Theodor Meyer, Ius naturae generale
Institutiones iuris naturalis, Pars I: Ius naturae generale
First published 1906
Theodor Meyer’s Ius naturae generale from the second corrected edition (1906), in Latin with an original English translation. Preface and proemium included; the navigational contents and publisher advertisements are excluded.
Introductio I: Preface
Introduction
Sectio I: General Ethics
Liber I: Book One. The Natural Elements and Conditions of Human Action
Chapter I. Propaedeutic Synthesis on the Activity of Secondary Causes, or on Natural Action in General
Chapter II. The Natural End of Human Acts and of the Human Being
Chapter III. The Principle of Human Acts
Prologue.
- In examining the human act, we now approach its other terminus, which stands as if diametrically opposed to the natural motion’s end and marks its beginning or principle. We have drawn from the genuine concept of nature the conclusion that, in every created being, its very nature is the common principle of all natural operations. But nature produces and directs its motion not immediately, or taken abstractly, but through natural powers. We have proved that every final unfolding of human nature is reduced to the proper unfolding of the human will (37). Therefore, the argument of this chapter will be concerned chiefly with considering the rational will, insofar as, as a principle, it in a way represents human nature itself.
And since this subject in a special way belongs properly to psychology, we do not think it our task to examine it analytically anew in moral philosophy from its beginnings, as if it were a region still unknown. Therefore, rather than reestablishing psychological notions on this subject, we must report synthetically those firmly established elsewhere1 and commonly accepted throughout sound philosophy; yet we must ensure that those parts of the doctrine whose connection with moral rules is known to be closer and more fruitful are not left without their own special rational foundations.
Article 1.
On the will’s influence on an act, or on the voluntary in general2
§ 1. What the voluntary is and its kinds.
- In the broadest sense, something is called voluntary either because the will tends toward it or because it proceeds from the will, that is, is in some way caused by the will. Taken more strictly, however, the character of the voluntary is usually attributed only to an action or deed insofar as it shares in causal influence from the will. In this way they distinguish the voluntary from the willed, which is predicated only of the intentional object of the will as such, or that toward which the will tends, even if it does not effectively proceed from the will.
Since it is clear that the will is the proper and natural principle of human actions, it follows readily that no action can truly be called human unless it is voluntary, that is, unless it proceeds from the will. But the will in man is not just any appetite, but the rational appetite, or a tendency toward good known intellectually (43). Therefore, on the part of the intellect, rational apprehension is a prerequisite for a voluntary act. For this reason the schools commonly define a voluntary action as:
“An action proceeding from an internal principle with knowledge of the end.”3
Thus, in constituting a voluntary act, these two elements—cognition by the intellect and the appetitive power or tendency of the will toward the known end—concur so essentially that, if either is lacking, an involuntary act arises.
-
The voluntary is distinguished
-
According to the different way in which it proceeds from the will:
a) Elicited and commanded. An act is called elicited when it proceeds from the will as its own immediate efficient cause. This applies to acts that are effected by the will in such a way that they are also received and completed in that same will. All of these are reduced either to love (desire for good) or to hatred (aversion from evil). An act is called commanded when it proceeds from the will not as immediately effecting it, but as commanding it; hence its proximate principle is some power of either soul or body physiologically subject to the will. Moreover, in a voluntary act elicited (of love), various degrees may in a way be considered as so many implicit partial acts. Following St. Thomas,4 six are commonly enumerated; three concern the end: willing, intention, fruition; the other three concern the means to the end: consent, choice, use.
For volition denotes a simple love of the end, abstracting from the means that lead to it; hence it is also called “velleity.” Intention is the same love of the end, but now effective and joined to a positive direction toward means suited to attaining it. Fruition is called the joy that accompanies the attainment and possession of the beloved end.5
With respect to the means, consent is the act by which the will approves one of the proposed means and inclines itself to choose this rather than another. Choice follows consent, that is, the will’s actual determination to take one means and leave the others aside. Finally, use is the act by which the will now actually applies itself and the powers subject to it to taking up the means chosen.6
-
b) Perfect and imperfect, according as it proceeds from the will with perfect or imperfect knowledge of the end and circumstances. The entire character of the voluntary, including the other element it receives from the inclination of the will, will be perfect or imperfect according to the degree of this cognition. For the condition and direction of the appetitive inclination lie in cognition.
-
c) Direct and indirect. A direct voluntary act (voluntary in itself) is one that proceeds from the will in such a way that it is also willed in itself, that is, intended by the will, whether as an end or as a means to another end. An indirect voluntary act (in its cause), by contrast, proceeds from the will not as something willed in itself, but as something connected with something else directly willed and in some way known as such. Thus, for a man who becomes drunk through excessive use of wine, while not ignorant of the wine’s effect, the drinking itself is to be called directly voluntary, but drunkenness indirectly voluntary, or voluntary in its cause.7
Nevertheless, not everything objectively connected with some directly voluntary action by a relation of consequence, even if that relation is necessary and foreseen by the agent, must thereby and always be considered to truly proceed from the will and hence be indirectly voluntary. For, given certain conditions, it can happen that it should rightly be called permitted or unprevented rather than caused by the will. Therefore, to determine securely in an individual case whether something is voluntary indirectly, a further criterion is needed, which will be discussed more specifically below when we treat of imputability.
What is commonly called interpretative voluntary action is in some measure related to indirect voluntary action, but must not be confused with it. That is, for something objectively connected with a directly voluntary action to be called interpretatively voluntary, no actual cognition of it by the agent is in itself required; it is enough that the cognition be interpretative, that is, such as the person could and ought to have had, although perhaps in fact he did not have it.8 But voluntary action in its cause, or indirectly, always presupposes some actual cognition or foreknowledge of it, at least confused.
-
d) Voluntary simply and voluntary in a certain respect, according as the will is inclined toward an object absolutely or only under some condition. An analogous distinction is likewise commonly used concerning the involuntary. Thus we call involuntary simply that toward which the will’s inclination is in no way directed and which shares none of its causal influence. Involuntary in a certain respect, however, is predicated of some deed that truly proceeds from the will by virtue of an effective inclination, but would not be done unless it were apprehended as necessary to avoid an evil that is feared. An example would be throwing precious merchandise into the sea to avoid an imminent shipwreck.9
-
e) Positive and negative, according as it proceeds from the will through the positing of an action or its omission with the awareness of reason. Conversely, positive involuntary is what happens when the will is positively unwilling and resists; negative involuntary is what happens when the will is neither unwilling nor desiring it, and therefore strictly deserves to be called not so much involuntary as nonvoluntary.
-
f) Actual, virtual, habitual. Actual is what depends on the will influencing it here and now; virtual is what persists by force (virtue) of an act once posited; habitual is what was once actual and has not been revoked.
-
- According to the different degree of internal causality that can be considered in the principle producing the act, three internal modes are distinguished in the voluntary in general, to which correspond three names for it: spontaneous, voluntary strictly so called, free.
-
a) Something is called spontaneous insofar as it proceeds from an appetitive principle internal to the agent himself. Every voluntary act, then, is spontaneous in this respect, which it shares with the acts of brute animals. By its very concept it is opposed to violent.
-
b) Something spontaneous is called voluntary strictly so called insofar as it proceeds from its principle not in just any way, but under rational cognition (“with knowledge of the end”). Therefore this degree transcends the power of every irrational agent. Its opposite is involuntary.
-
c) Finally, a voluntary act is free insofar as it proceeds not only with knowledge of the end, but also from a principle that possesses dominion over its own activity. Hence the opposite of free is necessary voluntary (“necessitated”), that is, whatever proceeds from the will under rational cognition by virtue of a causal necessity predetermining it to that very act. Thus every free act is a fortiori also spontaneous and voluntary, but the reverse does not hold: not everything spontaneous or voluntary is thereby also free.
§ 2. On the will’s command over the other faculties10
Although commanding properly belongs to reason, reason cannot perform this office without the will’s cooperation. Hence command is rightly attributed to the rational will. By the will’s command we understand the act by which the will applies the faculties subject to it to an act, according to the law of substantial union between body and soul. Such command is called absolute or nonabsolute, according as no resistance at all or some resistance can be opposed to it by the other powers. In antiquity the former was commonly called “despotic,” the latter “political,” using a term borrowed from civil government.11
In fact, the will exercises absolute command over no faculty subject to it at all, as experience sufficiently shows. For it often happens that the other faculties not only anticipate the will’s command by their own movements, but also admit a subsequent command with great difficulty and can be restrained from their acts only reluctantly and imperfectly. We experience this not only in those powers grounded in sensibility and therefore by their very nature more distinct from the rational appetite, but also in a spiritual power most closely joined to the will, such as the intellect. For the will is sometimes entirely unable, even when determined to do so, to turn the intellect away at once from certain thoughts.
-
But, as psychological experience testifies, the will exercises “political,” or nonabsolute, command over every single power subject to it within the unity of human nature; specifically:
-
Over the intellect12 For although the will is in itself a blind power, which, in order to pass into its own act, needs a prior excitation and some cognition on the part of the intellect,13 according to the axiom, “Nothing is willed unless previously known,” nevertheless, once this natural condition is met, it cannot be denied that intellectual operations depend in many ways on the will’s command and direction, as we experience every day. Hence it follows that acts of the intellect, no less than those of the other faculties, are truly to be called voluntary by virtue of that command.
-
Over the internal sensitive appetite. The will can both excite its various movements and, in general, restrain them, if it diligently strives to turn away from those things that usually give rise to such acts. Nevertheless, it cannot always wholly prevent them from being excited, whether by the impression of external objects or by the organic disposition of the body. Hence the Apostle also testifies in Rom 7:23: “I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind.”14
-
Over the external senses, insofar as their organs, while healthy, can at least in general be applied or restrained by the will, either organically and directly or only mechanically and indirectly.
-
Over the motive power, directly in those movements that pertain to properly animal life, such as the movements of the body’s external organs; indirectly, however, in those that serve vegetative life.
-
Corollary. Therefore as many different commanded voluntary acts can be distinguished as there are powers in man subordinated to the will’s command. For although all of them agree with one another formally as voluntary acts through the will’s command, each nevertheless has its own proper character and name as an act from the faculty from which it proximately proceeds. It should also be noted that every commanded act, although physically composed of two elements, namely the act of the principal agent and that of the instrument, is nevertheless morally one and is so called.15
§ 3. On involuntariness through force.
- What is violent is, as it were, more hostilely opposed to the will’s influence over the powers naturally subject to it (commanded voluntary action), since it is directly opposed even to the spontaneous. In general, a natural agent is said to suffer violence if it is forced to undergo, from an extrinsic active principle, a movement or impulse contrary to the natural inclination of its internal principle. Hence the schools commonly define violent as “that which proceeds from an external principle, while the patient resists.”16 The “patient resisting” can be understood in two ways: either only by reason of a contrary habitual natural inclination, or also by reason of an actual or elicited inclination. The definition of violent admits both modes, although violence indicating a mode of actual resistance is often given the more specific name coercion.
Therefore, for the character of violence to be observed in activity that happens in a human subject, it is not enough that it arise from an extrinsic agent without the will’s command; it is also necessary that it occur against the will’s resistance.17 If the will resists with all its strength, or as much as it can, the violence is called strictly so called; otherwise it is called broadly so called.
With these points established, it is readily demonstrated:
- Thesis IX. Violence strictly so called excludes the voluntary simply from the act subject to it; violence more broadly so called excludes it according to the degree to which it approaches strict violence. Nevertheless, the will can suffer violence only with respect to acts that are in themselves commandable, never with respect to acts that are merely elicited.18
Proof of Part I. As to both members, from the concepts of the voluntary and the violent. For there is an intrinsic and direct opposition between them, so that each involves the negation of the other, and the more something approaches one, the less it shares in the other. Indeed, what could more mutually exclude one another than an act proceeding from the will itself as an internal principle and an act induced by an external principle against the will’s resistance?
Proof of Part II. Nothing prevents powers subordinated to the will only by “political” command from sometimes being restrained by an extrinsic active principle either from carrying out acts commanded by the will or from being applied to their own acts against the will’s desire and resistance. Therefore, some violence can be inflicted upon the will extrinsically and mediately, with respect to acts inherently subject to its command, or commandable acts.
But this absolutely cannot happen with respect to elicited acts of the will. For it is incoherent that the will, by an elicited inclination, will or not will something and at the same time resist that same inclination. Hence it is understood that not even by God can such violence be inflicted on the human will. Nor does this detract in any way from God’s complete dominion over the will of a creature. For although God can at his discretion move the will toward an inclination or successively turn it from one inclination to another contrary to the first, even God’s omnipotence cannot do something intrinsically repugnant.
-
Corollaries: I. Not everything that is known to be involuntary in some way is thereby to be considered violent. Much less should it be confused with “involuntary in a certain respect,” which, despite a certain contrary conditional wish, nevertheless happens according to the will’s effective inclination and is therefore voluntary simply.19 (86).
-
II. Likewise, although sin may in some way be called a motion against nature—that is, against the rational nature’s inclination toward the morally good—it by no means shares the character of violence. For, as St. Thomas observes, “that toward which the will tends in sinning, although it is evil and contrary to rational nature according to the truth of the thing, is nevertheless apprehended as good and fitting to nature, insofar as it is fitting to man according to some sensible pleasure or some corrupted habit.”20 Thus it is clear that sin is done not against but through the will.
Article 2.
On freedom.
§ 1. General notion of freedom.
- Freedom, taken in the broadest sense, denotes immunity or release from any kind of bond or obstacle. Thus someone is called free from sin if he is just, free from misery if he is happy; free from material bonds if he uses a power of motion released from external obstacles; free from slavery if he is subject to no master’s power; free from a father’s or guardian’s authority if he is his own master, and so on.
When this general concept of freedom is applied specifically to human activity, two principal meanings of freedom arise:
-
Freedom from coercion, which excludes all violence and coercion. With respect to the human will this freedom is called essential, because violence cannot affect acts proper to the will; accordingly, in this sense free means the same as voluntary.
-
Freedom from necessity (freedom of indifference, free choice). This is usually the freedom chiefly meant when it is attributed to a rational agent, and it is a necessary condition for the moral value of human acts. Therefore, its notion in particular must be considered more carefully here.
If we ask about the familiar concept of free choice, there is no one to whom psychological experience itself does not suggest it: whenever we act through deliberate choice, we rightly judge that we are exercising free choice. It is for this reason that St. Thomas, starting from this same psychological fact,21 teaches that free choice itself is “the elective power,” that is, the faculty of choosing one thing over another by deliberation. “For we are said to have free choice because we can accept one thing and reject another, which is to choose; and therefore we must consider the nature of free choice from choice.”
-
Thus, as the same holy Doctor proceeds, analyzing choice as it were: “For choice involves something on the part of the cognitive power and something on the part of the appetitive power. On the cognitive side, deliberation is required, by which it is judged what ought to be preferred to something else. On the appetitive side, what is judged by deliberation must be accepted through appetite.” — But although both spiritual powers concur in choice and freedom, they do not do so in the same way. Namely:
-
Freedom formally belongs to the will alone. For “choice is principally an act of the appetitive power.” The reason is “that the proper object of choice is what is toward an end; this, as such, has the character of a good, which is called useful,” and therefore is “an object of appetite.” Hence free choice is also an “appetitive power.”22 Or, as Suarez explains more fully:23 “Freedom formally resides in the will alone.” Thus we rightly say that it is not the intellect but the will that is endowed with freedom.
Nevertheless, one must not think that the elective power constitutes a new power added to the will and really distinct from it. St. Thomas confirms and illustrates the fact that it “is not a power other than the will” by these sound psychological reasons: “Appetitive powers must be proportionate to apprehensive powers. As intellect and reason are related on the side of intellectual apprehension, so will and free choice are related on the side of intellectual appetite; free choice is nothing other than the elective power. This is clear from the relation both of their objects and of their acts. For understanding signifies the simple reception of something; hence those things known in themselves without comparison are properly called principles. To reason, by contrast, is properly to arrive from one thing at knowledge of another. Hence we reason properly about conclusions, which become known from principles. Likewise, on the side of appetite, to will signifies the simple appetite for something; hence the will is said to concern the end, which is desired for its own sake. To choose, however, is to desire something for the sake of attaining something else; hence choice properly concerns things that are toward an end. As in the cognitive powers a principle is related to a conclusion, to which we assent because of the principles, so in the appetitive powers the end is related to things that are toward the end, which are desired for the sake of the end. Hence it is clear that, as intellect is related to reason, so will is related to the elective power, that is, to free choice.”24 — Thus, although “choice and willing are different acts, they nevertheless belong to one power, just as understanding and reasoning do.”25
-
- The use of reason is the root of freedom26. No prudent person denies that freedom belongs to the intellect or reason in some way, though not formally—that is, “presuppositively or at the root”; this is clear enough from the words of St. Thomas cited above, who also expressly says: “The will is the subject of freedom’s root, but reason is its cause: for the will can be carried freely toward different things because reason can have different conceptions of the good.”27 Accordingly, in the mind of the holy Doctor, the intrinsic reason why the elective power can belong to the will lies in the indifference of reason’s judgment concerning several desirable things. For a judgment determined toward one thing (unless it has been determined to it beforehand by the free command of the will) leaves no room for the will’s indifference and therefore for free choice. In this way it is rightly said that freedom is rooted in the use of reason. Nevertheless, this point requires further consideration:
-
Question: Does the very necessity with which free choice requires a root on which to rest also require and demonstrate free choice on the part of that root, once the root of freedom has been established?
I answer 1. We rightly infer freedom itself from the root of freedom, if freedom is understood as a mere potentiality. For this is required by the natural proportion between the cognitive and appetitive powers; and our reason would be said to be furnished in vain with that natural power, unless the will’s elective power corresponded to it. In this sense St. Thomas also rightly says: “It is necessary that man have free choice precisely because he is rational.”28
I answer 2. The same inference does not hold with respect to actual freedom. Even given an indifferent judgment of reason, it can nevertheless happen that the will’s freedom, considered in its actual exercise, is lacking for some other reason. For who would doubt that God could move the human will to an act despite that indifference of judgment, in such a way that it performs the act necessarily?29 Therefore, for an act of the will proceeding from the root of freedom to be truly called free, it must also be presupposed that God’s cooperation is so suited to indifference that the act can also be performed freely by the will.30
§ 2. On the definition of freedom.
- Since “we are said to have free choice because we can accept one thing while rejecting another,”31 it seems to follow quite clearly that the will cannot be considered free unless it is immune from every antecedent necessity—that is, a necessity independent of the will and determining it toward one thing. Hence freedom from necessity is also called freedom of “indifference.” For indifference is opposed to determination toward one thing. Thus everyone readily agrees in general that some indifference of the will belongs to the nature of free choice. In order to establish a definition of freedom, therefore, we must first determine what kind of indifference is required for it to be considered sufficient formally to constitute free choice.
Indifference admits various modes and degrees. In general, this term means any capacity for two contradictories, contraries, or at least different things. If the capacity is only for contradictories—that is, for a form or its absence, for an act or its omission—it is called indifference of contradiction (of exercise). If it is for contraries, such as contrary or different forms or actions—for example, good and bad actions—it is commonly called indifference of contrariety (of specification).32 Both these kinds of indifference are again distinguished into two kinds: passive and active. Passive indifference consists in something’s being able to be determined from an extrinsic source toward two opposite or different things. Thus wax is indifferent to receiving a round or square shape. Active indifference can belong only to acting principles; it is an intrinsically productive power, capable of opposite or different effects. Such is the capacity implanted in an active principle to act or not act, or to act in one way rather than another.
It is beyond all dispute, and evident in itself, that passive indifference alone is not sufficient for the nature of free choice, since an act proceeding from a principle that is passive in itself could not even be voluntary. Thus only active indifference can be at issue here: whether, and under what condition, it seems sufficient to constitute the genuine nature of freedom.
On this matter, we must note that active indifference itself can again be divided into two kinds: negative or remote, and positive or proximate.
Negative (remote) indifference is the indifference of an active principle insofar as it is in itself in potency to act or to omit an act, to this or that act, and is determined in itself toward neither. It is called “negative” because it is only a negation of determination toward either of two opposites, for which the subject is presumed to have a capacity for determination. Such indifference, then, can belong to a principle only in the state of potentiality, or before its actual determination, once which is posited it ceases. In this way, the will is rightly considered indifferent and to that extent free from necessity simply because, on the part of the intellect, there subsists an indifference of judgment, or the root of freedom.
Positive (proximate) indifference adds something to the former, namely, such dominion of a power over its own operation that, given divine concurrence, it can also determine itself actually to this or that from itself, with no other cause determining or predetermining the act toward one thing.33 Accordingly, this indifference belongs to a power in such a way that it pertains not only to the state of mere potency or indeterminate suspension, but also positively to the state of actual determination; hence it is called “positive” or “proximate.”
With these points established, we rightly conclude:
- I. Any kind of active indifference of the will is not sufficient for the nature of free choice; rather, positive or proximate indifference for self-determination is also required.
For: The will is truly free and endowed with “elective power” insofar as, by the perfection of its internal power, it is truly mistress of its own action. St. Thomas therefore also requires this very condition for the nature of a truly human act, saying: “Those actions alone are properly human over which man is master ... hence those acts that occur in man or through man without being directed by the free choice of the will are usually called acts of a man, but not human acts.”34 — Moreover, the will has dominion over its act if, with its own power made proximally ready, it can perform or omit the act at will, so that neither the act occurs by antecedent necessity nor its omission through inability. For the holy Doctor again says: “That is free which is the cause of itself, and thus the free has the character of what exists through itself.”35
The “negative” indifference of the will does not of itself necessarily include this kind of actual dominion over its own act, since it makes the power as such free from necessity while leaving open whether the act that proceeds from this free power proceeds freely or necessarily. By contrast, “positive” indifference of itself implies that the act is not merely performed by a power that is free in some manner, but that it is also performed freely—that is, with the will’s full dominion over its own self-determination.36
- II. Indifference of contrariety is not required for the formal nature of freedom; indifference of contradiction is sufficient in itself.
The reason is that the condition of free choice, on the side of the object, requires in itself nothing more than that what is to be chosen be present while the other is rejected. For this, two termini suffice, one opposed to the other by simple contradiction, such as an act and its positive omission. — Likewise, on the side of the intellect, the root of freedom requires in itself only that at least one object be presented to it; but the object must not be presented as wholly and merely desirable, or simply good, but under some aspect of good and some aspect of evil, or of what is not desirable. For if an object were presented purely as good (as God would be if perfectly known), the intellectual judgment that guides the will could not be indifferent, but would necessarily be determined toward one thing; and thus no room would remain for the deliberation of reason that every choice presupposes to some extent.
From this it is likewise understood that indifference to doing good or evil does not belong to the nature of freedom; plainly, it rather indicates an imperfection in the free agent.37
Hence
- III. Free choice, taken according to its formal nature, is rightly defined as the faculty of the will by which, once all the prerequisites for acting are in place, it can act or not act38
Explanation. “Once all the prerequisites for acting are in place” means once every condition has been fulfilled that is required both on the side of the intellect as the root of freedom and on the side of God’s concurrence as first cause, so that the active power is proximally ready for act. The words “it can act or not act” mean that, with all the same prerequisites in place, both the act and its absence can be brought about. It follows that what is opposed to freedom is not only the determination of the will toward one thing because of a lack of indifference on the side of the intellect, but every absolute and antecedent necessity, from whatever source it comes, that by its nature causes the will’s determination.
- Scholium. The doctrine we have set out concerning the nature of free choice is the one that theologians of the Society of Jesus, following Suarez, have consistently professed and continue to profess. The Scotists agreed with them, as did many among the older Thomists.39 The later “Thomists,” however, disagree.40 All the doctors of the Catholic schools agree without controversy on these two points: 1. no secondary cause acts except through the power of the first cause; 2. despite the human will’s necessary dependence on the first cause, true freedom and true dominion over its acts must be attributed to it, since it is the principle of all moral imputability. But the most learned men on both sides disagree about how these two truths are to be reconciled appropriately, each side also appealing to the authority of the Angelic Doctor by means of interpretations of his words that are more or less probable.
The later “Thomists,” namely, lest anything be taken away from God’s full dominion over secondary causes, even free ones, think that for every operation of a creature a physical premotion (predetermination) is required on the part of the first cause, one that by its nature and essentially has the act connected to it. Therefore, so that freedom may nevertheless be preserved, they are compelled to accommodate the nature and concept of freedom in some way to this physical predetermination. They accordingly teach that, for freedom, it is sufficient that under a divine physical premotion toward a certain operation, which will follow both with necessary causal connection and from the will’s deliberate determination, the will retain the power not to act or the power for an opposite act. Since this power as such is not removed by the fact that, once that determining influx of God is posited, the will in fact cannot here and now refrain from acting or do the contrary, they conclude that freedom too remains intact. And so, indeed, it follows that something is free simply and always insofar as it proceeds from the will not as nature but as will—that is, under the indifference of cognition.41
For our part, with the Scotists, we deny that physical predetermination in the sense of the “Thomists” is required for free secondary causes in order to satisfy God’s rights over creatures. We maintain that the nature of free choice requires that, given all the prerequisites on God’s part, if these are considered according to their physical causality, the absence of an act or an opposite act also be possible; that is, the will must nevertheless remain immediately sufficient for either.42
It is enough to have noted these points in summary here. For it is the purpose of psychology and theodicy, rather than ethics, to pursue this controversy with a fuller array of arguments.43
§ 3. It is shown that man is endowed with free choice.
- Now, after defining the concept of free choice, we ask whether it can truly be attributed to the internal principle of human actions, so that every properly human act must be considered not only voluntary but also free. The answer to this question is:
Thesis X. Man in his present state of life is endowed with free choice.
Preliminary remarks. This truth is an essential foundation of the whole science of morals. Therefore, although it may rightly be presupposed as already established in metaphysics, it seems appropriate to state it here as a thesis and confirm it at least with the principal points of argument.
Two principal classes of opponents can be distinguished. The first includes those who, led by theological error, deny man’s free choice, such as the “Reformers” of the sixteenth century, who acknowledged man’s original freedom but taught that it was lost by our race through the sin of our first parent. The second consists of philosophers who, either explicitly or tacitly, exclude every created free cause through their cosmological and psychological doctrines.
Chief among them are the properly so-called Fatalists, who contend that everything that happens in the world comes about through a blind and ineluctable fate, a view known to have been held by many of the Stoics.
Also included are all who profess materialism or pantheism in any form. Materialism, since it recognizes only the powers of matter, plainly admits no freedom44; pantheism, by contrast, admits only freedom from coercion, and cannot admit any other kind according to its principles. Spinoza frankly admits this45 when he teaches that “the will cannot be called a free cause but a necessary one.” Likewise, all recent pantheists, although they commonly profess in name to attribute freedom to the will, understand and explain it in such a way that it differs in no respect from necessity. Nor should Herbart be left out here.46
Indeed, neither Descartes47 nor Leibniz48 left genuine freedom of indifference intact, since they held that in every act the will is necessarily determined by “the stronger motive presented by the intellect.”
Finally, in our own time, a philosophy called “positive,” together with the Darwinian naturalism that agrees with it, claims in the name of “science” to overcome and eliminate more and more the ancient “prejudice” of psychological freedom.49 Nor does the recent philosophy of pessimism dissent.50 And so, for the most part, outside Christian philosophy, all the vaunted modern science professes “determinism,” commonly denying human freedom!
- Proof I. From the proportion between man’s apprehensive and appetitive powers. (Cf. nn. 16, 80.)
By the force of this necessary psychological proportion, the will must stand in relation to desiring the good as the intellect stands in relation to knowing the good. But our intellect can not only “understand” the nature of the good as an end in general and in particular; it can also “reason” about the many and most diverse kinds of good in things “directed to an end,” that is, weigh what goodness or badness, what usefulness or disadvantage each has, whether in relation to proximate ends or to the ultimate end, or what is indifferent under the aspect of good. Therefore a faculty on the side of the rational appetitive power must necessarily correspond, as an analogue, to this faculty of reasoning on the side of the intellectual power: that is, the elective power, or freedom of indifference. For it is rightly said that the root of freedom lies in the use of reason, or in the indifference of judgment, because the elective power of the will constitutes its natural psychological complement51
- Proof II. From the intimate testimony of conscience.
Intimate experience assures us most certainly that, when we are about to perform or omit some act rationally foreknown by the will: 1. we use attention and reflection at our own discretion in weighing the contrary motives available to us from the lower appetite, against the purpose of reason; 2. we also notice and recognize the sufficiency of the motives that deter us from what is dishonorable and impel us toward what is honorable, even when we actually decide to act wrongly; and conversely, when we choose to act rightly, we feel ourselves driven by powerful impulses toward the contrary, anxious with fear lest we succumb to them; 3. we can at will delay or hasten our resolution, without ever observing anything that necessarily, by a necessity antecedent to it, absolutely draws us to one course, until at last we ourselves choose either to will or not to will, or to will later or sooner, or even decide beforehand upon this choice hypothetically, according as some future contingent condition occurs or does not; 4. we impute the resolution itself, once made, whether positively or negatively, to ourselves as its true authors, as deserving praise or blame; 5. we distinguish very well necessary acts of the will, for example, the appetite for happiness, from those we choose at our own discretion; 6. finally, no clearer or more certain sense of this freedom can be required or conceived in a truly free being than the very one we in fact experience.
But this constant and invincible testimony of inner experience, and therefore one marked by the most certain criterion of truth, plainly proves that our will is endowed with true freedom of indifference—not only potentially, but also actually in many of its acts. Who could deny that this inner testimony is precisely of the kind required and necessary if we truly enjoy free choice? And indeed, if we were driven by antecedent necessity to one of two contradictories or contraries, neither attention to the other course, nor further deliberation, nor postponement of the choice simultaneously would be in our power. For this reason, too, we distinguish necessary acts of the will from free ones by no other mark than that in the former the appetite is borne toward one of the proposed courses, willingly indeed, but without deliberation and without delay in choosing. Therefore . . .
- Proof III. From the common persuasion of mankind.
Argument 1. The moral notions of honorable and dishonorable, just and unjust, licit and illicit, merit and demerit, praise and blame, reward and punishment are not only common to all human beings, but are also so essential and so founded in rational nature that they can never be unknown to anyone who uses reason. Human society itself is the perpetual witness to this truth: unless it rested on those human notions as the common foundation of rational life, it could neither have arisen nor continue to subsist52
But all these notions also implicitly involve, and necessarily presuppose, the common human consciousness of free choice, as is clear from the very notion of morality and of the moral qualities of an action.
Therefore this common persuasion of mankind, by which they attribute free choice to themselves, must likewise be considered founded in their rational nature and consequently cannot lack objective truth.
Argument 2. The subjective persuasion of human beings concerning free choice is a constant and universal psychological, anthropological, and social fact, and one so notorious that no adversary has ever seriously tried to deny the fact itself. Indeed, even those who deny that the human being is truly endowed with free choice cannot rid themselves of this subjective persuasion; they continually manifest it in their whole manner of acting, in private as well as in social and public life, just as skeptics by their actions in a way profess the certainty that they deny or call into doubt in words.
But such a universal and invincible persuasion must be the immediate and most certain voice of rational nature and hence, attested by God himself, the author of nature.
Therefore sound reason cannot deny free choice in the human being.
Proof of the minor premise. With the possibility of a merely subjective illusion excluded.
a) No subjective reason can be assigned, much less a sufficient one, for so constant a persuasion apart from its objective truth. On the contrary, a certain subjective and psychological reason exists which positively demands freedom to choose in a rational being, as was shown in Proof I.
b) It is absolutely repugnant to the divine truthfulness, wisdom, and holiness that the whole moral order and its sanction through the legislation of God and human beings, the entire apparatus of judgments and punishments, moral obligation and imputability, and the other moral bonds by which the human race has habitually been guided from its beginnings as endowed with freedom, should be founded on a mere and invincible illusion—a thing no less cruel than absurd. Yet, if human freedom of indifference is removed, this very conclusion follows with no escape by reason.
- Corollary. From this it follows that, in the present state of life, only a free action can be called perfectly human, that is, an action proceeding from our will according to its own proper manner of acting.
Remarks for resolving difficulties.
-
A. Of older scholastic origin.
-
First, a necessity called hypothetical consequent must be distinguished from absolute or hypothetical antecedent necessity. When a human being acts under necessity in the former sense, he indeed acts necessarily, namely, consequent upon the hypothesis of a free determination already made; but this necessity does not remove freedom: it proves it, since it is freedom’s effect or exercise.
-
All acts of creatures, even free ones, are indeed foreknown by God and in some way decreed. They are decreed, that is, by an eternal decree to concur in accordance with the need of freedom, but not by a decree necessitating them to act in this way and not otherwise; they are foreknown by a foreknowledge consequent upon the exercise of freedom at the difference of such a time, but not by a foreknowledge antecedent to the free choice itself. For although God’s foreknowledge, being eternal, precedes our acts as placed in actual existence, it does not precede them as certainly future from eternity; rather, they are present to God’s eternity and immensity53
-
Although in the present state of life we can truly say with the Apostle that we often do the evil we do not will, and do not do the good we will, this is to be understood only of those movements of concupiscence that do not depend on our freedom and are therefore not imputed as guilt. There is indeed in fallen humanity great weakness and an inclination to moral evil under the aspect of the pleasant good, and great difficulty in attaining moral good; nevertheless, so far as free consent is concerned, a person simply can resist temptations and movements of concupiscence, although, as theology teaches, he needs the help of grace in order in fact to resist. In this way, too, all the statements that are commonly brought forward as apparently contrary, whether from ecclesiastical writers and the holy Fathers or from the sacred books themselves, can readily be explained54
-
The human will does indeed undergo necessity insofar as it has an essential and formal tendency toward good in general. For whatever is essential is necessary precisely by being so. Therefore God himself, however free, cannot help loving himself. But our will has no essential and hence necessitating inclination toward any particular good; for this reason, it can of itself determine itself to choose this or that. If, however, a particular object is proposed to it as altogether adequate to its essential tendency toward good, and is known as such, it cannot fail to move the will effectively and bring it into act. In this case, therefore, the will is necessitated not through any defect of its power, but through the perfection of its knowledge, by which all indifference of judgment is excluded. Such is the act of love of God in the blessed.
-
Although in matters that are plainly evident the assent of intellectual judgment is immediately determined to one course by the truth itself as apprehended, and in this respect every matter for indifference and choice is also removed from the will in view of that truth, it is nevertheless by no means true to say in general, without making any distinction, that just as the judgment of the intellect is determined by perceived truth, so the will, as a blind power, is necessarily determined by the judgment of the intellect.
For a) in judging what is to be done in a concrete case, as experience shows, there is not that evidence which compels the intellect and fixes its assent of itself. Since this indifference of judgment on the part of the intellect remains—and is rightly called the root of freedom—the will cannot be determined by the intellect to one course; rather, from the intellect’s proposal it has that which it itself may determine itself to choose. For the will to be able to determine itself of itself to a choice, it is enough that, on the part of the intellect, one object be proposed to it partly under the aspect of good and partly under the aspect of evil.
b) Nor is it necessary to presuppose some “last practical” judgment, by which the intellect, bringing deliberation to an end, definitively declares in the manner of a commandment that this and no other thing is to be chosen55. But even if such a judgment is admitted as a kind of definitive rule of action, nothing follows from this against the elective power proper to the will. For since, for the reason just given, the intellect cannot be considered determined to this definitive assent by the evidence of a truth apprehended, such an assent must be said to be commanded by the will itself. Let the will, then, necessarily follow that last practical judgment; but this necessity of the will is not antecedent but consequent, and it does not exclude but presupposes and proves the will’s prior free choice. From this it is likewise clear that those are mistaken who think the will is necessarily determined to choose what the intellect judges to be the greater good56
- Theodicy teaches more particularly how the freedom of a secondary cause is reconciled with its dependence on the first cause and with divine concurrence57. The arguments brought against freedom of indifference from materialism, pantheism, positivism are no stronger than those sources of error, and are refuted along with them.
114 a. B. On the part of modern “determinism”58
- This error, already almost an inseparable companion of vulgar naturalism, and one whose harm to the whole of social life can scarcely be conceived as more grievous, begins with a false conception of the freedom it denies. This is evident from the fact that, by a usage now widely accepted, “determinism” is opposed to “indeterminism,” by which they mean the affirmation of free choice. For freedom of indifference does not consist only in the negative aspect by which an internally necessitating determination to this or that proposed course is excluded; it is also a positive and active power of determining oneself, by one’s own choice, from oneself to act or not to act, to act in this way or that.
The conception of freedom used by Schopenhauer59 and Ed. v. Hartmann60, who consider it merely negative, is therefore likewise false. Nor is the latest definition of freedom proposed by Wundt61 sufficient for the true conception: “Freiheit ist die Fähigkeit eines Wesens, durch besonnene Wahl zwischen verschiedenen Motiven in seinen Handlungen bestimmt zu werden.” Against all these, the words of the Angelic Doctor may rightly be set: “The dominion that the will has over its own acts, by which it is in its power to will and not to will, excludes determination of its power to one thing and violence by an external acting cause.”62 See also the definition of free choice given above (n. 107).
-
From another angle, Adickes63 likewise introduces a false conception of freedom, writing that freedom is “ein Vermögen seiner Willkür, welches grund- und ursachlos (!), durch nichts außer oder in sich bestimmt, durch keine früheren Entschlüsse nach irgend einer Richtung hin irgendwie gebunden, Entscheidungen trifft”. But this empty hypothesis is excluded a priori by the “root of freedom” so carefully explained by the ancients (n. 102).
-
Many adversaries try especially to attack or weaken that argument for asserting free choice which is usually drawn a) from the testimony of intimate conscience and b) from the common persuasion of mankind (nn. 111 and 112).
As to a)—If Ed. v. Hartmann64 and Adickes65 think that the fact of the inner consciousness of freedom, which they call an “illusion,” should be considered less universal because they themselves say that from their youth they have been exempt from it, one may rightly ask on which side there is more room for some suspicion of “illusion.”
Nor is Alfred Fovillee66 more successful when he denies that the existence of true freedom can be inferred from this intimate sense. To do so, he says, a human being would have to know his whole inner being perfectly, with all its properties, the causes of each of his actions, and so forth. How unnecessary such a condition is for distinguishing a truly free act—and thus one imputable to the will—from any event that occurs in me necessarily, is immediately apparent as soon as the condition is applied to the everyday manner of acting and feeling of human beings who are conscious of their own rationality. The intimate sense of freedom is also confirmed by the intimate sense of repentance, which in German we call “Reve.” “Reve” is not merely “Missvergnügen mit sich selbst, weil man nicht anders gehandelt hat,” as Höffding67 thinks, nor “das nachträgliche Bedauern über eine begangene Handlung,” as Chr. v. Ehrenfels68 holds. For “Reve” essentially presupposes consciousness of guilt and, in that respect, freedom. Yet v. Ehrenfels himself (ibid. 214) sincerely admits that deterministic theory destroys in a human being das Schuldbewusstsein und das Sühnbedürfnis “in seiner spezifischen Färbung.”
As to b)—The argument from the common persuasion of mankind, with all its philosophical and social elements, as we have set it out (n. 112), must rightly be regarded as by itself fully decisive for every rational mind devoted to a sincere pursuit of truth, so that it by no means needs new or foreign supports. Among the leading philosophers of the Greeks—Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle—who were not unaware of the homogeneous unity of rational nature, a stated idea, especially in moral matters, was generally thought to partake all the more of truth’s character the more it was known to be rooted in the minds of many. On this point Wundt69, although in what precedes he is not free of determinism, says: “Man betrachtet es heute als ein kindlich naives Verfahren, wenn Sokrates einen ethischen Begriff dadurch festzustellen sucht, dass er zunächst ermittelt, wie alle darüber denken. Und doch wird es für uns niemals eine höhere Instanz der Wahrheit geben als eben die der Allgemeingültigkeit. Was jedes normale Bewusstsein unter Voraussetzung der zureichenden Erkenntnisbedingungen unmittelbar als einleuchtend anerkennt, das nennen wir gewiss.” Indeed, Aristotle70 already notes that in moral matters the strongest argument for truth is the consensus of all human beings. The common persuasion of mankind concerning freedom, among the ancients as today, notwithstanding the theoretical determinism of some, is a historical and social fact so conspicuous and constant in practice that even the determinists themselves cannot free themselves from it, at least in practical life. Others, although they profess one kind or another of determinism, nevertheless seem to respect this common persuasion of freedom so much in their writings that by their words they appear to have taken scarcely anything away from it. Thus, for example, Paulsen71 writes: “Der Mensch wird nicht durch Triebgefühle bestimmt, sondern er bestimmt sich selbst durch Zweckgedanken.” — “Daran ist nicht zu zweifeln, daß der Mensch durch den Willen sein Wesen umgestalten kann. Er kann durch Versagung der Ausübung vorhandene Triebe zum Absterben bringen und durch Gewöhnung schwach angelegte entwickeln und kräftigen.”
-
Those, too, who say that all our actions necessarily follow from the character of each individual, yet meanwhile admit the human being’s freedom to form that same character, share to some degree in this remarkable concession to theoretical determinism that we have just noted. Such are, more or less, Schelling72, E. Laas73, Masaryk74, and Kuno Fischer75. They therefore admit practical determinism, notwithstanding a certain qualification of theoretical determinism, though the former, it seems, is not free from every impairment of logical consistency.
-
But those who are accustomed to invoke the metaphysical “principle of causality” against the possibility of human freedom, such as V. Gizycki,76 Kirchmann,77 Fr. v. Liszt,78 and many others, must above all be reminded to learn the true sense of this principle: the sense in which sound philosophy has always understood it, and in which it is truly recognized even today as a metaphysical principle absolutely and without exception certain, including by those who defend human free will. For the principle is rightly stated in these words: Nothing happens without a sufficient cause, that is, for everything that happens there must be some cause, and one sufficient to produce that effect.
What, then, do our opponents understand by the name “principle of causality”? In keeping with their exclusive naturalism and monistic philosophy, they interpret it to mean that everything that happens successively in the world, whether physically or by human intention, happens by a law of necessity, with each event determined by innumerable causes, for the most part unknown in particular. They consider this all the more necessary because (in keeping with the error already noted above) they exclude proper causality from “free” acts; hence they hold that these acts, too, cannot be exempted from that law of causal necessity.
E. Adickes summarizes the moral and social consequence of this doctrine as follows79: „Jede menschliche Handlung ist eine notwendige Resultante aus dem ‚Wesen‘ des Handelnden und aus den äusseren Umständen, in denen er sich befindet. . . . Bei demselben Wesen und unter denselben Umständen hätte also keine andere Handlung geschehen können als die, welche wirklich geschehen ist, einerlei, ob es sich um sittliche oder unsittliche oder indifferente Handlungen . . . handelt. Der Mensch tut in jedem Augenblick dasjenige, was seinem ‚Wesen‘ unter den obwaltenden äusseren Umständen am genehmsten, am angemessensten ist.“ Elsewhere he adds: „Worauf es dem Determinismus allein ankommt, das ist: durchgehende, allumfassende Gesetzmässigkeit.“
We answer: The rightly understood “principle of causality” fully satisfies this requirement. Its providential application and execution differ in the physical and material world and in the moral and spiritual world, while the constancy of the law remains uninterrupted. The former is moved and directed causally to its effects only by the cosmic necessity of law; the latter, by contrast, is chiefly impelled toward its ends by the law of freedom, which is proper to spirits, not through coercion but through the use of reason. Hence, after deliberation, the will determines itself causally. We must surely deplore those people who, forgetting their spiritual dignity, prefer to be counted as part of the material world alone rather than to use the magnificent privilege of spiritual nature.
- In recent times, moral statistics itself is frequently used as an objection against the existence of free will. They say that wherever a common norm of lawfulness (Gesetzmässigkeit) appears in human actions, which otherwise seem to be freely performed, and to which they generally conform as a whole, true freedom cannot be presupposed.80
This conclusion is utterly false. For the exercise of freedom is not an empty caprice (Willkür) devoid of every reason; in its elective operation, in its comparative assessment of the appetible things presented to it, freedom is subject to common psychological and moral laws. The free determination to do this or that does not always or necessarily follow the will’s habitual degree of dominion over the impulses of the passions, but it usually does; sometimes it may also follow particular influences of education. If, then, someone knew perfectly the habitual disposition of the will of each member of a large group of people, together with the other influencing moral circumstances, he could, according to the law of probability or of what commonly happens, predict almost exactly the same future actions that would later be recorded after the fact by moral statistics, and do so while those people’s freedom remained intact, at least in general and excepting evident psychological impediments.81
Article 3.
On the psychological factors influencing the “voluntary” and “free” human act.
- Although free will, considered in itself, belongs essentially to every human being, the same cannot be said of its actual exercise in every human activity. Many things are done by man every day that are either not voluntary at all or at least not free, or not free in every respect; just as various modes and degrees are also observed in different actions with respect to the very character of what is voluntary and free. This should not seem surprising, since, while the same natural acting principle remains, various psychological influences may nevertheless be exerted on both the voluntary and the free by reason of the conditions that we have shown to be positively required for each. Therefore, to judge securely in an individual case the degree to which some action is voluntary and free, it is of great practical importance to survey, at least briefly, the chief sources of such influence and draw from them the necessary rules for judgment.82
These sources can conveniently be reduced to about three: the first consists in some deficiency of the cognition required, namely, ignorance and inattention; the second in those affections or disturbances of the mind commonly called passions; the third in mental habits.
Further, these factors do not all influence an act in the same way. The first two exert their influence, as it were, extrinsically, that is, by way of a psychological circumstance; it is proper to habits, however, to influence intrinsically, that is, by way of a principle of acts.
§ 1. On ignorance and inattention83
- Ignorance is defined as the absence of knowledge or cognition in a subject capable of it. If someone habitually knows something but does not think about it actually here and now, this absence of actual cognition is called inattention. Since, then, it exhibits only a particular mode of ignorance, it is reduced to ignorance taken generally, and there is no need to treat the two separately.
According to usage established in moral theology, ignorance is divided84:
-
By reason of its lack of conformity, into negative, privative, and positive. Negative ignorance is the absence of cognition in a subject who is capable of it but to whom it is not due. It is called privative insofar as it is the absence of knowledge that is due, for example, ignorance of laws in a jurist. Finally, positive ignorance, sometimes also called “wrong disposition,” is a false judgment positively contrary to the truth that is unknown.
-
By reason of its object, into ignorance of law and of fact. Ignorance of law occurs whenever a law or precept imposing or prohibiting something is unknown; ignorance of fact occurs when, although the law and its obligation are known, the fact or a circumstance of the fact is unknown by which the law’s obligation becomes actual in the particular case; for example, when someone errs through inattention in reckoning the day, knowing that some special obligation is attached to it. “Ignorance of penalty” may in some measure be reduced to ignorance of law; this occurs when someone is ignorant not of the prohibiting law or the prohibited act, but only of the penalty under which it is prohibited.
-
By reason of the subject’s degree, into vincible and invincible ignorance, according as the subject can or cannot overcome it by applying moral diligence. Moral diligence is considered to have been applied to dispel ignorance or acquire necessary knowledge if the care normally exercised by prudent men in a similar condition and similar matter is devoted to that end. Vincible ignorance admits various degrees and commonly receives various names accordingly. Thus it is called gross or supine if, although not willed in itself, it nevertheless arises or persists from evident and great negligence; affected if it is deliberately sought or preserved so that someone can indulge himself more freely.
-
By reason of its relation to the act of the will, into antecedent, consequent, and concomitant ignorance. Ignorance is called antecedent when it precedes the will’s free determination and is the effective reason why an act is performed or omitted. An example is ignorance by which someone, entirely believing that he is killing a wild animal while hunting, kills a friend. Ignorance is called consequent when and insofar as it has been induced or persists by virtue of a preceding free act of willing or not willing, and is therefore voluntary in some way in its cause. Concomitant ignorance is said to be that which is indeed joined to an action simultaneously but does not influence it as a cause. Thus, if someone, having already determined for some other reason to kill his enemy when he next encounters him, then actually kills him, but thinks that in so doing he is killing a wild animal. It is clear, moreover, that this mode of division partly corresponds in substance with the preceding one. For the more perfectly ignorance is antecedent, the more invincible it is; the more consequent it is, the more vincible it is understood to be.
Concerning the influence of ignorance on what is voluntary and free, the following rule is established:
- Thesis XI. What is done from invincible ignorance is neither free nor voluntary with respect to what is unknown; but what is done from vincible ignorance is voluntary and free at least indirectly.
Proof of Part I. What is done from invincible ignorance as such does not proceed at all from the will with knowledge of the end or object of the tendency, since, as is presupposed, there is a moral impossibility of such knowledge. But no element is more essential to what is voluntary and free than knowledge of the end. Therefore, insofar as an act is performed from invincible ignorance, it cannot be free or voluntary.
It is said “with respect to what is unknown,” because nothing prevents that same act, under another aspect of the end not unknown to the agent, from being both voluntary and free. Indeed, this must be the case in every human act performed from ignorance, since a truly human act cannot arise without any knowledge of the end.
Proof of Part II. What is done from vincible ignorance proceeds from a cause that is in some way voluntary and freely admitted. For it is presupposed that what the agent here and now does not know, or does not know sufficiently, through actual knowledge, could nevertheless and ought to have been known, because the effect was already in some measure foreseen, at least confusedly, in its cause. Therefore, it is voluntary and free in some way indirectly, or in its cause, to a greater or lesser degree according to the negligence in using the means by which ignorance could and ought to have been avoided or dispelled. For this reason, an act performed from affected ignorance differs in itself in no way from one that is directly free.
- Corollaries: I. Invincible, or perfectly antecedent, ignorance wholly excuses from formal sin, that is, freely willed sin, whether it is ignorance of fact or of divine, natural, or positive law.
II. Vincible ignorance, or ignorance consequent in some way, if it is not affected or very gross, lessens to some degree the subjective guilt of the sin committed from it. In each particular case this must be assessed according to the degree of negligence with which the sinner, with some awareness, neglected an opportunity to acquire the knowledge that was due.
III. What has been said of ignorance generally applies also to inattention, with a parallel distinction made between invincible and vincible inattention.
§ 2. On the passions85
A. On the passions in general.
- In a broader sense, passions is the name for any affections of the mind, even purely internal ones; more strictly, however, the name usually comprises affections of the mind that arise from a strongly aroused sensitive appetite together with an organic alteration or disturbance of the body. It is chiefly these that concern us here.
Passions are commonly distinguished according to the different way in which they proceed from the sensitive appetite: some are primitive or original, others derived.
-
Those passions that immediately follow and concern the sensitive appetite’s inclination toward sensible good or its aversion from sensible evil are called primitive. Three are numbered among those pertaining to inclination: love, desire (concupiscence), and joy (pleasure); three corresponding passions on the side of aversion are similarly opposed to them: hatred, horror (flight), and sadness (pain). They naturally succeed one another in the same order in which they are listed on each side, so that the others flow, as it were, from love or hatred as their principle. In love, namely, which is a simple pleasure in some object as good, the beginning and principle of the movement that constitutes desire is contained; the repose or cessation of that same movement is signified by joy. The same account applies to aversion from evil, which proceeds from hatred. But since love and inclination toward good are prior in reason to hatred and aversion from evil, just as good is prior in reason to the privation of good, or evil, love itself is rightly called the common principle of all passions: it is the proximate principle of those called primitive, and the remote principle of all the others derived from them.86
-
Derived passions are those that arise from original passions, with something like a new form added to them from an effort mixed in to overcome the difficulties that beset inclinations or aversions. Six such passions are likewise listed. The first three, hope, daring, and glorying, belong to the series of inclination; the remaining three, despair, fear, and anger, belong to the series of aversion. Each thus corresponds to one of the original passions, with the additional consideration of what is arduous either in attaining the good that is loved and desired or in overcoming the evil that is hated and from which the appetite flees.
This, as concerns our subject, is the division of the passions handed down by the Angelic Doctor and the ancients, although he chose to substitute different names for common use. For what they called passions of the “concupiscible” (that is, faculty) and the “irascible,” they nevertheless comprehended nothing other than what our division signifies by original and derived. In the sensitive appetite (“sensitive part”—“sensuality”), they were accustomed to distinguish two appetitive powers according to the different mode of operation apparent in it: one called “concupiscible,” the other “irascible,” assigning a proper office to each. Thus St. Thomas: “There must be two appetitive powers in the sensitive part: one by which the soul is simply inclined to pursue what is suitable according to the senses and to flee what is harmful; this is called the concupiscible power. The other is that by which the soul resists what attacks and opposes what is suitable and brings harm; this power is called the irascible. Hence it is said that its object is arduous, since it tends to overcome what is contrary and to rise above it.”87 Thus the relation of passions to either power supplied an obvious basis both for dividing and for naming them.
Among all the passions so distributed, which number eleven that differ in species,88 St. Thomas, following Boethius, distinguishes four principal passions. These are considered to be joy, sadness, hope, and fear. The holy Doctor gives this reason: “These four passions are commonly called principal. Two of them, namely joy and sadness, are called principal because they are simply completive and final with respect to all the passions; hence they follow all the passions. Fear and hope, however, are principal not as simply completive, but because they complete the appetitive movement toward something within its own kind. For with respect to good, movement begins in love, proceeds to desire, and ends in hope; with respect to evil, it begins in hatred, proceeds to flight, and ends in fear. The number of these four passions is therefore usually understood according to the difference between present and future: movement concerns the future, but rest is in something present. Thus joy is about present good, sadness about present evil, hope about future good, and fear about future evil. All the other passions concerning present or future good or evil are reduced to these as their completion.”89
- For our present purpose, it concerns us only to know the influence that passions exert on human activity under the aspect of what is voluntary and free. In this regard it should first be noted generally that there is nothing in passions in itself that is disordered or discordant with man’s rational nature, since they necessarily flow from man’s sensitive-rational nature and therefore were intended by the very author of nature. Physiologically, they are grounded both in the vividness of the apprehension of objects and in the readiness of the faculties’ natural inclination toward a suitable object, and in the physical and individual union of the organic body with the rational soul. By this union, a stronger affection of the subject, wherever it originates, seizes the whole man and stirs not only the mind but also the organism; hence it is called a passion. The natural function of the passions intended by the Creator is indeed to add force, strength, efficacy, and constancy to human activity. This benefit of nature is to be valued all the more, the greater the harm and hindrance that their absence, or complete apathy, would bring to man and human society.
Therefore, in themselves passions are neither good nor bad, but can be either according to their right or wrong use. For, in the order of nature, like all the other things that nature has granted man as aids to action, they must be subordinated to right reason and serve the will in pursuing what is morally good. Although in the present state of life this can often be achieved only by applying great effort, nevertheless, in this constant inward struggle, sustained by the sure hope of supernatural assistance, there is no small gain: for example, it prevents the will from wasting away through idleness and inertia and, through lack of exercise, from nearly losing awareness of its own command; or from forgetting its dependence and, as if sufficient to itself, withdrawing from God.90
As for the very influence in question, it is clear in itself that the various passions cannot derive it equally in degree or mode for modifying what is voluntary and free in human acts. Indeed, if what is in question is not just any remote influence but a proximate one, it is understood that this consideration properly concerns only those passions that regard good or evil not as already present but as future, and are concerned not with repose but with movement itself, whether the appetitive movement toward good or the flight from evil. Such passions, then, have some character of either desire (whether positive or negative) or fear. Hence what we learn specifically about the distinctive mode of influence of each of these two sources will serve as a summary of what holds in some measure for the other passions related to them, or can at least readily be applied to those passions according to their respective differences.
B. On desire.
- In common theological usage, the name desire is usually taken to mean man’s very nature brought into a worse state through original sin. In this sense desire denotes the propensity of man’s powers toward what is morally bad under the aspect of pleasant good. In another sense, more suited to philosophy, desire means any stronger movement of the sensitive appetite concerning sensible good, and can be defined as a vehement disturbance of the mind tending toward some sensible good. In this way, desire exhibits a particular passion, namely, that which is listed second among the original passions (of the “concupiscible power”), since it is caused by “love” and tends toward “pleasure.” Considered in themselves, the objects of all of them are common, namely, what is pleasant to the senses; but the “motive power” of this object differs in relation to each. For “what is pleasant to the senses, insofar as it in a way adapts and conforms the appetite to itself, causes love; insofar as it attracts something absent to itself, it causes desire; and insofar as it brings repose in itself when present, it causes pleasure.”91 Hence the proper object of desire is not sensible pleasant good absolutely, but under the aspect of being absent.
In common usage, however, the word desire is not always restricted so strictly to denote one particular passion; rather, it is often extended to several things under some common aspect. In this sense, any movement of passion by which an agent is borne toward pleasant good is at times called a movement of desire, whether or not some aspect of the arduous is mixed in. The name desire is considered far removed from its proper meaning when it happens to be used for the rational will, or appetite for pleasant good according to reason, itself. For desire understood in this sense does not properly have the character of a passion, since a tendency toward the good of reason as such presupposes in the appetite to some extent the choice and governance of reason.
- According to its relation to the will’s determination, desire is distinguished as antecedent and consequent. Antecedent desire is that which precedes every free consent of the will and therefore in no way proceeds from the will’s command, but rather entices it to perform an act suited to the desire already present. Consequent desire is that which the free will has directly or indirectly aroused and which therefore follows its act. For example, such is a movement of the sensitive appetite for which the will freely provides an occasion, whether by directly inciting or strengthening it, or indirectly by not removing a cause that it can and ought to remove. Antecedent desire itself may precede the will’s consent either perfectly or only imperfectly, and to that extent is perfectly or imperfectly antecedent.
Consequent desire, which is also called consent, is without any doubt voluntary and free. Indeed, in evil actions performed from desire that is directly free in this way, direct malice is also found, because the will does not succumb to temptation but rather provokes it. Therefore, only antecedent desire can in some measure be questioned as to how it relates to the voluntary and the free in acts that proceed from it. Hence it follows: 123. Thesis XII. Antecedent desire increases the voluntary, but, in itself, to some extent lessens the freedom of an act that proceeds from the will under its influence.92
Preliminary remarks. We set aside that partly physical effect of this passion by which the use of reason itself is sometimes wholly impaired. The act performed under the influence of desire is therefore understood to remain a human act, not a merely “first-first” movement, as they call it, without any awareness of reason. Thus, the act in which freedom is said to be somewhat diminished is not for that reason to be considered simply unfree. Moreover, the added clause “in itself” also suggests that the act may nevertheless remain perfectly free, because the influence of passion—which in itself does lessen freedom—may be counterbalanced from another quarter and its effect frustrated.
Proof of Part I. That which increases the will’s inclination toward an act is to be called that which increases the voluntary; for something is called voluntary because the will tends toward it (no. 82). But antecedent desire increases the will’s inclination toward an act. For when the sensitive appetite is aroused, the intellect is disposed to present the sensible object as more pleasant and alluring than it otherwise would have presented it; thus the will, stimulated by the sense of passion, is borne toward it more ardently. Therefore…
Proof of Part II. That which in itself diminishes the positive indifference of the acting principle in itself lessens freedom. But antecedent desire in itself, to the extent that it depends upon itself, somewhat lessens this very indifference. Indeed, it has this power of lessening from the same source from which it has its power to cause what is voluntary. For the same natural influence by which the sensitive appetite, excited by passion, affects the intellect so that the will’s inclination toward its object becomes more ardent also in some way binds the intellect to considering the object’s pleasantness and turns it away from considering its moral badness and the other evils inherent in it. To that extent it lessens the indifference of judgment, and consequently the indifference and freedom of the will.93
Nevertheless, the very evident distinction between moral goodness and badness in familiar matters, which shines upon our mind, does not permit every awareness in the intellect of an act’s moral quality to be excluded by consideration of its pleasantness, unless the vehemence of passion destroys the use of reason itself. And so desire does not in itself take away freedom, but at most lessens it. Indeed, there is nothing to prevent such a vivid awareness of the object’s moral quality from being retained during the most vehement passion, through internal or external circumstances, that the indifference of judgment may in fact not even be considered diminished. Therefore, if in such a supposition the will is nevertheless drawn into an act suited to the passion, freedom in fact remains intact, even though desire, in itself, tends to diminish it.94
- Corollaries: I. In each individual act performed under the influence of antecedent desire, the degree of freedom depends on the degree of actual awareness of the action’s moral quality.
II. Generally speaking, greater freedom is to be attributed to an act performed either without any influence of passion or from consequent desire; and, if it is morally bad, greater malice as well, than to an act which the will embraces freely indeed, but simply by indulging antecedent desire.
Notes for resolving difficulties.
-
It is indeed true that diminished knowledge of the end lessens not only freedom but also the voluntary. But desire lessens cognition only with respect to moral goodness, that is, of what is not the object of the sensitive appetite and desire; on the contrary, it increases cognition of the object under the aspect of pleasantness. Hence it increases the voluntary, although it lessens freedom.
-
The simultaneous increase of the voluntary and decrease of freedom implies no contradiction. It must be noted that the voluntary does not relate to the free as genus to species, but rather almost as substance to accident.
C. On fear.
- Fear, or dread, is generally called any perturbation of the mind on account of an evil that is probably impending. It therefore regards evil formally as future and thus differs from sadness, whose object is evil as present.
Fear is commonly distinguished as follows:
- By reason of its origin: external and internal, according as it is instilled by another person or arises from the subject’s internal consideration. 2. By reason of its intensity: grave and slight. Grave fear is judged to be that whose object is some grave impending evil, that is, one that generally moves even a strong man, such as fear of imminent death, loss of goods, honor, and so forth. Slight fear is considered that which, all things considered, regards a small evil or one that, though more serious in itself, is nevertheless impending only very remotely; consequently, it is the kind that in itself usually moves only very timid people. Fear is said to be grave or slight absolutely in this way. It must nevertheless be noted that fear slight in itself and absolutely is not infrequently grave relatively in an individual case, that is, when personal circumstances such as age, sex, temperament, and so forth are taken into account. Thus fear called reverential can usually be reduced to grave fear, when someone fears serious or lasting offense to a person of authority, as children may fear their father.
Moreover, fear concerns us here not in just any way, but only according to the influence that this kind of passion can exert on human acts under the aspect of what is voluntary and free. In this matter, acting from fear must be carefully distinguished from acting with fear.
- Thesis XIII. Although every act done from fear is “involuntary in a certain respect,” nevertheless, fear, however grave it may be, unless it happens to impede the use of reason, does not in itself lessen the voluntary in it in any way; rather, it itself causes the whole character of the voluntary that it contains, namely, “voluntary simply.” Nor does fear in itself take away the character of freedom, although it may lessen it in various ways according to the circumstances.95
Preliminary remarks. See above, no. 86, on the character of “involuntary in a certain respect.” A grave fear is presupposed, either absolutely or relatively, but not one that, as may sometimes happen accidentally, disturbs the use of reason itself and thus removes every condition of a properly human act. In view of the twofold relation of fear—to the voluntary and to the free—the thesis comprises two parts, of which the first consists of three assertions, the second of two.
Proof of Part I. Assertion 1. What is done from fear is “involuntary in a certain respect.” Whatever is done from fear, that is, solely under the force of fear, is, on this very supposition, something that would by no means be done from the will’s inclination unless it seemed necessary for avoiding the evil that is feared. It is therefore involuntary under some aspect, or, as the schools put it, “in a certain respect,” that is, involuntary insofar as it is considered in itself and outside this case presented to the will.
Assertion 2. Even grave fear does not in itself lessen the voluntary character of the act in any way. If fear lessened the voluntary character of an act in some respect, this would be because it might contribute in some way to its character of “involuntary in a certain respect,” which otherwise is also called “diminished voluntary.” But the act receives its entire character of involuntary, whatever that may be, not from fear, but from elsewhere, namely, from the fact that its object in itself is arduous and contrary to the will’s inclination, or at least lacks a particular appetibility for the will, as is clear from the example given of the merchant who, fearing imminent shipwreck, throws his most precious merchandise into the sea. Therefore, fear does not in itself lessen the voluntary in any way.
Assertion 3. Fear itself causes “voluntary simply” in an act, that is, whatever voluntary character it contains. Something is “voluntary simply” insofar as it in fact and actually proceeds from the will according to the cognition of the thing. “For each thing is said to be simply such according as it is in act.”96
It is clear that this character of voluntary simply belongs to every act that is done from fear; it is equally clear that this character alone belongs to it, because “in a certain respect,” that is, under every other aspect, the act is involuntary. But for the will actually to determine itself to that act, fear is the only impelling cause. Therefore, fear must truly be said to cause whatever voluntary character the act contains, namely, “voluntary simply.”
Proof of Part II. Assertion 1. Fear in itself does not take away the character of freedom. For, so long as the use of reason remains intact, the very “voluntary simply” found in the act, precisely because it has “involuntary in a certain respect” mixed with it, necessarily presupposes some deliberation and a process of choice, however brief, by which the will, arranging a means toward an end, here and now determines itself to what it otherwise would not want, choosing what appears to be the lesser evil rather than the greater. But the character of freedom is simply taken away only when the capacity to deliberate and choose is removed.
Assertion 2. Nevertheless, according to the circumstances, it may lessen the character of freedom in various ways. Freedom is lessened insofar as the indifference of the judgment that precedes the will’s choice is lessened. But grave fear can affect and lessen this in various ways according to various circumstances. For it not infrequently happens that the evil feared is so imminent that the time for deliberation, although not entirely removed, is nevertheless more or less restricted and impeded by the very urgency of the mind and narrowness of choice. But the indifference of judgment consists in the capacity to deliberate. Therefore, although fear in itself neither takes away nor always and necessarily lessens the character of freedom, it may nevertheless lessen it in various ways according to the circumstances.
- Corollaries: I. What is not infrequently said rather imprecisely about fear—namely, “that it takes away neither the voluntary nor the free, but lessens both to some extent”—needs at least a qualified interpretation if it is not to disagree with psychological truth.
II. Although in what is done from fear the voluntary is found mixed with the involuntary, the voluntary must nevertheless always be considered to prevail. For what is in act and simply so prevails over what is so only according to the account of a supposition for a case that is not actual.97
Notes for resolving difficulties.
-
- The relation of fear and violence is entirely different. For although in both there is some resistance of the will against what is being done, the resistance is quite different in fear and violence. In what is done by force, the will in no way consents, and therefore it is wholly involuntary; but what is done from fear is voluntary, because the movement of the will truly tends toward it, though only on account of something else.
-
Nor may anything be inferred from this, as if by parity, against what we established above concerning desire: as though, once that is admitted, it would follow that an act performed from antecedent desire is not only voluntary, but also involuntary in a certain respect, namely, with respect to the character of moral badness apprehended in it. For, as St. Thomas aptly observes on this subject, “In one who does something from fear, the will’s resistance to what is being done remains, insofar as it is considered in itself; but in one who does something through desire, the prior will that rejected what is desired does not remain; rather, it is changed so as to will what it previously rejected. And therefore what is done from fear is in a certain way involuntary, but what is done through desire is involuntary in no way.”98
-
The fact that positive laws declare some acts extorted through fear invalid or at least rescindable as soon as the fact is established is not to be understood as though they considered such acts to lack even the freedom sufficient to constitute a truly human act and hence one naturally valid. Rather, by invalidating them positively, the laws wisely provide for the common good, so that such acts are deprived of their natural efficacy.99
§ 3. On habits100
A. On the nature of habits.
- Through experience we learn that, besides the will, which we have come to know as the natural and proper principle of human acts, and besides the other faculties subject to the will’s command, still other internal principles likewise concur in human actions. For, with the same apprehension of good and the same natural efficacy of the will and other faculties, different people—and even the same person at different times—experience vastly different difficulty or ease in producing certain actions or restraining certain movements. This can be seen, for example, in people who are accustomed to perform the operations of the liberal arts with remarkable skill, confidence, and speed, although these operations are in themselves very difficult (if, that is, one considers only the natural faculties by which they are performed); and they do so not merely by chance and temporarily, but permanently and habitually. There must therefore be assumed, besides the natural faculties common to all, certain internal principles distinct from them, to which this ease of action is ascribed and which are commonly called habits.
A natural habit may therefore be defined as a constant inclination, added to a natural faculty, to reproduce similar acts.
Explanation. 1. It is an inclination because it facilitates an act; it is constant because it is distinguished from a vital act, which does not persist but ceases to be as soon as it arises. 2. It is said to be directed toward reproducing similar acts, that is, it does not give the power its first capacity to act, but only gives it the ability to act easily and promptly, and indeed to reproduce acts: every act produced by a power leaves, as it were, a trace of itself and thereby a quality by which that power is subsequently helped to elicit similar acts. Thus a habit shares this with the power in which it is found: both are inclinations to act. It differs from the power, however, in not being a primary and essential inclination, informing equally all acts that proceed from a power, but one that accrues secondarily and presupposes the power. Therefore, 3. it is said to be added to a natural faculty. This addition must not be understood as though a habit increased or elevated a faculty in such a way as to broaden its formal object. Rather, it only enables the power, besides the common and intrinsically undetermined inclination toward its formal object and all acts suited to it, also to acquire a special inclination determined toward certain particular acts, toward which, in itself and without a habit, it would be no more inclined than toward others.
-
This is established by experience concerning an acquired or natural habit. These must not be confused with supernatural and divinely infused habits, such as sanctifying grace and the virtues we call theological, namely faith, hope, and charity, which theology discusses. Besides having an origin from above that is entirely different, these also differ from naturally acquired habits in that they grant a power, in order to act connaturally with a supernatural end and principle, not merely the ability to act more easily, but the ability to act simply. Setting these aside, then, we speak only of natural habits.
-
Besides the common concept of habits that we learn from evident experience, many questions remain, for example, about the proper subject of habits, their mode of origin, their increase and decrease, and so on. All of these pertain to a deeper investigation of the nature of habits, in which psychology is engaged. But in this subject, obscure above all others and supplying ample room for opinion rather than arguments that establish conclusions with certainty, very few teachings are accepted even by the most perceptive doctors of philosophy after St. Thomas and admitted by all adherents of the same school as indisputable and certain. Many more occupy various degrees of probability, whether by the force of arguments or the weight of authority. We shall therefore briefly report, from what is either certain or more commonly admitted and proved, those points that seem in some measure to pertain to our purpose. They are roughly the following:
-
- A natural habit is produced through the repetition of similar acts, beginning with the first act, which already generates the habit inchoatively, although not perceptibly. The similarity of the acts seems to be derived from the specific unity of the object or motive, so that in one power there can in itself be as many simple habits as there are objects differing in species (not in genus) within the scope of that power’s formal object.
134.101 2. A habit, once produced through actions, in turn constitutes a principle of actions, not only remotely and morally, insofar as the power is rendered more inclined in the first act, but also proximately and physically, insofar as the second act itself thereby becomes more expeditious and perfect.
-
- The subject of habits can only be a vital power. For this is proper to a habit: to narrow further the indetermination of a power, by which the power is disposed equally in itself, within the scope of its formal object, toward various species of objects contained under it, and to give it a special determination toward certain acts. Therefore, for a power to be capable of receiving habits, it must be in some way intrinsically indeterminate, which is proper only to vital powers. Indeed, the greater a power’s objective indetermination, or determinability, the greater also seems to be its capacity and, as it were, need for that narrower determination by a habit. Yet authors more commonly consider that not all vital powers are suited to habits. They agree that habits are found chiefly in man’s will and intellect, the internal sense, and the appetite of brute animals. Common opinion denies that external senses acquire habits, because the facility arising from habituation to certain objects ought rather to be reduced to an organic variation in temperament and the removal of material impediments. For we see that musical instruments, by a similar adjustment of the material, are gradually perfected through constant practice by a skilled artist and, as it were, habitually adapted to produce the purest sounds. What is gradually effected in layers of brute matter through the repetition of similar motions can surely also happen in a material organ vitally informed through the repetition of vital motions. A similar view is more commonly held concerning the locomotive power in man and animals, since the facility apparent in it derives partly from habits existing in higher faculties and partly from the material disposition of temperament. That some habits of acting also exist in brute animals, especially in their appetitive power, whether acquired spontaneously under nature’s guidance102 or instilled by positive training under human care, is attested by evident experience.
-
Nevertheless, although habitual customs of this kind, or habits in the broader sense, are common to us and the other animals, they belong to man in a special way. For this reason habits strictly so called are not commonly considered or named as such except those found in man, and primarily and properly in the rational powers, namely, intellect and will; in the lower powers, by contrast, they are found secondarily and by participation, that is, only insofar as these powers are directly subject to the will’s command.
-
- By its nature a habit is to be numbered among “qualities”; for it is a permanent property of a subject and perfects that subject with respect to natural operation. It therefore has a relation both to the act of which it is the principle and to the nature of the being that it perfects as such. Hence an old custom also calls it a second nature. Moreover, a habit strictly so called, at least one existing in the intellect and will, must also be considered a positive quality, that is, one really distinct from the mere removal of impediments. For, besides the fact that experience shows this permanent facility to be acquired through frequent repetition of acts, so that something seems successively to be added to us that was not there before, at least in inorganic powers no such permanent removal of impediments can be imagined—especially since habits begin to be acquired in them immediately after the use of reason, and they have no temperament that could vary.
-
- If one further asks about the intimate nature of a habit in the intellect and will, authors dispute whether it is distinct from the impressed species themselves. The more common opinion in every school recognizes that habits in both the intellect and the will are distinct from species; this doctrine is considered nearly unshaken among philosophers and theologians, especially with respect to the will. Nevertheless, as regards a) the intellect, the negative opinion is at least very probable, since the intellect seems to need no habit distinct from species in order to be inclined or determined to act. According to this view, then, the acquisition of an intellectual habit is said to consist in the very intensification of experiential species. The example of brute animals is also commonly brought in confirmation: for instance, in dogs, the facility of acting in an orderly way acquired by use seems reducible to species left in the memory. b) As for the will, there are indeed some who think that its habit, too, consists in the intensification of experiential species that remain impressed by preceding acts of will, and that from their vivid cognition and pleasant recollection the will’s greater inclination and easier acts with respect to similar objects are sufficiently explained. Oviedo103 considers this not improbable, along with some others. Yet weighty and frequent contrary arguments may be seen not only in Suarez104 but also throughout the writings of “Thomists” as well as “Scotists.”
-
- From what has been said it follows that habits can be distinguished in many ways according to the diversity of their objects. The chief way of distinguishing them, and the one that pertains especially to moral science, is to divide them into physical and moral habits, according as they are inclinations toward merely physical acts or properly moral acts. Moral habits are both virtues and vices, which are to be discussed specifically elsewhere.
B. On the influence of habits on the character of what is voluntary and free.
- Thesis XIV. In an act that proceeds from it, a habit in itself increases the character of the voluntary; it affects the character of freedom only in such a way that, while leaving indirect freedom intact, it can to some extent lessen direct freedom.
Preliminary note. The subject is a natural and strictly so-called habit, which therefore depends in some way on the free will both as to its origin and its use. Part I of the thesis concerns the character of the voluntary; Part II concerns the character of the free and contains two assertions.
Proof of Part I. A habit in itself increases both elements of the voluntary, namely, cognition of the end and the will’s inclination; therefore, it also increases the voluntary itself.
It increases cognition of the end because it presents the object more specifically and vividly to intellectual apprehension and awareness under the aspect that accords with the habit. It also increases the will’s inclination, as is clear from the very concept of a habit. This holds whether the habit is considered in the will itself or in some faculty subject to its command, for that habitual facility and readiness derive from the will’s command and are acquired through repeated command. Therefore…
Proof of Part II. Assertion 1. The same habit leaves indirect freedom intact. For it is presupposed not only that the act performed from a habit is a human act, but also that the habit itself was freely contracted, that is, through the free repetition of acts proceeding from free will with at least confused awareness of the inclination that would follow from them. Therefore, all acts proceeding from it, at least for as long as the habit itself has not been revoked by an effective effort of the will, are to be considered free in their cause, or indirectly.
Assertion 2. It can to some extent lessen direct freedom. For by the very increase in inclination, especially a notable one, that a habit adds to a faculty, the indifference of judgment is lessened to some extent, though not removed, and consequently so is the indifference of the will with respect to its actual determination. But direct freedom depends on this. Therefore…