Theodor Meyer, Ius naturae generale

Theodor Meyer

Theodor Meyer, Ius naturae generale

Theodor Meyer

Institutiones iuris naturalis, Pars I: Ius naturae generale

First published 1906

Theodor Meyer’s Ius naturae generale from the second corrected edition (1906), in Latin with an original English translation. Preface and proemium included; the navigational contents and publisher advertisements are excluded.


Introductio I: Preface

Introduction

Sectio I: General Ethics

Liber I: Book One. The Natural Elements and Conditions of Human Action

On the elements and natural conditions of the human act.

Prologue.

  1. If we wish properly to know and define by natural light the norms of rightness suited to human activity, we must begin by examining the inner nature of the human act, guided above all by psychology. For this is a condition common to every practical science: it cannot possibly lack the foundation of a logically prior speculative science, on which it rests like a kind of consequent structure. The subject of this book is the laying of such a foundation, which is common and necessary to the whole philosophy of morals. Indeed, with regard to the human act that we undertake to examine, moral science is chiefly interested in investigating two things: first, what end is naturally proposed to it? Second, from what internal principle and under what condition does it proceed? These questions are evidently psychological in themselves; yet they are psychological in such a way that they are no less connected with cosmology and natural theology. It follows that they cannot be fully resolved from their internal rational foundations or wholly illuminated unless various metaphysical teachings are repeatedly invoked, as if borrowed from each of those parts of theoretical philosophy in turn. Therefore, before treating the human act itself in particular in two chapters, we thought it appropriate to offer by way of synthesis a brief compendium of propaedeutic philosophy to serve that discussion either as a general preamble of doctrine or as a common foundation. The chapter that we place first in this book belongs to that purpose.

Chapter I. Propaedeutic Synthesis on the Activity of Secondary Causes, or on Natural Action in General

Propaedeutic synthesis on the activity of “secondary causes,” or on the natural act in general.

Article 1.

General notion of natural acts. — Cosmological principles to be presupposed in this treatise.

  1. Psychology and cosmology teach that every subsisting created being is endowed with some proper operation or action, and hence with its own powers of acting: from the lowest inorganic substance, whose elementary powers we admire throughout the marvelous structure of earth and heaven, up to spiritual substance, which holds the highest place in the series of created things and likewise excels through the most perfect of all acts, the spiritual one. Indeed, it is by this very property of powers and action that we distinguish the different substances of things and their different species. We call operations specifically proper to things natural actions, from the nature from which they proceed as from their own principle.

  2. Accordingly, as many natural actions can be distinguished as there are natures or different species of things, and as many highest kinds of natural actions as there are highest kinds of substance. Thus inorganic substance has one natural operation proper to it, vegetative substance another, sensitive or animal substance another, and rational substance yet another.

  3. The idea of action can more easily be described from its logical elements than defined. For every action logically presupposes a power or faculty; the concept of power, in turn, involves the idea of a subject that has the power, and of a thing that is possible. The latter is proximately and immediately the action itself corresponding to the power; mediately it is what is done, or the object both of the action and of the power. Since nothingness cannot be acted upon, this object must be a real entity. Likewise, anything can be a cause, or act, only insofar as it is—that is, has being—and therefore every act is proportionate to the being of the agent, or, as St. Thomas says: “Every agent acts insofar as it is in act.” For this reason actions and faculties of every kind are named from the being of their subject, as, for example, human action, animal action, and so on.

In every action, then, three things in particular are to be considered in its analysis: the subject endowed with faculties, the object, and the action itself, insofar as it is the exercise of a faculty.

  1. A further way of describing action is drawn from the notion of motion. For although motion, too, can suitably be illuminated by action, according to Aristotle’s well-known definition: “Motion is the act of a being in potency insofar as it is in potency”, it is no less true, conversely, that every action suggests the idea of a kind of motion. This is evident from the fact that the object of an action is also called its terminus or end. For an action, insofar as it is motion or a kind of tendency, is terminated or brought to its end by its object. In motion, too, three things can chiefly be considered: beginning, progress, and terminus, or the starting point, the terminus toward which it moves, and the intermediate direction. When applied to action, these three correspond analogically to its a) subjective principle, endowed with faculties, b) object, and c) the action itself as the exercise of a faculty. Thus all the doctrine about action that may generally be desired concerns these three moments of action and their relations to one another.

  2. Nevertheless, to attain a genuine understanding of the character of this motion that we observe in nature, some empirical observation alone, carried out like an anatomical analysis, would by no means suffice. Indeed, what is most important to know about it—namely, toward what such a phenomenon is directed, or from what it comes—would have to be called an insoluble riddle for science forever, unless cosmological principles, pursued at a deeper level, shed light on the solution of these questions.

The following two principles, fundamental and essentially presupposed in the present discussion, are especially to be named:

I. That this universe was created by God the Creator, infinitely wise and holy.

II. That there is in the world an order of things directed to ends.

These two are also reducible, in a certain respect, to one, namely to the principle of creation, insofar as the being of one is understood to follow necessarily from the other.

Both of these, besides being known from divine faith, are not only the most precious safeguard of all sound philosophy but also its defense, secured by unshakable arguments and never to be overcome by any efforts of either pantheism or naturalism.

  1. This is at the same time the firmness of moral science, since it is built, together with all its deductions, upon this foundation alone, which is as necessary as it is secure. To make this apparent in a preliminary survey, it is useful here to list certain principal elements of doctrine contained implicitly in those two cosmological principles, each of which in turn is fertile in conclusions. For what they state in the briefest summary can be resolved into roughly the following doctrines:

  2. God, just as he is the first cause of all things, is also the common and ultimate end of all things: “the Alpha and the Omega.” Hence all creatures, each and every one, must by the Creator’s will be destined for the glory of God, which we call external glory.

  3. But this will of God cannot be ineffectual; rather, it must manifest its efficacy in creatures themselves, not only through a certain proportionate aptitude, but also through direction and a fitting impulse, by which each is moved, according to its degree and mode, to complete the end set before it.

  4. Therefore the whole universe of things, with all its parts, can be considered as placed by the very act of creation in a motion infinitely varied yet one, toward the common end appointed by the Creator. This motion consists in the natural operations of creatures. Accordingly, as many stations, so to speak, along its course can be distinguished as there are particular and proper ends of things, or different natural things; so that a different natural end corresponds to a different motion or natural act, and a different being from which it proceeds corresponds to a different motion.

  5. God the Creator and governor is the first cause of this motion; the secondary causes are contained in the very being of things and constitute it. For through its being each thing is naturally fitted and disposed to fulfill its own destiny by acting; conversely, therefore, it is clear that “every act is proportioned to the being of the agent as an effect to its cause.”

With these points established, it is now easy to set down certain heads of doctrine about natural action according to the threefold moment that we said must be considered in it. They are gathered from the principles already indicated, almost as corollaries, and for this reason we have chosen to call them axioms. Although they should not be considered self-evident, they have long been established by the testimony both of the ancients and of the Christian School, and by certain arguments of theoretical philosophy, so that those approaching moral philosophy from metaphysics need not prove them anew one by one; rather, for present purposes, they may suitably be presented in a concise survey.

Article 2.

On the subjective principle of natural action.

§ 1. On nature.

  1. Axiom I. The proper principle of a natural action is the nature of the acting subject.

The word nature (φύσις), both in common usage and especially among more recent philosophers, is ambiguous in itself because of the variety of its meanings. For example, “nature” plainly means something quite different when, following more recent philosophy, the term is restricted almost entirely to the complex of material and sensible things or powers, and is used to express the dualism displayed in this world by spirit and matter (“Geist und Natur”); something different again when we speak of nature and art; and still something else when, in the sense of Christian dogma, we speak of nature and grace, of the natural and the supernatural. It is hardly surprising that so great a variety in the use of the same word across different disciplines has often given even sound minds—but minds not on their guard—occasion to think and speak less rightly about nature in theological matters. It is therefore necessary to determine more precisely the sense in which we intend to use that word here, all the more because the concept of nature will serve as a foundation before the others throughout this whole inquiry, upon which the most weighty heads of doctrine will subsequently be built.

Accordingly, following the mind of Aristotle, which scholastic doctors later adopted throughout and cultivated for the most fruitful use of Christian science, we call the nature of anything, whether spiritual or material, its very being, insofar as it has within itself a principle of motion (whether of actively producing or passively receiving), by which it is adapted to complete its own proper end. Thus Aristotle says: “The first and properly so-called nature is the substance of those things that have within themselves, as what they are, a principle of motion.”

He illustrates the same point with examples, such as a statue, which as such has no nature but is a work of art; yet it has a nature insofar as it is wood or stone, because only in virtue of this does it have within itself a principle of motion or change (“einen substanziellen Grund der Bewegung, d. i. Veränderung”). Since, however, motion of this kind, grounded in the substance of things, cannot be fortuitous but, in light of creation, must necessarily be called directed to an end, Aristotle’s idea is rightly completed by Christian philosophy into the following definition of nature:

A substantial principle of motion implanted in created things, by which each is directed and impelled toward its own proper end.

Explanation. “Principle of motion” means action in the broadest sense; “substantial” means identical with the very substance of things. Thus being, substance, and the nature of things denote the same reality, but differ formally: being signifies the very existence of things without distinction as to any relation it may have; substance signifies it with reference to accident; and nature, finally, signifies that same being insofar as it is a principle of the final motion proper to those things. — “By which each is directed toward its own proper end,” that is, an internal end, the end of its work appointed by the Creator; “and impelled,” that is, not merely disposed by some aptitude that is indifferent in itself, but directed by some causality of motion and positive final inclination proceeding from the substance itself.

Moreover, both Aristotle and the Scholastics assume that this principle of motion in things is either active or passive: that is, either a principle of moving or of undergoing and receiving motion. In either case, the motion derives from its principle the fact that it is natural to the thing. Furthermore, they say that the active principle itself is either of such a kind that a thing can move itself, or can produce motion only outside itself—that is, motion that passes over to another. They teach that only in the former is the proper principle of life present.

  1. Axiom II. The concept of nature and the concept of the end of a thing appointed by the Creator are correlative to one another.

This is clear from nn. 6 and 7. For just as natural motion takes its measure from the proper end of a thing, so too does the principle from which that motion proceeds. Accordingly, just as particular natures correspond to the particular ends of things in a like subordination to one another, so too some kind of universal nature (a system of natures) must be conceived, corresponding to the universal end of creation and arising from particular natures that, through their fitting subordination, converge toward some supreme unity. It is often in roughly this sense that the word nature is used collectively, as, for example, when one says: the order of nature; God is glorified through nature.

  1. Axiom III. The wondrous harmony of motions that flourishes from this, by which each created thing, under the guidance of its nature, contributes to fulfilling the idea of the whole creation, constitutes the universal natural order. Its two chief members are distinguished according to the diversity of the things to be ordered: the moral order on the one hand, and the physical order (or natural order in the narrower sense) on the other. The former concerns the ordering of the motions of spiritual substance, the latter the motions of irrational beings.

Moreover, since the supreme end of creation, God’s external glory, must be fulfilled proximately in the moral order—that is, through intellects—it follows that the physical order contributes to producing the universal order of nature together with the moral order, while nevertheless being subordinated to the latter by its own nature and directed to it as its proximate end.

  1. Axiom IV. If a natural subject of actions is composed of different beings in such a way that from them a physically one being is formed, this natural composition does not prevent the whole composite from having one nature, just as it has one corresponding end.

For this unity is required by the very physical unity of the being, by which it is constituted as one suppositum of natural activity. In this way, a natural composite may, by reason of its constituents, participate in both the orders of creation mentioned above—the moral and the physical—with one subordinated to the other, within the unity of its nature; and thus represent within itself, as in a microcosm, the natural order of the whole universe. It is clear that, on earth, man alone is such a composite.

§ 2. On faculties as instruments of nature.

  1. Axiom V. Every natural action proceeds from nature through faculties, which therefore are to be regarded as so many instruments subordinate to nature.

This truth follows as a corollary from what was explained above (n. 5) about the idea of action. For the being of a creature is plainly not the same as its acting, since acting is shown to be a mere accident of that being; otherwise, a created being could never cease or change its action. Therefore, in every created subject, simply because it can pass from a state of rest to a state of action, some capacity to act—to do what it is not yet actually doing—must be presupposed before the act, that is, a faculty through which

  1. Axiom VI. A faculty is by its very nature inclined toward act, by the force of the moving principle—that is, nature—whose instrument it is (Axiom I); but, in order to pass from inertia into act, it needs an object external to itself (to the faculty itself), by which it is aroused.

For an act cannot tend toward nothingness; and unless the object were external to the faculty, the act by which the acting subject tends toward it could not be motion—that is, a coming to be. (Nothing, however, prevents the object from being internal to the acting subject itself.) It is likewise clear that, as the faculty tends toward the act by which it is completed, it also tends through the act toward that same object toward which the act tends immediately. Hence the object has the character of a completion, by which both the act and the faculty are perfected.

  1. Axiom VII. Just as a different nature corresponds to the particular end of a given being, so the diversity of objects specifies different faculties even within the same subject.

This is to be understood of the specific diversity of objects alone, not of their individual diversity. Thus, for example, the faculty of sight differs from the faculty of hearing, just as light differs from sound; but neither light of different colors nor different kinds of sound can specify a faculty. The object proper to a faculty and specifying it is called its formal object, which is distinguished from its material objects as a species is distinguished from the individuals contained under it. Therefore, the formal object of each faculty can be only one, whereas its material objects can be numberless.

  1. Axiom VIII. In an acting subject, two modes of activity are distinguished for producing a complete natural act: apprehension and expansion; apprehensive faculties correspond to the former, expansive faculties to the latter.

We do not call every incipient modification that takes place in an operating being a natural act properly speaking or complete, but only that which is brought to completion in the natural tendency toward a certain terminus or end to be attained proximately. For a subject’s actual tendency of this kind, which is remotely possible by the very power of the faculty of acting with which it is endowed, must acquire some further element on the side of the object in order to become proximately possible. Through that element the faculty is brought to completion in its proximate capacity, or the act is made proximately and simply possible (Axiom VI), even if it does not follow from this alone, or always of necessity (as happens in a free subject). This prior activity, necessary to a subject in order to receive that required completion of the faculty, is called apprehension (in the broadest sense of the word); the powers that nature assigns in every being to this function are called apprehensive powers or apprehensive faculties. We call expansion the natural tendency itself, which proceeds from a faculty made proximally ready toward its terminus; and the faculties that immediately serve this tendency are called expansive. These latter, then, pertain to producing the natural act itself insofar as it is a final motion, whereas the former are rather preparatory to that same act and are concerned in themselves with its possibility.

  1. Axiom IX. In the same nature, expansive faculties are proportionate to apprehensive faculties.

For apprehension itself contains the condition and measure of the possibility of the expansion that follows it. But from the perfect proportion of equality that exists between apprehension and the possible expansion—by which expansion cannot exceed the limits of apprehension—it by no means follows in itself and for every kind of natural action that actual expansion is always as great as apprehension, nor that it can never be omitted or suspended or confined within narrower limits.

  1. Axiom X. The cause of any natural act, then, is found neither wholly on the side of the tending subject nor wholly on the side of the apprehended object, but must be traced to both in a certain proportion.

The well-known principle of metaphysical and moral science, “The object specifies the act,” refers to the element that the object contributes to the act. But the object can exert this specifying influence upon an act properly natural only insofar as, through prior apprehension, it has become the formal terminus of the tendency, and not according to its material extension of being in itself.

  1. Axiom XI. Natural activity does not depend to the same degree in every nature on an external influence received through apprehension; rather, four degrees of dependence or independence are distinguished here on earth, corresponding to the four kinds of substance: 1. inorganic substance, 2. organic vegetative substance, 3. sensitive or animal substance, 4. rational animal substance. For the higher we ascend in this series of created beings from the lowest to the higher degrees, the greater independence of nature in acting from externally received influence that determines it through apprehension we observe; the more we see the causality of the act increase on the side of the subject and decrease on the side of the object; the more apprehension itself is variously modified in relation to its end and subordinated to an internal command; and the more the action of a being departs from a narrow determination to one thing and approaches the broadest and indefinite objective determinability, whose highest degree we recognize in the elective freedom of the rational will.

  2. Axiom XII. Apprehension and expansion, which concur in completing one natural motion, nevertheless, when considered separately, do not exhibit the same character of motion.

For through apprehension the subject in a way draws the object toward itself, assimilating it to itself by subjective representation and adapting it to its own capacity. By contrast, through expansion the subject moves outward toward the real object, adapting itself to that object so as to be united with it.

  1. Axiom XIII. The nature of a being, considered concretely, is most truly exhibited by the whole complex of all its natural faculties, harmoniously converging toward the unity of a natural tendency.

For nature, as a principle of natural action, can be known in no other way than through the very action of which it is the principle; and this action is immediately proportionate to the faculties themselves, insofar as they serve the same nature.

Note. On the subject of this whole article, cf. Kleutgen, Philos. der Vorzeit II, section 7: “On Nature,” especially nn. 685–791, where he explains at greater length the doctrine of St. Thomas, following Aristotle, and of the Scholastic doctors both on the concept of nature and on nature’s final activity, and illuminates it by comparison with the principal doctrines of more recent philosophy. See also Taparelli, Diritto nat. I, nn. 5 sq.

Article 3.

On the terminus of natural action, or on good and end in general.

  1. Axiom XIV. The terminus of a natural action, formally considered as such, can only be a good

A good, considered universally, is, as metaphysics establishes, whatever is fitting for the perfection of a nature, or whatever is a perfection with respect to some nature, or preserves or increases it. The reason a subject is impelled by nature toward motion or tendency toward some object—that is, toward an act—can only be that it lacks some perfection fitting to it, and by this absence is, as it were, thrown out of equilibrium. Hence every natural action tends formally toward that by which nature is perfected, that is, toward a good.

Moreover, just as nature acts only through faculties, so too it is perfected in its faculties or through them. Therefore, the concept of good, taken formally, always involves a relation to some nature in general, or proximately to some faculty of it, to be completed or perfected. Hence good in general is rightly defined also as “whatever can be desired,” that is, that toward which some faculty can tend as its terminus.

From this we conclude that a good is whatever is, or has being, because every being has both the character of a perfection in relation to some faculty or nature to be completed and the quality of being desirable.

The direct opposite of good is evil, which is therefore usually defined as privation of good. Thus, through the good of which it is a privation, evil likewise has a relation to some nature or subject deprived of a perfection fitting to it. “Evil is nothing other than the privation of that which one is naturally meant and ought to have.” — Evil is also called a negation of reality (nothingness, metaphysical evil); but even when understood in this way, evil involves the idea of the privation of a fitting good—not with respect to some determinate nature or faculty, but in relation to natures and faculties taken indeterminately and in general. For nothingness is incapable of perfecting any nature or determining any tendency. Finally, a thing is called good or evil when it participates in good or evil.

  1. Axiom XV. End and good, though formally distinct by their concepts, are nevertheless convertible objectively or materially

The same terminus of action, which is called a good, is called an end (in the broader sense) insofar as it concerns the perfection of a nature or faculty, and insofar as the natural action or tendency is brought to its end through it. In the narrower sense, however, an end designates the terminus of an action that is sought through rational apprehension and intention; thus, along with the idea of a terminus, it joins the idea of a certain causality, by which the terminus, rationally apprehended, contributes to producing motion by moving, and because of which the end is also called a final cause. In this sense, when the activity of creatures is at issue, the word end is restricted to designating the terminus of human action alone, and is usually defined as: that for the sake of which something is done.

  1. Axiom XVI. Whether end is taken as the terminus of action in general or in the narrower sense, it is distinguished according to the progression found in natural activity: proximate, intermediate, and ultimate.

The proximate end is the object immediately attained by the agent; the intermediate end is an object to be obtained by means of the proximate end, either intended by the agent or appointed by the Creator for it to obtain, and at the same time referred to a further end. Finally, the ultimate end is that in which every tendency comes to rest and is completed, with every relation to a further end removed. This end is called ultimate in a qualified or negative sense, or ultimate simply or positively, according as, once obtained, the agent’s nature comes to rest in it without excluding a further tendency, or is so perfectly completed by it that nothing remains toward which it might extend itself.

Taking into account as well the final order intended by the Creator himself, we distinguish the internal and external ultimate end of a being or nature. The internal ultimate end of a creature is that by which its nature is fully perfected; its external ultimate end, which coincides with the universal end of creation, is that to which its nature, in being perfected within itself, is referred according to the Creator’s final plan. — This division presupposes another well-known division of end from metaphysics, namely into the end of the work and the end of the agent, which can be applied both to human and divine works. We call the end of the work that toward which a being or its action tends by its nature and destination; the end of the agent is that which someone wishes to attain by acting, or by means of the work.

  1. Axiom XVII. The good and proximate end of a faculty is its act, since through the act the faculty is completed and perfected proximately in that toward which it is ordered by nature. Likewise, an object attained is the proper good and proximate end of the act itself. Therefore, deprivation of the object is the faculty’s proper evil, which must not, however, be confused with the evil of the nature or being.

  2. Axiom XVIII. In every series of activity toward some common ultimate end (whether ultimate simply or in a qualified sense), each intermediate terminus, as such, derives its character of good from the very terminus or ultimate end of the tendency.

The reason is that each intermediate terminus, as such, is desirable because of the end to which it leads.

  1. Axiom XIX. The formal object of each faculty is also its proper and formal good—that is, a good through which and by participation in which its material objects have their goodness with respect to that faculty. For the whole reason for a faculty’s inclination toward a material object is its natural inclination toward its formal object, in which all the perfection of which it is capable is conceived to be contained. The material object therefore receives from that formal object its whole relation to the perfection of the same faculty and its desirability (cf. Axiom VII).

  2. Axiom XX. If a particular object fully matches a faculty—that is, is really equivalent to the whole comprehension of its formal object—the faculty can tend no further toward act, but necessarily comes to rest once that object is attained. If it does not match it, however, the faculty’s rest upon attaining that object is only partial and pertains only to the preceding act; accordingly, by its nature it must itself strive onward to new acts, reaching toward its full completion.

  3. Axiom XXI. According to the different relations of desirability among the objects toward which a faculty can tend, three kinds of good are distinguished: the fitting good, the useful good, and the pleasant good

A good is called fitting (that is, fitting for the perfection of a faculty) insofar as it is naturally desired not for the sake of something else but for its own sake; it is called useful insofar as it is desired not for its own sake but only in relation to something else, to which it leads. A pleasant good is anything whatever (whether otherwise fitting in itself or useful) insofar as it is considered chiefly as bringing rest to a faculty through its attainment.

Accordingly, only the fitting good, since it alone corresponds in itself to the ultimate end of the tendency, has the character of good properly and in itself. For both the useful and pleasant goods derive all their goodness from it: the useful good does so because it is found formally only in intermediate ends, which derive their goodness from the ultimate end (Axiom XVIII); the pleasant good does so because it depends on the fitting good as something that naturally follows from it. Therefore, as such, it is not a good in itself (bringing perfection), but is inseparably joined to the attainment of a good and to that extent participates in the same goodness. For the sense of rest, or cessation of the tendency that follows in a faculty when an object or good is attained, is called pleasure.

Likewise, the character of evil properly and in itself is to be located solely in the privation of a fitting good. For from this privation derive their character of evil both acts that depart from an object naturally due to them and the feelings of sadness and pain that follow the privation of an object.

  1. Axiom XXII. Although what has been said about a faculty’s relation to its object generally also applies to the relation between the nature of the whole subject and the terminus toward which a being strives by its natural activity, this terminus of the nature must nevertheless not be confused with the termini or objects of the individual faculties.

— For

  1. The good, end, and perfection of a being stand to the good, end, and perfection of its individual faculties as the whole specific nature of the being stands to its subordinate individual faculties—roughly, as the resultant of powers suitably composed into one system of motions stands to those same component powers taken individually. Hence

  2. The good of a being is not whatever is the object or good of some faculty, but only that which is suitably subordinated to the end of the whole nature.

  3. Hence the common distinction between true good and apparent or false good is derived. The true good of a being is that which perfects its nature; false and apparent good, by contrast, perfects one or more of its faculties considered individually and in themselves, but not as subordinated to its nature.

  4. Just as with respect to individual faculties, so too with respect to the whole nature of a being, three kinds of good are distinguished: fitting, useful, and pleasant. A good fitting to a being is for that very reason its true good; the useful and pleasant are goods insofar as they participate in the fitting good or derive their goodness from it.

  5. Axiom XXIII. The proper and therefore highest good of each being—its natural end—is known from its nature, that is, from all its faculties subordinated to one specific tendency.

And since this specific tendency or expansion is proportionate to its specific apprehension, the natural end or terminus toward which the nature of each being tends is also determined through that being’s specific apprehension.

Article 4.

On action itself as motion toward a terminus.

  1. Action, insofar as it is a tendency toward a terminus, can be considered under two formal aspects: either as a way and means of attaining a good, or as a motion tending toward some appointed goal. As a means to a good, action participates in the goodness of its terminus, just as a useful good participates in a fitting good. Hence it is called good or evil according as it truly leads to a fitting good or turns away from it toward a merely apparent good; and an action is better or worse insofar as it leads to the good more surely and rightly, or turns away from it farther, and insofar as the good it procures or deprives us of is greater and more universal. By contrast, if action is considered rather as a motion toward a due goal, abstracting from its goodness, it is called right or not right according as it is directed toward the goal or deviates from it.

The former aspect corresponds to eudaemonology, the latter to deontology. But since the character of good is objectively inseparable from the end or goal of a tendency, it is clear that in morals eudaemonology can and indeed must be distinguished from deontology, but cannot be separated from it at all. For in some way what St. Augustine emphasizes about man holds of every creature: “Man must become happy from the same source from which he becomes good.” Therefore, when we establish a twofold rule of natural actions, one deontological and the other eudaemonological, we intend to note not a material difference between them, but a formal one, which is of the greatest importance for the whole science of morals.

  1. Axiom XXIV. The nature of each being is the proximate rule of rightness for all its natural action (the deontological rule).

For every motion is called right when it tends toward its goal without deviating in either direction. Nature, however, as the directing principle of that motion toward the end appointed for a being, is correlated with this end (Axioms I and II). Therefore, a natural motion or act is right insofar as it conforms to nature.

  1. Axiom XXV. Under the guidance of nature, every created being infallibly attains its true good (end) and its perfection, unless in some way it deviates from that path (the eudaemonological rule).

For the nature of each being is adapted by its most wise Creator to attain its internal end, and its perfection is contained in this end. Nevertheless, Axiom XXII should be carefully noted.

Epilogue

to the propaedeutic synthesis.

  1. Whatever we have understood in this first chapter to belong to natural acts in general must also belong in common, specifically, to the human act considered according to its generic character. Thus, as we begin to treat the human act in particular, we are already familiar with its general outlines; indeed, by means of these we also have the path and method indicated in advance by which to proceed further in investigating what is proper to it according to its species. The very notion of motion suggests this path of its own accord, since motion is common to the human act and every natural act. Therefore, by analogy, so to speak, with what was noted in general in this propaedeutic chapter about the principle and object of natural actions, a special analysis of the human act must again chiefly examine those elements that constitute it insofar as it is a natural motion and distinguish it essentially from every other: namely, its subjective principle and objectively appointed end. For in that psychological motion these two mark, as it were, the extreme termini of its direction: one the terminus from which, the other the terminus toward which. It is evident that these points, fixed as it were at either end of the motion, and their proper relation must first be known before we can rightly discern and measure the quality of rightness or lack of rightness in the tendency between them. This will provide the third topic for examining the human act, reserved for Book II.

But, so that the principle and end of human acts may be treated in an orderly way in the chapters immediately following, it seems that we should speak first of the end and then of the principle, since the end, although last in actual execution, nevertheless holds first place in the order of intention and causality of actions. This does not prevent us, while investigating the end itself, from anticipating in some degree certain more general notions about the subjective principle, which are dialectically presupposed for defining the end correctly.

Chapter II. The Natural End of Human Acts and of the Human Being

Chapter III. The Principle of Human Acts

Liber II: Book Two. The Moral Attributes of the Human Act

Liber III: Book Three. The Complete Norm of Human Acts, or Law

Liber IV: Book Four. The Human Being’s Subjective Moral Formation

Sectio II: Social Right in General

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