is the very nature of a rational being together with its essential relation to the end of the whole of creation. But the nature or essence of things is not only immutable in the metaphysical order, but also, in the order of the existence of things, is unfailing as long as that existence lasts. Therefore, intrinsically, or on the part of its proper foundation, natural law, insofar as its constitutive principles are concerned, can never be subject to any change. b) Natural law is “the participation of eternal law in a rational creature.” But eternal law is intrinsically immutable by its very concept. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, so is natural law.

  2. Extrinsically. This follows sufficiently in itself, once the preceding part has been admitted, and needs no proof, since the same hypothetically necessary will of God by which the law was enacted can never fail while the same hypothesis remains. It is therefore a priori certain that natural law, considered in itself, can never be changed in any respect, not even by God.

Points to note for resolving difficulties.

276. 1. The law itself, considered in itself, is neither affected nor changed so long as its general principles according to their formal character remain the same and intact. Thus, whenever modifications or apparent exceptions concerning the law’s precepts, even “secondary” ones, seem to occur because their matter or the circumstances of things have changed, it is readily understood that these are not true but only apparent changes in the law. Some examples of this kind are reported in sacred Scripture, by which God might seem, to someone who considers the matter only cursorily, actually to have dispensed at times from the precepts of the Decalogue themselves or derogated from them.

For example, when God commands Abraham to sacrifice his son (Gen. 22). In this and similar events, nothing is truly derogated either from natural law or from its formal object; whatever change may occur here concerns only the material object. Every natural prohibition has as its formal object something intrinsically evil. Thus the fifth precept of the Decalogue formally prohibits homicide, insofar as it is intrinsically evil, that is, as committed by a private human will; and it must necessarily be prohibited immutably in that respect. But nothing prevents one and the same action, considered materially, from being either included in or excluded from that formal object according to differing circumstances. Thus, in the proposed case, the sacrifice of Isaac, precisely because God, the absolute Lord of life, commands it, loses every character of homicide naturally prohibited; God therefore does not make lawful by exception for a person anything that would not always have been lawful in the same circumstances.

Likewise, therefore, a marriage can be dissolved by divine authority, while the immutable right of nature by which it is proved indissoluble remains in force—that is, it is such that it may not be dissolved by human discretion.

The command of God (Ex. 3:21–22; 11:2; 12:36), by which the children of Israel were ordered to take the Egyptians’ possessions, cannot be objected to as an example of dispensation from natural law (the seventh precept of the Decalogue), if only because, according to the established interpretation of the text, especially the Hebrew, there is no question here at all of taking possessions furtively. For God commands them to ask the Egyptians for vessels, while promising that he will give them favor in the Egyptians’ eyes, so that they will willingly give them, not only by lending but also by gifting, in order to be freed from the plagues more quickly. Thus these “spoils” are not to be counted as thefts. And even if the Israelites had taken the vessels from unwilling Egyptians at God’s command, they would by no means be said to have committed thefts at God’s order, since they were taking a thing that was no longer another’s but their own, by title of transferred ownership from the Lord of all.

Finally, when the archangel Raphael himself (Tob. 5:18), acting as God’s messenger, answers Tobias when questioned, “I am Azariah, son of the great Ananias,” he did not use a lie by divine dispensation; rather, he concealed the truth for the time being by an honest amphibology, without denying it. This is readily apparent to anyone who considers more carefully the Hebrew words used by the angel. For since Jah is an abbreviation of Jehovah, Azariah properly means God has helped, while Chananiah means God has shown mercy. Hence the angel could say with profound truth: “I am God has helped (help from God — Gotthilf), son of the great God has shown mercy (of the great merciful God — des grossen Gotterbarmers).” Nor does anything seem to prevent us from supposing that the angel assumed the appearance of some then-living man named Azariah, son of Ananiah, so that he could truly say: I, whom you see, am your Azariah

  1. No less merely apparent is the change that is sometimes thought to befall natural law from a collision of various duties or rights. At times, namely, various natural duties seem to conflict with one another in such a way that one of them must necessarily be omitted. But apart from the fact that such a conflict can occur not objectively but only subjectively and apparently, and never between negative precepts of law, no change in law takes place here. Indeed, every subjective difficulty too will readily disappear once the common rule given for such an apparent collision is observed. That is, whenever one grave affirmative duty, as supposed, seems to be impeded by another similar affirmative duty that happens to arise at the same time, according to right reason (which the law itself professes), only one duty is to be considered actually binding, namely, the one that is now more urgent and prevailing, while the other’s obligation is suspended for the time being. The well-known maxim supports this: “affirmative precepts obligate always, but not for all time” (cf. no. 234).

  2. When St. Thomas and many Scholastics, with Aristotle, seem to restrict the immutability of natural law to only its most universal or first precepts, they differ from our doctrine only in the form of words, not in substance; for in all the changes they admit can occur concerning secondary precepts, they entirely agree that it is not so much the law itself as its material objects that change.

Article 6.

On the supreme principle of natural law.

277. By the supreme principle of natural law we mean that most universal precept of law which implicitly contains the whole law and from which all of man’s natural duties can be derived by reasoning as from a common principle. The existence of such a principle is sufficiently clear in itself from what has been said about the natural promulgation of natural law; it is also required by that internal unity of the whole of moral science, by which we really do see all the particular dictates of practical reason founded in others that are less particular, and these in turn in more general ones. The principle in question here is, as it were, the complement of the principle we called, in a stricter sense, “the principle of morality” or “the objective norm of morality,” and which, because of this internal kinship, is sometimes treated together with it as a single topic. Consequently, among all those who undertake to construct moral science with no definite end for man, or with an ambiguous or false one, there is an equal variety and disagreement of opinion about both. — But those who think rightly about the end all readily agree about the supreme principle, if one considers the matter itself; and if there is any controversy among them, it concerns only the verbal formulation by which the same thing seems best expressed according to the requirements of the science. This also explains the common usage by which, with St. Thomas, we customarily speak of the first or universal principles of law, even though, properly speaking, there can be only one first and universal principle.

278. Since Kant established his principle of moral obligation as a merely “formal” one, situated solely in the law of reason revered for its own sake, a custom has arisen among some authors of distinguishing two supreme principles, one formal, the other material. They call a principle “formal” when it exhibits the ultimate objective reason, known in itself, on account of which whatever is commanded is understood to be naturally commanded, but without allowing us to know by deduction what is commanded. They call “material” a principle that comprehends not the ultimate why of every obligation but its ultimate or most universal what, so that the whole law, materially—that is, according to each of its duties—can be derived from it. They accordingly advise that in moral science this be distinguished carefully as the reductive principle and that as the deductive principle. This distinction is certainly not without foundation insofar as it denotes a twofold essential requirement of one and the same principle for it truly to be considered the supreme principle of natural law: by its very concept it must be supreme both formally and materially, that is, last reductively and first or most universal deductively. But the distinction seems quite idle insofar as it is used to duplicate the supreme principle itself.

279. Setting aside the various principles that are plainly erroneous, whose principal forms we have already examined indirectly from their foundations as far as necessary (nos. 153–180), it is better here to cite only those formulations that, as regards the matter, all in some way state the true principle of natural law, though a question may rightly be raised as to which of them seems to capture the true character of the supreme principle more perfectly than the others. The following in particular deserve to be named:

  1. The formulation proposed by St. Thomas, who says: “This, then, is the first precept of law: good is to be done and pursued, and evil avoided.”

  2. Live in conformity with human nature considered according to all its essential relations. (A principle commonly used in various Scholastic compendia.)

  3. Love God above all things and your neighbor as yourself, or love God as your end and everything else for his sake. (According to the mind of St. Augustine.)

  4. By free actions too, manifest the image of God, absolutely holy, imprinted on you by nature as a rational being. (A Christian adaptation of the Platonic-Schellingian principle.)

  5. Observe the right order of nature as divinely holy.

280. Of these opinions, the first, supported by the authority of the holy Doctor, comes closest to the last—or rather, truly contains the very thing that the latter states more explicitly—if it is assessed not from the bare verbal formula but from the author’s mind and the context of the article from which it is drawn. For, as is clear from the cited passage, St. Thomas does not understand “good” in a wholly indeterminate sense, but as rational or moral good, which consists in the “right order of nature” itself; nor, when he says that “good is to be done” by force of law, does he mean all moral good, but only that which right reason knows to be simply necessary for the integrity of the moral order. For he does not intend to deny that many things known to be good are permitted to human freedom, to be done or omitted, without obligation. But, apparently thinking these points sufficiently clear in themselves, he seems to have preferred to give the true principle in a very simple and practically clear formula rather than one explicitly defined in every respect.

281. Similarly, the opinion listed in second place intends not so much to propose something different and new from St. Thomas’s formula as rather to set forth that same formula in a more determinate way. Yet it seems less successful insofar as, although the supreme principle as deductive and material may perhaps not unsuitably be founded on conformity or nonconformity with human nature taken completely, it can scarcely serve as a reductive and formal principle, that is, one that at the same time contains the ultimate reason on account of which no further reason can or should be given.

282. The two formulations proposed in third place, which agree in recognizing the commandment of love of God (known naturally) as the head and summary of the whole natural law, seem to be commended both by the authority of St. Augustine and by Christ’s own saying (Matt. 22:37–40), as well as the Apostle’s (Rom. 13:10 and 1 Tim. 1:5). And indeed, if in that passage the Lord, or the Apostle according to the Lord’s mind, had intended to give us the supreme principle of natural law as a scientific principle, every controversy among Christians would have been settled. But, as St. Thomas teaches, by those words Christ chiefly summarized the law of charity, which is proper to the evangelical law and presupposes supernatural light. The Apostle likewise speaks of “love” as charity. Certainly, natural law too obligates man to love God, known naturally, above all things. But in both laws, natural and evangelical, the precept to love God above all things is first only in order of dignity and virtue: of dignity, because God is the ultimate end; of virtue, because through love of God man is led to the ultimate end and clings to it. But it is not first in order of cognition, just as God is not immediately evident. Moreover, this principle sets no limits by which the strict duties of law can be distinguished from mere counsels.

283. By the fourth opinion, imitation of God as holy is assumed as the most common rationale of natural law. In this way, Catholic thinkers laudably and not without fruit have attempted to adapt to Christian philosophy a moral principle of either Platonic or Schellingian type (cf. nos. 171, 174), with the pantheistic error removed. Yet this opinion too, although it seems to approach fairly closely the formal and material character of the principle, does not state it so determinately that it appears to be proper only for deducing natural obligations, and not counsels as well.

Finally, we consider the last formulation, which truly asserts nothing other than St. Thomas’s principle suitably specified, to be no less genuine in itself and preferable to the others for scientific use.

284. Thesis XXXII. The supreme principle of natural law is suitably reduced to this formula: Observe the right order of rational nature as divinely holy.

Preliminary remarks. 1. We say the order of rational nature, namely, human nature, simply complete according to all its essential relations; in this sense it is understood to be the same real and total foundation of “natural law.” 2. The order of rational nature—not just any partial and subordinate order, for example, an aesthetic one, but a final order simply as such, measured by the supreme end, and in which alone the moral quality of actions is founded. 3. Right order—to distinguish the object of law or strict obligation from the object of counsel. For law prescribes order not according to some greater or lesser degree of moral perfection, but within the limits by which an order is simply right and distinguished from what is not right. 4. As divinely holy—to indicate that the formal principle of obligation is situated not in human reason but in God’s most holy will (eternal law), and as such becomes known, at least implicitly, in man’s conscience together with natural law (see nos. 248 ff.).

285. Proof. To answer to its concept, the supreme principle of natural law must fulfill these three essential requirements: 1. It must be a truly “formal” principle, that is, reductively ultimate in such a way that it exhibits the proper formal object of every and only natural obligation, or that which is commanded in itself and for its own sake in every matter of law, and at the same time contains the ultimate reason that can be given for calling whatever we know to be naturally commanded or prohibited a command or prohibition. — 2. It must be a “material” principle, that is, truly first and most universal in the order of deduction, or such that it implicitly comprises all of man’s natural duties; for this is the necessary condition for all of them likewise to be derived from it by deduction. — 3. It must be known in itself and evident, that is, truly first in the order of practical cognition, or such that it does not logically depend on some other, better-known principle of practical reason. It is said to be first “in the order of practical cognition” because all cognition of law is contained within that order. This requirement therefore does not exclude the logical priority, in their own order, of speculative principles. — To these three essential requirements may be added a certain fourth, merely integral in itself (that is, concerning not so much the very substance of the principle as the perfection of how it is stated): namely, that it combine the greatest precision of wording with sufficient determination for scientific use.

But the principle of “right order of nature” plainly satisfies all these requirements. For it is a truly supreme principle:

  1. “Formal,” or reductively ultimate. For just as the formal object of eternal law is the right universal order of things, necessary in itself and for its own sake, so the formal object of natural law can be nothing other than that same order, sanctioned from eternity by God in his holiness but applied in time to man in particular, which is why we call it “the order of rational (human) nature.” It also explains every obligation in such a way that no further reason for it can or should be given. Indeed, when we finally ask why man is bound to obey God who enacts the law, we must have recourse to this ultimate order, since, founded in divine holiness itself, it has all its reason in itself: in the case of the divine will, because God cannot but will and command it; in the case of the created will, because by force of this precept it is bound to it. — The qualification right order restricts the principle to strict natural duties alone.

  2. “Material,” or most universal in its comprehensiveness. The very expression “rational human nature” considered in its totality—that is, according to all its essential relations—plainly determines the principle of “right order” toward this material universality. Thus, from that supreme and most universal precept, according to the three essential relations of human nature, these three general duties of man immediately follow: to live in an orderly way toward God, toward himself, and toward other human beings and the community of human beings. The whole range of man’s natural duties is contained in these three heads, as will be proved throughout Part II of natural law.

  3. Known in itself and evident. This property is bound by an inseparable connection to the very formal character of the supreme principle; once that is proved, this property itself can no longer be called into question. It is also directly evident, since the most proper and essential object of practical reason—namely, the order of things to be done, known as simply necessary and to be observed—cannot but be among practical notions the best known and most evident. (Cf. nos. 47, 184, 223.)

  4. Besides precision of wording, the principle carries such determination of meaning that it is free of all objective ambiguity for scientific use (for it is not asserted for any other end); this is sufficiently clear in itself partly from the formula and partly from the reasons given (under 1 and 2).

286. The same opinion is also confirmed by comparing it requirement by requirement with the other formulations proposed. For, apart from the fact that most of them lack the necessary determination, it will also readily appear that they can ultimately be reduced to this principle as logically prior and first in the order of cognition.

Chapter III. Positive Law

Liber IV: Book Four. The Human Being’s Subjective Moral Formation

Sectio II: Social Right in General

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