Theodor Meyer, Ius naturae generale
Institutiones iuris naturalis, Pars I: Ius naturae generale
First published 1906
Theodor Meyer’s Ius naturae generale from the second corrected edition (1906), in Latin with an original English translation. Preface and proemium included; the navigational contents and publisher advertisements are excluded.
Introductio I: Preface
Introduction
Sectio I: General Ethics
Liber I: Book One. The Natural Elements and Conditions of Human Action
Liber II: Book Two. The Moral Attributes of the Human Act
Chapter I. Morality
On morality.
Article 1.
On morality in general.
§ 1. On the nature of morality.
- We are accustomed to call morality, in general, that property of human actions according to which they are judged either good (morally good, right), or bad (not morally good, not right), or indifferent under the aspect of goodness or badness.1 That this property of actions, their freedom being presupposed, is grounded in their relation to an end is clear from what was generally premised in the first chapter about natural action (nn. 31–34). Therefore, where the proper end of human actions is known with certainty, the nature of morality cannot be in doubt; but where one errs in determining the end itself, sound teaching about the nature of morality cannot be expected either—a fact confirmed by the whole history of philosophy. Cicero puts it aptly: “When an end has been established in philosophy, everything has been established. For in other matters, whether something has been overlooked or left unknown, the disadvantage is no greater than the value of each matter in which something was neglected. But if the highest good is unknown, it is necessary to be ignorant of the way of life. From this follows so great an error that people cannot know to what harbor they should retreat. But when the ends of things are known, and it is understood what the ultimate limit of goods and evils is, the way of life has been discovered, and the ordering of all duties has been established.”2
To guard against errors of every kind in this matter, two questions are proposed here for solution:
-
whether the distinction that, by common human judgment, intervenes between morally good and morally bad actions is grounded in some reason intrinsic and natural to the actions, or instead only in one extrinsic and accidental, derived, for example, from some arbitrary or historical act, whether human or divine.
-
And, if the reason for the distinction is affirmed to be intrinsic, what it is and in what, finally, it lies.
§ 2. The essential distinction between moral good and evil is asserted.
- Those who deny that the distinction which, by the common appraisal of people, intervenes between morally good and morally bad actions is objectively grounded in their nature nevertheless commonly posit some cause of it, but an external and positive one, by which they try in some way to explain the constant and so evident human judgment on this matter. Hence their doctrine is comprehended under the common name moral positivism.3
In the broadest and less proper sense, the moral philosophy of those who directly profess crude or mechanical materialism may be referred to this position. For they, just as they recognize no cause of intellectual operations other than a material one, recognize no cause of moral ideas and judgments other than one likewise material, for example, one situated in physical or chemical modifications of the brain.4 Yet it is clear that these thinkers deny not so much the intrinsic reason for the moral distinction among actions as they remove every foundation of morality altogether.
- Thus, setting these thinkers aside, the assertors of moral positivism are reduced to roughly two classes:
The first class consists of those who declare that the reason for the moral distinction originates from man himself or at least depends on a human cause, and is therefore not natural but positive. It is clear that these thinkers, too, indirectly pave the way for materialism. But some institution can originate in or depend upon man in different ways: either by the plan and determination of human authority, or apart from a plan, through the cooperation of various causes, whether psychological or social, by which certain human moral judgments and hence moral precepts have gradually become more or less common, and have ultimately been sanctified either by the opinion of peoples or by education. And in fact we see that all those who have tried to recommend that absurd hypothesis have resorted to one or the other of these modes of explanation. They have derived the moral quality of human actions:
-
- Some from civil laws. This doctrine was taught systematically above all by Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), closely connected with his whole theory concerning the origin of society. Among other things, he professes: “The rules of good and evil, just and unjust, morally good and morally bad, are civil laws; therefore, what the legislator commands must be regarded as good, and what he forbids as bad.… Before governments, just and unjust did not exist.… Every action is by its nature indifferent; that it is just or unjust proceeds from the right of the one who commands. Legitimate kings, therefore, make just what they command by commanding it, and unjust what they forbid by forbidding it.”5 The same writer repeatedly discusses theoretically the preeminence of divine and natural law over all human laws, and things naturally illicit and naturally commanded.6 At the same time, he warns that “there can be no civil law that is not contrary to natural law unless it has been enacted (directly) in insult to God,” since natural law “commands that all civil laws be observed.”7 What Hobbes concluded in his own time in favor of royal absolutism, J. J. Rousseau concluded on similar principles nearly a century later in favor of national absolutism. Finally, recognize a worthy offspring of both in the modern idolatry of the state introduced by Hegelian philosophy, which likewise lays down absolute obedience to civil laws.
Hobbes’s opinion, but adapted more to modern realism, was revived in more recent times to some extent by J. H. v. Kirchmann,8 who sought to establish the principle of authority as apparent in human affairs, and its absolute reverence against individual criticism. He teaches that “the command of authority is the only and ultimate reason for all moral goodness and right,” and that it is so formally as such, independently of its “matter,” which always remains variable with the passage of time and for which no absolute norm exists.9 Moreover, he recognizes all morality of this kind based on law as necessary only relatively and, as it were, temporarily, according to the degree of the human race’s imperfect intellectual development.10
-
- Others have considered public opinion and the tradition of peoples to be the chief norm of morality. Among these is Saint-Lambert,11 (1717–1803), who, devoted to the vulgar naturalism of his century, undertook to reform the whole science of morals on merely anthropological principles. He therefore supposes that moral doctrine, originally derived from some instinct of utility, was gradually developed and established through various social influences, with the addition of popular opinion; he considers its most universal principles to be discovered by ethnological inquiries.
Already, in a similar way, Montaigne12 (1533–1592), although he arrived at this not from a materialistic or atheistic principle in itself, but rather from a certain itch for skepticism, tried to explain the reason for distinctions in moral judgments chiefly through the influence of education.
- Those who in more recent times either advocate atheism and what they call an “independent” morality, and undertake to free the human race especially from religious “prejudices,” resort much more openly and freely to these and analogous evasions13, or they endeavor to reconstruct every science, including ethics, from nearly Darwinian principles by the sole empirical-historical method.
In particular, these belong to that group:
a) The theory of Ed. v. Hartmann, who teaches that moral good and evil are not properties that objectively belong to beings or their actions, but only judgments about them, depending on the varying degree of development of each person’s consciousness.14
b) The pseudophilosophical school commonly called “positivism,” whose first founder and leader in France was Auguste Comte (1798–1857).15 In England, John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), the chief leader of “utilitarianism” after Bentham, then developed Comte’s doctrine and widely propagated it in his writings.16
This philosophy is called “positivism” because, scorning metaphysical deductions, it recognizes no teachings of “science” other than those that are “positive,” that is, historical and empirical. Although, therefore, it does not initially deny the internal and essential reason for the moral distinction among actions, by this very skeptical limitation of science it either tacitly rejects that reason or leaves it in doubt. For once the source of metaphysical cognition is rejected, what else do historical experience, anthropological and ethnological phenomena, in themselves and directly, report about morally good and bad, just and unjust, except the history of people’s moral judgments and their practice of morals among peoples at various stages of development? But “science” of the inner nature of morality cannot be drawn immediately from this source. For even if, perhaps, empirical observation and induction alone could in some measure establish some common objective reason for common moral judgments of this kind (they teach that this reason is roughly social utility), that would nevertheless signify not so much the internal quality of actions as a common psychological fact. From this, however, a certain kinship of this philosophy with the system of “moral empiricism” is apparent; the latter will be discussed below.
c) The ethics of social evolution, which represents the most recent form of “social utilitarianism” (see below, “Principles of Morality,” nos. 163–167), adapted partly to the principles of Spencer and partly to those of Darwin, and for some time eagerly cultivated in Germany as “scientific philosophy” (to distinguish it from “speculative philosophy”).17 According to this theory, the beginning of all morality is marked by individual egoism, common to all animals. Through manifold struggle and social experience, over countless generations it gradually develops spontaneously, along with the very forms of social life and through successive stages of civilization, into social egoism. Thus experiences of greater and more harmonious utility, accepted not by individuals but by whole generations over the course of history and transmitted by inheritance, are, as rules of morals in the social consciousness of men, “codified,” as it were, together with a certain social sanction grounded in real necessity. From this they ultimately display the character of a moral sense innate in nature.18
But, according to this explanation, it is clear that morality ultimately originates entirely from society; that the objective reason for good and evil can be neither internal to actions nor essential to them, but is always relative to the varying degree of social development, by which the harmonious reason of social utility is also to be measured objectively.19 Such, then, is “evolutionism” with respect to moral science. What, however, if the same view, rejecting every stable metaphysical foundation of truth, is generally applied to the whole complex of human knowledge, as we have already seen attempted in various ways for decades? This must necessarily give rise as a natural fruit to that peculiar skepticism called “relativism.” Supposing the perpetual evolution of things and powers in the physical and moral world, they consider all teachings of science now presented as certain to be proved only relatively true, that is, relative to the present period of evolution, while what would result in another period is unknown. Hence they conclude that nothing is absolutely and eternally true, but everything that appears simply true to our intellect must be called only relatively true. What a remarkable progress of modern naturalism, which leads to this despair of all true science! It is less surprising, however, that this unhappy Darwinian-Spencerian gospel could have spread so widely through almost every branch of science over the course of the nineteenth century, along with modern atheism or monism, which denies a personal God who rules the world providentially, that today the philosophy, indeed the science, of the nineteenth century—excepting its Christian part, largely as if proscribed—may not unjustly be said to be generally marked by this character of evolutionism.20
- The other class includes those who consider that every moral distinction among human actions must be derived from God’s free disposition. In particular:
Samuel Pufendorf (1632–1694), who, although he follows in the general foundations of natural law the footsteps of Grotius, in this matter attacks his doctrine and defends the directly contrary opinion, which he tries to establish above all with these arguments: “Since moral goodness, or moral necessity, and moral badness are attributes of human actions arising from their agreement or disagreement with a norm or law, and since law is the command of a superior, it is not apparent how moral goodness or badness can be understood before a law and apart from the imposition of a superior. And indeed those who posit, apart from divine imposition, some eternal rule of morality for human actions seem to me to do nothing other than join to God some external principle coeternal with him (!) that he himself had to follow in assigning forms to things. Moreover, everyone admits that God created man, like all things, by his most free will; hence it follows that it was according to his good pleasure what kind of nature he wished to assign to man. How, then, can any attribute belong to man’s action that proceeds by intrinsic and absolute necessity, apart from God’s imposition and good pleasure?”21
Before him, Descartes (1596–1650) had defended the same opinion, although on other grounds, teaching that there can be no reason of truth or goodness antecedent to, but only consequent upon, the determination of the divine will.22
But we, together with the sound philosophy of all ages, assert against all moral positivism:
- Thesis XV. Besides positive moral goodness or badness, which may belong to many actions only extrinsically, namely, as a consequence of a freely instituted legal norm, there is another, natural moral quality, which inheres in some actions so intrinsically that it in no way depends on the arbitrary will of anyone, not even the divine will.
Preliminary remarks. The present question does not concern the merely positive moral goodness or badness of actions mentioned in the thesis, nor do we undertake to prove that here. For, along with our opponents, we do not deny that there are many actions that are called and are morally good only because they are commanded by some law, and similarly many actions that are bad because they are prohibited; for this reason the moral distinction is called positive or extrinsic. The thesis therefore affirms nothing other than that, in addition, there is an intrinsic moral distinction by which some—not all—actions are naturally morally good or bad, that is, not because they are commanded or prohibited, but, on the contrary, because they are understood to be commanded or prohibited because they are in themselves morally good or bad.
- Proof I. From the metaphysical concept of natural moral goodness or badness. By its concept, moral goodness designates the right ordering of free acts as such; and a free action is to be considered rightly ordered when it is directed by a free choice of the will toward an end that adequately corresponds to nature, or, which is the same thing, toward a good truly suited to the whole nature. Therefore, with respect to a rational being, the concepts of moral goodness and of a good suited to nature are interchangeable (see above, no. 45). Hence one may reason as follows:
For a human action to be truly called intrinsically honorable or intrinsically dishonorable, it is required and sufficient that, considered per se, it be either of such a kind that it cannot fail to be directed toward a good of nature fitting to the whole, or of such a kind that it plainly conflicts with this per se and is therefore incapable of having any direction other than one simply opposed to the end of the whole of nature. But among human actions considered per se there are some in which the former condition is manifestly verified, and others in which the latter is. For who would deny that an act of love toward God, who is the end of human nature and a good simply fitting to it (n. 61), is per se, indeed formally, directed toward a truly fitting good, while an act of hatred toward God is essentially contrary to this? Other actions, too, share this same character of turning toward or away from nature’s end, insofar as they are informed in some way by those acts and tend either toward something per se congruent with the divine nature, such as love of neighbor for God’s sake or as reflecting God’s likeness, or, on the contrary, toward something per se repugnant to the divine nature, such as lying, hatred of neighbor, and so on. Therefore there are actions that by their nature and intrinsic distinction are honorable or dishonorable23 150. Proof II. From the common and invincible persuasion of mankind. However much human judgments about the moral quality of a particular action may differ, and may be subject to various errors, either through the inadequacy of our intellectual faculty or through the influence of a will given over to passions, this nevertheless is common to all human beings endowed with the use of reason: in their intimate conscience they feel and judge, with an invincible persuasion, that human actions are by no means all morally indifferent, but that there is some most certain distinction by which some are held and are honorable, while others are dishonorable. They are persuaded with the same certainty that this distinction, continually confirmed by the voice of conscience, whether warning or reproaching, is such in many actions that it can never be changed by any circumstances, by any consideration of advantage or disadvantage, by any variation of time, place, or persons—not even by God. Nor is it an obstacle that some people externally profess the contrary, since they do so not through a truly intellectual judgment, but rather by the will’s choice, as it were forcibly, trying, that is, to persuade themselves of it if somehow they could. For the rest, whatever such people subjectively feel, they can take nothing away from mankind’s persuasion, which history no less than psychology testifies has been and remains common to all peoples and ages, and which pagan philosophy also generally presupposes. For Aristotle, an excellent observer of human affairs, is not to be considered as reporting merely his own opinion, but rather what he saw to be the common judgment of mankind, when he writes: “But not every action nor every affection admits a mean. For some affections have wickedness implied in their very names, such as malicious joy at another’s misfortune, shamelessness, envy; and likewise some actions, such as theft, adultery, and murder. All these and others of this kind are censured not because of their excesses or deficiencies, but because they are evil in themselves: in them no one can ever act rightly, but must always sin.”24 But a persuasion so universal, so constant, and invincible must be founded in rational nature itself and consequently enjoys the testimony of an infallible criterion of truth. Therefore etc.
-
Proof III. By excluding all moral positivism; specifically,
-
according to the hypothesis of human institution.
a) Every effect presupposes a cause adequately proportioned to it. But whatever kind of human institution positivists resort to, they cannot produce anything that could be a cause proportionate to an effect so universal and so constant through every variation of things and times, so invincible and indelible against the lower appetite and the enticements of unrestrained license, as the very persuasion of mankind that we considered in the preceding argument. For nothing in the life and history of peoples is more variable and subject to the innumerable accidental changes of regions and times than the laws and policies of rulers, people’s assessment of what is useful, the customary opinions of peoples together with the corresponding education of the young, or any other contingent social influence that one might conceive, distinct from the essential guidance of rational nature. If, however, we observe some common and stable element in these things as well, that element is manifestly not the cause, but the effect of an earlier common persuasion that depends on no accidental influence.
b) Under nature’s guidance, people judge civil laws and the opinions of peoples themselves, just like individual human actions, under the aspect of morality, and often affirm with invincible persuasion that they are either good and just or dishonorable, perverse, and unjust. They therefore hold as certain both that no assent should be given to perverse opinions, however widely diffused, and that laws commanding dishonorable things should not be obeyed, or cannot be obeyed without dishonor. The criterion of morality can therefore lie neither in civil laws themselves, nor in some opinion of human beings, nor in any human institution or contingency. Indeed, who could have fallen so far from sound judgment as to say, or endure someone saying, that perjury, parricide, the slaughter of the innocent, brigandage, adultery, and treason against country and friends are actions per se “indifferent,” and therefore wicked only because they happen to be prohibited by civil law or condemned by custom? To state this error is already to refute it.
c) As for the doctrine of Hobbes in particular, it must collapse of itself simply because (as will be shown in its proper place below) it rests on a most false foundation: namely, the absurd fiction of an original state of human beings resembling that of brutes, which he calls “natural,” and which was succeeded by the social state through a “social contract.” 2. According to the hypothesis of free divine institution.
a) Whatever is true with metaphysical certainty is absolutely true in such a way that it can never, under any hypothesis, not even by God, be or become false. Such is, for example, the truth that twice two is four, that a circle is round, and similar truths, whose contradictory is understood to be absurd for every intellect, whether created or uncreated. But the honesty of some actions and the dishonesty of others are asserted with the same metaphysical certainty; this is just as if one were to say: actions or final movements that are per se in conformity with nature’s end cannot, as such, at the same time be nonconforming to that same end; and actions per se opposed to it cannot at the same time be in conformity with it (cf. Proof I). Therefore the divine will could no more make dishonorable, or vice versa, what is understood to be honorable in this way than it could make a circle square.
b) The contrary arguments that are brought forward are entirely empty. To Pufendorf, then, we reply: metaphysical necessity, logically prior to and independent of the free divine will, in no way presupposes some “principle coeternal with God and external to him” on which it is founded; for it cannot be unknown to any philosopher, even a mediocre one, that, although it is not founded in God’s free will, it is nevertheless founded in the divine essence. Nor does the same author fare better when he resorts to God’s “most free will,” by which God created the human being as well as the world, and concludes from this that “it was in God’s good pleasure what kind of nature he wished to assign to the human being,” or what rule for moral action. For we deny that in freely creating the human being God also created the ideal essence or exemplar idea of the human being, since this, like the idea or internal possibility of other created things, is eternal by virtue of the divine eternity and founded in God’s essence. Accordingly, although the existence of the human being (according to this idea and essence) is not necessary but willed with complete freedom, it by no means follows that those things which intrinsically follow from human essence or nature were likewise brought about by God’s free will.
The whole argument of Descartes, however, proceeds from an erroneous conception of divine freedom, which at this point we may rightly assume has been sufficiently refuted in theodicy—if indeed an opinion so absurd per se needs any refutation. For who in his right mind could persuade himself that the essential independence, freedom, or omnipotence of the divine will requires that even the intellectual order and the internal possibility of things depend on its free good pleasure?
- Scholium. Although Grotius was otherwise right on these matters (“De iure belli ac pacis” l. 1, c. 1, § 10), he nevertheless mixed error with truth by exaggerating. Indeed, from what has been said above it is easy to see that what he adds elsewhere in the same work (Prolegom. 11), while professing the same doctrine concerning the morality of actions, is neither true per se nor harmless in its consequences: “These things would indeed have some place, even if we granted what cannot be granted without the greatest crime: that God does not exist, or that he does not care about human affairs.” In these words, as I am quite willing to think, Grotius seems to have meant only this: our judgments about the moral distinction among actions are founded in rational nature in such a way that, if rational nature alone is supposed and persists in its integrity with all its essential aspects, those judgments would remain intact even if, absurdly, God were thought not to exist. So understood, that statement—which, I think, many have judged too severely—is not entirely without truth, insofar as the judgments are understood as merely speculative judgments about honorableness or dishonorableness. Yet, however mildly it is put, it is false insofar as it is supposed to include, besides the theoretical account of what is honorable or dishonorable, also the account of what is naturally commanded or forbidden. For the bond of obligation, as will be shown below, arises neither from rational nature nor from the nature of actions, but from the will of God, insofar as he is the author of nature and the absolutely holy legislator of human beings.
But whatever Grotius himself intended, it cannot be denied that the same statement, taken in its obvious sense, per se contains the seeds of that most disastrous error which Kant began to spread through moral philosophy like a deadly poison: namely, an error that detaches all morality, every rule of right action, and even moral obligation itself from God and religion, and derives them solely from human reason, as the supreme and independent legislator of humanity. Hence, as a corollary, we see the whole of social life likewise emancipating itself more and more from God’s government and every bond of religion.
§ 3. On the ontological ground of the internal moral distinction among actions, or on the “principle of morality.”
-
Since it is certain that there is an intrinsic distinction between the honorable and the dishonorable, we conclude with no less certainty that there is some ground of this distinction—not subjective and variable, but objective, or ontological and invariable—according to which actions must formally possess honorableness, baseness, or neither, that is, moral indifference if considered per se. This ontological and formal ground of the moral distinction among actions, insofar as it is stated in the form of some rule or ontological criterion, is also commonly called by modern writers the “principle of morality” (Moralprinzip). Many, however, wrongly include under this name at the same time the supreme principle of natural law, or of natural duties, since the one differs from the other just as the honorable differs from a precept; the difference between them will become clear from what is said below about obligation. For although everything dishonorable, as such, is understood to be naturally forbidden as well, not everything we know to be honorable per se is thereby also commanded, so that it would be wrong to omit it.
-
As far as the matter itself is concerned, the question of the genuine principle of morality has already been entirely settled for us; or, if anything remains to be solved, its full solution requires only that we draw from premises already certain a conclusion no less certain and unshaken, and cast it as fully as possible in the form of an objective rule or ontological criterion. For since every natural movement can be called right or not right only according to whether or not it is directed toward the goal naturally appointed to it (nn. 31–33), it is evident that a human act, too, is objectively right or not right according as, precisely as a human act—that is, by the free choice of the will—it is truly directed or not directed toward its end, which is God himself, to be possessed spiritually and glorified by this possession. Thus, once the true end of the human being is known, the very concept of honorableness and dishonorableness already implicitly denotes the objective ground of each as well (n. 149). Nevertheless, it will be useful to explain the same matter more fully, both negatively, by considering various errors opposed to it, and positively, by investigating what is, as it were, its most formal and absolute root, and by seeking a formulation that through its immediate evidentness can serve the human intellect as an objective criterion for discerning the general ground of the honorable and the dishonorable, or as a true “principle of morality.”
-
A. Disagreement among philosophers in establishing the “principle of morality.” All who do not profess open “moral positivism” must agree, at least, that a reason is to be found in the actions themselves—that is, in some property of them, whatever it may be—on account of which some are judged morally good per se and others bad. Most of them also agree in supposing, either explicitly or implicitly, some end of nature or some supreme good of nature, from whose final relation goodness or badness is derived in actions. But they differ very widely in rightly judging and determining the supreme good and end of nature itself. Thus, that common notion of the honorable or dishonorable taken in the most general sense, by which they recognize that it consists in conformity or nonconformity with nature’s end or good, by no means prevents them from disagreeing as much as possible when determining this relation more particularly and thus proposing a principle of morality. It is therefore no wonder that not a few of them depart from “moral positivism” more in empty words than in fact: namely, all those who place the supreme good of nature not in something objectively determinate in itself, but in something by its own nature variously conditioned and relative, and variable according to accidental circumstances. Thus nothing in moral philosophy has ever been said more truly than Cicero’s words already quoted above (n. 141): “If the supreme good is unknown, the way of life must be unknown.”
Indeed, it would take too long to note individually all the errors into which ancient and modern philosophers have fallen when establishing a principle of morality; it would take even longer to weigh all the divergent opinions on this subject, more or less approximating the truth, since even a small volume could be filled merely by listing them25. It is more useful to divide into certain classes all the principles of morality ever proposed or even conceivable, according to some characteristic by which they differ in the most general way, so that this kind of concise survey may make it easier and safer to estimate and judge the value of each from the common character they share. For in all of them one finds a character either eudaemonistic or deontological-rational in some degree predominant, or even present exclusively; thus sensual eudaemonism on the one hand and pure moral rationalism, or moral stoicism, on the other occupy the two extreme limits of the whole series of existing “principles of morality.” Those counted as intermediate between the two participate in varying ways and degrees in one or the other of these general characters, whether eudaemonistic or deontological-rational. Nothing, therefore, prevents us from reducing all principles of morality, according to this most general appraisal, to roughly two classes and designations: one comprising eudaemonistic principles, the other deontological-rational ones. We shall again subdivide each according to their various modes and degrees. With these preliminaries, it is useful to survey the chief principles of both classes in a summary overview; I say “survey,” since no one of them can be explained more fully without also expounding the entire philosophical system that corresponds to it and contains, as it were, its seeds. A fuller exposition is rightly reserved for the history of philosophy.
I. Eudaemonistic principles of morality.
-
Subjective or individual eudaemonism26. To this belong:
-
a) Moral Epicureanism (hedonism or sensual eudaemonism), professed among the ancients by the school of Aristippus of Cyrene and Epicurus (whence it also acquired its common name). Epicurus placed man’s supreme good and ultimate end in pleasure, and evil in pain; he placed the highest pleasure in the complete absence of pain. He therefore considered the supreme rule of life, common to human beings and other animals, to be to flee pain and seek pleasure. He denied that reason or argument was needed to recommend this, since, with nature as guide, the senses themselves supply the criterion27
In practice, however, he explains the same rule as follows: “Since pleasure is the first and innate good, we therefore do not choose every pleasure; rather, we often pass over many pleasures when greater distress follows from them, and we consider some pains preferable to pleasures, whenever greater pleasure follows from enduring the pains for a long time. . . . For at certain times we use the good as if it were evil, and conversely, the evil as if it were good.”28 Hence, according to Epicurus’ principle of morality, human actions are to be judged morally good or bad according as, after a prudent assessment of things and the course of life as a whole, they seem ultimately likely to bring more pleasure than pain or, conversely, more pain than pleasure.
- Among more recent thinkers, a multitude of materialists and quasi-materialists follow much the same doctrine, either explicitly or implicitly. In the eighteenth century they began with particular effort to drag moral philosophy down from its Christian elevation and profane it. The chief leaders in this work of corruption to be named are de Lamettrie29 (1709–1751); de Condillac30 (1715–1780); Helvetius31 (1715–1771); Diderot32) (1713–1784); the author of the book:
“Systeme de la nature”33 (1770); de Chasseboeuf, Count of Volney34 (1757–1820), and others. The advocates of modern materialism differ from them only in that, boasting of the contrived apparatus of what they call “exact science,” they deceive unwary minds far more easily. This “philosophy” by no means changes its native character even when, as often happens among people of more refined culture, it assumes more subtle forms, tempered by prudent moderation and the decency of social life. Under Epicurus’ guidance they understand that such moderation is needed in each enjoyment, lest either the powers of enjoyment be prematurely exhausted or, through the disturbance of social order, the common conditions for enjoyment fail. Indeed, they want it to be part of the progress of modern culture that the whole of the old ethics—that is, the ethics built on human life and destiny as immortal—be gradually replaced by a new ethics, adapted only to the conditions of this present life and resting not on metaphysical but solely on empirical foundations. And they even dare to proclaim this wholly atheistic moral philosophy, which they call “positive,” and whose supreme principle is none other than Epicurus’ principle of carnal prudence, as the ethics of the future age (“die Moral der Zukunft”)35. 158. b) Individual utilitarianism, which says that the rule of good and evil, just and unjust, is nothing other than utility in relation to those ends of life which each person, in pursuit of his own happiness, has set for himself to attain. It is clear in itself that this principle differs from the preceding one in name more than in reality. Both have an exclusively earthly, subjective, and contingent foundation; consequently, they also share the common character of “moral positivism,” which teaches that every moral distinction among actions has been contingently introduced by human beings: they do not so much explain the genuine morality of human acts as remove it altogether.
There were also those who, not so much from a preconceived philosophical principle as from a certain subjective pessimism and a kind of despair about any moral elevation of the human being, thought that in the end one must rest on egoism alone, both in practice and in theory. Thus, already in the seventeenth century, La Rochefoucauld, not unlike Hobbes in this respect, found almost nothing expressed in human nature except the invincible impulse of self-love; hence he judged that self-interest is the sole motive of all human actions, even those adorned with the praise of virtue and appearing most remote from every individual interest36
-
c) A different and nobler form of individual eudaemonism was professed by Aristotle (384–322 BC), a native of Stagira in Thrace. He was first a pupil of Plato for twenty years; after Plato’s death, having visited various neighboring peoples and princely courts, he founded his philosophical school at Athens, which thereafter surpassed the others not only in renown but especially in its influence on the development of the sciences, under the name “Peripatetic school”37. Less approving of Plato’s ideal elevation, he turned his studies toward a more empirical realism of life. Aristotle derives the principle of ethics from happiness or the supreme human good—not absolute, as Plato had considered it, but supreme in a relative sense: that is, what a human being can attain in this present life according to its conditions, and what is set before him as the supreme end of all rational activity on earth38. He does not think this good consists in the pleasure of the senses, nor in some state or potentiality of the soul, but solely in activity (ἐνέργεια) proper to the human being as rational and perfected precisely as such. Its completion is found in the noblest operation of the mind (νοῦ), namely, in the “contemplation” (θεωρητική) of honorable and divine things (καλῶν καὶ θείων). And since rational activity (ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγου) is likewise activity in accordance with virtue (ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ’ ἀρετήν), he teaches that the supreme human good consists in activity constantly conformed to reason or virtue39. He also says that external goods are necessary for a happy life, but not for their own sake: only as necessary supports of virtue and happiness40. Finally, he acknowledges that pleasure, although it is not itself the object of human happiness, nevertheless follows it naturally and necessarily41. Thus Aristotle’s principle of morality is eudaemonistic insofar as it derives the ground and measure of moral goodness in human actions from their relation to perfect human happiness.
-
- Social eudaemonism. Taken broadly, this class includes all systems of moral philosophy that place the objective ground of morality in some intrinsic relation of actions to the social and common good of all, or in their conformity with the demands of social nature; that is, systems founded in some way on the “principle of sociality,” even if they also partly include a deontological element. Such are:
-
a) Moral empiricism, cultivated especially in England and propagated under the influence of Locke’s empirical philosophy. Among the first authors of this system, Richard Cumberland (1632–1719) must be named; he thought that all morality could be founded on human beings’ mutual social benevolence42. Its principal cultivator, however, was the Earl of Shaftesbury43 (1671–1713), bound to Locke by friendship. Beginning from psychological experience alone, he undertakes to learn good and evil from human nature; for he is persuaded that anything a human being does contrary to nature’s guidance is evil. Moreover, he finds that the propensities of nature itself are of two kinds: some “idiopathic” (egoistic), which have a person’s private and personal good as their object; others “sympathetic” (social), which have the common or social good as their object. Since the latter are superior to the former and are properly natural to a rational subject, he teaches that they should have primacy, while the others are not to be neglected but contained in harmonious subordination beneath them. In this way, both the common good and the individual and private good are best provided for. He therefore concludes that the true ground of moral goodness lies in preserving this very perfect harmony between a person’s sympathetic and idiopathic inclinations; accordingly, actions that accord with it—that is, actions proceeding especially from social benevolence and concern for the common good—are to be called good, while actions that serve egoism chiefly or oppose nature are, precisely for that reason, bad. He further holds that the moral sense in a human being corresponds perfectly to the practical application of this same objective rule of morality; he compares it to the aesthetic sense, since both perceive rational harmony: the aesthetic sense perceives aesthetic harmony, the moral sense moral harmony. Since this morality rests on nature considered empirically alone, it is easy to understand that religion is connected to it by no bond other than the external utility of sustaining and strengthening it more effectively in the mind.
The same moral philosophy underwent a distinctive development at the University of Glasgow in Scotland, which is why it came to be called the “Scottish school.” Thomas Reid44 (1704–1796), a professor at that university, became the school’s founder. To counter effectively the skepticism that David Hume (1711–1776) derived from empirical philosophy, he decided to equip it with some new principle of certainty, likewise empirical. He taught that an invincible such principle is the instinct for truth, naturally implanted in the human being and distinct from the intellect and its operation, which he called “common sense.” By its force a human being, through an immediate and natural impulse—that is, without being guided by a reason he has apprehended—embraces as certain certain most necessary truths of both the physical and metaphysical and moral orders. It followed that in moral philosophy, too, this same “sense” of nature was similarly to be elevated to the dignity of the supreme principle of morality: actions were to be called honorable or dishonorable insofar as they conformed or failed to conform to this empirical criterion. And indeed we see moral doctrine throughout the subsequent “Scottish school” founded almost entirely on this common principle, although this common sense receives different names from different writers and is called at one time “moral sense,” at another “rational instinct,” and at another “moral sympathy or antipathy.” For the rest, besides this evident criterion of morality, familiar to everyone, learned and unlearned alike, the school also acknowledged that there is an ontological ground of morality itself, which the intellect can reach with the moral sense as its prior guide and which accords with the demand of natural sociality. For this reason, it too is rightly included, as far as the matter is concerned, under the common designation “social eudaemonism.” — The Scottish school, and in particular its ethical system according to the principle of “moral sense,” was illustrated above all by Francis Hutcheson45 (1694–1747), likewise a professor at the University of Glasgow.
Besides these, there is quite a long series of writers who, whether in Scotland or England, followed the same or similar paths and each developed moral empiricism in his own way. Among them are Henry Hume (1696–1782); Adam Smith46 (1723–1790), who teaches that moral sympathy or antipathy is the rule of morals (he is otherwise more famous as the author of the modern system of social economy); Adam Ferguson47 (1724–1816); Dugald Stewart48 (1753–1828); Thom. Brown49 (1778–1820), and others.
-
b) Pufendorf’s principle of sociality. At almost the same time that in England the objective rule of morality began to be derived empirically from social nature, the same was done in Germany as well, but rather from metaphysical principles. Pufendorf (1632–1694), following Grotius’s lead in this matter, considered in the social requirements of nature not only phenomena of nature that were empirically certain, but also recognized in them the law of God as Author of nature, expressed and known by reason. Thus, by grounding all morality in God’s law, he did not overstep the limits of moral positivism, which he professed on other grounds (n. 147). For when he said that the moral distinction among actions had been positively introduced by God through the free creation of human nature (natural legislation), he understood that the objective rule for distinguishing moral good and evil could be drawn only from the law of nature itself. He admits that this rule, though not absolutely, is nevertheless hypothetically—that is, on the hypothesis of the present order of creation—entirely necessary, immutable, and fixed. Moreover, he considers the law of sociality to be “fundamental” and most universal among the laws expressed through human nature, and thus to be the source from which all natural human duties can be derived. Accordingly, Pufendorf and his school teach that the ontological distinction between the morally good and the morally bad lies in the conformity or nonconformity of actions with the law of sociality, naturally imposed and known by the light of reason.50
-
c) Social utilitarianism developed by modern “positivism.” The moral system included under this name presents the latest form of utilitarianism. First conceived in England after “moral empiricism,” it was soon very widely spread and continually developed; today, if not in society indiscriminately, then certainly in the “modern” science that has apostatized from Christian tradition, it has begun to gain ever greater influence and dominance. Indeed, in contempt of the old ethics built on metaphysical foundations, which is commonly disparaged as “dogmatic” or “intuitive,” it seeks to arrogate to itself the glorious name “scientific ethics,” as though by excellence, and with similar modesty proclaims itself “the ethics of the future” (Ethik der Zukunft). Almost the whole of English moral philosophy after Bacon and Locke shares this general character: it undertakes to investigate the concept of good and evil, right and wrong, directly by the empirical method. But this school goes further by widening the scope of experience: its empirical observation extends not only to psychological facts such as “moral sense” and the sense of “sympathy and social benevolence,” but generally to all phenomena subject to science, both psychological and anthropological, in the manner of “positive” science.51 (cf. n. 146 c).
The principal teacher and, as it were, founder of this moral school must be said to be Jeremy Bentham52 (1747–1832), not as the first inventor of the doctrine, but because he reduced to a certain systematic unity, by a “scientific” method, ideas supplied piecemeal by his predecessors Epicurus, Hobbes, Hume, Helvétius, Paley, and Priestley.53 For Bentham was the first, proceeding from individual egoism and applying its principle to society and public legislation, to construct a complete system of utilitarianism, private, social, and political. Like Helvétius in his contempt for the wisdom of the ancients and Christian tradition, he expects true knowledge even in moral matters only from the method of experimental observation commended by Locke and Bacon. “What experience is for the physicist,” he says, “observation is for the moralist.”54 Thus, after making observations, he finds this evident fact with Epicurus and affirms it as a principle: all people seek pleasure and flee pain. From this he immediately establishes the most general moral principle: “Every pleasure (plaisir) is prima facie some good and should be sought; likewise every pain (peine) is some evil and should be avoided.”55 And thus the first step of this “rigorous science” is a conclusion that is neither logical nor scientific. For, apart from the fact that Bentham, while enumerating various kinds of pleasure that can befall man, does not seem to have “observed” the one that belongs to the purely spiritual and rational order, he also abruptly introduces a moral obligation (“must”), without any clear account of where it comes from or by what right it is asserted; at the same time he makes it illusory by adding: “Each person is not only the best but also the sole competent judge of what is painful or pleasurable to him.”56 For the practical determination and completion of the first and fundamental principle, he adds a second: man ought to strive, throughout the duration of his existence, for the greatest possible sum of pleasurable good, using a prudent calculation of things that he calls “deontological,” and comparatively evaluating both pleasures and pains according to intensity, duration, certainty, proximity, extent, fecundity, and so on.57
In this way, Bentham thinks, this principle, although egoistic in itself, will nevertheless truly and effectively agree with the principle of sociality for a human being who by nature is constituted in society and under its conditions. For no one can fail to see how intimate a relation exists between general and individual happiness, since each is recognized as an essential condition of the other, and at once its cause and effect. — Accordingly, the supreme principle of morality is finally reduced to this definitive formulation of the law: So order all your activity that, insofar as possible, it produces the greatest sum of prosperity and the least of pain, not only for yourself but also for other people, or at least for the greatest possible number of other people.58
Bentham undertook this entire moral argument for no other purpose than to set out a sort of scientific preamble to the larger political work he was planning (Traite de legislation), which brought his name its principal fame. Since he considered the object of social legislation to be the same as that of the universal moral law, although more circumscribed by the requirements of social necessity and utility,59 he judged that one and the same supreme principle should be established for legislation as for morality: namely, the principle of the “maximization of happiness,” or common utility. In his customary fashion, he undertook to apply this by “calculation” in practice to the various subject matters of legislation.60 Thus, without regard to any higher end or divinely established order, all civil and penal legislation—and indeed the whole juridical order—is founded on that arithmetical utilitarianism.
-
Those who most closely followed Bentham’s footsteps in moral doctrine sought to perfect it less by further development than by carefully applied theoretical moderation. Not wishing to make even social utilitarianism as a whole rest on a merely egoistic principle, they preferred to call individual egoism the first and imperfect stage of nature in the development of a nobler utilitarianism that is properly social. Among others, James Mackintosh61 (1766–1832) pursued a path already partly marked out by Hartley, as did James Mill and Stuart Mill. — Above all, Stuart Mill contributed greatly to the philosophical refinement and wide dissemination of the system of utilitarianism.62 He set it forth lucidly and “scientifically”—that is, by the method of positivism—in his work “Utilitarianism”, leaving nothing untried to show that the supreme criterion of morality lies in the most general social utility, and to weaken in any way the objections raised by the “intuitive” ethics of the old school, while above all avoiding the odious stigma of crude Epicureanism. To this end, he distinguishes pleasurable goods not only quantitatively but qualitatively: some are of the lowest order and common to brute animals, while others belong to man’s higher faculties and, as such, are absolutely superior to them and worthy of far greater esteem.63 Hence, he claims, this doctrine makes scarcely any objective change in moral obligations; indeed, it reduces the exercise of all virtues, especially justice,64 to the application of utilitarianism as something supremely essential and prescribed for all. — But in truth all this proves nothing other than what is clear in itself: that only what accords with the rule of morality is truly good and useful to man and human society, or that the deontological order materially agrees with the eudaemonological order. It by no means follows, however, that something is therefore formally morally right and honorable because it has that relation of utility. And what force can an obligation have for restraining unaccountable impulses if it is founded solely on consciousness of social nature? — Perhaps the future education of the human race and the wider progress of civilization will provide a remedy; from these, the same author ultimately hopes, a flower of common happiness will wondrously arise on earth!
-
After Stuart Mill, social utilitarianism is represented above all by Bailey (1791–1870), Bain (born 1818), Spencer, and Darwin. The first merely follows the well-worn tracks of his predecessors without notable deviation.65 The others, however, modify the common theory with some innovation, more or less fundamental, by considering moral ideas under the influence of social evolution. Although Bain66 accepts with Stuart Mill that immutable norms of justice are absolutely necessary conditions for social existence, he nevertheless teaches that moral consciousness as such was not originally innate in man, but was produced partly by the natural instinct of self-love and sympathy and partly by the influence of society’s authority. Herbert Spencer (born 1820), the principal founder of the “theory of evolution,” endeavors by means of this theory and the “positive” method to raise the system of “utilitarianism” to a higher form. He acknowledges the common axiom of this school, according to which good and evil in actions are to be assessed by their positive or negative causal relation to the greatest sum of human (social) happiness; yet he denies that each person’s subjective appraisal of this relation, based on individual experience, can be considered a true and scientific norm of morality. “The object of ethics properly so called,” he says, “is to determine by inquiry how and why certain actions are harmful, while others are beneficial. These qualities cannot be merely contingent, but must necessarily follow from the order of things. Hence the first task of moral science is to learn, by deriving them from the laws of life and the conditions of existence, which actions are necessarily directed toward happiness and which toward unhappiness. And when it has done this, its deductions must be recognized and obeyed as laws of conduct, with no regard to any direct assessment of their happy or unhappy results.”67 Shortly afterward he adds68: “Laws of conduct can have no scientific value” (that is, in the sense of positivism) “from any other source than their derivation from causal connections that subsist between actions and their consequences.” — Indeed, nearly all of Spencer’s principal philosophical works, gathered under the name “system of synthetic philosophy,” converge on the goal of preparing a foundation on which such an ethics might eventually be established. To this end belong his “First Principles of Philosophy,” “Principles of Biology,” “Principles of Psychology,” and “Principles of Sociology,” all presided over by the “theory of evolution” as their most trustworthy guide, weaving “science” out of innumerable vain suppositions. From these, as it were, premises, Spencer finally plans to derive his “Principles of Ethics” and crown his whole work, after having already published their preliminary outlines in The Data of Ethics. — Thus he thinks he has shown a way to fill adequately that “vacuum” which the “code of supernatural ethics” (that is, supposedly prescribed by divine authority), vanishing more and more each day in modern society, leaves behind; he would replace it with a “code of natural ethics” (that is, “secularized,” or emancipated from belief in divine legislation).69 A wondrous morality indeed, perfectly suited to modern atheism!—But how will this, to say nothing of his other absurdities, fill the “vacuum” of moral obligation?
Charles Darwin (1809–1882), developing the “theory of evolution” more broadly through the system they call “descent,” adapted moral doctrine to that same system. Darwin’s ethics can scarcely be called anything other than a special chapter in natural history. For just as he teaches that, in the natural world, more perfect organic forms descended from lower and ultimately from a few very low forms through continual evolution, by means of “selection” in propagation and “mutual struggle for the conditions of existence,” across countless hereditary reproductions, so he attempts to explain the origin of the moral sense through successive evolution from the herd instincts of animals (the progenitors of man!).70 Thus the noblest social virtues differ from primitive brutality only by degree as products of this natural process, and are rooted at first in that sense of need which led apes to live in herds!71
These, then, are the main points concerning the latest “utilitarianism,” also called “English utilitarianism.” This moral system seemed especially worthy of lucid exposition because it marks the most hostile error of the present age, and because to know it more deeply is already almost to refute it.
3. Progressive ethics of human perfection.
- By this name we include those ethical systems that establish the principle of morality in the relation of actions to the progressive and harmonious perfection both of man himself and of others. Although this principle, because of its objective universality, approaches the deontological-rational principles to some extent and is often counted among them, yet, in its formal character—which is its relation to perfection, that is, to the good of man and humanity—it should rather be called eudaemonistic. The following system must be referred here above all:
a) The Leibnizian-Wolffian school, which held nearly the leading place in Germany from the beginning of the eighteenth century until Kant. G. W. Leibniz72 (1646–1716), initially following partly Aristotelian and partly Cartesian paths, but soon going beyond both, diligently sought a way to reconcile the fundamental doctrines of ancient philosophy with what had emerged as true and established from more recent scientific endeavors, and at the same time to defend them effectively against the naturalistic skepticism and pantheistic corruption of his age. Thus he laid the foundations of a new philosophical school, which, though itself subject to not a few new and serious errors, was able to achieve its intended end only very imperfectly and with little success. Nevertheless, its author deserves the esteem of good people: he was renowned for the fruitfulness and universality of his doctrine, as well as for his sincere pursuit of truth and reverence for Christian dogma. Leibniz’s philosophical doctrine, scattered through many and varied works, was gathered into a single, organically ordered system by his disciple Christian Wolff73 (1679–1754), who also modified it in part from within and published it; hence the school is commonly named after both authors. In establishing ethical principles, this philosophy followed almost the same path as Pufendorf had taken earlier, proceeding from an examination of human nature and the law of the divine Creator expressed in it. Nevertheless, rather than locating the essence of rational human nature, as Pufendorf did, in “sociality,” it considered that essence to lie in perfectibility, the very root of sociality. Accordingly, it taught that the supreme end of nature proposed to the rational will is to strive continually toward greater perfection of that same nature in oneself and in others; that man’s happiness consists in this perfection, to be attained in God, the infinite good, but in such a way that it will never be simply complete and must continually increase in proportion to the infinity of the good possessed. From that supreme end of nature it also derives the supreme moral law of action, which Wolff states in this formula: “What perfects us, our condition, and others is to be done; what makes us, our condition, and others more imperfect is to be omitted.” This principle of the natural law plainly contains, implicitly, the following principle of morality: Actions are morally good or bad according as they promote or diminish the perfection both of the agent and of others.
H. Ulrici (1806–1884) comes somewhat close to this idea of Leibniz. He likewise teaches that the character of good and evil should be measured by the direction of free willing and action toward the complete and harmonious “perfection of human being and life,” or by its deviation in the contrary direction.74
b) Among English philosophers, Adam Ferguson (1724–1816), already mentioned above, should also be counted here. Although he followed moral empiricism to some extent, he nevertheless placed the ontological basis of morality in the progressive elevation of human nature toward an ideal perfection never fully attainable.75
II. Deontological-rational principles of morality.
-
Those systems of moral philosophy answer to this general designation which teach that the formal character of the moral distinction among actions lies not in any relation whatsoever of those actions to the happiness of the person himself, whether his own or the common happiness of all, but in their merely objective rational fittingness. Two classes of these systems are distinguished according to the different sense in which this rule is understood. For everyone agrees that in human actions the eudaemonological and deontological aspects are objectively, or materially, joined in an inseparable bond, and that the very acts we judge fitting and honorable according to reason are also useful for attaining true human perfection and happiness. But a doubt may be raised: should this ground of morality be understood purely and exclusively in such a way that every concomitant eudaemonological consideration is positively excluded from the agent’s subjective intention, and no action is admitted to be morally good unless it proceeds solely from the motive of rational fittingness? Or should it be understood so that, although the deontological aspect alone formally constitutes honorableness in itself, it should not for that reason be considered incompatible with also admitting, as an accompaniment and by nature’s institution, a regard for human perfection and happiness—even subjectively, just as it is objectively? This is why deontological-rational principles are called either pure or exaggerated, or moderate, according as they affirm the first or the second side of this disjunction. Moreover, they differ just as essentially from one another in character, as merely naturalistic, pantheistic, or theological, according as they locate the foundation of rational fittingness in rational human nature considered absolutely, in some universal pantheistic reason, or finally in the very essence of God, the Ordainer of the world.
-
1. Pure or exaggerated deontological-rational principles, which are commonly included also under the name “Stoicism” or “moral purism”; namely,
a) The principle of the ancient Stoics. The philosophical school commonly called “Stoic” after the place where its pupils used to meet began to flourish in Athens around 308 BC. Its founder and head was Zeno, a native of the island of Cyprus, a pupil of the Cynic philosopher Crates and later of the Academic philosophers Xenocrates and Polemo. He considered ethics to be, as it were, the summit of all philosophy and all theory to be subordinated to it. He therefore devoted himself chiefly to its cultivation, joining Cynic elements with others that were partly Socratic and partly Aristotelian. According to Zeno, the supreme ethical end and hence the principle of morality is τὸ ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν, or to live in conformity with nature.76 By “nature,” however, both Zeno and his disciples seem to have understood not only the individual nature of man considered in a merely anthropological way, but rather the universal nature of the whole world, which man participates in according to his own mode. The Stoics teach, therefore, that virtue consists in pursuing conformity with this very nature in practice, according to a correct theoretical appreciation of it; that virtue (τὸ καλόν) has the character of an end in itself and is to be loved and sought solely for its own sake; and that it is not only the supreme but also the only good of man. All the other things that can be called good besides virtue should not truly be called good, but indifferent (ἀδιάφορα). In particular, pleasure has in itself no character of an end for a rational agent. In the perfection of “virtue” Stoic “wisdom” also consists; hence both terms, virtue and wisdom, as well as their opposites, vice and folly, are used almost interchangeably. “Wisdom” is elevated above all affections of the mind (πάθη) by a kind of impassibility (ἀπάθειαν); thus it also possesses happiness within itself, which cannot be disturbed or affected in any way by any pathological influence, whether of pain or pleasure.77
Among the Greeks, the Stoic school was continued chiefly by Cleanthes, Zeno’s successor in the school, Sphaerus, Chrysippus, Zeno of Tarsus, Diogenes of Babylon, Antipater, Panaetius, Posidonius, and others; among the Romans, from the first century after Christ, by Annaeus Cornutus, Persius Flaccus, Annaeus Seneca, Musonius Rufus, the slave Epictetus, the emperor Marcus Aurelius, and others.
Nevertheless, disagreement of opinion and many changes over time were not absent even among the Stoics; the very vagueness of the term “nature” gave occasion for them. It is therefore no wonder that the other doctrines of Stoic philosophy concerning the world, the human soul, and so on often clashed miserably with that proud elevation of virtue, and, variously imbued with naturalistic materialism, fatalism, and atheism, destroyed all the dignity of rational nature and its foundation. Among later Stoics there are also some elements that contain unmistakable traces of evangelical doctrine.
- b) The principle of the Kantian school. Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), author of what is called “critical philosophy” and hence head of the new school that spread widely through Germany after Wolff, was likewise the primary force and, as it were, the leader of the more recent development of “German philosophy.” Seeking a decisive solution to the controversy in which he saw Cartesian idealism and Lockean empiricism mutually attacking and excluding one another, he undertook to subject all the sources of human knowledge and the powers of knowing to a new critical examination.78 In this way, however, he was able to mingle those disparate and conflicting elements into some kind of forced unity, but could by no means reconcile or internally unite them. This is no wonder, since the true and only remedy for that internal dissension, well known to the old school but buried and scorned along with it for centuries, was missing. Thus, in his inquiry, partly following Hume and partly Shaftesbury, Kant arrived by empiricism at skepticism, and by idealism at a certain ethical purism, founded solely on the autonomous law of reason and emancipated from all religion. Hence Kant’s moral doctrine is rightly called “resurrected Stoicism.”
The fundamental principles79 are roughly these: “Rational nature is an end in itself (Zweck an sich selbst)”; — consequently, insofar as he is rational, “man himself exists as an end in himself … to which no other end can be substituted, so that he himself might be ordered as a means.” And each person must recognize this dignity not only in himself but likewise in all other rational beings. Thus man has in himself (not above or outside himself), as he has an end, also the “objective principle of the will” as an absolute moral rule, which must likewise be a “universal practical law,” that is, absolutely binding on all rational wills in the same way. But for such a practical principle of reason truly to be a “universal” law, it must be purely “formal”: that is, it must consist in the general form of law alone, which is simply the fact of being a dictate of reason (τὸ esse), abstracting from all “matter” or determinate object about which the dictate is concerned, and also from any reference to an end other than pure rationality itself. Otherwise, an empirical element, or one a posteriori, contrary both to rational autonomy and universality, would be introduced into a law of reason that, because of its “absolute value,” must be wholly a priori. Since this same law of reason must overcome sensuality and pathological affections, it presents itself to man as a “categorical imperative”: it commands categorically and simply for its own sake, not merely conditionally or hypothetically—as a means that prescribes something necessary for attaining some proposed good. In that case the imperative would be only “hypothetical,” not “moral.” Thus Kant expresses the supreme moral law, issued solely by the authority of autonomous practical reason and absolutely binding, in this maxim: “So act that the (subjective) rule of your will could always at the same time be rationally recognized as an (objective) principle of universal legislation.”80
If we now ask about the proper principle of morality, by which, according to Kant’s doctrine, moral goodness is objectively distinguished from evil in human actions, it can easily be gathered from what has been said above and from the doctrinal chapters that follow, although it is proposed only implicitly in the principle of the moral law. For it plainly follows that moral goodness can be derived in our actions from no other source than objective and subjective conformity with the law of reason: objective, in that the agent wills precisely what the law prescribes; subjective, in that he wills it solely because it is prescribed, out of pure “reverence for the law.” Thus, just as the moral law is purely “formal,” having its reason in itself, so too the will, insofar as it is moral, must be moved by no consideration of “matter”—that is, of an object subjectively desirable or of a eudaemonistic end—but only by the “form” of the law. In the absence of this pure intention, actions according to Kant can indeed be “legal” objectively, but not “moral” (sittlich). Indeed, this “morality” does not permit anyone to act even with regard to the divine will; that would be to substitute “heteronomy” for the essential “autonomy of the will.”
Kant certainly does not deny that happiness is also joined to moral virtue by an internal relation of consequence; indeed, he professes that in the “good will,” that is, a will wholly conformed to the law of reason, lies not only man’s supreme good but his only good insofar as he is rational. Nevertheless, although happiness may rightly be expected as virtue’s attendant, it is not proposed to the rational will as an end to be intended. Hence he concludes that whatever is done from inclinations of the mind, or from fear of punishment or hope of attaining happiness, is not morally good or worthy of esteem, because concern for one’s own advantage corrupts the moral disposition and strips virtue of its intrinsic and absolute worth. — The familiar maxims on the lips of Kantians agree with this: “Reverence for the law is the sole moral ἐλατήρ” (moralische Triebfeder); “unless something is done out of reverence for the law (of reason), it does not deserve the name of virtue.” If all this is reduced to the form of a principle of morality, it comes down to something like this: In human actions, whatever is done according to the dictate of reason, and solely because of it, is morally good; whatever is done otherwise is morally vicious.
Thus Kant not only distinguishes all eudaemonological consideration formally from morality, but wholly excludes it as something incompatible with morality; hence he boasts that he has presented pure virtue, which has no extraneous support either on earth or in heaven.
For the rest, it is clear that both these principles, the Stoic and the Kantian, are, considered according to their general philosophical character, merely naturalistic, although Kant elsewhere does not deny theism.
2. Moderate deontological-rational principles.
- a) The Platonic principle. Plato (427–347 BC), an Athenian and the most celebrated disciple of Socrates, spent several years traveling after Socrates’ death. At last, around 387 BC, he founded his philosophical school in Athens at the “Academy.”81
The most fruitful principle of all Platonic philosophy lies in the doctrine of “ideas.” Plato does not consider these to be universal concepts formed by abstraction from things, but perfect and most pure exemplars of things, in which alone true being—that is, immutable being—is present. By contrast, all material and sensible things continually change and thus seem to stand midway between being and nonbeing, insofar as each thing exists to the extent that it imperfectly participates in some idea. The supreme idea of all, and at the same time the highest object of knowledge (μέγιστον μάθημα), is for Plato the idea of the good. It contains every character of truth and beauty; for this reason it is identified with God himself, the Creator of the world, or with the divine λόγῳ.82 In it, then, Plato finds the foundation of both aesthetics and ethics.
As for ethics in particular, whose doctrines are scattered throughout a whole series of dialogues (especially from “Protagoras” to “The Republic”), the following points above all should be noted: Plato teaches that the supreme end and the highest good of man consist in the greatest attainable likeness to God, the absolute good. Man is prepared for this by the virtues of the soul, such as wisdom (σοφία), courage (ἀνδρεία), temperance (σωφροσύνη), justice (δικαιοσύνη), and religious piety, or justice toward the gods (ὁσιότης). Every consideration of the will must be subordinated to this end, which is to be intended for its own sake. Thus the Platonic principle of morality comes down to this: morally good is whatever, and insofar as it, makes man like God, the absolute good; morally bad is whatever makes him unlike God.
In his work on the Republic, Plato undertakes, laudably enough, to apply the ideas of individual ethics also to human society, which he considers as it were a collective or universal man. But, exaggerating beyond measure the analogy that morally exists between the individual man and the social organism, he drew certain unfortunate corollaries, harmful to just civil liberty.
- b) The theonomic principle (also called the theological principle). What Plato already saw—that the ultimate reason for every moral distinction can be found only in God—could certainly not be unknown to Christian philosophy, which was endowed with far more perfect notions of God and his attributes. Only one point remained for debate among Christian philosophers: the more precise definition of this same divine foundation. Thus among philosophers who also professed (Protestant) theology, there were those who taught that the distinction lies wholly in the divine will itself, whether made known to us by reason or by positive revelation, reducing every deontological-rational principle of morality ultimately to the mere relation of conformity or nonconformity with the divine will.
Among others, this view was especially defended by Christian August Crusius83 (1712–1775), professor of philosophy and theology at Leipzig and at that time the principal opponent of Wolffian philosophy.
In more recent times Dr. H. Martensen, a (Lutheran) bishop of Zealand, again undertakes to advocate the same theonomic principle as the sole remedy against universal “antinomism” in his philosophical-theological work Christian Ethics. The extent of what Martensen considers “antinomism” is apparent from the fact that he does not hesitate to include “Jesuitism” among its forms.84
- c) Certain principles published by English writers should also apparently be referred to the class of deontological-rational principles. Although related by common origin to the moral empiricism that dominated England after Locke, they nevertheless depart considerably from its common eudaemonistic-social character. The following should be included here:
Samuel Clarke85 (1675–1729), a disciple of Newton and Locke, taught that moral virtue consists in this: that not only man himself but every other thing be considered and treated according to its own natural fitness and destination—man as a rational person, an animal as a being endowed with sensitive life, a plant as living vegetatively. In this way both the will of God and the good of man are fulfilled.
William Wollaston86 (1659–1724) says that man’s supreme end is to know truth and express it in words or actions, each of which can be considered as the assertion of some proposition. A free action is therefore morally good or bad according as it expresses a true or false proposition. To act truthfully is to treat all things in the way their nature requires; the contrary is to act falsely—for example, to torture an animal as though it lacked the sense of pain. He also includes in this same thing the condition of human happiness or unhappiness.87
3. Pantheistically “rational” principles.
- Finally, some formulas of moral principles must be mentioned, by which the leaders of modern pantheism, from Spinoza to Hegel, each marked his own philosophical system. I say “formulas”; for who would expect true “principles of morality” from those who sacrificed the very condition of all morality—namely, the true freedom of the individual human being—to their pantheistic fatalism, and for whom therefore the very name “human morality” must be devoid of any genuine sense? In any case, even the things these writers propose as principles of morality are not so new or peculiar per se that they do not bear some kinship or analogy to one or another of those listed above. In general, in their formal character they express not so much a eudaemonistic as a deontological-rational character, and so we have judged it appropriate to append them to this class. This in no way prevents them, by the obvious consequence of monism, from partly deriving corollaries that can even be reconciled with practical materialism; this is notably the case with Spinozism.
Baruch (Benedict) de Spinoza88 (1632–1677) soon replaced the dualism of Descartes, whose guide he had followed for some time, with open pantheism, recognizing a single “substance,” namely God, and teaching that nature is identical with him. Just as his entire philosophy, which he developed by the mathematical method, proceeds from this unity of substance as its common foundation, so does his ethics.89
Spinoza teaches that the highest moral perfection, as well as human happiness, is completed in the “intellectual love of God,” but that this is God’s very own love of himself. How this contributes to the purity of human morality is clear in itself. And since only God properly acts as an immanent cause in nature and through its powers, who would not conclude that the limits of good and evil, just and unjust, licit and illicit, are in practice measured by physical power?90
Joh. Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814), first devoted to Spinozism and then to Kant’s Criticism, from which he proceeded to erect his own subjective pantheism.91 If one sets aside the obscure verbal wrapping, the principle of morality he proposes scarcely differs from the Kantian principle founded on the pure autonomy of reason. For he locates moral goodness in moral freedom itself, that is, in the independence of rational volition from every factor that is not formally rational. For him the principle of the moral law is the pure τὸ Ego (“das reine Ich”), whose essential character is absolute independence (unbedingte Selbstbestimmung), and whose manifestation in the empirical τῷ Ego gives rise to the demand to return more and more, without limit, through rational independence to the “pure Ego.”92
Fr. W. J. Schelling93 (1775–1854), beginning at first from Fichte’s doctrine and joining it to Spinozism, constructed what is called his system of “identity,” guided more by imagination than by intellect: identity, that is, between object and subject, reality and ideality, nature and spirit, in the unity of the absolute or absolute reason.94 Over time, however, this system was modified considerably and gradually ended in a kind of theosophy, by which he also tried to accommodate Christian revelation to his philosophical dreams. In moral matters he adopted a kind of Platonism corrupted by pantheism, locating the ground of virtue in a continual striving toward the absolute or a progressive union with absolute reason.
G. W. F. Hegel95 (1770–1831), dialectically developing and in his own way perfecting the Schellingian principle of “identity,” also became the founder of a new system, commonly called “absolute idealism,” to distinguish it from “subjective idealism.”96 For him, the whole universe is nothing other than the necessary evolution of the absolute, or absolute reason, displaying, by a certain logical process, something like its own analysis. Manifesting itself according to various stages in nature, in intellects, and in history, absolute reason is in itself without any personality, although it underlies everything as substance. Just as he distinguishes “subjective spirit,” that is, individual personality, from “objective spirit,” expressed in the totality of social institutions and the course of history, and from “absolute spirit,” which is the union of both into unity, so, in the whole ethical order, he distinguishes “morality,” which as a kind of ought belongs to the individual will (subjective spirit) and whose supreme principle scarcely differs from Schelling’s, from “Sittlichkeit,” which is morality subsisting, as it were, objectively in social institutions (marriage, family, civil and political society). The logical or architectonic rational unity thus manifested is Hegel’s God himself, whose supreme realization is the political state (der Staat) itself and its successive development through world history. It follows that, as he himself says, no higher duty is given to a human being than “to be a citizen” (Staatsbürger zu sein); and so the political state is happily established on earth as the supreme and only source of all law and all morality. What wonder, then, that wherever this new idolatry has pervaded the minds of rulers and public institutions, all human affairs, and finally the very intellects, wills, and consciences of citizens, rejecting the rule of the true God, are compelled to revolve perpetually around and be sacrificed to this one idol called the “state”? But it is enough to have touched briefly on these points here. These errors deserve greater attention when we come to discuss law.
-
These, then, are nearly all the systems of moral philosophy that seemed specifically worth mentioning under the proposed general classification with regard to the principle of morality, while many others have been omitted: either they never attained the name and standing of a distinct school, or they represent a branch of another school not much different from its stock, or, finally, although they are famous in the history of philosophy as a whole, they owe that fame less to the distinctiveness of their ethical doctrine than to other aspects—as, for example, the system of Descartes, from which almost all “modern” philosophy received its impulse.
-
If, moreover, one asks what place specifically Christian moral philosophy historically occupies in this general classification, its well-known and common character supplies an obvious answer. Among Christian philosophers, too, there are indeed many formulas for expressing the principle; but this formal diversity does not prevent the whole Christian school from agreeing materially—and with respect to the ontological ground of moral distinction—on one principle of morality that must be asserted. This principle is of such a kind that it displays neither an exclusively deontological-rational nor a simply eudaemonistic character per se, but both joined fittingly: the former primarily and formally, the latter secondarily, as materially inseparable and positively subordinated to the former as an end. For the common foundation of all Christian ethics is the most certain knowledge: 1. that in the one beatific possession of God both the rational duty of the free will (the deontological-rational end) and the internal perfection of human nature (the eudaemonological end) are fulfilled; 2. that this same eudaemonological end is proposed to human activity by God, the author of nature, not merely as something objectively consequent but as a true end; 3. that this end, however, being essentially subordinated to the deontological end, is not to be intended by the rational will simply and exclusively for its own sake, thereby positively excluding the deontological relation, which it nevertheless objectively and by its own nature involves. Those who profess this fundamental doctrine concerning the human end must also agree in this conclusion, as to its substance: an action is honorable or dishonorable according as it conforms a human being to God, the supreme good, by embracing him in love, or turns him away by nonconformity (cf. nn. 59–80). — And this is in fact the common principle of Christian ethics as to the matter, and is entirely sufficient in practice by virtue of its objective truth. For any further discussion of the formally most fitting formulation of the same principle concerns not so much practical truth as speculative science. Indeed, for the practical conception of the principle it makes little difference whether the relation of free actions to God as the human being’s ultimate end is formally called love of God, assimilation to God, conformity with the divine perfections, conformity with the absolutely holy divine will, conformity with divine reason as the absolute norm of all order, or something similar.97
Wherever this inheritance of Christian philosophy was faithfully preserved in the public schools, there was neither desire nor need to devise new foundations for ethical doctrine and new systems day after day. Hence we see that in the modern age this philosophical fecundity, not to be envied, was most abundant chiefly in those seats of learning that, having rejected communion with Catholic tradition, preferred to resort to the license of pagan opinions and errors rather than securely possess certain truth.
B. Certain chief errors are critically excluded.
- There is no need to dwell on refuting principles that, by their whole character, are founded on crude sensualism, since they prove their own falsity clearly enough. It is more important that we examine briefly and critically, above all, those in which some truth appears mixed with error.
Thesis XVI. No relation of utility, whether one’s own or common or social, by itself alone formally exhibits the objective ground of moral goodness; materially, however, it can accord with it.
Preliminary notes. In this assertion, a relation of utility is to be understood very broadly, comprehending any relation of an action to happiness, of whatever kind, by which it is formally considered as a means to some good of a human being, whether real or apparent. The first part of the thesis is universally negative; the second affirms only relatively, that is, that it can hold under a certain condition.
Proof of Part I. The ontological ground by which naturally honorable actions differ from dishonorable ones, taken formally, cannot be something either per se inconstant, temporary, and variable, or relative in itself and contingent by its very concept; it must instead be formally of absolute value, just as the objective ground of logical truth is. For whatever we judge intrinsically honorable or dishonorable, we judge to be so not contingently and hypothetically, but necessarily, immutably, eternally, and absolutely, just as we assert absolutely that a circle is not a square. But no relation of utility whatsoever possesses these requirements. Therefore . . .
Proof of the minor premise: Whatever relation of utility is considered in an action, whether in relation to the agent’s own good or to the common and social good, the following disjunction holds in either case: Either this utility is referred to some accidental, temporal, hypothetical, and secondary good of a person or persons, or to a good of human nature that is simply such and intrinsically supreme for both the human being and human society. Now, if the first: the relation of utility itself shares in every accidental variability of its term; if the second: it will indeed be constant, but, on account of its term, it is neither intrinsically and simply necessary nor does it contain the character of absolute value. For human happiness itself, which is the supreme internal end of the human being and to which all social goods are ultimately ordered, is not as such, or by reason of itself, absolutely necessary, but only relatively so, since it is a creature’s good and, moreover, conditioned by the exercise of human freedom. Therefore, not even the relation of an action to human happiness contains a formal ontological ground on account of which it ought to be called intrinsically honorable, if the agent’s subjective good is considered in it merely from the eudaemonological point of view. All the more, then, must this be denied of every other relation of utility.
Proof of Part II. The eudaemonological order of natures, by which each is directed toward its own perfection, materially accords, by the Creator’s own ordering, with the rational or deontological order of ends (nn. 31–33). For in the same object both human nature is perfected simply and the objective rational order, in what pertains to the human being, is completed. Therefore, whenever a relation of means or utility is considered in an action, by which it is understood to contribute mediately or immediately to attaining the supreme good of the human being in God himself, this relation of utility necessarily accords objectively and materially with the very ground of rightness or honorableness. Nothing, then, prevents us from recognizing that, in a eudaemonological relation understood in this way, the criterion of morality, though not formally adequate for scientific use, is nevertheless materially true and therefore safe in practice (cf. n. 68).
- Corollaries: I. By a simple application of this norm, one can see how both “social utilitarianism” and the “Leibniz-Wolffian” school depart from the genuine principle of morality. For besides the fact that in both systems the formal ground of moral distinction is at least not stated expressly, even the criterion they contain, considered materially, is by no means defined intrinsically in such a way that it necessarily agrees in reality with true honorableness or dishonorableness. For although, in the authors’ view, both the “social good” and the “perfection of human nature” undoubtedly refer to the good proper especially to rational nature, nevertheless these vague formulas in themselves by no means exclude a much broader interpretation; this is especially true of Wolff’s principle. Indeed, unless the concept of “perfection” is defined more precisely, what would prevent even Epicurus from making it his own? — Add that the continual progression toward an ideal perfection that is never completed, as Leibniz preferred, has already been excluded by us elsewhere on certain grounds (n. 58).
179. II. The principle professed as its own within “moral empiricism,” specifically by the “Scottish school,” departs from the idea of the true principle of morality on two grounds: first, on the same ground on which “social utilitarianism” errs, of which empiricism represents a particular form; then, on account of a particular character peculiar to itself. This chiefly includes the invention of some “moral sense” or “rational instinct” that is distinct from the faculty of intellect and added to it. Whatever someone may wish to establish formally as the ontological ground of moral distinction, it certainly cannot be doubtful to anyone, from what we have learned so far, that the moral order consists in relations that transcend every sense and is therefore the proper object of the intellect (reason). Why, then, a further sense? And how could a sense or instinct, blind in itself (since it is distinct from the intellect), possess this dignity and excellence, so as to hold something like primacy among the powers in rational nature itself, performing the highest and noblest office of rational nature—namely, to provide moral direction to the human will rationally, and to do so blindly!? — But everyone knows that being guided by a blind instinct or sense is proper to an inferior order and an inferior nature. — Moreover, without internal contradiction, a quality of actions that is purely metaphysical, such as honorableness and dishonorableness, cannot be said to be the object of a “sense” properly so called, that is, of something distinct from the intellect. For how could something act upon a sense, or be sensed, if by its nature it is merely intelligible?98 — The authors of this school themselves sensed this difficulty, and for that reason they call the instinct “rational”; but by this very move they reduce it once again, in some way, to the intellect. And indeed, we do not deny that moral judgments in us often bear a certain likeness to instinct. We experience them as so prompt, immediate, and prior to all reflection. Who would fail to recognize in this the benefit and most wise arrangement of the Creator, who did not wish the internal distinction between moral good and evil to be known only by philosophers, but by all who have the use of reason? To explain this experience, however, there is no need to resort to a sense beyond the intellect, since it confirms only what we have already learned elsewhere from St. Thomas: that the proper object of reason is order, and that the practical object of practical reason is practical order, which, taken simply, is itself the moral order (n. 47). What wonder, then, that reason should attain its naturally proper object, wherever it is presented to it, by direct and immediate evidence, and thus precede every awareness of reflection? Add that in both orders, theoretical and practical, the evident principles of reason begin soon after its first use to be available by way of natural habits.99
180. Thesis XVII. Conversely, moral Stoicism, revived by Kant, must likewise be rejected.
Proof. Two chief errors vitiate the principle of morality proper to this system. For
-
The formal ground of honorableness and dishonorableness, which Kant boasts he has grasped in its purest form, is intrinsically insufficient and false. He rightly understood that, unless it is in itself “of absolute value,” it cannot be sufficient and true; but he errs most gravely in attributing this character of absolute value to rational nature or human reason, and in establishing there, in reason as such and setting aside all its relation to God, the ultimate and absolute formal ground of moral distinction. It is surely unworthy of a philosopher who, moreover, did not wish to be either an atheist or a pantheist, not to have noticed that whatever of absolute value is found in created reason is, in itself, wholly relative and derived from uncreated reason, of which created reason is only a likeness and faithful herald. But this Kantian error must be discussed more fully elsewhere.
-
The criterion of morality erected on the same foundation is not even materially true. According to Kant’s doctrine, for an action to be morally good it is required not only that it conform to the law, that is, to the dictate of reason, but also that it be done purely out of reverence for that law; it must therefore be considered deficient in moral goodness insofar as it is undertaken not purely out of this reverence, but also for a material end, that is, one different from this formal reverence. But this kind of moral purism, even if we grant—but do not admit—that it rests on a formally correct foundation, confuses the highest and ideal degree of moral perfection with moral goodness in general, and moral goodness taken at a relatively lower degree with moral error; in so doing, it also conflicts with rational nature itself, which it professes to be worthy of absolute reverence. For it belongs to rational nature no less than to sensitive nature to tend toward a good fitting to it, in a manner fitting to it. Therefore, when a human being, in the very act of recognizing and pursuing what he (from the deontological standpoint) recognizes as morally good, also intends his own true good (from the eudaemonological standpoint), he does precisely what he is positively led to do by rational nature, and through it, by God. Surely it is not accidental that this is the Creator’s arrangement: in the final tendency of creatures we see the eudaemonological order objectively and materially accord with the deontological order; hence virtue is offered a reward and vice a punishment by the general law of nature. The chief end of this natural sanction, by which the divine legislator wished to strengthen the moral law against the arbitrary choice of human freedom, as will be explained more fully below, is that the human will, both in view of reward and from fear of punishment, may suitably strengthen itself to persevere in pursuing moral honorableness, despite the obstacles of sensitive nature. Who, then, would say that a person departs from moral goodness if, besides reverence for the law itself, he also uses as an incentive to do good what God himself suggests and imposes, so that each person may use it as need and opportunity require?
Note. You will easily infer what truth, what falsity, or what lesser degree of perfection is to be said to belong to the other principles of morality we have reviewed, from what we are now undertaking to establish ethically concerning the genuine principle of morality.
C. Positive conclusion concerning the true principle of morality.
181. We no longer doubt the objective ground of moral distinction insofar as we have learned with certainty, together with all Christian philosophy, that it lies in the final proportion of an action to God, the absolute center of the whole order of ends. The only question that can still be raised is how this very final proportion must be conceived and stated so that it exhibits not only objective truth but, by its concept, a truly formal and simply ultimate ground on account of which something is called and is honorable or dishonorable. To determine this is to determine the very principle of morality: not merely an objective and practically true principle in some way, but also a formal and absolute one. The same thing can therefore also be called interchangeably the “ultimate objective norm” or “supreme objective criterion” of morality. It is called objective to distinguish it from a subjective criterion or rule, which exists in each person’s conscience and does not exclude accidental error; it is called the supreme criterion or ultimate norm to indicate that in it the whole ground of the norm is resolved per se and formally in such a way that it cannot be reduced to anything further.
It is just as clear that there can be only one such principle of morality as that there can indeed be several principles that are objectively and materially true, without their exhibiting per se an absolute ground. This alone makes it sufficiently clear that this question of form, since the matter itself has at least already been secured among Christian scholars, concerns speculative moral science more than practical science. Nevertheless, it must not be passed over here, both because it is required per se for the completeness of the science and because it suitably provides certain necessary seeds and foundations for what will be said below about natural law. Therefore, we state:
182. Thesis XVIII. The ontological distinction between the honorable and the dishonorable consists formally and absolutely in conformity or nonconformity with divine reason.
Preliminary notes. Divine reason means nothing other than the divine nature itself, insofar as it is absolute holiness, or the absolute order of things to be done.100
Proof I. Divine reason is the absolute norm of all things to be done. It must be conceived in God as that according to which the most holy divine will wills whatever it wills from eternity, and contrary to which it can will nothing. It will therefore, by parity, be the absolute norm of rightness for all operations that, dependently on the first cause and under God’s will, proceed from secondary causes, whether physically determined or endowed with reason and freedom.101 Therefore moral rightness or nonrightness consists formally and absolutely in conformity or nonconformity with divine reason.
Proof II. Just as truth and falsity in the speculative order are related to the divine intellect, so, by an objective analogy, in the order of practical truth the honorable and dishonorable are related to divine holiness or divine reason. But in the ontological order the ultimate and absolute ground of the distinction between truth and falsity is conformity or nonconformity with the divine intellect as absolute truth. Therefore, by parity, the ultimate and absolute ground of the distinction between the honorable and dishonorable is conformity or nonconformity with divine reason, as absolute holiness or the absolute order of things to be done.
Proof III. Every other ground of moral distinction that is not materially false can readily be reduced in the end to this very ground stated in the thesis, as the supreme and ultimate one; but not conversely. Therefore this ground must be called per se formal and absolute.
Proof of the antecedent. If it is said: an action is honorable insofar as it conforms to human nature, considered completely according to all its essential relations, or insofar as it is directed to God as the end of the human being and of all things, or insofar as it is objectively love of God, or insofar as it conforms the created will to the divine will, and so on; while an action is dishonorable if it is contrary to these things: what is said in all these formulations is indeed true. Nevertheless, there is none of them for which a further reason cannot be given, namely, in terms of its own absolute rationality or irrationality, that is, its conformity or nonconformity with divine reason as the absolute order of things to be done. If this is verified even of conformity or nonconformity with the divine will itself, although the divine will is rightly called “the supreme rule of every created will,” it will all the more hold, as is evident, of the other grounds, which are intrinsically more remote. Now, the divine will itself is the supreme rule for this reason: it is absolutely holy, that is, it can will nothing except according to absolute reason. Hence St. Thomas teaches that “the goodness of the will depends on conformity with the divine will”102, while also saying that the supreme rule of the will is “the eternal law, which is divine reason.”103
183. But after establishing the principle of morality as per se formal and absolute, one can further ask how it can be held as an objective criterion in the order of human knowledge, since that absolute norm of rightness, which is God himself, is not known to us immediately. And indeed, the very evidentness of the judgments by which we distinguish the honorable from the dishonorable sufficiently demonstrates that the criterion our mind uses in those judgments must be, in the order of moral knowledge, per se and immediately known. Therefore, so that the doctrine concerning the ontological criterion of morality may be complete and adapted to scientific use, it is finally completed by this thesis:
184. Thesis XIX. Proximately, the objective norm of morality exists in practical human reason itself, insofar as it exhibits the essential direction of rational nature, but only as a secondary and relative norm.
Preliminary notes. 1. Human reason is called “practical” insofar as it has as its object not theoretical truth but practical truth, that is, truths that in themselves concern the direction of the will in acting. — 2. Human practical reason admits a double sense. It is taken either according to what it has proper, subjective, and individual in particular individuals and in concrete use; in this way reason shares in the variability of the subject itself and is accidentally liable to error; or it is considered by an abstraction of the mind only according to what it has essentially in common among all rational individuals; in this way it denotes something objectively constant and immutable, and in that respect exhibits “the essential direction of rational nature.” — 3. This essential and objectively constant direction in practical reason is on the side of the known object, not on the side of the knowing subject. For it is proper to rational nature to be directed finally by rational cognition, or by what is known through reason. Now, it belongs to the essence of practical reason to know evidently the order of things to be done, and indeed to know at its limit the universal order, or the rightness of action according to a universal and absolute end—not because our mind possesses this conception by way of an innate idea, or through an immediate intuition of divine reason as the absolute order of things (for that idea of order is abstract, just like the idea of universal truth, and has a similar psychological origin), but because, once the mind has developed to the use of reason, it attains this conception by direct evidence through the necessity of nature, abstracting it from particulars first known as rightly or wrongly ordered.
- Practical reason, therefore, considered in the sense of the thesis, means the same as the universal order of things to be done, evidently known to the mind, since through this it “exhibits the essential direction of nature.” Expressions that can be substituted for it as truly identical in reality are the evident principles of practical reason, since they are all ultimately reduced to the objective evidentness of that same universal order and constitute the essential character of rationality. Accordingly, the same objectivity of practical reason is implied whenever, in everyday usage, some way of acting is judged to be “according to reason” or “against reason.” (Cf. nn. 43–47.)
Proof of Part I. “It exists proximately.” According to the general cosmological principle (Axiom XXIV, n. 32), “the nature of each being is the proximate (objective) rule of rightness for all its natural action”; that is, any action of it is right or not right according as it conforms or fails to conform to its nature. For nature is the very formal principle directing a being to the end appointed to it by the Creator (Axiom I). Therefore, human rational nature, too, according to its final direction, must be called the proximate objective rule of rightness for human actions. But the practical reason defined in the thesis is manifestly nothing other than human rational nature itself, insofar as it directs the human being toward the end appointed by the Creator. For in rational beings nature directs finally by means of practical cognition derived from principles of reason known per se. — Therefore, without doubt, practical reason, taken according to that essential objectivity, is to be acknowledged as the proximate objective norm of morality, or the norm internal to the human being.
Proof of Part II. “But only secondary and relative”; that is, it is not a norm simply by reason of itself, but only through an essential and formal relation to divine reason, which alone is the ultimate and absolute norm of morality.
Argument I. This is drawn from the immediately preceding thesis, in which this assertion is already contained as a settled point. For since, as proved, divine reason is the absolute norm of every moral distinction, and there can be only one such norm, it is clear in itself that, if created reason is likewise called an objective norm of morality, this dignity of the name can belong to it only secondarily and relatively, that is, by derivation from divine reason.
Moreover, the points that follow prove this same thing directly:
Argument II. The character of absolute value displayed by the judgments of practical reason insofar as they are evident can belong to them only insofar as they are objectively founded in absolute practical truth, or divine reason. But human reason constitutes a truly objective criterion of morality solely through that very objective evidence, or absolute value, of its universal judgments, which are called “first practical principles.” Therefore the designation “objective criterion” does not belong to it absolutely, but through formal dependence on, and derivation from, divine reason.
Argument III. The essential relation that created reason has to divine reason proves the same thing. For it is related to divine reason by its nature
a) as a secondary cause to a first cause. Now we may reason about this relation as follows with St. Thomas: “In all ordered causes the effect depends more on the first cause than on the secondary cause, because a secondary cause acts only by the power of the first cause. That human reason is the rule of the human will, by which its goodness is measured, comes from the eternal law, which is divine reason. Hence Psalm 4:6 says: ‘Many say, Who shows us good things? The light of your countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us’; as if it said: the light of reason that is in us can show us good things and rule our will only insofar as it is the light of your countenance, that is, derived from your countenance. Hence it is clear that the goodness of the will depends much more on the eternal law than on human reason.”104
b) as an image to its prototype. Hence an analogous argument can be made: Everything predicated of an image formally as such, that is, insofar as it represents the likeness of some prototype, must belong more principally and primarily to the prototype itself. But rationality in the human being is by its nature a created likeness of divine rationality and holiness; and it is also predicated formally as such to be an objective norm of morality. Therefore this predicate must belong primarily and absolutely to divine reason (the prototype), and only secondarily and relatively to human reason (the image).
185. Corollaries: I. The principle of morality, as the objective proximate criterion, can be reduced to roughly equivalent formulas such as these: Human actions are honorable or dishonorable: either insofar as they conform or fail to conform to practical reason (taken in the sense of the thesis); or insofar as they agree or do not agree with the universal order of things to be done, naturally known; or insofar as they accord with or oppose the evident practical principles of reason. On this last substitution, it should be noted that reason naturally uses its essential conception of universal truth and universal order in the manner of principles, partly speculative and partly practical, whose natural habits are immediately thereafter given in the mind; consequently, practical reason, considered according to its essential object, is equivalently exhibited by the evident practical principles of reason themselves.105 — All this is implicitly contained in the very brief formula suggested by the Angelic Doctor in these words: “Those habits are called good which accord with reason, while those that disagree with reason are called evil.”³
II. It must nevertheless be observed: just as these formulas are true for designating the objective criterion of morality as proximate and derived, so they would be intrinsically false and exposed to Kantian error as soon as, by denying or neglecting the essential relation to the absolute foundation located in divine reason, they claimed for themselves the dignity of a criterion of morality simply as such and absolutely in itself. It therefore belongs to the essential integrity of the principle of morality to positively include this relation, whether explicitly or implicitly. — St. Thomas thus sums up the whole doctrine: “In things done by the will, the proximate rule is human reason, but the supreme rule is the eternal law (divine reason). Whenever, therefore, a human act proceeds toward its end according to the order of reason and the eternal law, the act is right; but when it deviates from this rightness, it is called sin.”106
Remarks for resolving difficulties.
186. 1. The fact that even atheists, by the light of rational nature alone, recognize the internal distinction between the honorable and the dishonorable by no means proves that this distinction is ultimately and absolutely founded in rational nature or reason alone, without any relation to divine reason, which they deny. Rather, it proves with certainty these two things: a) that human reason, through its nature and therefore independently of the person’s good or evil will, has per se evident knowledge of its relation to an absolute order founded in God; hence atheists themselves are, as it were, compelled by their own moral judgments to attribute absolute value to them; b) that in this very matter atheists admit the greatest inconsistency, recognizing the absolute value of rational cognition while at the same time denying its necessary foundation and sole sufficient reason.
-
Practical reason, taken in the sense of our thesis, has nothing in common with Kant’s “pure practical reason,” since a) it presents in itself only “formal” principles or dictates, that is, principles valid and deserving of reverence only because they proceed from reason, to the exclusion of every relation to something extrinsic to reason (“material”), such as a relation to some final order established outside and above the human being, and even a relation to God and divine law. — b) Even if it did not differ from it in its very concept, it would nevertheless differ essentially from it in that the latter is said to be not merely a proximate and derived norm of moral rightness but the ultimate and absolute norm, indeed intrinsically possessing perfect binding force.
-
Nor can practical reason, invariable according to its essential object, be confused with the “universal reason” of pantheists. For this is thought to be one universal substance, existing as such and manifesting itself in each rational individual; whereas our practical reason, like every created thing, has no existence other than individual existence. It participates in its entire invariability and universality in the mode of cognition from the universal objective order.
187. Scholium 1. The principle of morality, strictly understood, which we have established thus far, has this use in itself: by its aid we can now discern moral good and evil not only through direct evidence but also reflectively and according to the objective character of science. This alone was the aim of the present inquiry. But just as the same direct evidence by which we distinguish the honorable and dishonorable theoretically also leads us to judge what is illicit, licit, and commanded, so the doctrine of the principle of morality would be intrinsically incomplete unless a similar inquiry into the formal ground of obligation and the supreme principle of law were added to it as its practical complement (as below, Book III). This inquiry, in turn, would necessarily lack the rank and foundation of a science if it did not have the former doctrine laid down beneath it first.
188. Scholium 2. It remains, following what I have already elsewhere (n. 47) been pleased to suggest to each person’s philosophical reflection, to offer seeds for fuller consideration drawn from the present subject of doctrine, by which the objective harmony and unity of moral science with the whole of philosophy and with its individual parts may be illustrated. For the same arguments that prove rational nature, as finally directive according to the evident practical principles of reason, to be the objective proximate norm of moral rightness derived from divine reason as absolute norm—those same arguments, I say, by the force of real analogy also prove that the same rational nature is rightly called the proximate objective norm of truth and falsity according to the evident speculative principles of reason, and of the beautiful and not beautiful according to aesthetic principles, while the common ultimate and absolute norm of all these is divine reason. For this plainly follows from the real unity both of human reason considered according to its essence and of the proper object of all rational cognition, which, according to St. Thomas, is order. And objective order is really one metaphysical object, although according to various relations it is formally distinguished into the speculative order of truth, the practical order of things to be done, and the aesthetic order.
Article 2.
On morality in particular.
- All human acts that conform to the objective norm of moral rightness agree with one another in the genus of moral good, just as those that fail to conform to it agree in the genus of moral evil. Yet not all good acts conform in the same way, nor all evil acts fail to conform in the same way; hence various species can be distinguished both within the genus of good and within the genus of evil. Accordingly, the question of morality in particular concerns by what in a human act this conformity or nonconformity is brought about, although it differs from act to act even among acts belonging to the same moral genus. This primary question must then be completed by another, intrinsically dependent on its solution, which concerns the possibility of morally indifferent acts.
§ 1. On the sources of morality in particular.
- Thesis XX. An action’s conformity or nonconformity with the norm of moral rightness arises from three aspects of the action: object, end, and circumstances.
Preliminary notes. 1. Although every object, in a broader sense, also has some aspect of an end, since it terminates or completes an action, here “object” is to be taken in a narrower sense, in which it differs from the end or intention, and therefore only as the proximate term essentially specifying a voluntary act, whether elicited or commanded. It is considered not physically or materially, but formally as known. 2. An end is any object of volition, on account of which some faculty is moved toward its object. 3. Circumstances are anything connected extrinsically or as if accidentally with either the object or the end. Seven in particular are commonly enumerated as those by which an action can be morally modified, marked by the familiar verse: “Who, what, where, by what means, why, how, when?”
Proof. Beyond doubt, all those things concur in establishing an action’s conformity or nonconformity with the moral norm, on which its final direction depends insofar as it is a movement proceeding from a free will. But this direction depends on the object, end, and circumstances. Therefore, etc.
Proof of the minor premise by its parts. 1. From the object. Certainly nothing can influence this direction more essentially than that which primarily and simply specifies the act, that is, the movement of a faculty, as the object does. For the direction and species of any movement depend principally on its proximate term.107
2. From the end. In every voluntary act the end has the character of a moving cause; for it is that on account of which the will determines both itself and the powers subject to it to their act or movement. Therefore the end causally and formally influences every act insofar as it is voluntary or, which is the same, finally directed. Hence the end also specifies the act in the moral order. Nor is this contradicted by the general axiom “the object specifies the act”; precisely because it is general, it must also apply to the end, which is the object of volition. So too St. Thomas: “A moral act,” he says, “receives its species from two things, namely, the object and the end; for the end is the object of the will, which is the first mover in moral acts. But the power moved by the will has its own object, which is the proximate object of the voluntary act, and in the act of the will it is related to the end as the material is to the formal.”108
3. From the circumstances. As the word itself indicates, circumstances as it were surround the action extrinsically and are added to its substance like certain accidents. But accidents of this kind can morally affect and variously modify the object or end of the action, as everyday practice and the common judgment of people sufficiently show, and as the analogy of natural things also confirms. For in natural things, too, as the holy Doctor observes, “the whole fullness of perfection due to them is not found in their substantial form, which gives them their species, but much is added by supervening accidents, as in a human being by shape and color, and similarly in other things; if any of these is lacking for a fitting condition, evil follows. So it is also in action.”109 Therefore, through the object and end, which per se specifically influence the final direction of an action, the circumstances themselves exert a similar influence. — Indeed, at times the same circumstances make the moral direction of the act right or not right immediately and per se, so that they not only modify a moral species already established elsewhere, but introduce a new species into the act.110 This plainly occurs whenever the circumstances are equivalent to a new object formally distinct and thus per se morally specifying. For example, someone who steals a thing set aside for divine worship, and known by him as such, in order to have the means to indulge in intemperance, commits an action to which three different species of moral evil adhere: considered per se from its object, it has the species of theft or injustice; from its end, the species of intemperance; and from the circumstances of the object, in addition, sacrilege. But a circumstance of quantity—that is, the greater or lesser value of the thing stolen—modifies the species of evil that already derives from the object and end not specifically but only quantitatively or materially.111
- Corollaries: I. The moral quality of an action derived from the object is rightly called fundamental, because it is intrinsic and essential to the action no less than the object itself, by which the action is simply constituted in its being. Therefore, a defect of moral rightness inherent in an action by reason of its object makes it morally evil so immutably that it can never be made good either by the agent’s good end or by good circumstances. Conversely, an action indifferent by its object nevertheless becomes either good or evil through one or the other moral quality arising from its end or circumstances.
II. For an action to be morally good, it must conform to the norm of morality in its object, end, and circumstances; for it to be evil, it suffices that it fail in any one respect. Hence the axiom: “Good results from an integral cause, evil from any defect.”112
III. From the different degrees of perfection and purity with which the rational order is fulfilled in an action, both in its object and in its end and circumstances, there also arise different degrees of moral perfection. Likewise, the more that same order is disturbed, whether in one or in all of these respects, the greater the moral evil found in a human act.
IV. The intention of one’s own good, even the pleasant good, certainly does not per se make an action bad in respect of its end; indeed, it accords entirely with right order so long as the will pursues a true good in it and does not rest in the good as pleasant as an end in itself. Nevertheless, the eudaemonistic concern of the will in actions otherwise well ordered marks a degree of moral goodness that is not perfect but capable of perfection with respect to its end. For the more purely the will is conformed to divine holiness—that is, the more, abstracting from every formal regard for a particular good, it turns toward the universal or properly rational good—the more the action conforms, in respect of its end, to the absolute order.
§ 2. On the moral indifference of human acts.
- From what has been said thus far about morality, this further question arises naturally: Is the division of human actions as moral into good and evil adequate, or are there also actions intermediate between them, neither good nor evil, that is, morally indifferent? And since moral goodness or evil can be derived in an action only from its object, end, or circumstances, the same question is equivalent to this: Is it possible that no species of morality is derived into an act either from its object, end, or circumstances? This is indeed what every controversy concerning moral indifference in the schools can be reduced to. The doctors differ in two opinions: some contend that human acts can be morally indifferent not only in species but also individually; others, only in species or in the abstract. For an act is taken “in species or in the abstract” when it is considered only according to its object, abstracting from end and circumstances; it is considered “individually” when it is also considered according to end and circumstances, both of which pertain to the concrete individuality of the act. The occasion for doubt and disagreement in this matter is suggested not so much by the difficulty of the question itself, considered in itself, as by a certain disagreement among doctors concerning the deeper principle of the doctrine, on which its solution logically depends. For all who teach that a positive intentional relation of every free activity to the ultimate end is required for right order of nature, such that an act fails in moral rightness even through the mere lack of that relation, cannot admit acts indifferent individually. But those who say that a merely negative final relation, or mere “referability” of an act, suffices for it to be considered not positively evil even if it is not good, consequently conclude that there can be indifferent acts even individually. We, therefore, in keeping with the doctrine we have proved about the relation of the human being to the end (Book I, ch. II, art. 4), hold in the present question also to the corresponding opinion, guided by the Angelic Doctor. Hence let it be:
193. Thesis XXI. Although human acts morally indifferent must be admitted when considered in the abstract, no act can exist concretely that is not in some respect either good or evil.
Preliminary notes. The discussion here concerns only truly human acts, that is, those proceeding from the free will. For all the others, called “acts of a human being,” which make up nearly the greater part of human activity, are neither good nor evil only because they lack the condition of all morality. Further, the disjunction “either good or evil” is to be understood philosophically, not theologically. For it is one thing for an act to be called naturally good, another to be supernaturally or theologically meritorious. No Christian denies that there is something intermediate between evil and supernatural goodness that is indifferent even individually (theologically), namely, what is merely naturally good.
Proof of Part I. By everyone’s agreement, many objects of actions are morally indifferent per se, that is, abstracting from the agent’s intention and from circumstances, and consequently many actions are likewise indifferent by reason of their object. But this is the same as saying that they are indifferent in the abstract or in species. This part of the doctrine is therefore sufficiently evident in itself and needs no further proof, all the less because in the present controversy it states precisely what both sides admit as their common foundation. Indeed, who would ever say that walking, traveling, bearing arms, and similar things are intrinsically—that is, by their object—good or evil?113
Proof of Part II. Every human act considered individually, besides being terminated by a definite object, is also directed, through the agent’s deliberation, toward a definite end, and has certain accompanying circumstances of person, time, place, manner, and so forth. For all these things are inseparable from a truly human act considered individually. — Hence we argue as follows: For a human act to be morally indifferent individually, besides the indifference of the object, indifference of the end and circumstances is also required. But, whatever may be the case with circumstances, a deliberately intended end can never be morally indifferent, but is either morally right or not right. Therefore every human act considered individually must necessarily be either good or evil at least by reason of its end.
Proof of the minor premise by two arguments:
- From the very concept of right order of ends. By virtue of this order, all proximate and secondary ends of an acting human being must in some way be referred to the ultimate end by positive subordination, not merely negatively. The reason is that our whole rational life, according to the unity of nature and end, also constitutes one series of ends (n. 75 ff.); but in every series of ends all the intermediate or secondary ends, precisely as such, participate in their whole character of good and end from the ultimate end of the tendency (n. 25), just as useful goods participate in every character of true good from what is good per se (n. 29, ad 4). Hence as follows:
The end that a person acting freely intends proximately is either referred in some way (that is, immediately or mediately, explicitly or implicitly, or virtually) to the ultimate end, that is, what simply accords with rational nature, or is not referred to it at all; there is no middle ground between the two. But if it is referred to the ultimate end, it conforms to the objective order of ends, or is right; if it is not referred to the end at all, it is positively nonconforming to this order, and hence not right.114 Similarly, if the end is considered under the aspect of good, in the former case the true good is intended, whereas in the latter an apparent good is intended, that is, something irrational and evil with respect to the whole of nature. Therefore an end actually intended cannot be morally indifferent.
- From divine holiness. By virtue of his holiness, through which he wills the right order of things from eternity, God necessarily wills that, just as every contingent being depends on God as the first cause, so every created being be positively referred to God as the ultimate end. This condition pertains not only to physical entities but also to every entity in the moral order, such as a human act insofar as it proceeds from the free determination of the will. But a human act according to its moral being—at least when it is morally indifferent by its object—can be referred to the ultimate end only through the agent’s end. Therefore, insofar as the agent acting individually does this in some way through his end, or fails to do it altogether, the act is, by reason of its end, either fitting or unfitting to divine holiness, that is, either good or evil.115
Remarks for resolving difficulties.
-
- To say that rational life must be positively subordinated to the ultimate end of nature does not demand anything incongruous or impossible. This positive subordination does not consist in requiring a person to do good positively continually and without interruption; it requires only that, if someone performs a deliberate act, it be directed only toward an end positively fitting to rational nature. If this is not done, it is asserted that such an act is thereby itself nonconforming to reason, or evil.
-
For an act to be considered philosophically or naturally good by reason of its end, it is not required that the intention be directed explicitly and formally to God as the ultimate end; it suffices that this be done virtually and implicitly.116 And since a person whose reason has developed cannot invincibly be ignorant of the essential relation of his own reason to divine reason and holiness, it may rightly be assumed that this right intention is generally possessed “virtually and implicitly” wherever a person is guided by the motive of honorableness, intending an end according to a sincere and truly rational appraisal, while rejecting the blind and immoderate impulse of sensitive nature. It is therefore clear that even honorable recreation is by no means excluded from this goodness.
-
Those who invoke what appears to be the contrary common judgment of people often confuse either an act of a human being with a truly human act, or the supernatural and theologically meritorious goodness of an action with its natural goodness. This makes the discussion stray from the point at issue.
-
A naturally licit action, that is, one not forbidden by natural law, is per se nothing other than an action indifferent in the abstract. Therefore, for such an action also to be performed licitly as an individual act, it is necessary that a rational end be added, together with rightly ordered circumstances. For who would say that everything licit in itself is thereby licitly done by anyone and in any manner?
-
For an act to become positively evil on the part of its end, it is not necessary for the intended end to be positively opposed to the ultimate end; it suffices that it lack a due conformity to it.
-
If it is objected that indifference cannot belong to actions in species without likewise belonging to all individuals contained under the same species, this is rightly concluded if one is speaking of the very indifference found in the species, that is, indifference from the object: for this truly remains in the individual as well. But the moral difference asserted to be present in the act nevertheless arises not from the specifying object, but from individuating features, namely, the intention or circumstances.