Theodor Meyer, Ius naturae generale

Theodor Meyer

Theodor Meyer, Ius naturae generale

Theodor Meyer

Institutiones iuris naturalis, Pars I: Ius naturae generale

First published 1906

Theodor Meyer’s Ius naturae generale from the second corrected edition (1906), in Latin with an original English translation. Preface and proemium included; the navigational contents and publisher advertisements are excluded.


Introductio I: Preface

Introduction

Sectio I: General Ethics

Liber I: Book One. The Natural Elements and Conditions of Human Action

Liber II: Book Two. The Moral Attributes of the Human Act

Chapter I. Morality

Chapter II. The Moral Attributes Accompanying the Morality of an Act

On the moral attributes that accompany the morality of an act.

Article 1.

On imputability.

§ 1. On the nature of imputability.

  1. The judgment by which an act is attributed to some subject as that subject’s own act and as its author is called imputation. Imputability, therefore, is a property of an action by virtue of which it can and ought to be attributed to someone as its own author and master. Imputability has this in common with the morality of an action, insofar as morality denotes its specific attribute (n. 141), that each is a property of a free action and consists in a relation intrinsic to it. They differ, however, in that morality denotes a relation of the free action to the ultimate end, whereas imputability denotes its relation to its internal principle as its proximate cause. Hence, according to its morality an action is called good or evil; according to its imputability it is praiseworthy or blameworthy, or is imputed either to praise or to blame.

From this notion of imputability, which we have drawn from the common understanding of people and their use of the term, the following principle concerning its proper nature can be stated:

196. Thesis XXII. The formal ground of imputability is the very freedom of the action.

Preliminary note. This thesis is analogous to the one by which in the preceding chapter we defined the formal ground, or objective norm, of morality; from there, therefore, one should also infer what we mean here by “formal ground” (cf. n. 181).

Proof. The formal ground that alone and per se constitutes the imputability of an action is that by which the subject must be considered properly the author and master of his action. But the formal ground of this causality and mastery is the very freedom of the action, as is clear from what was said above (nn. 104 ff.) about the genuine notion of free choice. Therefore, etc.

  1. Corollaries: I. Whatever removes, diminishes, or increases the freedom in an act removes, diminishes, or increases its imputability in the same respect and to the same extent.

II. The distinction between evil or sin that is formal and material is founded on this very truth. For sometimes an action, considered in itself, can be imputed to someone, while its objective moral quality is imputed either not at all or not in its whole extent. This occurs when someone has indeed performed an action freely, but through invincible ignorance has not adverted to its moral quality, either not at all or only in part—for example, under just one species of evil, when in fact several species belong to it. Every such action, though in itself and objectively evil, is called material sin, since it was not freely willed by the agent according to this moral quality and is therefore not imputable to him as such. But the same action, insofar as it is imputable to the agent according to its moral value formally known to him, whether objectively true or merely thought to be true, constitutes formal sin.

III. For the moral evil of an act to be imputed, it suffices that the agent notice it; but for the goodness of an action to be imputed, mere notice is insufficient: it is also required that the will in some way intend it. The reason for this difference is that a rational subject, as soon as he notices something to be evil, ought to omit it; if nevertheless he admits it, he is rightly considered to will it freely. Conversely, not every goodness that someone notices in an act he undertakes is thereby to be considered positively willed, since nothing prevents him from tolerating or permitting it, rather than positively willing it, in view of the end chiefly intended. Now each thing is imputed according as it is formally the object of free volition.

IV. The natural fruits that follow the imputability of an act according to its praiseworthiness or blameworthiness are: esteem or contempt — praise or reproach — honor or disgrace — glory or infamy. Indeed, the very actual imputation, since it is a judgment attributing a morally good or evil act to someone, establishes esteem or contempt almost immediately; according to varying degrees and differences of outward expression, these are honor or disgrace, glory or infamy.

§ 2. On the imputability of effects connected with an action.

  1. Something can depend on a free will either as voluntary in itself or as voluntary in its cause (85). What is voluntary and free in its cause, or indirect, must generally also include what is foreseen to be connected with the freely willed action. I said “generally,” for this cannot be affirmed simply and in every case, but only when, according to other criteria, the will, in embracing some object, ought reasonably to be considered as tending in some way also toward what is more or less necessarily connected with it. Now it often happens that, by a rational interpretation, the will cannot at all be considered, by its own volition, to tend toward everything in any way connected with its free action, even if it foresees it as connected with that action. For sometimes it must be said not so much to will such foreseen effects as to permit them lawfully, as proceeding from another direct proximate cause, whether necessary or free. The conditions must therefore be determined under which some effect, or any other consequence connected with a free action, can be exempted from imputability.

This question does not practically concern good effects, since nothing prevents the will from formally intending along with the action all the good things that follow it in some way, and making them imputable to itself. But it has an almost daily use, and often a very serious one, in the case of evil effects.

For many actions present themselves in daily life that are good and praiseworthy in themselves, or at least indifferent, yet can cause hesitation in a deliberating mind because they seem to have attached effects that the will ought to reject. Therefore, following the lead of St. Thomas, we establish the following criterion in this matter.

  1. Thesis XXIII. An evil effect that an agent foresees will follow from an action apart from his intention cannot be imputed to him whenever he is not bound to prevent it positively. — For such an obligation truly to be considered absent in a particular case, three conditions are required: 1) that the action, considered in itself, be good or at least indifferent; 2) that by its nature it be ordered not solely to the evil effect, but at least as immediately to a good effect, which the agent rightly intends; 3) that, given the proportion between this good and the evil that is permitted, the agent have sufficient reason to exercise his right.

Preliminary notes. The thesis includes two parts: the first states a general rule, while the second proposes the same rule framed in terms of particular conditions. The former assertion states a hypothetical truth, provisionally setting aside the question whether the hypothesis ever happens to be verified in fact, and under what circumstances; the latter answers this very question of fact.

The matter proposed requires that to some extent we presuppose here, as sufficiently known, the concepts both of obligation and of right, although each subject will be treated more particularly below. This is all the less inconvenient because nothing is presupposed except what is admitted and known by the common judgment of people before any scientific reasoning.

Proof of Part I. The general rule. For something to be imputed to a person, it must be voluntary for him in some way, either in itself or in its cause. But an evil effect that occurs apart from the agent’s intention and under circumstances that give rise to no obligation to prevent it positively, although foreseen by the agent, is nevertheless not voluntary by any act of will. Therefore, etc.

Proof of the minor premise. 1. It is not voluntary in itself, as is clear from the very hypothesis; for it is supposed to occur “apart from” the agent’s intention. 2. Nor is it voluntary in its cause. The only reason why it might seem to be so is that the agent notices the evil that will follow from the action and nevertheless does not omit its cause. Now this reason is entirely without force in the present case. For although it is rightly said that merely noticing the evil inherent in an action suffices for it to be justly imputed to the agent, this has no other foundation than the common hypothesis that everyone is considered obligated to avoid, insofar as it depends on him, every known evil of an action. For this must be understood of moral evil, which is supposed certainly to taint the action itself either through its object, end, or circumstances (see n. 197, coroll. 3). But the rule stated in the thesis is expressly subject to the condition that the agent is “not bound” to prevent the evil effect as something morally extrinsic to the action. Therefore, under this same condition, there is no reason to say that the effect is voluntary in its cause.

Proof of Part II. In a particular case, the three conditions listed collectively in the thesis are required and sufficient for the agent not to be bound to prevent the evil effect positively.

A. They are required. 1. The action, considered in itself, must be good or at least indifferent. For an action evil in itself, precisely because it is already illicit in itself, will be all the more illicit if it is also the cause of an evil effect, as is clear.

  1. The action must be ordered not solely to the evil effect, but by its nature at least as immediately to a good effect, which the agent rightly intends. For while the agent does not intend the evil effect but permits it, he must have a good and legitimate end that he can rightly intend and to which he can, by that same right, order his action as a legitimate means in itself. But he could not do this if either the good effect resulted from the action only accidentally and remotely, that is, through the evil effect, since it is wrong to will a good end through an evil means; or he lacked a right to an end that is otherwise good, for then he would likewise lack a right to the means.

  2. Given the proportion between the good that is rightly intended and the evil that is permitted, the agent must have sufficient reason to exercise his right. For an action to be simply licit in a particular case, it is not enough that the agent have a right to perform it; it is also required that nothing prevent the use of this right from becoming illicit in that particular case. Now in the present matter, the law of charity and prudent moderation makes the use of the right illicit unless the object of the right, or the good intended, is such in comparison with the foreseen evil that it truly constitutes a serious reason for permitting it.

B. They are sufficient. Whenever the presence of these three conditions is entirely established, it is certain that the action is neither evil on account of its object or end, as is clear, nor on account of its circumstances, and therefore is not forbidden. For although the circumstance of the evil effect to follow, considered by itself, could taint the act itself and make it illicit, nevertheless, when considered in connection with the other circumstances presupposed by the third condition, its moral efficacy is entirely outweighed by the opposing consideration. Thus, according to right reason, even if such an effect is never intended, it can nevertheless be permitted licitly when it cannot be avoided without a grave, or comparatively grave, disadvantage.

The same is confirmed:

  1. From the common persuasion of mankind. Surely no one who uses reason can be found who does not acknowledge the same principle in practice and often put it to use, with the approving testimony of intimate conscience.

  2. From the absurd consequences. For if all evil effects in any way connected with our actions were to be imputed as voluntary simply because they had been foreseen, or if not preventing an evil for a reasonable cause were the same as willing it in its cause, it would follow: a) that human rights are wholly illusory, since evil effects could almost always be connected extrinsically with their exercise through the malice of other people; b) that all evils connected with human freedom, foreseen by God the Creator, would have to be imputed to God’s own most holy will—a thought that is impious even to entertain.

From all this we conclude with certainty that, under the conditions defined in the thesis, an evil effect of an action, even if foreseen by the agent, can be permitted per se without sin and is therefore not to be imputed to the agent as voluntary.

200. Corollaries: I. Generally speaking, whoever undertakes an illicit matter is responsible for all the evils he foresees, at least confusedly, will follow from it, unless some excusing or mitigating factor intervenes from another source, either from the subject matter itself or from the circumstances. But someone who undertakes an otherwise licit and just work can nevertheless become responsible for a foreseen evil effect on either of two grounds: either a defect of a good and legitimate end, or the relative slightness of the good intended in comparison with the evil permitted.

II. Whoever is obligated by justice or by duty to avert some evil event is likewise bound by justice to omit the action foreseen to cause it, even if otherwise it would be illicit neither in itself nor on account of its end.

III. The principle established in the thesis contains a norm of right reason that is most fruitful in practical application, not only for solving innumerable moral problems but also for measuring im- in both respects: 1. by the proper term of the relation; 2. by the proper relation to the freedom of the action. For morality presupposes this freedom only as a necessary condition; imputability arises from it as an adequate formal cause; merit and demerit arise from it as a co-formal cause.

203. II. The metaphysical foundation of the concept of merit and demerit lies in the objective order of things, to which rational nature has an essential relation. Yet in that same objective order of things, if taken in its universality, the concepts of the honorable and dishonorable and all other concepts belonging to the essence of rational cognition are likewise founded in their own way, as was shown above (nn. 47, 188). It remains, therefore, to investigate in that very common foundation of so many diverse concepts the proper ground by which it can be understood to be the suitable and proper foundation of merit and demerit alone.

Indeed, the order reflected in all the works of God, to the knowledge and imitation of which rational nature is adapted, varies according to the diversity of things and relations in which it is found. All this variety of order, however, as St. Thomas teaches, is reduced to two broad classes (cf. n. 47). For it is either the order of things to be done toward an end, and indeed, at their term, toward the ultimate end; or the order of parts to one whole and, by reason of that whole, to one another. The former concerns the final movements and successions of things; the latter, their state, as it were, of relative rest, which they maintain in relation to one another through their simultaneous and coordinated coexistence. The constitutive unity of the former is their common relation to one end; of the latter, their common arrangement into one whole. The question, therefore, finally comes down to this: which of these two orders, constituting the universal order, should be considered the one in which the concept of merit and demerit is properly founded.

We answer: The “order of things to be done toward an end” as such is the proper foundation of the honorable and dishonorable; therefore it cannot at the same time be the same proper foundation of the concept of merit and demerit. Hence it is necessary that this latter foundation be contained in another aspect of rational order, namely, in the “order of parts to one whole and, by reason of this, to one another.” — Nevertheless, this order too, because of its general applicability to very diverse things, needs further specification in order to exhibit the specifically proper foundation of merit and demerit. For merit and demerit can be predicated only of rational supposits; hence those relations of parts to one whole must be referred not to the physical world, but to the moral world. Just as one physical cosmos is formed from material entities as its component parts, so from the spiritual communion of all rational creatures there also arises one moral cosmos, whose component parts are the individual rational supposits, or persons. Therefore, given the different subject matter, the condition of right order by which each is sustained and preserved must be similar in both: namely, a fitting quantitative proportion of the parts to the whole and to one another. In the moral world, this quantitative proportion can consist only in that contained in the rights of persons, suited to each person’s social relation to other persons and to the whole community.

After this analytical consideration, the matter should finally be stated as follows.

The special and proper metaphysical foundation of our rational concept of merit and demerit is: the order of quantitative proportion applied to the moral world.

For the human reason recognizes this proportion as a necessary element of the universal rational order and demands it in imitation of divine reason itself. Therefore, it requires that material changes in this quantitative order, which the freedom of rational agents, by its own nature and by the force of social interaction, continually introduces—sometimes by excess, sometimes by deficiency of due quantity—be compensated in some way and restored to the formal integrity of proportion. This is in fact what occurs when, by a rational assessment, we attribute merit to someone who benevolently renders another something beyond what is due by right, that is, a right (at least in equity) to a similar recompense from that person; but to someone who malevolently takes away what is another’s we attribute demerit, that is, a debt of rendering satisfaction, whether freely or by imposition.

  1. To illustrate the same point, observe: 1. This moral cosmos, insofar as it is constituted by parts (persons) rightly ordered both to one another and to the whole (society), is the same order that we call the order of justice. What accords with it we call just, what is contrary to it unjust. Thus the concepts of just and unjust, merit and demerit, are referred to a common metaphysical foundation. In both cases a rational demand is recognized, requiring that each rational creature, as a part of a spiritual communion, be maintained in a certain spiritual equilibrium with other similar creatures, both taken individually and taken collectively. St. Thomas, too, is to be understood in this way, when, following Aristotle, he holds that justice is founded on a certain “equality” (quantitative proportion). The common division of justice accords with this same point: distributive justice is directly concerned with preserving the proportion of the whole community to its individual members, while commutative justice is directly concerned with the mutual proportion of members to one another.

  2. In the physical world itself one finds a perfect and, as it were, symbolic analogy of that same law of quantitative order by which the moral world subsists and is preserved in its harmonious unity. — For just as in the world of spirits the law of justice is the necessary condition of an order reconciled with the perpetual movement of freedom, so in the physical world, while it too is in a perpetual flux of changes, partly the law of equilibrium of forces and partly the law of symmetry preside over the preservation of the order intended by the Creator. The law of equilibrium is adapted to the dynamic order of the world, while the law of symmetry is adapted to its aesthetic order; both pertain to producing and preserving in the visible world the quantitative proportion of parts (bodies and forms) to one another and to a single whole.

§ 2. On the natural conditions of merit and demerit.

  1. Together with the very concept of merit and demerit, their natural conditions are clearly known, as the common sense and persuasion of mankind confirms. But now that we have understood the objective order in which the ground of merit is founded, nothing prevents us from giving an objective account of its conditions in the same way. To this pertains:

Thesis XXIV. Merit and demerit are acquired by all and only those to whom an action, insofar as it is imputable, brings a benefit or detriment that is not already due in every respect according to the order of strict justice.

Proof. Merit and demerit are founded on the order of proportional equality among coexisting rational beings; their internal and essential end is to preserve continually or restore this order as a whole in the perpetual social movement proceeding from freedom. This is done through a certain law of compensation between one who gives and one who receives good or evil. But the demand for such compensation arises to preserve or restore the order of proportional equality in all and only those who have received good or evil beyond what was due in justice, from another’s exercise of freedom. For one who renders something fully due in justice introduces no inequality or disproportion, but completes precisely what had previously been lacking and required for establishing this order.

  1. Corollaries: I. An action useful to another does not cease to be meritorious with respect to that person, even if the one providing the benefit happens to have been obligated to perform it on some other ground than the debt of justice, for example, by the law of charity. Thus a beggar who receives alms from a rich man is not reasonably excused from the duty of gratitude toward him on the ground that the rich man is considered to have done no more than what he owed by charity, being otherwise bound by no right.

II. Indeed, even an act owed to another under a title of justice and for an agreed payment can nevertheless be meritorious insofar as the manner of performing it manifests a particular devotion of will toward that person. For this manner of rendering what is due per se exceeds the measure of strict justice. The common practice of workers to ask for something beyond what was agreed as their wage is founded on the general presumption of merit of this kind.

III. An act directed toward the good of a particular person has merit primarily with that person, secondarily with the whole society to which the person belongs; similarly, an act directed toward the good of some society has merit primarily with that society, secondarily with each of its members. The reason follows from the thesis itself and from the fact that the good of individuals redounds to the good of society, and the good of society to the good of individuals, by virtue of the union by which society becomes one moral person.

§ 3. On the natural merit and demerit of the human being before God.

207. Both merit and demerit presuppose an order of rank and quantitative proportion between the one who merits or demerits and the one with respect to whom the merit or demerit is acquired. But merit presupposes this order in one way, demerit in another. For to be able to demerit, that is, to injure another’s right and thereby incur a debt, the slightest degree of relative personal “quantity” suffices, such as simple personal existence. Given this alone, every free created being can be a subject of debt, even if otherwise it has no right of its own in relation to the one to whom it is indebted, indeed even if it enjoys its very existence solely by that one’s favor. A greater degree of relative dignity is required in the subject of merit. For to merit is, as it were, to acquire a title of right, at least of equity, to receive compensation from one in whose favor someone has freely ceded something of his own, that is, of a quantity belonging to him. It is therefore necessary that, prior to meriting, he possess something truly his own, not already owed under another’s right.

From this there naturally arises the question: Can a human being have any merit before God at all? For since in his whole being, possession, and power, man is subject to God’s absolute dominion, it seems that he can do nothing wholly of his own in God’s favor that is not already owed to God by strict right. But how, once every proportion of reciprocal right has been removed, can any merit before God—that is, a right in relation to God—be attributed to man without detracting from the fullness of divine right?

208. And indeed, if man’s relation to God is considered simply and absolutely, it must certainly be admitted that, in relation to God, man can only be a subject of duties and, if he has violated them, of demerits, never in himself a subject of right and hence not of merit either. But if man is considered in view of the dignity of his nature, which, though not from himself, he nevertheless possesses in himself and thus, in a certain way, as his own, through the munificence of God the creator; if God himself is considered not so much as he is infinite in himself and absolutely independent, but as he has wished, in his most gracious ordering, to show himself almost as a neighbor to man, offering himself to him not only as the supreme good and reward to be possessed but also as the provident governor and king of the whole human race: nothing prevents us from recognizing a certain proportion of goods, as it were, between God and man, founded on that very divine ordering and secured by divine faithfulness. By its force, as St. Thomas rightly observes, “both God and man act according to their own manner. But the manner and measure of human virtue comes to man from God. And therefore there can be merit of man before God only on the presupposition of the divine ordering: namely, that man should attain from God through his own action, as it were as a reward, that for which God appointed him the power to act.”

Just as it is clear that man’s supernatural merit before God is founded on God’s positive promise and grace, so too it must be said that his natural merit is founded on a certain kind of natural promise of God, that is, one made by God as author of nature and known by man through the light of reason. And in truth, God’s most wise and generous ordering in creating has the character of such a natural divine promise: by it he willed that, in the whole created world, the eudaimonological order of nature be objectively joined in an inseparable bond with the deontological order. For by force of this ordering, whoever and insofar as he pursues moral good through free action must thereby and to that extent advance in his own proper and true natural good and approach his perfection and happiness; conversely, he recedes from them precisely insofar as he inclines toward moral evil. We therefore have in the nature of things a manifest will of God the creator, promulgated by the light of reason: he chose that the same good which is set before us as the end of natural tendency, owed by nature, should also be proposed as the reward of morally good action.

And so, although man can have neither right nor merit in relation to God simply, both can nevertheless belong to him in a qualified sense; and this is perfectly consistent with the fullness of divine right. For although, given that divine ordering, the attainment of good is thereby owed to the one who acts well, and evil, or the privation of good, to the one who acts badly, it is by no means to man that God must be said to owe this, but to himself—to his own wisdom, holiness, and faithfulness. In this sense it is asserted:

209. Thesis XXV. Merit before God is acquired not only by every morally evil act as demerit, but likewise by every morally good act.

Proof of Part I. Demerit. It is sufficiently clear in itself that every evil action is demeritorious before God. For whoever freely violates God’s order opposes God and, as it were, inflicts evil on him. But this is all the more contrary to the proportion man owes to God because that proportion does not consist in equality but in the greatest inequality, whereby all rights belong intrinsically to God alone, while only duties belong intrinsically to man. Therefore.

210. Proof of Part II. It is also certainly demonstrated that merit before God belongs to a man who does good, and that in a twofold way. For whether man is considered in his personal and immediate relation to God as ultimate end, or in his social relation to the whole moral world and through it to God, its ruler and guardian, it is shown by just as many arguments that in either way he merits before God, just as he demerits:

Argument I. In view of man’s personal relation to God as ultimate end. Every good action has the conditions of merit, both on man’s part and on God’s part:

a) On man’s part. Whoever acts well freely pursues the order that God himself necessarily loves and wills, although it was in his power to violate or neglect it. But by doing this he shows in deed his favorable disposition toward God and, as it were, offers in God’s favor something that is his own, that is, depends on his free choice; this is so even when he freely carries out something commanded by law. Therefore, in this respect, he merits in some way:

b) On God’s part. For God himself established in the order of nature a certain order, as it were, of equality between himself and man, by which what is already owed to God by strict right in itself can nevertheless be meritorious. For, besides the fact that God does not strictly command many good things but leaves them to man’s good will, even what he commands he does not demand from man solely by virtue of the title of his divine dominion, but also with a reward fixed in advance in proportion to good actions (no. 208). Therefore, on God’s part, the character of merit is not merely compatible with morally good human action; it is in fact acknowledged by God himself.

Argument II. In view of man’s social relation to God as ruler of the moral world. — The whole moral world is a kind of community or society, whose members are individual rational beings and whose supreme ruler and guardian God constituted himself by the same free act by which he created it. The supreme common good of this society is the integrity and perfection of moral order, while its common evil is the disturbance of that order. It is therefore the task of the supreme ruler to provide and preserve the former for the society and to ward off the latter; in this capacity he represents the whole society, as it were, and takes its good and evil as his own. With this consideration as our premise, we reason in the mind of the Angelic Doctor as follows:

Whatever merit or demerit a man has before this universal society subject to divine governance, he likewise has before God, its ruler and guardian. But before that society, just as every morally evil human act is demeritorious, so every good act is meritorious. Therefore, the same holds before God.

Proof of the minor premise. Every morally good act, precisely by fulfilling or perfecting the common rational order, advances the common good of that universal society; an evil act, by contrast, injures and diminishes it. This holds not only whenever, by its object or the agent’s intention, a good or evil act is directed directly and immediately toward advancing or diminishing the universal good—as, for example, acts of religious service toward God as supreme king and legislator, or, conversely, rebellious contempt for divine rule—but also when, by its moral character, an act directly and primarily promotes or detracts from that good only for an individual person, whether another or oneself. For through that person the common good or evil of the community to which he belongs is also promoted secondarily. Every good act, therefore, has merit before the universal society of the moral world, either primarily or secondarily, while an evil act has demerit in the same way (no. 206, ad 3); consequently each has merit or demerit before God, the supreme ruler of that same society, and a fitting retribution is owed to each.

211. Corollary. In the moral world, under God’s partly immediate and partly mediated governance, man has three rational orders to fulfill freely: the individual, social, and universal. Under these three aspects, therefore, a moral action can be meritorious or demeritorious before God, guardian of the order of the universe, either primarily or secondarily. — The individual order is that by which each individual person is rightly ordered within himself under the immediate governance of reason. This is achieved through the due subordination of sensitive nature to rational nature, and of the individual powers to the governance of reason in accordance with the requirements of human nature as a whole. The social order is that by which human society, insofar as it constitutes a collective whole, is rightly ordered within itself; this occurs both through the order of justice and through the order of social charity. But since the whole of human society coalesces into several closer groups, namely families, communities, and states, according to certain organic levels, this same social order can be considered either universally, in the collective unity of the whole human race, or within its various particular groups. Finally, the universal moral order is that by which the whole of rational creatures is rightly ordered according to the universal end of creation, with its individual members rightly disposed toward one another and cooperating in an orderly way. Thus the universal order presupposes the social and individual orders, while the social order presupposes the individual order and, in its broader unity, includes it.

Points to note for resolving difficulties.

212. 1. Just as, by God’s most free promise and the gift of supernatural grace, every person who fulfills the required conditions on his part has some right to eternal life, so too the natural order, freely established by God through creation and presented to human reason as its chief object of knowledge, truly has, as we have already observed above (no. 208), the character of a certain natural promise. Through the light of reason God announces to man by this promise that the more faithfully and perfectly he himself observes the moral order, the more abundantly and perfectly he will attain his own good through God’s retribution.

  1. How the fullness and independence of divine right are reconciled with man’s merit (in a qualified sense) has been shown above, following St. Thomas, no. 208.

  2. Whoever carries out something prescribed by God’s strict command indeed provides God with nothing objectively that he does not owe in every respect by justice; for if he omitted it, he would undoubtedly violate divine right. Nevertheless, even in such an action merit is found insofar as, by divine ordering, that very command has been set forth under the condition of merit, that is, joined to a natural promise by which observance of it is understood to be the way to attain happiness, so that happiness must now be called not only the end owed by nature but also a reward of virtue divinely offered.

  3. See also the replies with which St. Thomas (loc. cit.) elucidates and refutes the objections that seem to be raised against this doctrine.

§ 4. On reward and punishment.

213. The concept of reward and punishment is intrinsically correlated with the concept of moral merit and demerit (that is, what is acquired by actions as morally good or evil before God or a social authority delegated by God). For good that has been or is to be repaid to an agent for a morally meritorious action is called a reward, while physical evil inflicted or to be inflicted as retribution for a morally demeritorious action is called punishment. Reward and punishment are therefore opposed to each other by the same contrariety as the moral imputability of an action in relation to praise and blame. This feature distinguishes reward (Belohnung) from wage (Lohn), which generally denotes retribution for any performance, without formal regard to its moral praiseworthiness. According to this analysis of the concepts, it is rightly stated: Every moral merit entails at least a remote and broadly understood right (Anrecht) to a reward, and every demerit entails a debt of punishment.

214. The social atheism of our age, which increasingly strives to profane all social institutions or, as they say, to “emancipate them from heaven and return them to earth,” has had no more pressing aim than to adapt the idea of social justice philosophically to its own ends. Yet it could not accommodate the common conviction of the Christian world—and even of the gentile world—confirmed by apostolic teaching, that the function of social justice, and specifically the power of the sword for punishing crimes, belongs to human society from no other source than divine commission, and is exercised by human beings in the name of God, the supreme guardian and defender of order. It was therefore necessary, just as with public authority in general, and especially with the administration of penal justice, to attribute it to human society as detached from every intrinsic relation to God, so that it would have to be regarded as an institution purely human and grounded in itself solely in a practical necessity of human affairs. The modern theory of criminal law associated with “liberalism” belongs here: it grounds every use of punishment partly in society’s right to defend itself effectively against aggressors, and partly in its duty of social care, either to reform wrongdoers as harmful members of society through suitable correction or to coerce them into serving the commonwealth—while rejecting any expiatory rationale for punishment by which, in addition, vindictive justice establishes retribution proportionate to the demerit of the fault. Among other consequences of this doctrine, as is readily apparent, is that capital punishment must either be abolished entirely or at least restricted to the very few cases in which an urgent need for public security requires it. Therefore, although this question must be treated explicitly elsewhere, it is nevertheless useful to establish here already the general philosophical foundation by which such a novelty can be ruled out at the outset as contrary to the objective rational order. The following assertion serves this purpose. It analytically determines, from the very idea of reward and punishment and their intrinsic relation to the character of merit and demerit, the genuine and essential end to which both reward and punishment are ordered by their intrinsic character and consequently by the intention of the author of nature:

215. Thesis XXVI. By their intrinsic character, reward and punishment are ordered to two essential ends: namely, 1) preserving and promoting right order in the moral world, and 2) completing and restoring that same order through retribution for merit and demerit, as justice requires.

Preliminary remarks. The two ends distinguished by the thesis can ultimately be reduced, in view of their general object common to both, to one general end, which consists in effectively sustaining moral order. Yet they are properly considered separately, both because they indicate different functions with respect to this order and encompass it under different aspects, and because modern naturalism does not contradict both of them in the same way. In accordance with the first end, reward and punishment provide for moral order beforehand, prior to the free determination of human beings, and morally influence that determination; everyone readily agrees that the essential character of reward and punishment is contained in this. In accordance with the second end, they concern the order of the moral world subsequently to the exercise of human freedom, since they presuppose good or evil acts already freely performed. The rational order they have directly as their object is the order of justice alone (that is, the quantitative proportion of rational beings among themselves and in relation to the whole community of the moral world, whose supreme provider and guardian is recognized to be God himself). This is the end for which materialist philosophy cannot give an account, especially insofar as it pertains to the expiatory character of punishment, and which it therefore considers one of the obsolete prejudices of the human race.

Proof of Part I. By their intrinsic character, reward and punishment have a relation to the human will insofar as it is the elective principle of moral actions. But in this respect reward and punishment intrinsically pertain to preserving and promoting right order in the moral world. Therefore they must be said to be essentially ordered to this end.

Proof of the minor premise. In view of human nature, which is driven by an essential impulse toward happiness, it cannot be denied that reward and punishment present to the human will a motive not only suited in itself to it but also most effective in abstaining from moral evil and doing good. Now the provident preservation and promotion of moral order consists precisely in this free will’s abstention from evil and its being drawn toward good, whereby freedom, while remaining intact, is strengthened against its own inconstancy as it pursues right order. Therefore, etc.

Proof of Part II.

Argument I. Reward and punishment have an intrinsic correlation with the character of moral merit and demerit (213). But according to this correlation they essentially pertain to the order of justice, which is to be completed by retribution for merit and restored by retribution for demerit (expiation). Therefore this itself must be recognized as the essential end of reward and punishment.

Proof of the minor premise. Reward and punishment, considered in their correlation with moral merit and demerit, are precisely that by which the ideal requirement denoted by the concepts of merit and demerit is actually satisfied. But this requirement has as its formal object the integrity of the order of justice, or quantitative proportion in the moral world. This integrity is completed by retribution of good for good and restored by retribution of evil for evil (nos. 203–204). Therefore, etc.

Argument II, from the common and invincible conviction of mankind. Such is the “sense of justice” of all human beings who use reason: with the same immediate evidence by which all grasp the idea of merit and demerit, they likewise recognize as a rational requirement a term correlated with each of these moral relations—namely, retribution of good for merit and vindictive retribution of evil for demerit—and they recognize it for its own sake, without any eudaimonistic regard for some other good or advantage, whether private or social. Therefore this rational conviction must correspond to an objective rational truth.

Proof of the antecedent. As to 1 (with a view to reward). This is clearly shown by: a) the commonly acknowledged natural duty by which everyone owes at least an expression of gratitude to a benefactor for a generous act of charity, and for neglecting which, by common consent, one is judged deserving of blame; b) the bestowal of honor and praise, which is customarily offered spontaneously by all to outstanding merit in virtue (especially social virtue), provided they are guided by reason rather than envy or some other wrongful feeling.

As to 2 (with a view to punishment). The following helps both to elucidate and prove this: a) the very impulse to avenge an injury implanted in human beings. For although it must be said to contradict right reason insofar as it urges one, out of subjective desire, to exact private vengeance—since, according to the social order of nature, this function of justice is reserved to social authority—it is nevertheless founded in rational nature insofar as it expresses an objective debt of satisfaction by which an injury must be repaired, either voluntarily or through imposition; b) the common satisfaction of all good people and of public morality, which is ordinarily felt and expressed whenever more atrocious crimes are expiated by condign punishments; and, conversely, the feeling of pain or indignation when such crimes happen to escape their deserved punishments.

216. Corollaries: I. Since God is the author and supreme ordainer of the physical as well as the moral world, it follows that providing for right order in the moral world by suitable means, and to this end establishing rewards and punishments for moral merit and demerit, belongs essentially and in itself to God alone; it belongs to human authority only by God’s mandate and communicated power.

II. Reward and punishment, considered in relation to their first essential end, correspond to the wisdom of the one who governs the order, whether in his own right or by commission; in relation to the second, they correspond to his justice. Therefore, in view of wisdom, whose function is to choose only means suitable to the end, rewards and punishments must be such as to offer human freedom a psychologically sufficiently effective motive for faithfully observing the moral order: that is, they must in themselves outweigh all the reasons by which the human will, surrounded by the allurements of evil, is enticed to abandon the path of right order. In view of justice, however, they must contain retribution quantitatively proportionate to merit and demerit.

III. Punishment, considered in its final relation to justice, is rightly conceived as the reaction of moral order against violation of order, or as the victorious affirmation of the objective inviolability of that order against the rebellious denial of the will.

IV. Just as three modes of moral merit and demerit are distinguished according as a good or evil act is meritorious or demeritorious directly and primarily in relation to the individual, social, or universal order, so reward and punishment likewise share an analogous diversity, according as they are directed directly and primarily to preserving, completing, or restoring the first, second, or third of these orders. Hence, in its first relation to demerit, the retribution of punishment is ordered primarily to individual good, namely, the offender’s correction, and only secondarily and remotely to social and universal good. Conversely, in the retribution of punishment in its second and third relations, social or universal good is considered primarily, and the individual good of the offender only secondarily or in third place. This difference with respect to the proximate and immediate end does not at all prevent the ultimate end of every reward and punishment from rightly being called the universal order alone, since the social and individual orders are organically subordinated to it as its parts.

V. It belongs to God as author of nature to provide for right order in the moral world in a similar way, by means of nature. Therefore we see that whatever in the natural order of things is understood to have the character of reward or punishment is in fact arranged by the most wise economy of creation so as to attain its effect (retribution of good for good and of evil for evil) through the secondary causes of nature themselves. For under God’s natural providence we experience every day, by a certain general law, that morally meritorious actions (whether in relation to the individual, social, or universal order) by their very nature produce certain good effects or fruits connatural to them, and these are analogous to those three orders; similarly, evil effects naturally correspond to demeritorious actions.

217. Scholium. Natural rewards and punishments, insofar as they pertain to the sanction of natural law, will be treated more specifically below. Yet, to illustrate in particular what is asserted more generally above in Corollary V, it remains to indicate the principal points concerning those things in the moral world that plainly exhibit such natural retribution, varying according to the different character of moral merit and demerit under the three levels of moral order that the agent either fulfills or violates. And indeed:

  1. Corresponding naturally to the individual order, which consists in the restraint of all appetites under the governance of reason, as analogous retribution are a) for merit: the judgment of reason that approves, or peace of conscience; integrity and health of mind and body; serenity of spirit; a longer life, etc.; b) for demerit: the judgment of reason that reproaches and condemns, or remorse of conscience; illnesses of body and mind; the yoke of concupiscence and its many bitterness; a life deprived of every true comfort and joy; premature death or an unhappy old age, etc.

  2. Corresponding naturally to the social order, for merit and demerit, are on the one hand esteem, praise, honor, good reputation, glory, and peaceful enjoyment of life and goods; on the other, contempt, blame, disgrace, the stain on one’s name, infamy, and manifold disruption of social existence. To these are added countless other kinds of good and evil, which ordinarily arise for the community itself from observing or violating the social order and from there redound to its members. For example, on the one hand, domestic and public peace with all the fruits of private and public prosperity; on the other, disturbance of peace and security, conflicts, hatred, killings, upheavals, and wars, which at the same time obstruct the sources of countless social goods, both material and spiritual, such as, for example, the cultivation of minds through the sciences, literature, and the arts. These things occur purely by nature; for I omit the additional punishments for social crimes to be determined by positive law through social authority.

  3. Finally, corresponding to the universal order, as a reward for the merit of persevering faithfully in its observance is attainment of natural happiness; as punishment for grave and unrepaired demerit, the privation of that same happiness, or the supreme natural evil. And since both the individual and social orders are contained as constituent parts within the universal order, and no merit or demerit can be acquired in relation to either of them that does not also redound mediately to this universal order, it follows that the character of reward and punishment specifically and individually suited to those orders is not yet in itself complete, but has its completion reserved for the retribution corresponding to the universal order.

Liber III: Book Three. The Complete Norm of Human Acts, or Law

Liber IV: Book Four. The Human Being’s Subjective Moral Formation

Sectio II: Social Right in General

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