Theodor Meyer, Ius naturae generale
Institutiones iuris naturalis, Pars I: Ius naturae generale
First published 1906
Theodor Meyer’s Ius naturae generale from the second corrected edition (1906), in Latin with an original English translation. Preface and proemium included; the navigational contents and publisher advertisements are excluded.
Introductio I: Preface
Introduction
Sectio I: General Ethics
Liber I: Book One. The Natural Elements and Conditions of Human Action
Liber II: Book Two. The Moral Attributes of the Human Act
Liber III: Book Three. The Complete Norm of Human Acts, or Law
Liber IV: Book Four. The Human Being’s Subjective Moral Formation
On the subjective moral formation of the human being.
Prologue.
- It would be of little use to have investigated the moral qualities of human acts from objective principles of things and theoretically learned the objective norms of action secured by the force of the eternal law, unless one also knew the manner and condition by which the acting subject himself, as an individual, can and ought to be morally formed by them. There are chiefly two things in a human being that contribute to this subjective formation: one is each person’s conscience, by which the objective rule of the moral order is first received in the subject and applied to individual activity; the other consists in the free will’s disposition (whether positive or negative) toward this same rule of conscience, from which moral qualities arise in the subject, commonly called virtues and vices.
Accordingly, the subject itself suggests the division of this book that we shall follow: first requiring an explanation of conscience, then of moral virtues and vices.
Chapter I. Conscience, or the Subjective Application of Law
303. For the objective binding force with which natural law, and through it also positive law, is endowed actually to exercise its efficacy in binding human beings, or to act “in second actuality,” it is not enough that it be promulgated on the legislator’s part, thereby generally making it available for subjects to know and belonging in itself to the objective character of law. It is also necessary that the law become subjectively known to each subject to be bound and be applied individually as a rule of action. By nature’s institution, this duty is performed by each person’s conscience.
Article 1.
General notions about conscience1
§ 1. Definition.
304. The term conscience is used in various ways: 1. for the inner awareness by which we are conscious that we exist, understand, act, etc.; 2. for the soul itself insofar as it is conscious of itself, in which sense we speak of a clear or defiled conscience; 3. for synderesis, that is, habitual knowledge of universal practical principles in the sphere of morals2, for example, God is to be worshiped, parents are to be honored, one must not do to anyone what one would not wish done to oneself, etc.; 4. for the practical judgment concerning the moral quality, permissibility, or impermissibility of our particular actions or omissions, whether past, presently occurring, or future. Understood in this way, conscience, whenever it concerns future acts brought under deliberation, performs the office, as it were, of a guide and counselor; when it concerns past actions or accompanies present ones, it performs the office of an inner judge.3 5. In the strictest sense it is taken for a dictate or practical judgment in the moral sphere that immediately concerns particular things we are to do or omit. Only in this last sense can conscience properly and strictly be called the application of law, although in itself it does not differ from conscience concerning past actions that, together with inner approval or condemnation, also declares the sanction of law. This is the sense chiefly at issue here. Understood in this way, conscience is aptly defined: A practical judgment dictating that something is to be done by us as commanded, omitted as prohibited, or permitted to our discretion as lawful.
305. Therefore the proximate application of law, which takes place through conscience, consists entirely in the activity of reason: by it, while knowing both the law or general norm of action and the nature of the action under deliberation, reason pronounces—by deducing a practical conclusion—whether the action conforms or fails to conform to the law and what practical necessity follows from this. Conscience, then, is nothing other than the conclusion of a certain syllogism that reason silently constructs within itself. Its major premise contains some general principle, or a known precept or prohibition of law; its minor premise is some statement of fact by which this or that action or omission now proposed to the will is judged to be either implicitly or virtually included under that same law or not.
From this it is readily understood that conscience shares all the limits and incidental fallibility of the intellect, and, no less than the intellect, can have varying relations both to objective truth and to certainty.
§ 2. The way conscience is distinguished.
306. Conscience is distinguished in various ways according to different respects:
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By its conformity with the law to be applied, it is either right (true) or erroneous (false); erroneous conscience is in turn either invincibly or vincibly erroneous. (Cf. what was said above at no. 116 about vincible and invincible ignorance.)
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By the firmness of its inner assent, it is a) certain, when the mind, having perceived the reasons as sufficient, adheres without fear of error to the practical conclusion drawn from them; b) doubtful, when the mind wavers between two opposing practical propositions, assenting to neither. Doubtful conscience is subdivided into negative and positive doubt according as there are no motives for positive assent on either the affirmative or negative side, or there are motives on both sides that, in the subject’s assessment, are equal, or at least such as to exclude certain assent to either side; c) probable, when the mind, on the basis of weighty considerations but not without all prudent fear that the opposite is true, nevertheless embraces some judgment. Thus probable conscience, as long as it remains such, differs from conscience doubtful in the broad sense only by degree and shares all its conditions. Yet it is rightly distinguished from conscience properly so called as doubtful, since the latter designates suspension of judgment in drawing a conclusion, and thus the absence of conscience rather than conscience in the true sense, whereas probable conscience presupposes some practical judgment, though not a certain one.
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By habitual state, conscience is commonly distinguished as tender, lax, and scrupulous; perplexed conscience can also be included. Someone who is accustomed to judge conscientiously and carefully the morality of acts even in matters of lesser importance, and to follow that judgment, is said to have a tender conscience. Someone who rashly thinks that no obligation or transgression is present on the basis of slight considerations is said to have a lax conscience. Someone who, on account of reasons of almost no weight and mere appearances, is accustomed at one time to suspect that an obligation or sin exists when it does not, and at another to suspect that it is graver than it really is, is said to have a scrupulous conscience. Finally, a conscience is called perplexed when the mind anxiously hesitates between two sides of a practical contradiction, fearing sin on either side.
Article 2.
Whether conscience must be followed.
307. To answer this question as fully as necessary within the limits of our undertaking, we shall set out the chief practical rules on this matter, founded in the very notion of conscience and in its relation to the moral law, of which, according to the intention of the author of nature, conscience ought to be each person’s proximate interpreter. Meanwhile, we shall leave to moral theology the longer and subtler inquiries on this subject prompted in the schools by the historical controversy concerning the system they call probabilism.
§ 1. On the supposition of certain conscience.
308. Thesis XXXIV. Everyone is bound to follow the dictate of a certain conscience that declares something prohibited or commanded; and this always holds, even if the conscience is perhaps invincibly erroneous.
Proof of Part I. By its very notion and natural purpose, certain conscience is nothing other than the law itself, certainly known to us and applied to individual cases. At least, it manifestly possesses this authority when it is supposed to be right. For since the will is a blind faculty, it can be bound by a law only through reason, or conscience. But a law certainly known binds our will by obligation. Therefore the dictate of certain conscience, at least whenever it is also right, must impose the same obligation as the law itself4.
Proof of Part II. “. . . even if it is invincibly erroneous.”
Argument I. Although in the particular application of a law an invincible error can accidentally occur, given the condition of created intelligence, nevertheless, neither ignorance nor error can ever erase from the heart of a human being who uses reason that essential promulgation of the law which consists in its supreme principles: namely, that everyone understands himself to be bound to avoid, as far as it depends on his free choice, evil, and to do the good that appears necessary to the right moral order. This supreme law is known to everyone no less with certainty than according to objective truth (nn. 270, 271). But by virtue of this dictate of certain and right conscience, each person is bound to follow conscience even if it is invincibly erroneous.
Proof of the minor premise. Insofar as it depends on his own choice, a human being preserves right order, or avoids evil and embraces necessary good, to the extent that his will conforms to the certain dictate of conscience prohibiting or commanding something, whether that dictate is true or invincibly erroneous; for the will, a blind faculty in itself, can be guided to right action in no other way than according to what the intellect proposes to it. — Therefore, by the very fact that through certain and true conscience everyone is bound to fulfill right rational order, or natural law in general, as far as it depends on his choice, he is also bound to follow certain conscience even if it is invincibly erroneous, as is clear from the first part of the thesis already proved.
Argument II. From the concept of formal sin.
Formal sin, or the evil of an action imputable to a human being, is contracted insofar as the will freely embraces moral evil known as such (cf. n. 197). But whenever someone acts against the dictate of certain conscience, even if it happens to be invincibly erroneous, he freely embraces some object that in his own knowledge is evil, and commits formal sin. Therefore he is bound by obligation to conform to that dictate. — On the same subject, St. Thomas5 does not hesitate to affirm: “It must be said that every will that disagrees with reason, whether right or erring, is simply always evil.” The Apostle says the very same thing (Romans 14:23), when he says: “Whatever is not from faith (that is, whatever is done against conscience) is sin.”6
309. Corollaries. I. Conscience is rightly called the proximate or immediate rule of human acts, but it exercises this efficacy only in the name and with the authority of law, whether real or supposed.
II. Hence, by the same title by which we are obligated to follow conscience, we are also bound, insofar as it depends on our care, to provide for the rectitude of conscience; and therefore everyone ought to:
a) investigate duties, both those common to all and those particular to himself, with the care appropriate to his age, state, office, and other conditions of life;
b) whenever doubt concerning the morality of an act enters the mind during action, apply to investigating the law or applying it rightly the diligence demanded by the matter, the time, one’s abilities, and the other circumstances.7
III. A conscience actually vincibly erroneous concerning the honorableness or dishonorableness of an action or omission may neither be followed rashly nor contradicted at the risk of objective dishonorableness; rather, the obligation to remove the free cause of the error presses above all. For in following it one sins against the obligation noted in the preceding corollary; in acting against it one errs because one performs an action one judges evil here and now.8
Remarks for resolving difficulties.
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- God does not formally command or intend as such the material evil that follows from the dictate of an invincibly erroneous conscience; he permits it as accidentally connected with the very limitation of human intelligence, which he certainly wisely intends and which, indeed, in creating, he could not fail to will.
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An act performed from a conscience erroneous in this way, insofar as by its objective character it is nonconforming to the law, is not human, since it lacks the first and essential requirement, cognition. Hence, although it is sin in the abstract, in the concrete, that is, in relation to the concrete determination of the will, it can have no character of sin at all. Nor, therefore, is God in such a case said to command sin, or a human being to be obligated to sin. Accordingly, Suarez aptly observes concerning the same apparent difficulty9: “(In such a case) a human being is formally obligated not to evil but to good. Hence if some evil seems to be found in the external act, it is so materially, insofar as it is a certain material object, but not insofar as it is a human action. Hence it does not properly follow that a human being is obligated against God’s law, since he is obligated to an act of virtue. Materially, however, there seems to be an obligation against a certain law of God that does not bind in that case, because the human being is excused by ignorance and by another, stronger law of God, namely, obedience to prudent conscience.”
§ 2. On the supposition of doubtful or probable conscience.
311. Thesis XXXV. To act honorably from conscience, a morally certain dictate of conscience is required and sufficient.
Preliminary notes. 1. The dictate of conscience taken in the strict sense must be carefully distinguished from the remote practical judgment of reason, which is also called speculative in the moral sphere. This thesis concerns only the former, which always denotes the last practical dictate of reason. 2. A dictate or judgment of reason is called “morally certain” when, in proportion to its motive, it excludes every prudent fear of error.
Proof of Part I. “It is required . . .”
Whenever a dictate of conscience concerning a particular action to be performed or omitted by obligation of law lacks moral certainty—that is, whenever it is doubtful or merely probable—it does not exclude a prudent fear that the action is dishonorable. But it is wrong to act while there is an actual prudent fear that what we are doing may be dishonorable.
Proof of the minor premise. Beyond doubt, it is wrong deliberately to scorn the law, with the actual disposition of will to be equally ready, insofar as it depends on oneself, to embrace dishonor or honor. But one who rashly chooses either side while in practical doubt has that disposition of mind and scorns the law. Therefore a dictate at least morally certain is required.10
Proof of Part II. “It suffices . . .”
No one is considered obligated to do what he cannot do. But unless a morally certain dictate of conscience sufficed for acting honorably, we would be obligated to do what we cannot do. For metaphysical certainty is entirely unattainable except concerning the first and general principles of natural law and things deduced immediately and evidently from them. Therefore either the will’s determination must always be suspended in all matters concerning the concrete application of principles—which is no less absurd than impossible—or it must be considered that a morally certain dictate of conscience suffices for us to act honorably and prudently on its basis.
312. Corollaries. I. One who is in practical doubt, even with a probable judgment in favor of one side, must resolve the doubt if he can in any way; if he cannot do so at all, he is bound to refrain from embracing either side, either to suspend the action, if circumstances permit, or to choose the safer side, that is, the side that satisfies the obligation if one exists. This axiom applies specifically to practical doubt: “In doubtful matters, the safer side is to be chosen.”
II. The direct and immediately applicable method of resolving practical doubt consists in trying, by diligent investigation, to resolve the remote or speculative doubt from which it arises; that is, by reexamining either or both premises of the syllogism whose conclusion is rendered practically doubtful: the “major premise” if the doubt concerns the law, the “minor premise” if it concerns the facts.
- Scholium. What generally holds for doubtful conscience can be applied only with discretion to practical doubts as well, which a scrupulous conscience is accustomed to become entangled in even when matters are most clear.11 Such doubts, founded not so much on reasons as on play of the imagination, are generally recognized as imprudent by the inward assent of the judging reason itself, notwithstanding the mind’s agitation; in this case they do not necessarily exclude the moral certainty of the dictate of conscience, since it consists in the judgment of reason, not in a fabrication of the imagination. In practice, everyone suffering from this malady should be advised to allow himself to be guided by the reason of another prudent man through simple obedience, and to seek protection, under another’s direction, against the illusions of his own imagination.
Similar things should be said about perplexed conscience. If someone subject to this difficulty cannot lay aside his irrational error (for an opinion that he must necessarily commit sin is always such an error), and the necessity of acting presses upon him, let him embrace what seems to him the lesser evil;12 for in this way he will have avoided evil as far as he could.13 If he cannot even discern the lesser evil, let him do what he pleases; he will not commit sin, since sin cannot be committed under an unavoidable necessity.
§ 3. On the indirect method of laying aside practical doubt.
A. The system of probabilism explained.14
- If, even after careful consideration by wise people, a speculative doubt about the matter in question cannot be resolved at all, and therefore either the major or minor premise of the syllogism by which the dictate of conscience must be formed through a conclusion remains doubtful, or at least does not reach moral certainty beyond the limits of probability, the conclusion drawn from it, and hence conscience itself, cannot be more certain in itself and directly. Nevertheless, nothing prevents a practical dictate of conscience from being made certain in another way, under certain conditions, while a speculative doubt remains: namely, indirectly or reflectively, by instituting some new reasoning about the doubtful conclusion of the first syllogism, drawn from another certain principle independent of it.
Among principles of this kind, the following general one is especially prominent: “An obligation must not be imposed unless it is certainly established,” or “a doubtful law (not sufficiently promulgated) does not bind.”
This doctrine, which teaches that, provided the due conditions are observed, it is legitimate to use such a reflex principle to form a certain conscience, is the proper and genuine foundation on which the system called “probabilism” rests in moral matters.15
From this alone it is sufficiently clear how far from the truth are those who, by an inept and arbitrary interpretation of the name, think that the system consists in teaching that we may licitly follow even a practically doubtful conscience, provided it is probable; on the contrary, it is manifest that the whole system proceeds from this very principle: it is wrong to act with a practically doubtful, or uncertain, conscience concerning the honorableness of an action. And so the studied calumnies heaped upon this system, especially in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by the machinations of the Jansenist sect16, and still circulated by the ignorant or malicious, are sufficiently self-refuting.
But for the substance of the doctrine to be understood on its merits, insofar as it concerns philosophy, the matter requires some preliminary clarification.
- Whenever there is a positive doubt whether an action or omission, considered either in the abstract or in the concrete, is licit or illicit, both the affirmative and the negative opinion can be more or less probable precisely because neither is certain. For an opinion or judgment is called probable insofar as it rests on a genuinely weighty motive, although with fear of the opposite.
Probability is further distinguished: 1. by the ground: intrinsic and extrinsic, according as it is founded on reasons drawn from consideration of the thing itself or arises from the authority of weighty men; 2. by the object: probability of law and of fact, according as it concerns the doubtful existence of a law or a doubtful fact by which a law otherwise certain is applied to the present case; 3. by degree: a) in itself, true (solid), certain, or, conversely, slight and doubtful; b) comparatively with respect to the probability of the opposing opinion: highest, greater, equal, or lesser. In the same way an opinion is commonly called most probable (if it rests on a very weighty ground and therefore admits only a slight opposing probability), more probable, equally probable, or less probable. — Finally, independently of these degrees, among opposing probable opinions the one that favors the law or obligation is called “safer,” while the one that favors freedom is called “less safe,” even if the latter is otherwise known to be more probable.
- With this preliminary explanation, everyone can see that a very serious practical question arises in moral matters: whether, and under what condition, in a case of theoretical doubt about an obligation, a person may in practice follow a probable opinion that is opposed to the safer one and favors freedom.
According to the various answers given over time by different writers, the following principles or systems are distinguished in moral science on this subject: 1. rigorism or absolute tutiorism, which teaches that the safer side must always be followed by obligation as long as the opposing side is not entirely certain; 2. mitigated tutiorism, or simply tutiorism, which affirms that the same obligation remains at least as long as the opinion favoring freedom is not most probable; 3. probabiliorism, which concedes that the “less safe” side may licitly be chosen over the “safer” when it is more probable than the safer one; 4. aequiprobabilism, which permits the same even when the opposing opinion against the law is approximately equally probable; 5. moderate probabilism, which goes beyond this comparative assessment and teaches that, in itself and generally, no further condition is required for licitly following an opinion favoring freedom than that it be truly and solidly probable; 6. laxism (although generally not recognized as a distinct system), which presumes to extend the same freedom to every opinion, however slightly probable, even one that is only slightly probable.
Among these principles, however, the first and last, occupying the extremes of moral rigor and moral license respectively, have rightly been rejected and proscribed by ecclesiastical authority.17 Hence every dispute among Catholic doctors is restricted to the remaining four. Although there was at times a sharp controversy even about these, in our time it can scarcely fail to be regarded as settled in favor of moderate probabilism by the nearly universal practice of experts and even of the Church—moderate, I say, that is, with due restraint against abuse of rash license or laxity. Indeed, aequiprobabilism is entirely reducible to moderate probabilism, and is even fully identified with it as to principle, insofar as it recognizes that the chief criterion for discerning an opinion that is truly and solidly probable lies in the moral balance of the reasons that can be brought forward for and against an opinion.
- If the systems just listed (now setting aside rigorism and laxism) are compared with one another according to the philosophical principles on which they rest, everyone sees that only two are opposed to each other by the defined property of their principle, namely, tutiorism and moderate probabilism. For the former presses, with no lack of theoretical consistency, this principle: even in speculative doubt about some obligation, it is always safer to choose the safer course, so that, as far as it depends on a person, the danger of violating the law is avoided; such danger is removed not by a merely probable or more probable opinion, but only by moral certainty in an opinion favoring freedom. — The latter, by contrast, holds that it is practically safe in itself and free from the danger of sin to follow an opinion favoring freedom, so long as the assertion of an obligation remains truly doubtful in the face of a solid opposing probability. Probabiliorism, however, lacking any distinct and deeper principle of its own, tries to introduce a kind of middle accommodation between these two opposed positions and thus destroys itself logically by arbitrarily mutilating the consistency of each.
Philosophically, therefore, the question is left to be disputed almost exclusively between the systems of tutiorism and probabilism. Nevertheless, they are by no means so opposed in their whole character that, if the proper domain were fairly assigned to each, they could not be reconciled amicably. Hence we shall assert the system of probabilism as logically consistent and philosophically sound, while nevertheless allowing the principle of mitigated tutiorism to retain its rights within its legitimate scope.
B. The legitimate use of probabilism defined.
I. Negatively:
- Thesis XXXVI. Setting aside every opinion, even one truly probable, the safer course must be chosen in practice whenever speculative doubt concerns a means necessary to an end or effect that is due by a certain obligation.
Preliminary notes. Besides obligations introduced immediately and directly by force of some precept, many others can exist that follow from a precept mediately and are immediately generated by their necessary and indivisible connection with a logically prior certain obligation. Thus, one who is obligated to some end is thereby obligated to the means necessary for that same end. Similarly, one who is bound to avoid some effect is thereby bound, with equal obligation, to omit its cause. This is what is referred to in the thesis when it says that the doubt concerns a means necessary to an end, etc.; that is, if there is speculative uncertainty about the sufficiency or insufficiency of some means (an action or omission) by which the actual fulfillment of a certainly owed end or effect, whether positive or negative, is to be secured, in practice it is not licit to follow a probable opinion that is not also safer, that is, one by which that obligation (to accomplish the end in reality) is fulfilled more certainly.
Proof. A certain and undoubted obligation, known as such, according to the dictate of right reason also requires certain and undoubted fulfillment on the part of the person obligated. But in the proposed hypothesis, a speculative doubt or the speculative probability of one or the other opinion by no means prevents the obligation from remaining certain to fulfill that owed end in reality or to avoid that effect in reality. Therefore, in such a doubt, according to the dictate of right reason everyone is bound to satisfy that certain obligation insofar as it depends on his free choice; that is, in practice to choose the safer course over the less safe, even if the latter is theoretically probable or more probable.
The major premise of the argument is clear from what was established above concerning certain conscience.
The minor premise is sufficiently evident from the hypothesis itself, since it plainly excludes a prudent use of the axiom “a doubtful law does not bind,” while the law that imposes the obligation remains entirely certain notwithstanding that factual doubt.
Hence the conclusion can have no doubt either. Indeed, one who in such a case, though able, would refuse to choose the safer course, trusting perhaps in the speculative probability of his own opinion, could in no way be excused from the crime of practical rashness, which should be considered all the graver as the more serious is the end placed in danger.18
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Corollary. Therefore, the use of probabilism is specifically inadmissible:
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where the doubt concerns a condition or means necessary for attaining the ultimate end itself;
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where the question concerns the validity of an act necessarily required for some effect, as, for example, in administering the sacraments;
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when the question concerns unjust harm to a third party that may happen to result from an action. This consideration is often connected with a special reason arising from the office someone must perform. Thus, for example, a judge cannot licitly declare someone positively guilty and condemn him to punishment on the basis of some mere probability of guilt. Nor may a physician, in treating a sick person, use a medicine that is perhaps probable but uncertain and dangerous instead of certain and safe remedies, for the sake of experimentation or advancing medical knowledge.
II. Positively:
- Thesis XXXVII. For an action or omission whose liceity or illicitness under a precept is the sole subject of speculative doubt to be prudently judged not illicit in practice, it is required and sufficient that the speculative opinion or judgment affirming its liceity be truly probable.
Preliminary notes. 1. The wording of this thesis positively defines the proper material scope of the legitimate use of probabilism, already delimited negatively. It extends to every case of true doubt concerning the liceity or illicitness of an action or omission considered in itself, or, which is the same, concerning the actual existence of an obligation by force of a precept, whether divine or human, by which it is prohibited or commanded. 2. Infer what is required for the “true probability” of an opinion from what was said above (nn. 306, 315). 3. The assertion that “true probability is required” is beyond dispute and sufficiently clear in itself; therefore only its “sufficiency” demands special proof. It should also be noted that this sufficiency is affirmed simply, and hence even when the opposing opinion favoring obligation seems to possess similar or even greater probability.
Proof. To act honorably from conscience, a morally certain practical (last) dictate of conscience is required and sufficient, as has already been proved (n. 311). But under the condition presupposed in the thesis, from a truly probable speculative judgment about the honorableness or liceity of an action or omission, a morally certain practical dictate of conscience about it can legitimately be formed. Therefore such a truly probable speculative judgment provides a sufficient foundation for saying that it is licit to follow it in practice.
Proof of the minor premise.
- Argument I (direct). Whenever, after careful investigation even by experts and consideration of the circumstances on both sides, one judges for a grave reason and therefore with true probability that a proposed action or omission is free from every prohibition and hence objectively licit, the supposed law asserted by the contrary judgment is thereby entirely uncertain and invincibly doubtful for those to whom it pertains. Nor does it cease to be so because it too seems to rest on a similar or perhaps even greater probability. For moral certainty is incompatible with a true probability opposed to it.
But from an invincibly doubtful law this certain conclusion follows: that it is null with respect to its binding force. For an axiom certain not only philosophically but also juridically holds: “A doubtful law does not bind,” or, as St. Thomas says, “No one is bound by any precept except through knowledge of that precept.”19 This requires not so much proof as explanation. Namely,
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It belongs to the nature of a law that actually binds that it be sufficiently promulgated. Accordingly, however much a law may perhaps objectively exist in the legislator’s mind, it lacks the law’s proper force with respect to binding subjects, or is to be considered nonexistent for them, so long as it has not been sufficiently promulgated, as plainly holds in the present hypothesis.20
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Moral obligation consists in a practical moral necessity, not of just any kind, but one as great as can be reconciled with the freedom of a rational creature: a true and ineluctable necessity, but disjunctive. By its very nature, therefore, obligation cannot reach the will and hence exist subjectively except through the intellect or reason, which is ordained by God himself as the herald and proximate interpreter of the objective rational order to be observed according to God’s will. A necessary condition of moral obligation, then, is that reason know this necessity not as arbitrarily supposed but as objectively existing. This necessity is twofold: the necessity of the end (right rational order) and the necessity of the means (an action or omission) to that same end (nn. 222 ff.). But under the rational and invincible doubt that we presuppose, this necessary condition of obligation plainly cannot be established.
Therefore, from the supposed truly probable judgment, by means of this reflex principle, a practically and morally certain judgment can be formed in favor of freedom against any truly doubtful opinion concerning a law, whether commanding or prohibiting.
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Argument II (indirect). It seems that scarcely anything apparently stronger can be brought forward to weaken the force of this conclusion than that axiom of canon law invoked by tutiorists: “In doubtful cases the safer side must be followed,” or, which at the same time gives its rationale for the present subject, “In the face of an imminent probability of committing sin, it is always safer to choose” the side favored by the law that is by no means doubtful, “to avoid the danger of sin.” Indeed, if this kind of axiom could be invoked as a reflex principle in every doubt, even a speculative one, about what is licit or illicit, with equal or even greater right, the reflex principle of probabilism would be deprived of its force. Now, rightly interpreted, that juridical axiom by no means has this force of signification. For:
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It must be understood per se of practical doubt, in which one surely may act only by following the safer course. Otherwise, absolute tutiorism, which has been excluded by the judgment of the Church, would alone have to be considered strictly legitimate. In addition, this juridical rule prescribes that the greater harms feared to follow from either course be avoided in practice and that the safer course be chosen to that extent. Therefore, whenever this further consideration of such extreme consequences is added to the question whether something considered in itself is licit or illicit, everyone agrees that, according to right reason, the use of probabilism in favor of the principle of tutiorism is restricted. This interpretation of that principle is generally presupposed both by ancient and by more recent theologians, excepting the Jansenist rigorists.21
Besides, this cannot be invoked against the principle of probabilism precisely because through that principle the certain law “to avoid the danger of sin” is not merely acknowledged but carefully observed.
For when someone, with all practical doubt set aside, does what in fact is prohibited by no law, or omits what no law binds him to do, neither a danger of sin nor a “probability of committing sin” is imminent. Hence what is chosen in this way is simply safe in itself.
- If sometimes the same axiom is used in a broader sense, it is to be considered a counsel, not a precept. This certainly follows from what was said above and is confirmed by the most authoritative writers in moral theology, such as St. Alphonsus de Liguori, St. Antoninus, and many others.22
Accordingly, whether it is understood narrowly or broadly, it takes away no force whatever from the probabilist principle.
Therefore, once the fundamental point of the doctrine has been established invincibly—the point on which the assertion of the minor premise and, through it, the proposed thesis depend—the thesis itself is shown to stand with equal certainty.
Remarks for resolving difficulties.
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- It is objected without justification that the principle of probabilism logically and consistently leads to laxism, because even a slightly probable opinion in favor of freedom makes the contrary opinion in favor of the law doubtful, or not entirely certain; therefore, in this case too, one could similarly apply the reflex principle concerning a doubtful law.
To refute this argument, it suffices to observe that a certain practical judgment cannot reasonably be founded except on a reflex judgment that is likewise certain both in itself and in its application to the matter at hand. For this it is plainly required that the law or obligation in question be certainly doubtful, not merely doubtful in some way by probability. Therefore, to prevent anyone from rashly using such a principle against right reason, the opinion disputing the existence of the obligation must be judged not merely slightly but truly and solidly probable. Otherwise the obligation itself would by no means be certainly doubtful, but would remain most probable and hence, as St. Alphonsus observes, in some way morally certain.
- If proponents of probabiliorism, as sometimes happens, also try to support their case against probabilism by the common principle that a person is commanded to “avoid the danger of sin,” everyone can see how ineffectual their weapons are. For if these arguments had any force against moderate probabilism, they would be no less valid against probabiliorism and aequiprobabilism, and only tutiorism would have to be admitted, since it alone, by always “choosing the safer,” avoids every danger of sin in the sense of its adversaries. That this sense is entirely erroneous has been sufficiently shown above.
From this “axiom,” therefore, it by no means follows that in practice the more likely—that is, the more probable—opinion must always be preferred. For besides the fact that, in assessing the relatively greater or lesser probability of some opinion, unanimous agreement even among experts can scarcely ever be expected (since one person judges more probable precisely what another judges less probable, causing no small difficulty for the moral direction of conscience), that inference itself must be said to lack any solid foundation. For in order to embrace either side safely, all that is required and sufficient above all is that a person know with certainty that he is bound by no obligation to either side. This certain knowledge is fully established by the positive and solid probability of the opinion that denies the obligation, whether that solidity is concluded in a particular case directly from the intrinsic weight of the reasons considered in themselves or from comparing them with those that can be brought forward for the contrary opinion. For the true and solid probability of an opinion—that is, such a probability as makes the existence of a law or obligation truly doubtful—can plainly subsist even when similarly weighty reasons, or sometimes even weightier ones, seem to be present for the contrary opinion.
C. On the method of forming or discerning an objectively probable judgment.
- Since no true probability, whether external or internal, can be admitted that is not founded on certain objective and weighty reasons, it is useful to set out some common sources of such reasons, from which, not infrequently, considerations agreeable to right reason can supply a probable judgment in obscure matters; these vary according to the subject matter. Nevertheless, because these sources are general in themselves, their particular use also requires a prudent assessment both of the matter in doubt and of the particular circumstances, lest an error be derived in place of a judgment of right reason.
Some special rules of judgment, or axioms, commonly received in either canon or civil law are generally referred to here. The chief of these are roughly as follows:
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- “In doubtful matters one must stand by the side supported by presumption.” Namely, when there is doubt between two contradictory propositions that cannot be resolved directly, rational judgment is provisionally inclined toward the side supported by “presumption,” that is, in whose favor a kind of preexisting likelihood is established by the common order of things. This rule not infrequently accords with true moral certainty, and is always practically adapted to the right order of human affairs. Thus, for example, it is to be presumed that a command is just when issued by legitimate authority, so long as the contrary is not certainly established.
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- “In doubtful matters judgment is to be made from what commonly happens.” This is not so much a new rule as an application of the preceding one to a particular kind of presumption, and rests on the same foundation. Its use pertains especially to a doubt of fact.23
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- “In doubtful cases the condition of the possessor is better.” If its foundation is considered, this juridical rule can likewise be reduced in some way to the first. That is, actual possession supported by good faith, when doubt arises about the possessor’s legitimate right, gives rise to a presumption in favor of the possessor, so that the burden of proof falls not on him but on the opposing party; that is, his right is to be considered secure until the contrary opinion is established as certain. This axiom, then, pertains per se and proximately to matters of justice. Nevertheless, by legitimate analogy it may rightly be extended to other matters of moral doubt as well, in which some sort of title of possession, either on the side of the law or on the side of freedom, can reasonably be considered.24
From the circumstances, therefore, it must be assessed in each case whether the burden of proof rests more on the assertion of the law or on the assertion of freedom; that is, whether the obligation of the law is to be considered “in possession” against freedom, or freedom “in possession” against the supposed obligation. Thus, for example, the law is said to possess when doubt concerns the cessation of a law that had hitherto certainly been in force; freedom is said to possess when an adventitious obligation is doubted on solid grounds.
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- “In doubtful matters one must stand by the validity of the act” is a rule adopted from civil law and is to be understood in this way: when there is doubt only about some circumstance or necessary condition or due manner of an otherwise certain fact, it is to be considered properly done until the contrary is established. For this principle to be applied prudently, one must always take account of the subject matter and harmonize it in each case with the other principles. — Similar to this is the juridical axiom: “In doubtful matters an act is presumed to have been (rightly) performed if it ought to have been performed according to law.” But when there is doubt about the substance of the fact, civil law establishes this rule: “A fact is not presumed but must be proved.”
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Scholium. From what has been said it is sufficiently clear how far the genuine system of probabilism differs from the corrupted image of probabilism that ignorance or calumny often tries to construct, according to which it would be distinguished from laxism only by a kind of fraudulent hypocrisy. This injustice will be exposed all the more easily and certainly if, in the use of probabilism, every appearance of rashness in judgment is carefully avoided.
To this end, it is always useful to remember well:
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Not every opinion founded only on negative doubt or slight reasons, or rashly formed without serious inquiry into the truth, can be considered a truly probable opinion. For it is by no means sufficient to make the contradictory opinion that affirms the obligation of the law fall from the degree of moral certainty. In particular, when the doubt concerns a matter of law, the judgment of men expert in moral science and of weighty authority must first be consulted before one can safely pronounce in general on the solid probability of an opinion.
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In establishing the system of probabilism, the question is not what in a particular case it would be more fitting for each person to do or choose, but only what is to be considered commanded and what not commanded. For in every subject there is this consideration: no one should be deprived of his own property, which he reasonably possesses, merely because of doubt as to whether he ought to be deprived of it in order to perform an act of justice, such as making restitution, or an act of religion, such as fulfilling a vow, or something similar. It is otherwise with other uses, because one may not always make use of one’s property when there is doubt of some evil or harm. Nor is it the case that everything rightly judged licit, not prohibited, or not commanded according to an opinion that is even truly probable is thereby recommended to the will as more praiseworthy than the opposing course that favors the law. For in order to choose reasonably in a particular case one thing that is licit in itself over another similarly licit course, it is necessary to be guided by a prudent and reasonable motive, not by a mere desire for license.
Chapter II. Virtues and Vices, or the Human Being’s Subjective Relation to the Moral Order
On virtues and vices, or on a person’s subjective relation to the moral order.1
Prologue.
- This part of moral doctrine receives its chief illumination more from theological than philosophical sources. Indeed, Christian philosophy must be convinced that in the present order of human affairs neither the exercise of moral virtues worthy of a human being nor happy freedom from the slavery of vices can ever in reality be separated from the intervention and fatherly guidance of God, the author of the supernatural order. Therefore, leaving a fuller treatment of this matter to theology, we shall briefly set out only the common philosophical teachings from which it must proceed as from its rational foundation—not as though such merely philosophical precepts, taken alone and with the higher Christian teaching disregarded, could already suffice for a perfect moral life as divinely proposed, but in such a way that the light of reason may indicate in them a kind of preliminary step of nature by which to ascend to a summit above nature.
Article 1.
On moral virtue and vice in general.
§ 1. On the nature of each.
- The freedom of the human being and the imputability of human acts cause the moral goodness and evil found in acts to redound to the acting subject itself according to degrees of imputability, so that the human being is considered good insofar as he acts well and evil insofar as he acts badly. This occurs much more fully and abundantly, however, when good or evil acts proceed according to their moral character not merely from the free will in some way but also from a habit.2 For in this way the subject, through a habit that derives its moral specification from the acts toward which it inclines, and that inheres in the subject together with its faculties as a quality, likewise participates in a lasting moral quality or character; thus in a more proper sense (because habitually) it becomes good or evil.
Moral habits of this kind are called, as it were by excellence, virtues or vices, according as they intrinsically dispose the subject to embrace or violate the right order of reason. The very names seem to imply that a good habit contains a new support of rational nature for pursuing its end (a virtue), while an evil one contains a corruption of that same nature (a vice). Accordingly, virtue can rightly be defined: A habit inclining the mind and will to acts conforming to rational nature; or, more explicitly: A constant and efficacious disposition of the mind to order all inward affections and outward actions according to the norm of honorableness.3 Nevertheless, virtue is not infrequently taken to mean moral perfection itself, which strictly speaking is more properly the fruit or proximate end of virtue. To this pertains the definition found in St. Augustine: “Virtue is the equality (conformity) of a life in every respect agreeing with reason.”4
The description of virtue also conveys indirectly the very character of vice: for it is a habit opposed to virtue, that is, one inclining the mind and will to act wrongly. From it a moral quality is derived in a human being called viciousness, which Cicero describes as follows: “A habit or disposition throughout one’s life that is inconstant and at variance with itself.”5 Therefore, someone who sins unexpectedly once or twice is not properly considered vicious, but someone who is accustomed to fall through a disposition already acquired. Nevertheless, sins are also not infrequently called vices in a less proper sense.
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One virtue is called infused, another acquired. An infused virtue is obtained through a supernatural divine operation, such as supernatural faith, hope, and charity, which theologians discuss; an acquired virtue is produced through instruction, practice, and exercise, and produces ease and readiness in frequently performing acts that accord with it. This discussion concerns chiefly only the latter virtue, since it alone shares the common character of natural habits.
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In a moral virtue of this kind, taken completely, according to the command that the rational will exercises over the other faculties, a sort of twofold part can be distinguished: one like governance, the other like service. The former consists in the mind’s affection and habitual disposition, by which, with due regard everywhere to persons, times, and places, it is inclined to the honorable measure of action; the latter, by contrast, is an acquired ease in acting honorably, which is found proximately in the faculties subject to the command of the will, and depends not only on suitably ordered intellectual representations but to a great extent also on the manifold configuration of the bodily organism. Thus in virtue itself, too, a certain analogy of the human composite, namely, soul and body, is reflected. For just as the body must be informed by the soul in order to be a human body, so this lower part of virtue must necessarily be informed by the higher lest it fall away from the character of virtue. And just as the soul can exist without a body, so virtue in its essentials can indeed exist without this lower element, at least temporarily, but it is incomplete according to the full character of human virtue. Therefore, neither should a person be considered devoid of the virtue of temperance who has a constant and efficacious inclination of will toward it but experiences less ease in exercising the outward duty of temperance, nor should someone be considered endowed with this virtue who perhaps acquired great ease in performing outward acts of temperance from avarice or another motive alien to moral virtue.
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The well-known axiom that virtue lies in a mean is founded on the same point, that is, in conformity with the rule of reason.6
For by “mean” is understood the measure and manner that must be imposed on every human operation by the governance of reason if it is to attain moral rightness. Hence acts that would otherwise be acts of virtue can, through the lack of this governance and reasonable measure, deviate by excess into the character of vice.
Moreover, virtue admits various degrees and is more excellent and sublime: 1. the nobler the motive by which the will is led to pursue it; 2. the more obstacles it has to overcome, whether from contrary inward inclinations or outward impediments; 3. the more good it strives to accomplish; and 4. the more readily and eagerly it accomplishes it.
§ 2. On the necessity and condition of moral virtues.
- Just as, in general, besides his natural faculties, a human being needs habits in order to act perfectly and efficaciously, and is spontaneously furnished with them by nature’s very benefit, so virtues are necessary to him for acting perfectly in the sphere of morality—all the more so the more and greater the obstacles he must overcome on this path. For a human being, both sensitive and rational, does not attain this perfection of action unless he is inwardly and permanently disposed toward honorableness so as to practice it readily, delightfully, and constantly; this is achieved through moral habits.
On this point St. Thomas aptly says: “We need habits of virtue for three reasons. First, so that there may be uniformity in operation. For things that depend on operation alone are easily changed unless they have been stabilized by some habitual inclination. Second, so that perfect operation may be readily available. For unless a rational power is in some way inclined by a habit toward one course, inquiry into the operation must always precede whenever it is necessary to act; as is clear of someone who wishes to contemplate but does not yet have the habit of knowledge, or who wishes to act according to virtue while lacking the habit of virtue. Hence the Philosopher says in the fifth book of the Ethics that things done suddenly proceed from habit. Third, so that perfect operation may be completed delightfully, which comes about through a habit. Since a habit is in the manner of a certain nature, it makes the operation proper to it something like a natural operation and consequently delightful. For fittingness is a cause of delight. Hence in the second book of the Ethics the Philosopher gives delight in the work as a sign of habit.”7
- But just as moral action, to be perfect, must be supported by virtue, so virtue itself, to be genuine, must necessarily be informed by religion. Indeed, we are endowed with virtue only if we are habitually disposed to live in conformity with the rational order that, taken completely, corresponds to our nature; but anyone who is not so disposed as to profess and pursue with all his heart and soul his dependence on God in all things, and thus does not worship God religiously, certainly lacks this disposition. For religion in general consists in service and worship of God. — Moreover, our virtue is not genuine unless acts conforming to the moral order or divine law proceed from reverence and love for the law itself; but reverence and love of the law cannot be separated from love and reverence for God. For even reason itself, which rationalists have tried to substitute for God the legislator, can claim no other dignity or reverence of obedience than that which belongs to it as the voice of a herald announcing to us God’s absolute goodness and most holy will. Hence the moral virtues of the impious, in which those who despise religion sometimes glory, may rightly be called, with St. Augustine, “splendid vices.”
Likewise, no one can accurately know the nature of vice without considering it in relation to God. For it is impossible for someone to hold virtue in contempt without thereby, as it were, despising God; or to neglect the dictate of conscience without violating the authority of the supreme legislator. Those, then, understand the matter poorly who locate the baseness of vice solely in its opposition to human dignity and perfection. Entirely foolish, however, is the complaint of some that the ancients regarded sin chiefly as an offense and injury inflicted on God. Indeed, it did not escape the ancients that no evil can be inflicted on God by a creature, just as virtue brings him no good; but they rightly judged that it is one thing to hold in contempt the excellence of a human being and another to try to evade the authority of divine majesty by means of the “imperative” of human reason. Therefore, even in a merely philosophical order, no genuine virtue can exist that is entirely lacking in religious formation (cf. n. 258).
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Scholium. In the actual order of providence this very truth is more closely defined. For after God willed the Christian religion to be established by law, no virtue other than Christian virtue can be acceptable to God or salutary for a human being. Moreover, this virtue itself enjoys so many and such great prerogatives that those who stubbornly reject it and take satisfaction in mere rationalism and naturalism are condemned by the testimony of natural reason itself. For the superiority of supernatural virtue, practiced with the aid of the Christian religion, over natural virtue shines forth especially in the following respects:
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By reason of the end. The more exalted the end to which the whole pursuit of virtue is referred, the more sublime virtue itself must be. But the end proposed by Christian revelation far surpasses every natural destiny. For by God’s free disposition we are now called not only to knowledge but also to the vision of the divine essence and to the regeneration of the whole human being through the mighty power of the Savior.
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By reason of the motive. The motive of natural virtue consists in rational knowledge of honorableness and law; the motive of Christian virtue, however, is drawn from divine faith. This knowledge is not only clearer and more explicit for use, but also more certain, since it is supported by the wisdom and truthfulness of the supreme God, rather than acquired through abstruse and often uncertain reasoning, especially in the discipline of morals. Beyond doubt, our virtue will be all the stronger and purer the more clearly and certainly we know both the law itself and the force of obligation. Moreover, our virtue cannot fail to grow in intensity and efficacy with an increase in love and reverence toward God. How could a Christian fail to revere and love God more, when he knows what may be called God’s very inner mysteries, and contemplates him not only as Creator and Lord, but as a most loving Father and Redeemer, who out of love became human and suffered the utmost?
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By reason of the object. Whatever is the object of natural virtue is also an object of Christian virtue, according to St. Thomas’s saying: “Grace does not destroy nature but perfects it”8; but Christian virtue, by divine institution, also embraces many other and more exalted objects.
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By reason of the aids. The exercise of natural virtue requires no powers other than those of nature itself. But for us to be able to exercise virtue suited to a supernatural end, God has wondrously bestowed aids inaccessible to nature and established most salutary laws about which reason is silent. How far the virtues called theological—faith, hope, and charity—surpass every character of natural virtue, whether one considers what God does to infuse them or what a human being does on his own part to cultivate them! — All Christian virtue is founded and informed by these.
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By reason of merit. Supernatural virtue also has a corresponding merit of the same order, namely, an increase of sanctifying grace and an eternal reward, which natural virtue does not equal. — Finally, one may add:
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By reason both of its innate beauty and nobility and of its efficacy in elevating all human nature and the whole of human society to the true splendor of culture and genuine happiness already in this life. As for the intrinsic loveliness of virtue, the saying of Plato, and after him Cicero, is well known: if virtue could be seen with the eyes, it would awaken incredible love. What if those pagan philosophers had known Christian virtue, and contemplated it made visible and offered for imitation in its divine exemplar, Christ the Lord, God and man! — Historical records and daily experience speak to the power of Christian religion and virtue to ennoble human conduct and promote true civilization, and to what natural and merely philosophical virtue has ever been able to accomplish in itself, or can accomplish even now.9
Article 2.
On the distinction of virtues and vices.
§ 1. Various modes of distinction.
- Virtues and vices, like laws and duties, can be distributed into various genera and species.
The first and most generic distinction of virtues is drawn from the two principles of human action, namely, the intellectual and appetitive powers. In this way virtue, taken in general as a habit perfecting a human rational power for acting well, is commonly divided into intellectual and moral (strictly or properly moral) virtue. Thus, on this subject, after Aristotle10, St. Thomas says: “Human virtue is a certain habit perfecting a human being for acting well. But the principle of human acts in a human being is twofold only: intellect or reason, and appetite; for these are the two movers in a human being. . . . Hence every human virtue must perfect one of these principles. If it perfects speculative or practical intellect for a good human act, it will be an intellectual virtue; but if it perfects the appetitive part, it will be a moral virtue. It follows, therefore, that every human virtue is either intellectual or moral.”11
Vices opposed to the virtues admit a similar division into two kinds.
Properly moral virtues are further divided generically by their matter, that is, what they concern: some concern operations, others passions. Namely, “operation and passion can be related to virtue in two ways: in one way, as an effect; and in this way every moral virtue has certain good operations of which it is productive, and some delight or sadness, which are passions. . . . In another way, operation can be related to moral virtue as the matter with which it is concerned; and according to this, there must be some moral virtues concerning operations and others concerning passions.”12
- The more common division, already customary among the most ancient writers, reduces all moral virtues to four principal species: prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude. Thus we read already in Cicero: “Everything honorable arises from one of four parts: either it consists in the discernment and skillful pursuit of truth; or in preserving human society and giving each person his due, and keeping faith in agreements; or in the greatness and strength of a lofty and unconquered spirit; or in the order and measure of all that is done and said, in which moderation and temperance are found.”13 Hence these same virtues, and these alone, are commonly called cardinal, because, as St. Thomas observes, other virtues are fixed upon them as a door is fixed upon its hinge.
St. Thomas proves that these four virtues are cardinal or principal in this way: “The number of certain things can be taken either according to formal principles or according to subjects; and in both ways four cardinal virtues are found. The formal principle of virtue of which we are now speaking is the good of reason, which can be considered in two ways. In one way, insofar as it consists in reason’s own consideration, and thus there is one principal virtue, called prudence. In another way, insofar as the order of reason is established concerning something, either concerning operations” (which regard external relations among human beings and in social life), “in which case there is justice; or concerning passions, in which case there must be two virtues. For the order of reason must be established concerning passions, considering that they resist reason. This resistance can occur in two ways: in one way, insofar as a passion impels someone toward something contrary to reason; in this case the passion must be restrained, and this gives its name to temperance. In another way, insofar as a passion draws someone away from what reason dictates, as fear of dangers or hardships does; in this case a person must be strengthened in what reason dictates so as not to depart from it, and this gives its name to fortitude. — The same number is likewise found according to subjects. For there are four subjects of this virtue of which we are now speaking: the rational by essence (reason), which prudence perfects; and the rational by participation, which is divided into three: the will, subject of justice; the concupiscible appetite (sensitive appetite), subject of temperance; and the irascible appetite, subject of fortitude.”14
Thus it is understood not only that all other moral virtues are reduced in their respective orders to these as cardinal virtues, but also that a similar distribution by opposition is found among the corresponding vices.
§ 2. On the cardinal virtues in particular.
- I. Prudence is commonly defined as “right reason concerning things to be done”15, or as a habit of applying universal moral principles to particular conclusions concerning actions. “Prudence,” says St. Thomas, “pertains to applying right reason to a work, which is not done without right appetite. And therefore prudence not only has the character of virtue possessed by the other intellectual virtues, but also the character of virtue possessed by the moral virtues, among which it is also numbered.”16 It is, in itself, an intellectual virtue, belonging to practical reason and having its seat in the intellective faculty; yet, since it concerns the rightness to be imparted to moral acts and presupposes a will rightly ordered toward the end, it also participates in the character of a true moral virtue.17
Indeed, prudence is a kind of queen among the virtues, since it pertains to defining the due manner and measure in all the others, so that they “always remain in the mean” and do not deviate through deficiency or excess into contrary vices.
Its three principal acts are enumerated as deliberating, judging, and commanding concerning things that lead to the proper end. Hence, as constitutive parts of prudence, St. Thomas identifies Eubulia, which signifies goodness in deliberation; Synesis, which signifies right judgment concerning particular things to be done; and Gnome, which signifies a certain perspicacity of judgment.18 Its chief supports, as it were, are therefore memory, understanding, foresight, docility, circumspection, and caution.19
Vices opposed to prudence are, 1. by deficiency: negligence, precipitancy, obstinacy, inconsiderateness, inconstancy; 2. by excess: what is commonly called carnal prudence, excessive solicitude and anxiety, craftiness, and deceit.20
- II. Justice, as a particular virtue taken in the strict sense, is commonly defined: “A constant and perpetual will to render to each his due right.” It therefore immediately affects the will and resides in it. But for each person’s due right to be rendered under every aspect required by right reason, a human being must be considered not only in his social relations to other human beings taken individually, but also as a member of society, considered as a whole in itself and rightly ordered in relation to its parts. Hence again St. Thomas21 says: “Justice,” he says, “orders a human being in relation to another, which can happen in two ways. In one way, in relation to another considered individually; in another way, in relation to another in general, namely, insofar as one who serves a community serves all the human beings contained in that community. Justice, therefore, according to its proper character, can relate to both. It is manifest, however, that all who are contained in some community are related to the community as parts to a whole. But a part is what belongs to the whole; hence the good of any part can be ordered to the good of the whole. Accordingly, the good of any virtue, whether it orders someone to himself or orders him to other individual persons, can be referred to the common good, to which justice orders. And in this way the acts of all virtues can pertain to justice, insofar as it orders a person to the common good; with respect to this, justice is called a general virtue. Since it belongs to law to order to the common good, it follows that justice of this kind, general in the aforesaid way, is called legal justice, because through it a person agrees with the law ordering the acts of all virtues to the common good.”
Besides legal justice, commutative and distributive justice are distinguished. Commutative justice is so called insofar as it concerns an arithmetical proportion, or strict equality, between one person’s right and the corresponding debt of another; its end is therefore the right order of one person in relation to another. Distributive justice is so called insofar as it concerns the distribution of rewards and punishments according to merit, or the imposition of social burdens and the conferral of goods, and intends the right order of the community in relation to its individual members. It concerns a geometric proportion of a thing to a person according to social merit or demerit, and is therefore subdivided into remunerative and vindictive justice.22
The following are in some way coordinated with justice: religion toward God, piety toward parents and country, obedience, gratitude toward benefactors, truthfulness, respect toward people distinguished by dignity and virtue, and so on; opposed to these are corresponding vices, such as irreligion, superstition, impiety, and so on.23
For the ways in which injustice, as a special vice, can be opposed to the virtue of justice are sufficiently clear from this distinction. For “injustice is twofold. One kind is lawless, opposed to legal justice; in essence this is a special vice insofar as it concerns a special object, namely, the common good, which it holds in contempt; but in intention it is a general vice, because by holding the common good in contempt a person can be led to all sins. Likewise, all vices, insofar as they conflict with the common good, have the character of injustice, as if derived from injustice. In another way, injustice is spoken of according to a certain inequality in relation to another, insofar as a person wants to have more of good things, such as wealth and honors, and less of bad things, such as labor and losses; in this way injustice has a special matter and is a particular vice opposed to particular justice.”24
- III. Temperance is the virtue that moderates sensual inclinations and allurements according to right reason and the ends of honorableness. It therefore shines forth especially in the use of things pleasant to the senses, in which the “concupiscible” appetite needs the moderation of reason. In this way it denotes a special cardinal virtue distinct from the others. Nevertheless, the term temperance is not infrequently used more broadly to signify the whole moderation that reason imposes on human actions and passions, which is common to every moral virtue.25
The following are commonly enumerated as constitutive parts of the special virtue of temperance: abstinence and sobriety, which concern moderating the natural appetite for food and drink, and in general the things that pertain to preserving the individual’s nature26; chastity and modesty, which restrain pleasures unworthy of rational nature in those matters that concern the preservation of the species.27
Moreover, the virtues annexed or coordinated to temperance are counted as continence, humility, meekness, modesty, frugality, austerity, simplicity, eutrapelia, and so on28; opposed to them are vices such as intemperance, lust, shamelessness, buffoonery, cruelty, and so forth.
- IV. Fortitude is “the deliberate undertaking of dangers and endurance of hardships”29, or strength of mind in fearlessly undertaking hardships, enduring dangers and bearing adversity and difficulties for an honorable end. Thus, as a special virtue, it orders the “irascible” appetite by overcoming the greater obstacles and difficulties that could draw the will away from following the dictate of reason. It too is sometimes taken in a broader sense insofar as it implies that firmness of mind which is a condition of all virtues, since it pertains to them to act firmly and constantly.30
Fortitude occupies, as it were, the mean between timidity and daring. For, as St. Thomas explains, “it pertains to the virtue of fortitude to remove an obstacle by which the will is drawn back from following reason. But being drawn back from something difficult pertains to the character of fear, which implies a certain withdrawal from an evil that involves difficulty. Hence fortitude is chiefly concerned with fears of difficult things that can draw the will back from following reason. But the impulse of such difficult things must not only be firmly endured by restraining fear; they must also be moderately attacked when, that is, they must be driven away in order to secure safety for the future, which seems to pertain to the character of daring. Fortitude, therefore, concerns fears and daring, as a kind of restraint and moderation of fears and daring.”31 Hence it is concluded that not every daring of mind, by which fears are despised through blind impulse or without the application of any moderation of reason, can be equated with the virtue of fortitude. For “the virtue of a human being is that which makes the human being good and renders his work good; but the good of a human being is to be according to reason.”32
The chief companions, as it were, of fortitude are magnanimity, which “by its name implies a certain stretching of the mind toward great things”; patience, through which “the good of reason is preserved against sadness, so that reason does not succumb to sadness” in enduring pressing evils; and perseverance, which “makes a person persist firmly in the good against the difficulty that arises from the very duration of an act.”33
Finally, other vices oppose fortitude by deficiency, namely, timidity, smallness of spirit, cowardice, sadness, and despair; and others by excess: rash and thoughtless daring, or even boldness in carrying out criminal plans; and presumption, or excessive confidence in one’s own powers, which in particular is opposed to magnanimity by excess.34