Theodor Meyer, Ius naturae generale

Theodor Meyer

Theodor Meyer, Ius naturae generale

Theodor Meyer

Institutiones iuris naturalis, Pars I: Ius naturae generale

First published 1906

Theodor Meyer’s Ius naturae generale from the second corrected edition (1906), in Latin with an original English translation. Preface and proemium included; the navigational contents and publisher advertisements are excluded.


Introductio I: Preface

Introduction

Sectio I: General Ethics

Liber I: Book One. The Natural Elements and Conditions of Human Action

Chapter I. Propaedeutic Synthesis on the Activity of Secondary Causes, or on Natural Action in General

Chapter II. The Natural End of Human Acts and of the Human Being

On the natural end of human acts and of man.

Prologue.

  1. Here we undertake to speak, not of the end commonly called the agent’s end, which may be manifold at man’s discretion, but of the end of the work, that is, the end preordained for man by his Creator, by attaining which he is to be fully perfected and completed in his being according to the measure of nature; and this end, certainly, can only be one.

Further, this same natural end, which is called indifferently the end both of man and of human acts, since it is proposed that it be attained through those acts, is also called, more explicitly, man’s ultimate internal end; ultimate, indeed, because in it nature is simply perfected and completed, and internal (also called “proper” or “particular”), to distinguish it from the ultimate external end, that is, the common and universal end of all things.

The sure path for investigating this end is supplied by that very internal correlation which must necessarily obtain between the nature of each being and its natural end (see Axiom II), and whose practical rule Axiom XXIII (no. 30) draws together, stating:

“The proper natural end of each being is known from its nature, that is, from all its faculties subordinated to one specific tendency (unfolding).”

Following this method, then, we must begin by first defining human nature in order to define its end; I say, defining it with regard to its correlation with the end, not examining exhaustively all its individual internal aspects. For a fuller inquiry of this kind, more aptly undertaken once the end has been established and in turn sheds light ahead, will be completed in the second chapter.

Article 1.

On the psychological source for knowing the end, or on the final relation of human nature.

  1. By its genuine concept, nature denotes the substantial principle of motions that are not indifferent in themselves, but essentially final; and its internal correlation with the end is grounded precisely in this (Axioms I and II). Hence nature is to be assessed not so much in its own entity as such, but formally with regard to its final relation, so that it may truly be called the source for knowing the end. Further, every nature is presented formally with regard to its final relation through the tendency or unfolding proper to it specifically (Axioms XXIII; cf. VIII and XIII).

When these points are applied to human nature in particular, to be examined with regard to its final relation, the whole present question ultimately comes down to this:

What unfolding is to be considered specifically proper to human nature.

To answer this question, the sought-for unfolding must be determined psychologically, both in itself and in its formal object.

§ 1. On human nature’s unfolding considered in itself.

  1. Thesis I. The rational appetite, or will, exhibits the proper unfolding of human nature.

Preliminary remarks. You may gather from the axioms cited above what we mean here by an unfolding proper to a nature. According to them, the unfolding of human nature denotes the natural inclination or tendency of man (that is, one arising from nature’s impulse), by which man, insofar as he is man, is directed and impelled toward the end set for him. Such a final inclination can be considered in two ways: either as actual, that is, exercised in some particular act, or as potential, that is, as the common and permanent principle of the individual particular inclinations that occur in actuality under its influence. In the present thesis we take it in this second way. So too St. Thomas: “… the will is the rational appetite, which is proper to man.”

Proof. The unfolding proper to human nature as such, and marking its proper final direction, must be one that gathers together into unity all the particular unfoldings found in the reality of the whole nature, much as a common resultant does in a system of mechanical forces. For just as any being, however composite and therefore endowed with diverse expansive powers, is nevertheless one, so the end corresponding to it must be one, and therefore the final unfolding corresponding to it must also be one (Axiom IV). But this unfolding in man is the rational will itself. Therefore, and so forth.

Proof of the minor premise. Man, as a natural composite consisting of rational and animal nature, unites the proper tendencies of both natures in one subject of action. The vegetative tendencies, since they are taken up by physical necessity into the service of animal life and immediately subordinated to it for the sake of perfect unity, may rightly be disregarded here, or rather treated as included in the tendencies of animal nature itself. Hence only two principal classes of natural unfoldings in man remain to be considered: one corresponding to rational nature and consisting in the rational appetite, or will; the other proper to animal nature and comprising the sensitive appetites together with tendencies or powers of locomotion.

Now, for tendencies so diverse in themselves and differing according to the diversity of their objects to be ordered toward a unity of tendency suited to the unity of the acting subject, they must all be subordinated and subservient to one tendency (Axiom IV), the highest in degree, and therefore the rational tendency, or will. For apart from such subordination, no other way of bringing about that unity can be conceived except, perhaps, either physical commingling, by which the individual particular tendencies would be changed into some one collective thing different from themselves, or the suppression of all but one. Yet both alternatives are no less contrary to physiological and psychological experience than to the wisdom of the divine Ordainer. Moreover, this is sufficiently confirmed by analogy with the order evident in the composition of substance, which is common to all living things. In these we see not only vegetative powers subordinated to sensitive powers, but also inorganic powers subordinated to the vegetative, so that each higher grade comprehends all the lower grades under itself by the same subordination and in a way represents them all in the unity of vital tendency.

We conclude, therefore, with certainty that, by virtue of a like subordination and the unity resulting from it, the natural unfolding specifically proper to the whole of human nature is to be recognized in the will alone, insofar as it is rational.

  1. Corollaries: I. The rational nature of man, to which the will as a rational tendency corresponds, by virtue of that subordination truly represents the nature of the whole human composite in the order of its natural operation, because the lower faculties are subordinated to it. Therefore, for man as man there can be no operation simply natural that does not accord with that same rational tendency. St. Thomas illustrates this in practice, In lib. sent. 2, dist. 30, q. 1, a. 1 ad 4: “Whenever many things concur in constituting something, something may naturally belong to one of them in itself according to its own nature, while something belongs to it according to the nature of the whole; as is clear of the elements entering into a mixed body. Accordingly, I say that the concupiscible power naturally tends toward what is pleasant to the senses; but insofar as it is the human concupiscible power, it further tends toward its object according to the governance of reason. Hence for it to tend without restraint toward its object is not natural to it insofar as it is human, but is rather contrary to its nature as such.”

II. The properly human act is rightly distinguished from an act of a man. For only that is properly a human act which is proportionate to man’s being as an acting subject and consequently proceeds under the influence of the will. “Those actions alone,” says St. Thomas, “are properly human over which man is master; and man is master of his actions through reason and will. Hence those acts that take place in man or through man without being directed by the free choice of the will are usually called acts of a man, but not human acts.”

III. All human acts are either exercised immediately by the will or proceed from it through faculties subordinated to it. Therefore, some acts of the will are called elicited, others commanded.

§ 2. On the formal object of this same unfolding.

  1. Just as actual motions are distinguished from one another chiefly by their terminus, so no potential inclination to motion can be described without knowing its potential direction. The formal object of each power exhibits the direction proper to it. Hence the well-known principle of psychology: A power is specified by its formal object, that is, it is distinguished from every other power by its species. Accordingly, “formal object” designates the ideal terminus of the power itself as such, not the real terminus of the acts produced by the power, nor some particular object determined by it, but the common aspect of all possible particular objects, abstracted from them by an operation of the mind. For the aspect of a formal object is present in each individual “material” object as a common element in precisely the way that it is common to each individual act of some power to be and be called an act of this power and not another (cf. Axioms VII and XIX).

With these preliminary points in place, it is clear what this further question concerns and how necessary it is to our subject: What is to be considered the formal object of the will, or of the rational appetitive power in man—that is, what it is both in respect of its comprehension and scope and in respect of its formal relation to the power.

A. The comprehension and scope of the formal object.

  1. Thesis II. The formal object of the human will, in its concept, is as broad as the aspect of good taken in the broadest sense; that is, it is good in general.

Preliminary remarks. The concept of “good in general,” or taken in the most universal sense, as understood here, agrees fully in its comprehension and extension with the concept of “being taken in the broadest sense,” treated by general metaphysics. Each, namely, in its universality has the least comprehension of features and the greatest possible scope of extension. Thus, just as being in the most universal sense includes within its scope whatever has the aspect of being, in whatever way (not excluding even infinite being, insofar as, when we abstract from infinity, it undoubtedly has the aspect of being in opposition to nonbeing), so too good in the most universal sense extends to every aspect of good, abstracting from finite and infinite, and excluding nothing but what is not good. This concept is therefore not properly generic, constituting a genus of being or goodness univocally, but is rather of the sort commonly called “analogical,” uniting in analogical unity things so disproportionate in their entities that they cannot in any way be comprehended under the unity of a genus.

Proof I. The will, as the natural and specific unfolding of man, is evidently proportionate to man’s specific apprehension, which is contained in the rational cognitive faculty. Hence the will must potentially extend to everything that is presented to rational cognition as its potential and formal object (Axiom IX).

But the formal object of the intellect is being under the aspect of truth taken in the most universal sense, or truth in general, as is established with certainty in psychology. Therefore, in the same way, being under the aspect of good taken in the most universal sense, or good in general, must correspond to the will as its formal object. For truth and good differ not in entity, but only in relation; and the one and same being that, as knowable, is true for the intellect, is at the same time good as appetible for the will.

  1. Proof II. That object of the human will is to be called formal because of which whatever man desires is desired implicitly, and which is desired implicitly in all things and for its own sake. But such an object, with respect to all acts of desire of the human will, is good in general. For if every terminus of a natural tendency has the aspect of good (Axiom XIV), it is immediately certain that such a formal object is contained under the common aspect of good. Thus one may reason as follows: it is either finite good, whether particular or generic, or infinite good, or finally good in general and in the broadest sense, abstracting from every determination of it, whether finite or infinite; for there is no other way of conceiving good. But it can be neither of the first two.

  2. Not finite good, specifically, a) not particular good. For no particular finite good so fully measures the tendency of the will that it cannot continually advance further to desire other things; on the contrary, its appetite is urged further for as long as reason conceives that something else appetible remains. (Axiom XX). Therefore, such a good cannot contain in itself the formal aspect of appetibility for all material objects toward which the will may successively tend. b) Not generic good, that is, only and exclusively the common and abstract aspect of finite good. For, by the proportion between the unfolding and the apprehension proper to human nature (Axiom IX), the formal object of the unfolding cannot be more narrowly circumscribed than the object of apprehension or understanding. But by an operation of the mind man can naturally rise from finite things known to the idea of the infinite, and in view of this the concept of being in common is “analogical” (no. 40). Therefore, by parity, following that operation of the mind, the aspect of the appetibility of infinite good is also included in the will’s formal object under the common aspect of good.

  3. Not infinite good taken determinately; for to admit this hypothesis would be equivalent, concerning the origin of our cognitions, to professing the system of ontologism, which is shown elsewhere to be false both philosophically and theologically. For however much the Ontologists differ from one another in their manner of speaking, they share this dogma in substance: no particular being can be known by us unless an intuition of absolute being itself is first admitted in our mind; and hence, as follows quite logically, no particular good can be naturally desired by the will unless a prior desire for absolute good is presupposed. Thus, just as they make absolute being itself the formal object of human natural apprehension, they are also compelled by logical necessity to place the formal object of the unfolding in absolute good, and hence in infinite good taken determinately. Likewise, anyone who would have infinite good itself be the formal object of the human will is driven, by the same logical necessity grounded in the proportional relation between apprehension and unfolding, to profess the error of the Ontologists also concerning the origin of cognitions. Therefore, the hypothesis that leads to this conclusion must likewise be excluded as false.

Therefore it remains that the will is formally inclined toward good in general and in the most universal sense, abstracting from every determination of it, whether finite or infinite.

  1. Corollaries: I. The inclination of the will toward good in general is the form of all human acts of appetite. That is, in each act of some power, two elements may in a way be distinguished: one formal and therefore essentially common to all acts of the same power, the other material, by which the same acts differ individually from one another. In the same sense, then, form and matter may also be distinguished in an act of the will—not as though either could ever be actualized and exist concretely apart from the other, but because these two elements concur in constituting every real act and, as such, can be known and considered separately by abstraction of the mind. The corollary’s meaning should therefore be taken as if it said: an act of the will is considered according to its form or its matter, depending on whether, by abstraction of the mind, one considers in it only that general tendency toward good which constitutes the common essence of all acts of this power, or, on the contrary, its tendency toward this or that determinate good.

II. Hence it also appears how superfluous the ontologist hypothesis is for the very purpose for which it is assumed. For to explain how our intellect can know particular beings or the will desire particular goods, there is no need to resort to some prior actual intuition of God as absolute being, by whose light limited beings then gradually become known as well, nor to some primitive act of desire for God as the highest good and ultimate end, by virtue of which desires for particular goods would then arise. A fully adequate and true explanation of these matters is found, for the intellect, in its formal relation to truth, and, for the will, in its formal inclination toward good in common.

B. On the formal relation under which the will has its proposed object.

  1. Thesis III. The common aspect of good can be considered the proper formal object of the will insofar as it is presented to the will by rational apprehension.

Proof. For something to be truly called the formal object of a power, it must not only correspond to that power extensively, but also be taken under the aspect by which it truly specifies the power (39). But the aspect of good distinguishes this power specifically as rational from every appetitive power that is not rational in itself, not only through its widest extension, but also through the formal relation to the will that accrues to it from rational apprehension. Therefore…

The minor premise of this argument asserts a well-known fact of psychological experience, which needs explanation more than proof. Just as the rational appetite surpasses the animal appetite, which concerns itself only with sensible good, by the extension of its object, so it is essential to the rational appetite that it tend toward good presented to it under rational apprehension, that is, good properly known, not merely perceived in any way whatever. For an animal, too, perceives the good (the sensible good) that suits it, but only through sensory apprehension, that is, through the sense of pleasure. It belongs exclusively to rational nature, however, to perceive its own good (whether sensible or spiritual) intellectually, namely by knowing the suitability of the object itself, by which it is properly good, that is, suited to perfecting nature in some respect. Our mind is able to know and assess this suitability independently of every sense of pleasure, indeed often contrary to that sense, although in that same cognition it may sometimes also be helped and in some measure guided by the object’s pleasantness. In general, then, the difference between sensitive apprehension, to which the sensitive appetite corresponds, and rational apprehension, to which the rational appetite is proportioned, is that by the former the subject of action feels its suitable good, while by the latter it properly knows it.

It is also the case that some aspect of goodness in things belongs so exclusively to rational cognition alone that it cannot be reached in any way by sensitive apprehension. Such is that absolute aspect of suitability by which an object, perfectly suited to the end of some particular nature, is thereby also known to be suited to the universal end of the whole creation. Thus rational apprehension is objectively analogous to rational unfolding, since it likewise extends to desiring and loving the most universal aspect of good. Yet although the intellect presents various such aspects of goodness, the will is not bound by necessity to embrace any object actually under one aspect rather than another; all this determination is left to its free choice, as will be proved more specifically in Chapter III.

  1. Corollaries: I. Thus, while brute animals are necessarily led to the good suited to them and to their end, under the direction of sensitive nature, it is proposed to a rational being that, through rational cognition as its guide, it direct itself to the good truly suited to it and to its end; and it alone can act not only according to an end, but also for the sake of an end.

  2. II. So great is the likeness of rational nature to divine nature itself that man, insofar as he is rational, can have no good truly suited to him except one that is in some way good under the aspect of universal and absolute goodness, or in some way God’s good. This aspect is nothing other than the aspect of moral goodness, by which the rational will must be directed in every free choice. For moral goodness, by its evident concept, designates the right ordering of free acts as such; and a free act is rightly ordered when, by free choice of the will, it is directed toward a good suited to rational nature as such, that is, which is absolutely good or good with respect to the universal end of things. Hence whatever is understood to be good in this way is commonly called morally good.

  3. III. Something is truly good for man to the extent that it is morally good, because only moral goodness is suited to human nature insofar as it is rational. Thus whatever is morally good in itself and for its own sake is likewise truly good for man in itself and for its own sake. The objects of the will that are in themselves indifferent with respect to moral goodness, namely useful and pleasant goods, share the character of true good in the same way as they share moral goodness: solely through an intentional relation to some good that is ultimately morally good in itself.

  4. Scholium. Philosophical-aesthetic consideration.

This very relation to what is morally good, both as known and as loved, truly exhibits the proper character of rational nature, but considered only under that formal aspect which pertains chiefly to ethics. For ethical purposes, it is enough in itself to note here this certain practical conclusion for conduct: The proper good of rational nature, to be pursued by free acts, is situated in moral goodness itself.

For philosophy taken more broadly, it is of considerable interest to comprehend this very relation of our reason to its suitable object from an even higher perspective. Besides moral goodness, it is clear that truth and beauty are also proper objects of rational apprehension. And since there is one faculty of the soul to which each of these is referred, they must differ from one another only by a formal distinction, while in reality they exhibit only one metaphysical and rational object.

The question therefore arises: under what most universal concept can this one object be comprehended so that moral goodness, truth, and beauty are understood to be contained in it, as in their common and, as it were, higher unity? And what is the formal aspect by which they are nevertheless distinguished from one another?

St. Thomas seems to suggest a solution to this problem in l. Eth. Aristot. l. lect. 1, where he says: “It is proper to reason to know order.” This does not conflict with what is commonly said elsewhere: that the proper operation of reason consists in knowing the relations of things. For the concept of order in general says nothing other than what we often also express by the word harmony, namely, the relative arrangement of several things with respect to some unity. Therefore, a different account of this unity gives rise to a different kind of order. Hence the holy Doctor adds in the same place: “Two kinds of order are found in things: one is the order of the parts of some whole or of some multitude in relation to one another, as the parts of a house are ordered in relation to one another; the other is the order of things toward an end, and this order is more primary.” Further, a different formal aspect of each of these two kinds of order can in turn be distinguished, according as either τὸ being as a whole, as the unity of parts, or the end, as the unity of things referred to an end, can be variously related and considered.

Indeed, it cannot be denied that moral goodness, truth, and beauty agree in signifying a certain objective order, although this order is known to be one kind in moral goodness, another in truth, and yet another in beauty:

It is sufficiently clear in itself that moral goodness, which our mind conceives as belonging only to free actions, pertains to the kind of order called “the order of things toward an end.” Yet we do not call every final order found in human operations morally good, but only that which is the order of things toward the universal and absolute end. Any other ordering toward particular ends, if their relation to the absolute end is set aside, is usually included under the more general name of objective purposiveness in acting (Zweckmässigkeit). Thus moral goodness is the final order absolutely suited to free acts as such, or conformity with the absolute final order.

Τὸ truth, taken objectively, is distinguished into speculative truth and practical truth; accordingly, our reason, in relation to either object of cognition, is called speculative or practical.

Practical truth, precisely because it expresses a norm for acting, likewise belongs wholly to the final order of things. Thus everything morally good, insofar as it is known or knowable, is at the same time practical truth and an object of practical reason.

Speculative truth, by contrast, exhibits not a final order, but “the order of the parts of some whole in relation to one another”; for it consists in the harmony of features constituting some one being insofar as it is knowable. And just as moral goodness includes a relation to the absolute end, so every truth objectively includes a relation to the absolute order of being, or to absolute truth.

Finally, beauty has in common with speculative truth, objectively, that it likewise denotes “the order of the parts of some whole in relation to one another,” that is, some order of being, not of free action, likewise including a relation to the absolute order of being. Beauty also agrees with truth in this: it is an object that perfects the cognitive power in itself, and is its proper good, suited to it for its own sake. St. Thomas bears witness to this, saying: “It belongs to the aspect of good that the appetite comes to rest in it; but it belongs to the aspect of beauty that the appetite comes to rest in its sight or cognition … Thus it is clear that beauty adds to good a certain ordering to the cognitive power, so that ‘good’ means that which simply pleases the appetite, while ‘beautiful’ means that the very apprehension of which pleases.”

Accordingly, beauty, like truth, is to be considered first and foremost as an object of cognition or contemplation, and only consequently as an object of appetite. “Beauty has the character of an appetible thing only insofar as it takes on the character of good; for truth, too, is appetible in this way.”

Beauty differs formally from truth in that, in truth, the order of parts belongs to purely intellectual ideas and is presented to rational cognition for immediate and direct apprehension; in beauty, however, it appears as if embodied in sensible or quasi-sensible forms and shines forth symbolically from their harmony, and so is apprehended by reason through the mediation and assistance of sensibility (that is, the cognitive function of the soul insofar as it is sensitive). This consideration is understood not only to illustrate but also to confirm the well-known definition by which τὸ beautiful is said to be nothing other than the radiance of truth that is, truth or the order of being, as an object naturally suited to reason, is said to shine forth as if in sensible harmony; and Plato’s opinion seems to agree with this.

Having thus determined the object formally proper to rational cognition, we thereby know the proper object of rational appetite as well. For insofar as “it is proper to reason to know order,” so too it will be proper to rational appetite as such to love order, and indeed as a formal good, that is, one suited to rational nature in itself and lovable for its own sake. Psychological experience testifies that this is indeed so. This is why that objective order, as soon as it comes before us either in moral goodness, truth, or beauty, produces in itself and for its own sake a certain satisfaction and pleasure, analogous to the object according to its threefold formal property. For we experience a purely spiritual pleasure in moral goodness and truth, and in beauty a spiritual pleasure as well, but not without the sympathetic participation of the sensitive part of the soul (an aesthetic pleasure).

Thus the same rational object, in itself suitable, good, and lovable, is known by the speculative and practical intellect as true and morally good and possessed through spiritual pleasure; but it is perceived as beautiful by the whole man, that is, according to the physical unity of his sensitive-rational nature. Therefore the whole man rests in that same object through a similar, namely sensitive-rational, pleasure and fruition.

It must be noted, however, that the notion of beauty explained above is grounded solely in human experience. Hence “beauty,” as thus defined, may rightly be considered specifically proper to human contemplation, since only human beings on earth are naturally endowed with sensitive-rational apprehension. Nevertheless, anyone who would dare to conclude from this that intellects of a higher order, or of a purely spiritual nature, are naturally excluded from the fruition of beauty would plainly be mistaken. For it is beyond doubt that objectively beautiful things—if not beauty under that formal aspect of ours, then certainly beauty as virtually beautiful—are presented to all those more blessed minds through spiritual cognition with perfect clarity, indeed in a more eminent way.

A definition of beauty proposed by P. G. Gietmann has also provided a useful addition of light on this subject: “Die Schönheit im allgemeinen ist die lichtvoll erscheinende Wahrheit oder Vollkommenheit, die Schönheit für uns Menschen aber und die Kunstschönheit die in sinnlicher Form lichtvoll erscheinende Wahrheit oder Vollkommenheit.”

It is enough to have suggested this, even in passing, so that from it we may learn:

  1. How great is the dignity of rational life, which consists wholly in knowing, loving, and fulfilling order, and thereby participates to some extent, by a created likeness, in divine life, which is itself the absolute order of truth in being and understanding, the absolute order of holiness and wisdom in loving and acting, and the absolute order of beauty in self-manifestation.

  2. How nobly aesthetics is joined by a bond of kinship to philosophy as a whole, both speculative and practical, and indeed how all human sciences and arts are most closely united with one another in the mind of the Creator. By their very nature, through the common object of all rational cognition and appetite—that is, order, which everywhere confronts the mind in this created world, both physical and moral, they all strive toward knowing God, the absolute order, ever more fully from his works, and toward loving and imitating him. Would that man himself did not so often turn them away from this highest end!

§ 3. On the final relation of human nature to happiness.

  1. From the psychological analysis of human nature that we have pursued thus far according to its correlation with the end, the following conclusion immediately results: by virtue of his nature man is inclined, under rational apprehension, toward good in general, or toward every good taken indefinitely. If, moreover, we compare the concept of happiness with this formal object of the inclination, it follows readily in itself that the same inclination of nature may also, by a legitimate paraphrase, be called—and truly is—the natural appetite for happiness.

A. The notion of happiness.

  1. Happiness in general denotes the perfect felicity of a rational being; or, to use the words of St. Thomas, “By the name of happiness is understood the ultimate perfection of a rational or intellectual nature.”

And since every such felicity or perfection can be found only in a good, whether in some collection of goods or in some perfect good that is, as it were, a compendium of many goods, happiness may be defined more concretely, but still in general, either with Boethius as “a state made perfect by the aggregation of all goods” or as a state made perfect by the fullness of good. In this sense St. Augustine says: “Blessed is the one who has everything he wills”; and St. Thomas says that happiness is “a perfect and sufficient good, excluding every evil and fulfilling every desire”.

Yet the name happiness is often also used in some improper sense, either to designate a person’s felicity that is not perfect but relatively great in comparison with the common condition of human beings as it actually appears on earth, even though it neither excludes every evil nor fulfills every desire; or to signify the greatest felicity a person can attain within the bounds of moral possibility, while considering a particular condition of life, for example, the present mortal life. This is the happiness discussed by Aristotle, considering it only with respect to the present life. Hence, speaking of people who are happy in this way, he adds: “We call them happy as human beings”, that is, to the extent that the human lot permits on earth. But it is clear that every such improper designation of happiness is used only by some analogy to happiness truly and simply so called, and presupposes its concept. Therefore, in what follows, when we speak of happiness, we intend it only in its proper sense.

  1. Further, two things in particular may be considered in happiness: the good by which someone is made happy, and the attainment of that good. When happiness is understood in the first respect, it is usually called objective and signifies the same thing as the object of happiness; in the second respect it is called subjective, and is the very beatification of the subject possessing the object. Subjective happiness is finally also called formal, insofar as it expresses not merely possession of the beatifying object in general, but the formal act and mode of this possession.

Furthermore, natural and supernatural happiness must be distinguished. The former lies within the limits and capacity of the natural faculties; the latter goes beyond nature’s limits and corresponds to a supernatural elevation of powers and capacity. Such is the happiness that consists in the intuitive vision of God, together with the love and fruition that follow from it, and is proposed to man in the present order of providence, as the Christian faith testifies. Thus natural happiness, although perfect in its own order, is nevertheless imperfect when compared with supernatural happiness. But to discuss the latter belongs to theology; therefore, considering this perfect state of man within the bounds of philosophy, we shall understand by happiness only natural happiness.

B. On the natural appetite for happiness.

  1. Thesis IV. It is rightly said that, in view of the formal object of the will, man is borne toward happiness by a natural appetite.

Preliminary remarks. This doctrine is almost a corollary that follows by simple development of the concept from Theses II and III. Nevertheless, it must be asserted explicitly in the form of a thesis, both because it contains the sum of the entire preceding psychological inquiry and because, in human nature formally considered, it designates precisely that by which human nature becomes the dialectical source from which the end is known truly and proximately. — To understand the assertion, note that for the present happiness is taken only in general, that is, with the further question left aside of what particular thing happiness is to be considered to consist in.

Proof. Man may be said to be borne toward happiness by natural appetite in two ways: 1. by natural appetite considered merely as potential, which consists solely in the essential inclination of the appetitive faculty toward happiness and may be called nature’s weight; 2. by elicited natural appetite, insofar as, following that inclination of the faculty or impulse of nature, man is also urged toward happiness by an actual act of appetite, either implicitly or explicitly. But it is proved that man naturally desires happiness in both ways. Therefore …

Proof of the minor. To 1°. By the natural inclination of his will, man is borne toward good in general, that is, toward every good taken indeterminately (Thesis II); but this formal object of the will plainly coincides in reality with the very concept of happiness considered in general. Therefore, by the same natural appetite by which man is borne toward good, he must also be said to be borne toward happiness.

To 2°. a) Once reason has developed, man cannot fail to become in some measure conscious of this formal inclination toward happiness; for in every act it shines forth as an essential element of that act. Given this formal propensity and a more or less reflective awareness of it, it is understood to be psychologically necessary a priori that man should often also by elicited appetite aspire to happiness—if not explicitly, then certainly implicitly—by continually striving to become as happy as possible.

b) The same is confirmed in fact by the experience of inner sense. For man’s unwearied activity is directed toward this: never fully satisfied by any goods or successes, he continually reaches toward further ends, either to prepare himself ever more for the true object of perfect happiness or, if he is mistaken about the way toward it, at least to secure for himself many of the things he considers good. For this reason St. Thomas does not hesitate to lay down the general axiom: “Every rational being naturally desires its ultimate perfection.”

  1. Corollary. Natural appetite for happiness in general, no less than the inclination of the will toward good in general (42), is rightly called the form of all particular human appetitions, and thus expresses most truly human nature itself, shown in epitome as its natural expansion.

Article 2.

The ultimate end of man in general is asserted

  1. The essential inclination of human nature toward happiness, considered in itself, is a purely psychological fact which, in its own right, denotes only a subjective property, though an essential one. But the end of nature about which we inquire here—that is, the ultimate destination assigned to man by his Creator and to be fulfilled in accord with nature’s direction—belongs in its own right to the objective order of things. Therefore, the formal object of that natural inclination, which in itself is nothing other than the ideal or intentional terminus of a subjective tendency, does not by its concept yet signify the objectively real end of nature itself; rather, as was noted above (51), it supplies only the next dialectical step, from which one may safely proceed to affirm that real objectivity. Although this can already be done by a simple inference, the matter must nevertheless be stated explicitly in view of its importance, and supported all the more firmly by certain arguments because there are various sources of error from which doubts may be raised, and in fact are raised, under a semblance of truth against this fundamental point of the doctrine. The first thing that must be established with certainty is man’s end “in general”: that is, whether real happiness is proposed to him at all as the objective end of nature, leaving aside for now the question of its particular object and the way in which the subject is made happy in it.

  2. Thesis V. Man’s natural ultimate end consists in the real attainment of happiness.

Proof I°. From the mutual correlation between nature and the end of nature.

It is cosmologically certain that every created being, and therefore man as well, is destined by the Creator for some natural ultimate end, and that this end is objectively proportioned to its nature. But nothing other than happiness to be attained in reality is plainly proportioned, in the objective order, to human nature, which, considered in its subjective final orientation, is most truly expressed by the natural appetite for happiness (51). Therefore …

Proof II°. From the divine perfections.

Man is urged invincibly toward happiness by natural appetite, not only potentially but also actually and habitually (Thesis IV). But from this the Creator’s plan is known with certainty: he has destined man to attain happiness in reality at some time.

Proof of the minor. It is surely incompatible with the divine perfections for God, through no fault of man, to frustrate in its real fulfillment that formal inclination of rational nature and its essential, invincible desire. Indeed, this is contrary: a) to divine truthfulness and fidelity, for by an invincible stimulus and, as it were, an explicit promise expressed through the very speech of rational nature, God would entice man toward what is false and toward the vain expectation of goods that he is never to obtain; and b) to divine goodness, for God would make man, through the very thing by which he excels brute animals, far more miserable than they, and would torment him with an invincible hunger and thirst that can never be satisfied, even though he is conscious of his broadest natural expansion.

Therefore man must be said to be destined by the Creator to attain the ultimate perfection of nature, namely, in real happiness.

  1. Scholium. A philosophy that attributes to man a natural end consisting in natural happiness should not for that reason be thought to contradict Christian theology, which teaches by divine revelation that man is destined for a supernatural end: namely, for a happiness more perfect than every natural happiness and exceeding every proportion of nature. For both statements are entirely true, the one in the natural order, the other in the supernatural order, to which we believe the whole human race was raised in its first parent through the gift of grace. Just as the order of grace does not abolish the order of nature, but presupposes, elevates, and is built upon it, so the supernatural end does not take away the natural end, but perfects it beyond nature’s requirements. Thus it is indeed certain, by an article of faith, that through the free and gratuitous dispensation of divine goodness man is truly destined for an end that is not merely natural but supernatural, proportioned, that is, to nature as elevated, and therefore attainable only with supernatural helps of grace. The natural end is nevertheless not thereby deprived of its objective reality; rather, it subsists eminently in the supernatural end itself, as the less perfect subsists in the perfect. Affirming the same, Suarez says: “It is certain,” he says, “that in supernatural happiness man will have every perfection connatural to him.” — We omit the further opinion of some that, even in the present order of providence, unbaptized persons who die in infancy and are deprived of supernatural happiness solely on account of original sin will nevertheless not lack that natural happiness; although, in view of that deprivation, such a lot would no longer truly be called happiness, but rather misery.

Notes on resolving difficulties.

  1. I. The force of the argument we used second to prove the thesis is in no way touched if someone objects that brute animals too are borne by natural appetite toward a good proportionate to their nature, and yet—without any injury to the divine perfections—they can be deprived of all their good at man’s discretion; indeed, that some things also seem to be naturally desired by man, yet by a common law lack their real effect: for example, he desires the preservation of life by natural impulse and likewise recoils from death. The reply to these arguments is:

  2. There is no parity in this matter between rational man and a brute animal. For

a) the whole of the animal’s nature, with all its powers and appetites, has been handed over by the very Author of nature to man’s service;

b) precisely because an animal lacks intelligence and hence all personality, it cannot be the terminus of any divine promise, in view of which divine fidelity would owe anything to itself. Moreover,

c) since an animal is incapable of forming a universal concept and can never actually desire anything except a sensible object apprehended as presently existing, nor ever become conscious of any tendency toward happiness, it is not made miserable or unhappy at all when, in serving man, it fulfills its end.

  1. The argument concerns only man’s desire that is formally natural: that is, one that constitutes the very essence of natural appetite and is therefore wholly necessary and invincible. The only desire of this kind is the desire for happiness in general. Whatever, then, a man desires in particular under this impulse is desired not by a necessity of nature, but rather according to nature through human choice; and it is not necessary that every such thing actually be fulfilled. The same is true of the desire to preserve life: although its first, spontaneous movements, as they are commonly called, are often necessarily aroused by the sensitive instinct common to all animals, with respect to the rational appetite it is neither necessary nor invincible, since it is clear that even death can be desired as a good by a free choice of the will.

  2. II. Pantheistic naturalism, related to materialism, and also modern atheism openly professed—or “philosophical materialism,” under the leadership of Haeckel—which for decades has held wide sway in theory and practice and has partly devastated Christian society, must surely be named among the principal adversaries of our doctrine. For naturalism, whatever name it bears, when treating man’s ultimate end usually understands by this name little other than an end for humanity, that is, for the human race on earth, assigned by nature and consisting in its continual evolution and progress toward an ideal culture and perfection.

It teaches that each human being is subordinated by nature’s institution to this end, as the supreme end of all human affairs. Consequently, no proper ultimate end is left to individual human beings other than this: that each, according to his own capacities, serve the cultivation of “humanity,” and from it draw, insofar as he can, his own share of perfection and prosperity. But it is clear that this error, both in itself and in its consequences most destructive to the genuine “cultivation of humanity,” not only fails to know man’s true end but even utterly abolishes the very idea and dignity of individual personality. Since its foundation is the same as that of all materialistic or pantheistic philosophy, a considerable part of metaphysics is occupied with refuting it, and there is no need to dwell longer here on its refutation. Moreover, since this same error is recognized as an especially deadly poison in modern public law as well, we shall repeatedly meet it in the course of this work, in the various forms it assumes, with our own weapons.

  1. III. The error of Kant and his school must also be noted. From another quarter it contradicts our assertion, substituting for true happiness—that is, a state of repose in possession of ultimate perfection—perpetual progress toward a happiness never fully possessed. In his work “Kritik der practischen Vernunft” Kant, wishing to establish the soul’s immortality from his own system, draws an argument from the rational soul’s destination “to holiness, that is, to the absolute conformity of the will with the moral law.” For this destination, he says, is understood to be necessary from a postulate of practical reason, yet it can never be completely fulfilled by any rational being in this sensible world at any time during its existence (“in keinem Zeitpunkte seines Daseins”). It is therefore necessary, he concludes, that “through some progress toward that fullest conformity extending to infinity” this destination be satisfied; accordingly, “in this very practical progress the real object of our will must be recognized.” And shortly afterward he adds that the condition of attaining happiness corresponding to moral holiness is similar, namely, “that it likewise consists only in infinite progress and in its totality, and therefore can never be fully attained by a creature.” Setting aside the critique to which this Kantian reasoning and his method of proving immortality give occasion from other quarters, it will suffice for our present purpose to note the following:

  2. This Kantian hypothesis is excluded a priori by the argument that positively proved the contrary thesis from the divine perfections (54).

  3. It suffers from several internal inconsistencies by which it excludes itself. For it assumes a real series of secondary, participated, relative human goods without any real good that has the character of a good per se, from which those goods derive their participation and to which they are referred; it also assumes a real final series without a determinate ultimate end, unless perhaps one that is merely ideal and forever receding into an almost infinite distance. This seems as incompatible as positing a series of motions without a real first mover. For the saying of St. Thomas is well known: “The ultimate end stands to the movement of appetite as the first mover stands to other motions”; as if to say: an ultimate end in a series of appetitions can no more be removed without contradiction than a first mover in a series of motions. — Nor does it help if someone insists that, in that perpetual progress toward further perfection, absolute perfection itself can be regarded as the ultimate end and first mover in the intentional order, even if this end is never to be attained in the real order. For this would imply an absurd contradiction in rational nature itself: an object that per se can never be attained, and is therefore per se disproportionate to human nature, is nevertheless posited in the order of natural appetite as the first mover and so as soliciting expansion on its own account. For something to be per se disproportionate to nature, and at the same time to be per se its formal good and fulfillment, toward which it is borne by its essence, is logically and cosmologically absurd. St. Thomas himself affirms this, saying: “For nothing is moved toward what it is impossible to attain.”

  4. Perpetual progress toward happiness without a term of repose also cannot be reconciled with the order of moral sanction, which our reason recognizes as altogether necessary, even when it considers only God’s natural providence (as will be shown in its proper place below). This order consists chiefly in the just distribution of reward and punishment, that is, in a certain general law of natural providence proportioning them to each person’s moral merits and demerits. We understand that such a law is promulgated in the very nature of things also from this: the Creator willed the eudaemonological aspect to be objectively joined to the deontological aspect in every natural tendency (31). But on that hypothesis every foundation for preserving such proportion is removed. What objective diversity of reward could there be for people of different merit in attaining the good, when there is one common and perpetual infinite course through successive degrees of good?—perhaps a greater or lesser delay or acceleration? But what can intervals of time, or earlier and later, mean in an eternal progression?

  5. Whatever objections might further be raised against the possibility of a quiescent state of happiness, either from a mistaken understanding of the formal object of rational appetite (by confusing “good in general” with the generic concept of merely finite goods) or from an apparent appeal to the perfectibility of human nature, will be resolved of its own accord by what is said below.

Article 3.

Man’s ultimate end is determined in particular.

§ 1. On objective happiness.

  1. Thesis VI. Human nature can be perfectly fulfilled, or made happy objectively, not in any finite good, but in God alone.

Preliminary remark. “Perfectly fulfilled” is said advisedly: finite and temporal goods too, provided they are rightly ordered to the supreme good, objectively contribute to perfecting nature more and more and thus to producing natural happiness in man. In this sense, there is certainly nothing to prevent happiness from being said to be already contained, in some initial way, in the collection of such goods.

  1. Proof of the negative part of the assertion: Not in any finite good … etc.

For some good to be capable of perfectly fulfilling human nature, it is undoubtedly necessary:

  1. that it be good per se, that is, desirable by its very nature for its own sake, not for something else; 2. that it completely satisfy appetite;

  2. that, with every evil excluded, it be stable and unfailing.

But both experience and reason show that these conditions are found in no finite goods whatsoever, whether taken singly or collectively. If this were not sufficiently clear in itself, it would become even clearer by reviewing, even briefly, all such kinds of goods. For they are either goods of the body (suited to sensitive nature), goods of the soul, or external goods, commonly called goods of fortune—such as abundant wealth, honors, dignities, friendship, and so on—or, finally, a collection of all these. Now all of them not only lack every one of the stated characteristics, but per se and essentially exclude them:

  1. Goods of the body. These consist in the body’s substance and life, its health, vigor, strength, beauty, enjoyment, and sensitive pleasures. By their nature these are plainly subordinated to goods of the soul, and belong among the goods called useful; therefore they are not to be desired for their own sake or on their own account. Everyone experiences, moreover, that they are highly liable to failure, imperfect, uncertain, unstable, and therefore unable to satisfy human appetite.

  2. Finite goods of the soul are partly the soul’s very substance considered in itself, together with its faculties, and partly spiritual goods acquired through exercising those faculties, namely, wisdom and virtue. But a) the very being of the soul is plainly not, and cannot be, that by which man is made happy, as its faculties themselves sufficiently show: they reveal how little the soul suffices for itself and how greatly it needs to be perfected from outside. b) Spiritual goods acquired through exercising the faculties, though most noble, do not contain in themselves the character of the supreme good; rather, they should be called a disposition and a way toward acquiring it, or means ordered to it as their end. For wisdom, to which all knowledge and cultivation of the soul are subordinate, is nothing other than knowledge and pursuit of acquiring the true good; while virtue is the habit of directing free actions through this knowledge and pursuit. Moreover, neither is perfect in itself until after the supreme good has been attained, on account, for example, of innumerable difficulties, errors, and vexations, of the insatiable desire always to know more, and of the struggle virtue is forced to undergo, while it can continually increase.

  3. External goods, or goods of fortune, such as wealth, honors, dignities, power, friendship, and so on. For

a) all these are good insofar as they are useful for acquiring goods of the soul or body, and therefore are not to be desired on their own account;

b) their acquisition and preservation are not within everyone’s power, and they are always uncertain and unstable;

c) they are acquired with labor, possessed with fear and anxiety, and lost with grief; they not only fail to satisfy desire but continually sharpen it, and sometimes even bring nausea and weariness of life.

  1. Finally, the collection of all these goods. For

a) the inability of each of these goods to make a person happy derives not from quantity but solely from their natural quality, by which they are per se imperfect and liable to failure. But that defect can never be removed by any aggregation of them.

b) It is certain that no one has ever been found who, however many finite goods he possessed, was completely filled and satisfied by them; indeed, no one is to be found who does not desire more the more he acquires. Therefore one may conclude that even if someone possessed everything alone, he would by no means thereby be happy. Otherwise, appetite ought to diminish in proportion as a person already possessed more good and approached more closely the limits of complete satisfaction; for if the cause of all appetite is lack of good, then as the cause diminishes the effect too must diminish.

Therefore it is certain to conclude in general that true objective happiness cannot consist in any finite goods.

  1. Proof of the affirmative part of the assertion: In God alone … etc. Since happiness must be attained in reality in some fitting object (Thesis V), this other part may already be regarded as indirectly proved in the preceding part, simply by excluding finite goods. For no middle ground remains between the finite and the infinite. It is useful, however, to strengthen the same truth with direct arguments:

I. Psychological argument: from human nature’s relation to an infinite object.

Only that good can bring ultimate perfection to human nature and thus truly make man happy which in reality matches the formal object both of that nature’s apprehension and of its rational expansion. But nothing does so except infinite being, or God.

The major is clear from what was said above (16, Axiom IX; 27, Axiom X; 37, Thesis I). Psychologically, this is the one condition by which natural appetite comes to rest from further movement.

Proof of the minor. Just as the will exhibits the final expansion proper to the whole of human nature, so the intellect exhibits that nature’s proper apprehension, proportioned to it as well (37, 16). The formal object of both rational faculties is of the widest scope: in the order of knowledge, everything that has the character of truth; in the order of appetite, everything that has the character of good (40). But nothing in the real order can be equivalent to this universality of either truth or good except the infinite. Indeed, since our intellect can naturally advance from knowledge of finite beings to a notion of the infinite as well, and from knowledge of particular truths to a notion of absolute truth, the formal object of intellect and will must also extend to absolute truth and absolute good under that most universal character of truth and good (40). Therefore the intellect can find its ultimate perfection only in absolute truth, and the will only in absolute good, or God.

St. Thomas expresses nearly the same argument in these words: “It is impossible for human happiness to consist in any created good. For happiness is a perfect good, which wholly satisfies appetite … The object of the will, which is human appetite, is universal good, just as the object of the intellect is universal truth. From this it is clear that nothing can satisfy the human will except universal good, which is found not in anything created, but in God alone.” In this sense St. Augustine also proclaimed a truth no less philosophical than theological, declaring: “You made us for yourself, O Lord, and our heart is restless until it rests in you.”

  1. II. Cosmological argument: from the final order of creation.

This argument too is constructed from the ideas of the Angelic Doctor, which he developed as fundamental to all philosophy in many places in the Summa theologica, and especially across several chapters of the work “Contra Gentes”, and which may be reduced to roughly the following consideration:

God is the common ultimate end of all created things. The natural tendencies of all things are gradually directed toward him as the center of the entire final order. This direction consists in all agents ultimately tending toward perfection, or good, each according to the measure of its own nature. Thus the natural end of all created beings is to become like God as the supreme good and in some way to draw near to him, as each participates in good through its operations in the manner it can. This proper manner differs among creatures according to their differing degrees of being, so that a certain series of beings tending ultimately toward God is constituted, ascending from the lowest degree to the highest. In this series, each lower degree is suited to become like the next higher degree by participating in its good and in its character as an end. This continues until one reaches the degree of being that is naturally suited to participate immediately in God’s good and to be perfected by it. The highest degree belongs wholly and solely to the rational creature, since it alone is naturally suited to participate in the divine good as the object of knowledge and love. Therefore, by the final order of the whole creation, man’s ultimate perfection, or objective happiness, must be located in God.

This reasoning, when reduced to a concise argumentative form, consists in the following syllogism:

The common end of all created beings, to the extent each nature is capable, is to participate in God’s good, mediately or immediately, and to be perfected in it. But in the whole series of beings only rational nature is capable of participating immediately in God’s good and being ultimately perfected in it. Therefore, etc.

  1. Corollaries: I. Natural happiness differs from supernatural happiness not in its object, but in the essentially different mode of possession and enjoyment on the part of the subject.

II. Since it is already known to be that God is man’s ultimate end in the eudaemonological order, that is, his supreme good, it is certainly concluded for the same reason that God is likewise his ultimate end in the deontological order; so that, in attaining God, the supreme good, man fulfills precisely what is proposed to his freedom for fulfillment by the right order of reason and by the Creator’s will (cf. 31 and 32).

III. By the natural appetite through which he desires his own happiness and thus implicitly desires the object that perfectly makes him happy, man naturally desires God himself in some way, namely, implicitly and in general. But to desire God explicitly and particularly as the ultimate end and supreme good belongs to the free choice of the will (cf. Thesis II, Proof II, to 2).

Notes on resolving difficulties.

    1. For God to be the object of human happiness, a proportion of being between human nature and God is not required; a proportion of relation and final orientation is sufficient. In this sense human nature can in some way be called infinite according to its object, although it is finite subjectively.
  1. God’s indivisibility by no means excludes different degrees of happiness in different subjects. For this diversity arises not on the part of the object, which is always possessed as a whole, but on the part of natural capacity, which, since it cannot be infinite in a created being, must be determined to a definite degree that can be more or less perfect.

  2. God is not a means that man uses, as it were, to make himself happy; rather, he is the object that causes happiness and the absolute center of every final order, to which man himself, happy in God, is ultimately subordinated (cf. 31 and 51).

  3. As the object of happiness, God is truly the end of man, not merely of the spiritual nature in man. For he truly completes both parts of the whole human composite, the animal and the spiritual—not, of course, both in the same way, which would be altogether incompatible, but in a manner fitting each part, giving final fulfillment to the spiritual part immediately and to the animal part mediately. Since animal nature is joined with the spiritual in the physical unity of human nature, it is subject to the rational tendency and governance of the whole man and is positively subordinated, with all its powers and operations, toward one end that belongs equally to the whole man. Thus one cannot speak of an end exclusively proper to the sensitive part or of a perfection and happiness belonging to it, as though by some particular right of its own, apart from the happiness of the rational person himself. Indeed, the sensitive part of man adequately fulfills its natural end and attains its true good and fitting perfection insofar as it perfectly serves the spiritual part—which exhibits the substantial unity of the whole human composite—in pursuing the rational good that belongs to the whole man. I say that true good also accrues to the sensitive part through this service. For the rational good of man not only does not exclude the use of sensible goods that are truly good, but plainly requires and presupposes it. What it excludes from enjoyment are goods understood to be unfit to perfect the sensitive nature insofar as it is a part of man.

Thus, while the spirit—not just any spirit, but the human spirit—attains the infinite rational good of man in the one way possible by the nature of the thing, namely, spiritually, it nevertheless attains an end correlated not only with the spirit in man but with the whole of human nature. And just as the whole rational man, with the powers of mind and body harmoniously joined, strives under the guidance of nature toward that one good, so in that same supreme good of man, although it is spiritual in itself, the good of the lower nature must also be said to be completed mediately and even to be contained there virtually, as it were. This holds whether attainment of the ultimate end is considered in the state of the soul’s union with the body or in the state of its separation.

§ 2. On subjective happiness.

  1. Once the essential object of happiness has been determined, it is clear enough in itself that subjective happiness consists in some union of the subject with the object. And if we are speaking only of natural happiness, it is no less clear that this union must be one fitting human nature and not exceeding its powers in themselves; it must therefore consist in some natural activity by which, through the infinitely good object, the ultimate perfection and happiness of human nature is attained. It remains only to define more precisely what this activity is and what kind of activity should be considered to constitute subjective happiness formally.

Thesis VII. Subjective happiness consists formally in the most perfect knowledge of God that each person can attain according to his own capacity of nature, and in a correspondingly perfect love of him. Yet it cannot be attained completely except in immortal life.

Preliminary remarks: 1. The reference to “capacity of nature” in the thesis entails a twofold limit of perfection in knowing and loving God: one negative, by which that perfection is said not to exceed the mode proper by essence to human intellect and will; the other positive, by which it is required that, within that common measure of nature, the degree of perfection corresponding to the capacity of each individual, considered as an individual, be positively fulfilled.

As regards the negative limit, it is certain that seeing God according to his essence, or knowing God intuitively, altogether exceeds in itself the natural power of the human mind, and cannot belong to it in any other way than supernaturally. St. Thomas gives the reason: “Our natural knowledge takes its beginning from sense; hence it extends only as far as it can be led by sensible things. From sensible things (that is, by the way of abstraction connatural to us) our intellect cannot reach the point of seeing the divine essence, because sensible creatures are effects of God that do not equal the power of their cause.… But since they are effects dependent on their cause, we can be led from them to know of God whether he exists and to know of him those things that must belong to him insofar as he is the first cause of all things.” Therefore, according to this limit, to know God perfectly means to know him perfectly as the first cause of all things from created effects—that is, through phantasms drawn from those effects. This knowledge of God, to distinguish it from “intuitive” knowledge, is usually called “abstractive.” Thus known, God can likewise be naturally loved by our will above all things as the supreme good.

This common capacity of nature, which is determined only according to the species, plainly admits in individual cases as many subjectively different degrees as there are individual human beings, bringing different subjective dispositions and preparations. The degree of capacity thus determined for each individual constitutes the limit of perfection for that person’s knowledge and love of God, which we called positive. This accords with the natural institution of moral sanction, to be discussed below, by which God willed to provide that the blessed completion of nature should also have the character of a reward proportioned to each person’s merit, that is, to his subjective moral preparation. But when, by accident, the condition of free cooperation and personal merit itself is lacking, as happens in infants, the Author of nature must be considered to supply this defect by his concurrence, so that nature may nevertheless attain its ultimate perfection and happiness to some determinate degree.

  1. The thesis contains two parts, each to be proved separately; the second at the same time supplies an extremely strong argument for the soul’s immortality.

  2. Proof of Part I.

Argument I. God is the essential object of human happiness (Thesis VI). But man can be made happy in God as his object only by

  1. his vital or spiritual possession, which consists in knowledge and love. For, given the nature of God and man, God cannot be united with man in any other way so as to perfect him;

  2. and that possession must be relatively most perfect, in the sense explained above. The condition of finite nature prevents it from being absolutely perfect; but unless it were perfect relative to each person’s capacity, it could not give rise to the ultimate perfection of nature, or to true happiness.

Therefore, in whatever state man’s happiness is to be completed, it can consist only in that relatively perfect spiritual union with God.

Argument II. The arguments Aristotle already used to establish nearly the same point, though imperfectly, also serve to confirm this position. For, setting aside all consideration of a future life and inquiring only into that perfection and happiness of man beyond which none greater or fuller could come to him in this life, he nevertheless understood: 1. that it consists not in some quality, nor in mere power or disposition, but in some activity (ἐνέργεια), since activity properly pertains to the perfection of a nature;

  1. that this activity cannot belong to the lower part of man, which he shares with beings lacking reason, but must belong to what is most excellent in him and distinguishes him as a human being: “the mind, that is, or whatever else it may be that by its nature seems to rule within us and hold primacy, and to contain the understanding of noble and divine things, whether this itself is divine or is the most divine thing among the things in us.” From this he concludes

  2. “that in this activity, according to its proper virtue (κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετήν),” namely, in “contemplation (θεωρητική), perfect happiness consists”—that is, in the contemplation of those “noble and divine things” (καλῶν καὶ θείων). It is clear in itself that, in Aristotle’s view, the fitting cooperation of the will is also included in this most excellent activity of the mind according to virtue (κατ' ἀρετήν).

Among the many further reasons by which he commends this happiness of man as supreme—namely, that it is more lasting and immaterial in itself, desirable for its own sake, proper to human nature as rational, and suited to it according to its highest degree, and so on—he also recalls that it makes man like God, who is happy through contemplation of himself, and makes man intimate with him.

He adds, moreover, that “even a happy man (since he is a human being) needs some supply of external goods,” but not in the sense of “abundance,” rather of “sufficiency”; that is, such goods do not constitute happiness itself, but are only supports required by the condition of nature for attaining a happy life, and are to be sought only insofar as they are required for this.

By these considerations Aristotle seems in fact to have proved precisely what we profess in this part of the thesis: that true human happiness formally can be found only in the most perfect spiritual union with God through contemplation and love.

  1. Proof of Part II.

Natural knowledge and love of God, however perfect, are seen to be subject throughout this mortal life to so many hindrances and difficulties, disturbed by so many dangers and contingencies, that even if they were everlasting they would by no means suffice to make man truly happy. Moreover, death hangs over all the happiness of the present life as its most certain limit. Therefore it is clear in itself that the complete happiness demanded both by the natural desire implanted in us by the Creator and by God’s fidelity (Theses IV and V) cannot be attained in this life. Since the voice of nature and of the Author of nature cannot remain empty, it must therefore be awaited in future immortal life, to which we journey through this temporal life as through a training ground, pilgrims in the body.

  1. Corollaries: I. Not only in the same object (63, II), but also in the same act of knowing and loving God, in which formal happiness consists, both orders—the eudaemonological and the deontological—are fulfilled with respect to a rational creature.

For man, in attaining his own proper supreme good (the internal end of his nature) through perfect knowledge and love of God, thereby formally glorifies God and so actively fulfills the ultimate end of nature, also external and universal, in the way proper to a rational creature. For God’s external glory, which is the ultimate universal end, that is, the common end of all creation, and therefore the center of the whole deontological order, formally consists in this: God is known by created intellects and, according to this knowledge, esteemed and loved. To glorify God in this way is proper to every rational creature and to it alone; all other things contribute in some way to the same deontological end only materially, or remotely and mediately, insofar as by their very nature they manifest God’s perfections and serve the rational creature in attaining that end.

  1. II. Happiness so determined is rightly called man’s ultimate end in itself also in the sense that it corresponds adequately to the unfolding of human nature even formally as rational (45).

For in finally intending this, the rational will is to be said to rest not in some particular good or one exclusively its own, but in a good universal in itself, that is, in what is in some way God’s good. For although the happiness of man immediately concerns man’s good, in desiring which he here loves himself as well, nevertheless it comprehends this good neither solely nor chiefly as such, but as if contained as one element within a good universal in itself, namely, the glorification of God, and essentially subordinated to it. By this wise and kindly arrangement of God, just as objectively man is made happy and God glorified by one and the same act, so subjectively the tendency of the human will, provided it is directed toward true happiness, thereby conforms to the right deontological order, rightly reconciling love of God, which they call “desire,” with love of “benevolence.” Therefore, in pursuing happiness, the will would be considered to deviate from the rational order only insofar as, positively excluding the objective deontological relation, it intended only its own subjective felicity as an exclusively eudaemonological end.

Notes for resolving difficulties.

  1. I. Subjective perfectibility, by which human nature is endowed with intellectual faculties, is by no means such as naturally to exclude a determinate limit of perfection, such as the state of happiness presupposes. Our intellectual nature is unlimited neither in act nor in potency, and therefore is not infinitely perfectible. It is rightly called in some respect indefinitely perfectible, in the sense that it, in itself, that is, considered in the abstract, does not involve in its concept some determinate degree of perfection, but within the range of that same specific power may have a greater or lesser degree, just as every specific nature is indefinitely variable according to individual determinations. Yet nothing follows from this except what was already noted above by way of a preliminary explanation of the thesis: namely, that the degree of relative perfection by which someone may naturally be united to God through knowledge and love is to be justly measured according to each individual’s capacity, which consists chiefly in moral disposition and merit. Thus, although some enjoy the infinite good more perfectly than others, each nevertheless enjoys it perfectly according to the degree of his capacity, and is therefore made happy subjectively.

  2. II. It must be denied that man’s natural desire for perfect happiness cannot be wholly fulfilled by that merely natural contemplation and love of God, on the ground that man also seems by natural appetite to be borne toward a perfect vision of God, at least as the first cause of things. There were indeed some among the Scholastics who considered this appetite natural in some respect; Suarez lists them and clearly refutes them, rightly affirming that “in man there is no innate appetite to see God clearly and as he is in himself, and consequently none for supernatural happiness.” He says that this holds “of the vision of God under any aspect whatsoever,” because “in man there is no natural power, active or passive, total or partial, to see God.”

Nevertheless, we readily concede that, in the present order of divine providence, a man who, enlightened by faith, knows that supernatural happiness will be granted to him through God’s generosity can no longer be satisfied by the possession of God that is purely natural. But this does not occur because of the absence of some completion proportionate and due to nature, but only with respect to a supernaturally elevated capacity of which man is now aware.

  1. III. Nor should one suppose that man’s appetite cannot be satisfied at any determinate individual degree of natural happiness, on the ground that he knows of innumerable degrees far more perfect than the one he occupies according to his merit, and also possible within the bounds of nature. For in that state of perfect union with God through knowledge and love, no actual appetite of man can be presupposed except a rational one, that is, one wholly in accord with the objective rational order, which is the order of divine holiness and goodness. An appetite for something disproportionate to an individual’s natural capacity, and hence impossible according to right order, would be called irrational. Indeed, even in this present life, the more purely right order and God’s most holy dispensation are perceived and loved, the less room there is for envy or idiosyncratic rivalry; it must be held with certainty, all the more, that in a state of perfect love this inequality of lot takes nothing away from the happiness of individuals. Moreover, if this difficulty had any force, it would affect supernatural happiness no less than natural.

  2. IV. Since man cannot be made perfectly happy in the present life, it surely remains for us to say, philosophically, that this blessed end is to be naturally completed in the state of the soul’s separation from the body. For we await the future resurrection of bodies not as something due to nature, but as a supernatural gift of grace. From this, however, two difficulties may arise against the proposed thesis: one occasioned by the very name man’s end, the other by the apparently insufficient way of making man happy. The following will suffice to resolve both:

To the first objection. Although a separated soul is no longer a complete man, it is nevertheless rightly said that in that state man attains his ultimate end. For it is sufficient that

a) the end attained be truly the end of man, not of the soul alone; and it has already been shown above (64, response to 4) that it is such;

b) at least radically personal identity remain between the human subject who freely acts toward the end in this life and the subject who attains the same end completely in the next life, that is, the identity of the internal principle from which actions are elicited. It must also be noted that while living in the body man can indeed attain his natural end truly, although imperfectly; he needs only to be freed first from this material burden in order to complete it perfectly.

To the second objection. Man’s beatification does not in itself necessarily require a state of union between soul and body; specifically,

a) not on account of the reward due to the body as well as the soul for good works. It is true (as will be proved more particularly below) that happiness is not only the ultimate end of nature but also the character of a natural reward, to be given in return for man’s moral merits. But the body can be the subject neither of merit nor of reward. Thus man himself, whether he merits a reward by using the faculties of the soul or of the body, is the one who merits it, and only insofar as he is the principle of free activity, hence formally according to his spiritual part.

b) Not on account of a required condition for it to be truly said that man is made happy.

For: first, this is sufficiently established by what was explained at no. 64, response to 4. Further, we must say with Suarez: “It is not necessary that man be able to attain his end in some way other than that in which he is able to exist; for no natural thing requires anything except that, while it exists, it be able to attain its end. Thus, just as man according to his whole nature is corruptible, but according to his soul is immortal and eternal, so it is enough that for some time he be naturally happy (inchoatively) in the whole composite, but perpetually only in the soul.”

Third, we add: If anyone nevertheless considers some participation of sensitive nature to be absolutely required in this happiness (although no certain reason for it is apparent), this requirement too seems in fact to be satisfied to some degree. For although the separated soul is deprived of the bodily organs of sensitive life, it does not thereby cast off its very essence, by which it is not only spiritual but also sensitive. Since, then, the whole soul is made happy, it must also be happy insofar as it is sensitive, with spiritual fruition as it were overflowing into its whole substance.

If you object that the sensitive faculties of the soul in that state, lacking their organic condition, can never pass into any act and therefore must be excluded from all participation in spiritual fruition, it is rightly answered on the supposition that such sensitive activity was in fact naturally necessary to the character of happiness: we must also suppose that God, through his natural concurrence, would abundantly supply every such deficiency.

Fourth, it must be noted: From the fact that the separated soul is in itself in potency to inform the body and is in this respect in a certain way incomplete, it does not follow that its state is unnatural and therefore unhappy. For since the soul by its own nature has two ways of existing and living—one in the body, less perfect with respect to intellectual life and impeded in many ways; the other outside the body, much more perfect and free for spiritual operation—there is no reason why the separated soul should desire by an elicited and rational appetite to recover the former. Indeed, setting aside the glorious transformation of the body, which can undoubtedly occur only supernaturally, Suarez considers that the soul would choose “to remain separated rather than return to the body.”

Moreover, we gladly grant that from this entire discussion one benefit may be gathered: the resurrection of bodies, which faith testifies will take place, not only does not oppose the light of reason, but is rather in harmony with it and worthy of divine wisdom, as is readily understood.

  1. Scholium. When Scholastic authors discuss happiness, they are also accustomed to inquire into its essence, necessary attributes, and accidents. But this whole discussion, especially insofar as it concerns accidents (“accidental happiness”), seems, on account of its foundation, to pertain more to supernatural than to natural happiness. Therefore it will suffice here to note briefly the following:

As concerns objective happiness, whether natural or supernatural, it is self-evident from what has been said that God alone constitutes its essence.

Several acts concur to perfect subjective happiness, each bearing in a different way upon that one essential object. For cognition, love, and joy or delight in the fruition of the supreme good are distinguished. None of these belongs to happiness only accidentally or nonnecessarily, whether as essence or attribute. The question can therefore be asked which of these acts, more than the others, is to be considered to exhibit the very essence of subjective happiness. Since this essence corresponds to the metaphysical concept of happiness itself, the question ultimately reduces to this: which one or more of these acts are such that they are required in themselves and simply sufficient to effect a relatively perfect union of the subject with God?

On this matter, most people readily agree that delight in the fruition of the good, since it does not constitute that union but naturally follows it, pertains to happiness only as a necessary attribute. Thus nearly all possible doubt concerns only the acts of cognition and love. And indeed we see that among the Scholastics serious arguments were advanced on both sides in favor of the prerogative of each act. If supernatural happiness in particular is considered, it seems right to affirm with St. Thomas that it formally consists in the act of the intellect alone, that is, in the clear vision of God. But Suarez warns that the same is not to be said when only natural happiness is under discussion. For he says that its essence is situated wholly both in the knowledge and in the love of God, and to prove this he chiefly uses the following argument: For cognition alone to be said formally to constitute the essence of happiness in itself, it must bring with it love as an attribute necessarily consequent upon it; otherwise the subject might be physically perfect through an intellectual act but, as a moral being, that is, according to the will, remain imperfect and not united with God. This necessary connection with perfect love of God undoubtedly belongs to the supernatural vision of God, but not so certainly and in itself to a cognition of God perfect only in a natural way. “For who,” he says, “would say that a demon is essentially happy with natural happiness because he has perfect natural knowledge of God, when he has no love?”

Article 4.

On man’s highest end with respect to the present life.

  1. Since man’s ultimate end is proposed to be attained perfectly only in the immortal life to come, you may ask: What natural perfection and happiness is man, while he sojourns in this mortal life, destined by nature to attain; and what is man’s highest end with respect to this life? The question is indeed already clear in itself from what has been set forth and carries its solution with it; nevertheless, it should not be passed over altogether, if only because it provides a suitable occasion for drawing the whole doctrine concerning man’s end together into a practical summary.

Just as man in the entirety of his nature, so also throughout the whole duration of his existence, must be naturally ordered to that same end which we have shown to be simply his ultimate end. Therefore one end is not proposed for man in this life and another in the next; rather, only his different subjective relation to that one essential end is to be distinguished according to the different stages of existence. For a person is related to the end in one way when he rests in its full attainment (“at the terminus”), and in another when he is “on the way” to attaining it. Hence the matter itself admits this one answer to the question proposed:

Conclusion. The end that in particular corresponds to the present life consists wholly in the free and practical pursuit of the ultimate end, to be fully attained in the life to come; or, which says the same thing, in freely pursuing, and also attaining inchoatively to the extent permitted by the condition of this life, that true felicity which consists in union with God according to intellect and will, the fullness of which is awaited in the immortal life.

However self-evident and certain this conclusion may be in itself, it seems nevertheless to need further clarification to guard it against the obscurity that often clouds it. For even among men who otherwise profess sound philosophy, there have been those who would say that the end of the present life defined above does indeed exhibit the primary end proposed by nature, but is not complete unless it expressly includes, along with moral happiness, also sensible happiness, insofar as the latter is not opposed to the former; for only in this way, they say, can the end of life truly be called suited to human nature on earth. Hence they wish to establish, in a certain sense, a twofold end for this life: one primary and essential, consisting in “morality,” that is, in the right ordering of actions toward attaining the ultimate end in the life to come; the other secondary, consisting in the prosperous enjoyment of the present life, insofar as this is not opposed to the moral end.

We consider this opinion, though more ambiguous than erroneous, not entirely harmless. For this prosperity either denotes the use of temporal goods that is in some way useful for perfectly accomplishing the moral end; in that case it exhibits not some special end of nature, primary or secondary, but a means subordinated to the common end not merely negatively but positively, and therefore implicitly contained under it. Or it means that every prosperity of life, even one indifferent with respect to the ultimate end, provided only that it is not opposed to the moral end, is proposed by nature to man as an end to be pursued for its own sake by natural obligation. In that case, it appears very difficult to reconcile such a natural obligation with certain principles of Christian life and evangelical counsels in such a way that no absurd disagreement seems to be admitted between the truth of the natural order and the truth of revealed faith.

Therefore, the following is added for good reason:

  1. Thesis VIII. The felicity which, by nature’s destiny, is proposed for man to attain in the present life, though in itself sensitive-rational, includes no fruition of the sensitive part other than that which is positively subordinated in some way to the ultimate end, or which naturally accompanies and follows the use of the faculties of mind and body rightly ordered toward that same end.

Preliminary note. Whatever, and to the extent that it, has in some way the character of a necessary or useful means with respect to an end is said to be positively subordinated to that end. Negative subordination, by contrast, presupposes not in itself a relation of means to end, but rather a comparative assessment of two ends independent in themselves, one of which is understood to be more primary than the other and to be preferred in the event of a conflict.

  1. Proof I from the unity of the final direction of the whole of human nature.

Although human nature is composed of rationality and sensibility, it is nevertheless physically one, and therefore must have one end and one final direction (11). But to bring about and preserve this unity of final direction in human life, the merely negative subordination of sensitive life is manifestly insufficient; rather, all particular natural tendencies of both mind and body must be positively subordinated to the governance of reason with respect to the ultimate end of the whole nature (37; cf. also 64, response to 4). Therefore…

  1. Proof II from the notion of true good and apparent good. The end objectively correlated with human nature, at whatever stage of human existence it is considered, must be such as to have the character of true human good, excluding the character of apparent good; this is most certainly established by the very concept of nature and its relation to the end, as well as by the holiness and wisdom of nature’s divine Ordainer. But there can be no true good for man except one that is either in itself rational and morally good with respect to the ultimate end, or related in some way to such a good and derives from that very relation all its moral goodness and true goodness (29 and 46). Therefore, for any prosperity of life to be considered a true good for man and a true end of nature, it must in some way be positively related to man’s ultimate end.

  2. Corollaries: I. The natural end of the present life, so defined, not only fails to exclude the proper enjoyment of even sensible goods, but positively includes it wherever it contributes something to man’s true good and true happiness.

II. By this very account, the eudaemonological order of nature is objectively joined and perfectly reconciled, even here on earth, with the deontological order, and the pursuit of true happiness with the moral end.

III. Therefore, this general principle may be established: The more perfectly anyone strives throughout all his sensitive-rational activity to fulfill the right final order of nature (the moral order), the more he also attains his true happiness in the present life.

Notes for resolving difficulties.

    1. God, as author of nature, surely did not surround the use of the present life with a variety of pleasant provisions and sensory delights without reason; hence a moderate enjoyment of them, provided the moral order is preserved, appears to accord with the most kindly intention of the Creator. Exactly so. Nevertheless, since these comforts of life were provided by the most generous Creator for a sensitive-rational man, and not for the same man considered as merely an animal, in themselves, and by the intention of the divine giver, they are meant to help man pursue his human end and to support him in this arduous journey in a way suited to his nature. Therefore, for the enjoyment of the senses to conform both to human nature and to the Creator’s intention, it must be rational both in itself and with respect to its end, that is, ordered in some way to the true good of rational man; otherwise even the “moral order” itself, which consists in the right final ordering of all free activity, could not remain intact.
  1. Nothing contrary to this view is proved if someone should reason as follows: “The highest end of this life is precisely what is the highest good of this life. But a rational good together with a sensible pleasant good is undoubtedly to be judged a greater good of this life than rational good alone, since a + b > a. Therefore, the highest end of this life seems to be placed explicitly in both kinds of good.” The answer readily follows from what has been said above. Namely, once the general principle stated in the major premise is admitted, the minor premise must be distinguished and either granted or denied insofar as that pleasant good either serves the rational good in some way and is thus implicitly contained in it, or is in no way related to it. For only on the former supposition does it have the character of good (true good); on the latter it is merely apparent good. Thus the expression a + b > a is by no means true, since b == 0; indeed, b is understood to be a negative quantity. Therefore, the conclusion must also be denied.

Chapter III. The Principle of Human Acts

Liber II: Book Two. The Moral Attributes of the Human Act

Liber III: Book Three. The Complete Norm of Human Acts, or Law

Liber IV: Book Four. The Human Being’s Subjective Moral Formation

Sectio II: Social Right in General

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