Theodor Meyer, Ius naturae generale
Institutiones iuris naturalis, Pars I: Ius naturae generale
First published 1906
Theodor Meyer’s Ius naturae generale from the second corrected edition (1906), in Latin with an original English translation. Preface and proemium included; the navigational contents and publisher advertisements are excluded.
Introductio I: Preface
Introduction
Sectio I: General Ethics
Liber I: Book One. The Natural Elements and Conditions of Human Action
Liber II: Book Two. The Moral Attributes of the Human Act
Liber III: Book Three. The Complete Norm of Human Acts, or Law
Chapter I. Law in General
Article 1.
The notion of law.
§ 1. Its metaphysical analysis drawn from the concept of obligation.
219. Some derive the word law from reading, because it is customarily written and hence read1, or from reading, that is, choosing, which presupposes a just selection of things to be commanded2, or from binding, because the proper effect of law is to bind.3 But whatever the true etymology of the word may be, it is certain that the notion of a bond or obligation, which law brings about, cannot be separated from the notion of law. Thus every law contains a relation both to the thing that is bound, to the thing concerning which or to which it is bound, and to the efficient cause that binds it. Hence the general notion of law is composed, as it were, of four metaphysical elements: the idea of a bond or obligation, the subject that is obligated, the object, whether material or formal, to which it is obligated, and the efficient cause by which it is obligated. When each of these is considered, a proper definition of law emerges.
220. Here we must recall what we observed at the beginning of this treatise about the common destiny of all created things: each, while naturally striving according to its nature toward its own ends, must at the same time work toward some supreme and common end and glorify God, in proportion to its nature and to the rank each occupies in that wondrous order. God is the one who established this order and also preserves and carries it out as the first mover, though not without the cooperation of secondary causes. All created things therefore need some bond by which they are bound, according to their rank, to this same order, so that they do not depart from its unity or common end. It is precisely in this bond that obligation in the broadest sense consists. In this sense, then, obligation extends to each and every created thing. It is no less clear that there can be no other first cause that obligates than God alone, and that the formal object and essential end of every obligation is the order of things intended by God’s wisdom and holiness (cf. nos. 7–10).
221. But the character of that bond is essentially different in rational creatures and in creatures devoid of reason. The latter are led to fulfill the order by physical determination, whereas the former must lead themselves to the order; hence it belongs to their nature to be bound in such a way that, although bound, they are not deprived of freedom. The former constitutes physical obligation, the latter moral obligation. The order to whose fulfillment the former immediately tends is the physical order, whereas the latter immediately relates to bringing about and preserving the moral order; the former is effected through physical laws, the latter through moral laws. But for our present purpose it is relevant to speak only of moral obligation.4
222. Moral obligation, also called obligation without qualification, has this distinctive feature above every other bond: it imposes a necessity that is not physical but moral, that is, one suited to a spiritual nature and consequently does not take away from the mind the free power over its acts. But no such necessity can be conceived except as disjunctive: namely, one by which a rational being is bound no less than an irrational being is simply to the supreme order of creation, yet in such a way that some room for choice is left to freedom concerning the manner in which it would rather fulfill that order—either by freely following God’s benevolent direction in rational nature toward its own supreme good, or by spurning that direction, to its own supreme evil, and thereby undergoing the just reaction of order.5
From this we conclude:
223. I. Moral obligation is not a merely logical bond, by which the intellect is constrained in judging, but a practical bond, that is, one by which the will itself is bound either freely to pursue the order or to undergo it by necessity; — nevertheless, this same bond cannot reach the free will except through the intellect, that is, by means of the practical judgment of reason, which supplies the will with a motive that morally binds it.
Indeed, for this judgment of reason, which presents itself to the will like an imperative and proposes some term of choice to it as a moral debt (ein Sollen, eine Pflicht), it is necessary that the intellect perceive a twofold objective necessity: a) the necessity of the end in itself and for its own sake; b) the necessity of the means (which lie within man’s free power) for attaining that same end. This end, necessary for its own sake, is formally only one: namely, the universal order of things to be done, which is the essential object of rational cognition (see nos. 45, 184) and, with the same evidence by which we perceive it, is also perceived as necessary, that is, as the essential object of the rational will, just as it is the necessary object of God’s most holy will. An action or omission has the character of a necessary means when it is understood, in relation to that order, as necessarily pertaining to its integrity. Once this twofold necessity is known, there cannot but arise an ineluctable dictate of practical reason that this or that must be done and something else omitted. Hence Taparelli rightly defines moral obligation as “a rational duty resulting from final necessity, that is, from the necessary connection of means with a necessary end.”6
224. II. Although obligation can be imposed only through the practical judgment of reason, nevertheless the binding force properly so called, or that by which the free will is morally constrained, is not the activity of reason forming that judgment, but the objectively existing and logically prior disjunctive necessity itself, which reason does not create through its activity but recognizes as already existing.
225. III. If this necessity, with respect to some action or omission, is recognized as founded in the essential order of things, so that it exists independently of any free will, created or uncreated, it constitutes natural obligation. But if it has been introduced contingently and freely, the resulting obligation is called positive. — The primary efficient cause of either obligation can be the will of God alone, the supreme and absolute ordainer of things. Yet it is the cause of natural obligation in one way, and of positive obligation in another. The former descends immediately from the divine will as hypothetically necessary (under the hypothesis of creation); the latter may arise immediately either from the free divine will or from a created will called to cooperate in some respect with God, the ordainer of the moral world. In this latter case the proximate and immediate efficient cause of positive obligation is the created rational will acting as God’s delegate, while God’s will, which communicates that authority to the creature, is the mediate and first cause.
Accordingly, with respect to its origin, it is of the essence of moral obligation that it proceed from a will that is a) rational, since only such a will is capable of ordering to an end; b) superior to those who are to be obligated, either in itself and absolutely, as is true of God alone, or by virtue of communicated power.
226. IV. The formal object and internal end of every moral obligation is right moral order, by which a rational creature is rightly disposed both according to its relation to the ultimate end and, in view of this end common to all, also according to its relations to other creatures. Yet, according to the different degree of this order, obligation can be referred proximately and directly either to ordering individual persons according to the individual order, or to some social unity according to the social order, or to the totality of all according to the universal order. I said directly, for indirectly and remotely every obligation concerns the universal order, because it always has at least a remote regard to the common ultimate end, which alone is necessary for its own sake.
227. V. Hence it is concluded that in obligation, just as the bond of order in general for rational creatures, so in a special way and properly the bond of ordering a community is situated: through it the community and each of its members are rightly disposed toward the common end (the common good).
Therefore, whenever the act of obligating directly concerns the order of a community, it is an exercise of power (authority, jurisdiction) over the members of that same community, proceeding from the one who presides over it as its ordainer toward the common good, either in his own right, which belongs to God alone, or as God’s representative.
228. VI. Every obligation can therefore be understood in two ways: either as it is in the person obligated, or as it proceeds from the ordainer or one who obligates. In the former respect it is called passive, in the latter active.
Moreover, these very elements of law, which we have just now derived a priori and analytically from the fundamental concepts of rational order, can also be recognized and verified synthetically in the commonly taught notion and definition of law.
§ 2. Definition of law.
229. According to its ordinary meaning, law stands to obligation as a proximate cause stands to its effect. Nevertheless, according to a broader or narrower interpretation, in common usage it sometimes admits different senses.
Law, taken in the broadest sense, “denotes some rule and measure of acts, according to which someone is induced to act or is restrained from acting.”7 Thus the name of law can extend even to agents determined by the necessity of nature to their acts; hence the rules governing these are also called physical laws.
But even when law is applied only to rational agents, it can again be taken more broadly or more narrowly. In a broader sense it is used for any practical rule, in which sense every art has its laws. More properly, it denotes only the rule and measure of human acts as such, whose proper effect is therefore moral obligation.
But this very meaning of law is still bounded by either narrower or broader limits. For either the name of law is understood to include “precept” as well, that is, a law imposed on particular persons, or on a community but only temporarily and for a particular case; or law is distinguished from precept, and then it concerns ordering the community alone in relation to the common end and therefore stably.
230. In this final, strictest, and most proper sense, law is defined by St. Thomas as “a certain ordinance of reason for the common good, promulgated by the one who has care of the community.”8
Four points in this definition must be considered:
a) It says an ordinance of reason, to indicate its origin. For the “rule and measure of human acts” can proceed only from reason. “For it belongs to reason to order to an end.”9 Now the aim of law is to order human acts, that is, to direct them in such a way that they contribute to attaining the end; law therefore proceeds from reason. — But it proceeds from reason not in just any way, but as a certain “ordinance” of reason, which designates an act or decree of the rational will, that is, the legislator’s command in accordance with the guidance of reason.
b) For the common good: this distinguishes law from precept, which, as we observed above, is imposed not on the whole community but on particular persons or for a particular case, and may also be imposed by a private person endowed with some authority. Hence the end at which a precept aims need not necessarily be the good of the whole community; but this is of the essence of law. In this objective relation of law to the common good, the justice of law is chiefly contained, and it is therefore rightly counted among the essential conditions of law.10
c) by the one who has care of the community. . . . For, as St. Thomas observes: “Law properly and primarily concerns the ordering toward the common good. But to order something toward the common good belongs either to the whole multitude or to someone who represents the whole multitude; and therefore to make law belongs either to the whole multitude or to a public person who has care of the whole multitude, since in all other matters too it belongs to the one whose proper end it is to order toward an end.”11 Concerning this passage it should be noted that “multitude” designates not any crowd of people but a social body already united and vitally constituted; and “to represent the multitude,” in the mind of the holy Doctor, means nothing other than what he immediately adds: “to have care of the multitude (society),” and in this capacity to care, in the name of the multitude, for things that belong to it (not to oneself)—which is certainly incumbent on every legislator, even though in respect of power he represents not the multitude but God. For, as St. Thomas repeatedly teaches, it belongs by essence to God, the author of nature, to order the whole moral world, mediately or immediately.12
d) promulgated. For to command is the same as to apply subjects to the fitting order by obligating them; but such application in an intelligent subject can occur only through cognition and hence through an authoritative manifestation, that is, through promulgation.13
Suárez too includes the same elements of law, which constitute the same number of its essential conditions, although in a different verbal formula, proposing this definition of law: “Law is a common, just, and stable precept, sufficiently promulgated.”14
231. Corollary. From what has been said, it is easily understood how counsel differs from law. For although counsel agrees with law in that it aims to induce action according to reason, it is distinguished from law above all in that it imposes no moral necessity of acting and therefore no obligation.
232. Scholium. Some have questioned promulgation, asking whether it should more properly be said to belong to the essence of law or rather to be only a necessary requirement for law to have external efficacy. — The “eternal law,” which will be discussed below, has raised the difficulty to some extent; although it has no promulgation (at least no external one), it is nevertheless commonly called law. — But, as Suárez wisely observes, two states of law must be distinguished: “one is merely interior, insofar as the law is considered in the mind of the legislator; the other is exterior, insofar as the law exists outside the legislator, either in the subjects themselves or in some sign manifesting the legislator’s will. Accordingly, as the force of the word itself makes clear, promulgation is spoken of with respect to external law, since it denotes publication of the law by which it can be known to the subjects. But eternal law denotes only law conceived in the mind of God, and therefore the same rationale of promulgation cannot be applied to it.”15 What kind of promulgation is appropriate to it must be examined below. Thus, when law is considered in its external state, sufficient promulgation must undoubtedly be considered “of the very character of law.” In affirming this opinion, St. Thomas16 also invokes the authority of Gratian, who says: “laws are established when they are promulgated, but confirmed when they are received into custom.”17
Several other matters commonly raised concerning the general character of law or its requirements seem to pertain more specifically to human law and are better referred to it.
Article 2.
The rationale for distinguishing laws.
§ 1. Distinction drawn from the different acts of law.
233. The first rationale for distinction that presents itself in considering law does not concern different kinds of law but rather the different effects or acts of law, according to which the law itself takes on various modes and designations. Namely, besides the principal and adequate effect of law, which is obligation, four particular effects or, rather, acts are usually enumerated: commanding, prohibiting or forbidding, permitting, and punishing; according to these, law is distinguished as commanding (affirmative), forbidding (negative), permissive, and punitive.18
All these acts are properly contained in obligation itself and designate nothing other than the various ways in which obligation itself can affect human activity, and at the same time the different ways of sinning against it.
234. Accordingly, insofar as obligation induces one to perform certain acts, it is called commanding or affirmative; insofar as it induces one to omit certain acts, it is forbidding or negative. One sins against the former by omission, against the latter by performing the act. Moreover, although the binding force of each is formally the same, materially they have different efficacy, according to the widely known legal maxim:
“An affirmative law obligates always, but not for all time; a negative law, however, always and for all time.”
Both obligate always, from the time they are enacted and for as long as they last, because obligation is the natural effect of every law, which cannot be absent unless the law itself has ceased to exist. An affirmative law is said to obligate not for all time because it does not obligate at every single moment, but only at a certain time for which it imposed the duty of acting. A negative law, by contrast, obligates also for all time, because the negation it includes is stated for every time, in keeping with the full extent of its prohibition; and a precept that something must not be done at all is equivalent to this: it must not be done at any time.
235. Permitting is not always and in every respect an effect of law. For something is said to be permitted in two ways: either by the mere absence of obligation to do it, whether it has been commanded or prohibited, and in this way permission is not an effect of law but rather an effect of the absence of law itself; or it is said to be permitted positively, that is, by an act of will by which the legislator wills neither to command nor to prohibit it; only this mode of permission can be counted among the effects of law. A distinction must likewise be made between permission in fact and permission in law. The former does not rule out a prohibition of the thing, but merely signifies that an act is not prevented by the legislator, although it could be prevented, and so is not an effect of the law itself. Thus God permits sins to occur, though he prohibits them and does not leave them unpunished. But permission in law properly pertains to law, since it denotes the negation or suspension of obligation itself with respect to the one who is granted permission to do something. Whenever this permission is founded on a positive decree of the one who permits it, it is always joined to some obligation, although not an obligation of the person in whose favor something is permitted. For it obligates others not to impede that person in the matter permitted, and obligates the judge not to declare him guilty of violating the law on that account.
236. Finally, the effect that consists in punishment is produced by law in two ways. First, through the fault itself, which is the ground for punishment, insofar as it depends on law that the transgressor incur liability to punishment. Second, insofar as the assessment of the penalty, or even its actual infliction, is considered: this is sometimes effected immediately by the law, so that by its force the penalty is incurred ipso facto upon the transgression; sometimes only mediately, when a command is given to the judge to set a penalty appropriate to the offense.
The four effects just enumerated, although they all pertain to law taken without qualification, do not nevertheless belong to every individual law.19
§ 2. Distinction of laws by specific difference.
237. Laws are thus divided:
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In the broadest terms: into eternal law and temporal laws, or those enacted in time. Yet eternal law is no less truly called the common exemplar and principle of all temporal laws.
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By the immediate author: into divine and human.
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By their foundation and promulgation together: into natural and positive.
Moreover, positive law is in turn distinguished as divine and human. The latter, finally, is ecclesiastical or civil, according as it is enacted by ecclesiastical or civil human authority.
Here we must treat eternal and natural law more carefully than the others; to them we will add some general considerations about positive law, whether divine or human. For discussing positive divine law in particular belongs to theology’s proper province, while investigating the particular character of human laws is largely proper to the science of civil and ecclesiastical law. Insofar as the same subject concerns natural law, however, it must be completed in the more specialized part of this work as its appropriate place.