Theodor Meyer, Ius naturae generale
Institutiones iuris naturalis, Pars I: Ius naturae generale
First published 1906
Theodor Meyer’s Ius naturae generale from the second corrected edition (1906), in Latin with an original English translation. Preface and proemium included; the navigational contents and publisher advertisements are excluded.
Introductio I: Preface
Introduction
“Every systematic inquiry undertaken by reason concerning some subject must begin from a definition, so that it may be understood what it is that is being discussed.”1 Moral philosophy, also called practical philosophy, and equally and very broadly known by the name natural law, is the science which, from the principles of reason, teaches the norms of rightness proper to all free human activity as such—I mean both objective and subjective rightness, which is absolutely fitting to human activity insofar as it proceeds from freedom, according to its individual or social relations. All of this is implicitly contained in the very brief formula by which it can be defined just as aptly: The science of moral rightness from the principles of reason.
This definition contains above all two distinctive features by which this discipline is distinguished from every other: one drawn from its object, the other from its source.
- Its proper object is moral rightness. The word “right” (from “to direct”) is transferred from physical motion to every kind of motion, including spiritual ones, and in itself seems to denote something that tends toward a predetermined goal without deviating this way or that. Hence every kind of rightness implies a relation to some goal of direction, or norm according to which something ought to be arranged or done. Accordingly, as many kinds of rightness as there are different norms to which something must conform, or different ends toward which any given thing ought to be directed by its nature, can be conceived. Thus speech is called logically or grammatically correct insofar as it satisfies the rules of logic or grammar; every art, and the physical order itself, has its own rightness according to its proper laws of operation. By a similar account, therefore, moral rightness is to be understood as that which is proper to human conduct, that is, to free actions as such. Hence moral rightness is whatever in free activity conforms to the norm to which every free action as such must by its nature conform, according to all its connatural relations; therefore, it properly signifies nothing other than the order to be established in free actions as such.2 For the proper order of each operation consists in its direction toward its due end. Thus, just as moral rightness, or this due order, in its full extent constitutes the formal object, so the whole of free activity, insofar as it is subject to this measure of rightness, constitutes the material object of the whole moral science.
If, then, one asks in what way moral philosophy constitutes a part of universal philosophy and what place it occupies among the other philosophical disciplines, both questions must be assessed from this same property of its object.
Moral philosophy has in common with all philosophical disciplines that it investigates the true from the principles of reason; it differs from each one, however, just as the character of truth found in moral rightness differs from the character of truth that corresponds to each discipline as its proper object. Now all truth that can be attained by human reason, according to its various relations to the powers of the soul, is reduced to two highest classes: one comprises speculative truths, the other practical truths. In both classes the intellect alone is the proximate faculty at work, but it works in an entirely different way. For in knowing speculative truth, the intellect acts, as it were, entirely on its own and enjoys the truth as something proper to itself. But in discerning practical truth, it performs its function rather as a servant of the will, supplying the fruit of its knowledge to the will as a rule for action. Man, endowed with intellect, is assimilated to God as absolute intelligence; and endowed with free will, he is assimilated to him as the absolutely wise and holy creator and ordainer of things. Accordingly, he is created not only to contemplate spiritually, as an object of enjoyment, what is accessible to the intellect, but also, made in some way by rational nature a participant in the divine exemplars that are present to the eternal will in its activity, he is called to imitate the most holy ordainer of things and to cooperate with him in some way. Thus, everything that can be an object of human science pertains to one or the other order of truth, either speculative or practical, so that the whole scope of philosophy3 is contained in the examination, by the light of reason, of these two questions: 1. What is, or what does something have being as (whether ontological or logical, for example)? — 2. What ought to be, or to come to be (that is, as dependent on a rational and free efficient cause)? — The former is the concern of theoretical or speculative philosophical disciplines, the latter of practical ones. Once this most general and logically adequate division of universal philosophy has been made,4 it is easy to see what place and rank belongs in it, by virtue of its object, to each discipline considered philosophical.
Indeed, moral philosophy holds the foremost place among the practical disciplines, though it is foremost without being the only one. For there are as many provinces, as it were, of practical truths as there are specifically different ends of rational activity according to which something is understood to be done or omitted; all of them are comprised by practical philosophy in the broad sense. Properly speaking, this term in a certain way denotes a genus under which, alongside moral philosophy, are counted as species logic, which teaches the rules for thinking rightly, aesthetics, mechanics, and other disciplines. Nevertheless, moral philosophy is rightly also called practical philosophy par excellence. For it stands out above all other practical disciplines chiefly in this respect: the rightness of action it considers is measured not hypothetically or contingently, nor by some end or other, but necessarily; it belongs to free actions as such not merely relatively but absolutely.
- This science is said to draw its principles “from reason,” a source it shares with all philosophy and by which it is distinguished from moral theology. For although moral theology concerns the same object and likewise teaches norms of conduct, it derives them not from the dictate of natural reason alone but also from the deposit of divine revelation and ecclesiastical laws, and professes to confirm them by positive authority, whether divine or ecclesiastical.
There is no need here either to list individually or to refute the insane efforts of those who, introducing the principles of “positivism” into philosophy as a whole and especially into moral science itself, wish to substitute a merely empirical source (according to the principles of “evolution” developed by Herbert Spencer and Darwin) for its rational and metaphysical source, and thus make moral science almost equivalent to natural history. These are follies of modern atheism, to be assessed elsewhere according to their merits.
We do not, however, wish moral philosophy to reject every kind of positive experience completely. Clearly, the source of a science and its external aids, whether useful or necessary, must be carefully distinguished. Hence nothing prevents something that reason itself excludes as a source from legitimately being called in from outside in some way as an aid, and often it should be.
Indeed, two such aids to moral philosophy, external to its source, must be named above all: the positive authority of God who reveals and the history of peoples and human customs. For who would deny that a philosopher too, in order to use the light of reason safely and fruitfully, must repeatedly turn to these two for guidance? — Indeed, he must continually observe truth made certain by divine testimony as a guide along the way, and history as a companion. He must be guided by the guide’s heavenly light, which as it were shows in advance the path and its destination, lest human understanding, while proudly relying on itself and presuming to investigate truth as though groping along unknown roads, miserably stray from the path of truth into every kind of falsehood. He must use the assistance of the companion so that, having learned from it what moral teachings have continually imbued the human race through all the changes of generations, places, and times, he may more easily distinguish the genuine and immutable declarations of natural reason from their adventitious corruptions.
Moreover, both aids are necessary lest philosophy—which must consider not only an ideal but also a real world, and not only metaphysically true human beings but also human beings embodied in flesh and blood and subject to the real conditions of life—abstract itself excessively from this reality of life and its practical assessment. Indeed, unless the history of ages and the actuality of the present time are continually kept before one’s eyes in the science of morals, especially of social law, it will easily happen either that time and effort are spent on useless questions rather than on useful and necessary ones, or that universal principles, once established, though true in themselves and to be asserted invincibly as such, are nevertheless sometimes applied to concrete affairs less truly and rightly. A philosopher must likewise be said to turn away from the real world toward a merely fictitious one if, surrounded on every side by Christian light, he deliberately closes his mind’s eyes to it and presumes to affect ignorance of the most illustrious fact of Christian revelation, preferring a scant knowledge of the history of peoples to the rich light of Christian philosophy.5 For although each philosopher draws his arguments from the natural light of reason alone, the light of reason is nevertheless one thing for the Christian philosopher, who uses it augmented and confirmed from outside, and another thing for the pagan, who was unfortunately lacking such aid.
Once these points about the nature and proper character of natural law have been set out, there is no need to speak further in a special chapter about its dignity or usefulness. When the private and public affairs that surround us speak for themselves in a loud voice, words seem superfluous. Indeed, who would devote himself to this science today without being inwardly persuaded that from it above all we must gather weapons against the many errors hostile to the true happiness of men and to all human society, and that from it too we must prepare remedies suited to healing social diseases and most effective by nature? — Who, surveying the countless and most serious “questions” that agitate our age—questions, I say, both ecclesiastical-political, political-social, pertaining to social economy, and of other such kinds, which arise day by day—would fail to understand that nearly all must be solved, objectively assessed, and directed above all from the sound principles of natural law, with the aid of Christian light?
II. On the origin and progress of the science of natural law.
We do not undertake here to present a complete survey of history, much less a special history of this science. Certainly this is not because we think that institutions of natural law can wholly dispense with it; rather, it seemed far more useful to students if the necessary historical notions were not taught separately, collected into one compendium, but instead inserted into the institutions themselves as occasion arises and as the arguments under discussion require, so that, once the origin and inner relation of doctrines advanced over time by various writers have been understood, and with certain criteria of truth already illuminating the way, the doctrines may be gathered more easily and accurately into one view. There is no reason to say exactly the same things twice. Besides, the special and fuller history of any science, if we do not wish to increase darkness rather than light in students’ minds, should occupy not the beginning but the end of its treatment.
Therefore, it seems that nothing else is needed here except to note the principal periods and, as it were, stages of natural law in general, by which those beginning the study of this science may be suitably assisted and guided when they later encounter particular historical evidence.
As for the first origin of natural law, we have as its most certain witness rational nature itself. As soon as it is developed to exercise its proper intellectual functions, it cannot help inclining toward the investigation of practical truth, just as it does toward speculative truth. Thus, if by natural law or moral philosophy we consider not so much the formal shape of the science, which is certainly of more recent origin, as its material complement in some way, it is beyond doubt that this science arose along with rational man himself, just as all philosophy did. Indeed, over the centuries we see practical philosophy to have been inseparable from theoretical philosophy, either accompanying it or following it, and sharing almost the same fortunes. But that part of philosophy concerned with conduct displays in itself even more clearly, for more than one reason, the common fortunes of philosophy as a whole. For since it concerns the full ordering of human life, both private and public, it must above all display all the influences that, arising from movements and passions of the will, anticipate the operation of the intellect and not rarely turn it away from the light of truth toward favored errors. Moreover, the subject matter of moral philosophy is such that its instruction will be more true and right the more clearly the true relation of man to God, the creator and ultimate end, is understood. Hence, especially from the practical character of philosophy, it becomes clear how rightly a person thinks, even theoretically, about God and man.
Therefore, since the criterion of this science in some way lies in the right knowledge and assessment of God and man, and no knowledge is more right or perfect than what we have learned through Christ the Lord, an obvious reason seems to be supplied for dividing the whole historical course of natural law into two stages, as it were: one traversed before the Gospel of Christ was proclaimed, and the other after. From the former we learn what human reason by nature, deprived of the fuller supernatural light, can do by itself to rightly order human life; from the latter we see both the marvelous fruitfulness and security of that same human reason in gathering the happy fruits of knowledge, for as long as it also admitted the guidance of heavenly light in a pure pursuit of truth, and its most wretched ruin and relapse into the shameful darkness of errors once it began to reject that offered aid with pride or even attack it with hostility.
Moral philosophy before Christ.
According to the intention of the divine creator, the human race was never destined to live without all supernatural light, guided only by reason. From its beginnings it had been enriched and equipped with a certain treasure of divine revelation, which had to be carefully guarded and handed down to later generations as a precious inheritance.6 But after the first fall, human vices multiplied, and in the end scarcely even obliterated traces of this original institution remained in the minds and customs of the nations. Thus—whatever modern naturalism may object—it is clear that our race was not gradually raised from some original state of beasts to human culture through successive evolution; on the contrary, it continually declined from happier beginnings, especially as regards the moral notions necessary for life. This is apparent even from the fact, now certainly proved by stone monuments, that among the most ancient peoples recorded by history, monotheism everywhere preceded polytheism.7 Therefore, before the coming of Christ, if we except the one people of Israel, distinguished by God’s special guidance, the opinions and doctrines of wise men and philosophers served all nations as lamps by which they were directed in pursuing moral goodness or happiness in private and public life. And indeed, the most ancient peoples—Indians, Chinese, Chaldeans, and Egyptians—each had their own moral philosophy, according to the degree and character of their culture.8
Above all, Greek philosophy exercised an influence both on the general cultivation of minds and, specifically, on the practical assessment and ordering of life. Because of this influence, which extended into every later age, two schools in particular must be named: the Platonic and the Aristotelian (Peripatetic). Both were built on Socratic principles and shared from them a common eudaemonistic-rational character, though not in the same way. For Socrates understood man’s supreme good to be happiness, not attained by chance but acquired through knowledge and effort; hence a man must strive to carry out more consistently what he has seen more clearly. Through his doctrine of “ideas,” Plato opened the way, to some extent, for all later philosophical idealism, while Aristotle, through his analytical-empirical method, prepared the way rather for realism. — Next, the schools of Zeno (Stoic) and Epicurus must be named above all; both proceeded to some extent from Socrates’ ideas but followed paths wholly opposed to one another, especially in moral doctrine. The latter taught that man’s supreme good lies in the greatest sensual enjoyment; the former, in “wisdom” alone considered in itself, excluding every pathological consideration. Accordingly, the one is rightly considered a kind of leader of materialism, the other of pure moral rationalism.
Roman philosophy, and in particular the branch concerned with conduct, came almost entirely from Greek sources or at least received much of its formation from them. Above all, it followed partly the theories of Zeno and partly those of Epicurus. Among all the Romans who treated this discipline philosophically, M. T. Cicero stands out; his books De officiis, De finibus bonorum et malorum, and De legibus contain many splendid precepts about morals and institutions, although not wholly free of errors. Likewise, Seneca, following in the Stoics’ footsteps and avoiding not all of their deviations, nevertheless wrote many useful things about moral precepts.
Moral philosophy after Christ.
In the stage of this science following the proclamation of Christ’s Gospel, two periods must be distinguished: one in which it was cultivated under the direct influence of Christian light and within the bosom of the Catholic Church, and another in which, torn away from the Church’s guidance, it began to pursue an independent course. A third period, although historically only just beginning, may rightly be added: it may aptly be called the Christian restoration of natural law.
A. Moral philosophy under the direct influence of the Gospel and the Church of Christ, and therefore rightly deserving the name Christian philosophy, is again divided according to the two ages it comprises: the age of the early Church, or the holy Fathers, and the age of the Middle Ages, or the scholastics.
- The holy Fathers and ecclesiastical writers of the early centuries also made use of the aid of philosophy in many ways, at least the most prominent among them, who were more directly confronted by the remaining outposts of paganism, so that they might more effectively implant in human minds the salutary dogmas of the Christian faith and its precepts of conduct, dispelling the darkness of pagan superstitions, and at the same time set up the kingdom of Christ as a spiritual fortress against the proud errors of human wisdom. They did so also with this aim: both to turn whatever pagan philosophers are known to have said in conformity with truth and moral goodness toward commending the far more sublime and abundant truth of Christianity, and to use the light of Christianity to restore to truth and purity what those philosophers taught erroneously or mixed with error.9 Thus, while correcting above all the errors of the ancients that pertained to morals and the right ordering of life, the holy Fathers and other ecclesiastical writers illustrated the doctrine of conduct in splendid works, not only theologically but also philosophically. And although they did not treat moral philosophy as a special body of science, they nevertheless left to the studies of posterity an almost boundless treasure of doctrine in this field, suited not only to private but also to public life; in so doing, they prepared both the foundations and the elements for its eventual systematic construction. In this work we see Plato and Aristotle, in turn, called into the service of Christian doctrine. In general, the Fathers followed Plato’s footsteps more in showing the supreme good, and Aristotle’s more in describing the moral virtues.
Of the writers of this age,10 it will suffice to mention by name Clement of Alexandria, Origen, St. Basil, St. Gregory Nazianzen, St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. John Chrysostom, St. Ambrose, and St. Augustine. Everyone knows how much this Doctor of the Church stood out even among the philosophers of his age, both for his extensive learning and for the depth of his doctrine. In practical philosophy too, he treated not only moral doctrine but also social institutions, especially in his great work De civitate Dei. For this reason, many succeeding centuries celebrated him as a most trustworthy guide.11
From the eighth century onward, Christian philosophy began increasingly to be built upon Aristotelian philosophy. Although many subtle commentaries were written on Aristotle’s ethical books, however, these studies were then undertaken with less success and reliable fruit for science because the very interpretation of the works of the Stagirite that circulated was unsafe and had been distorted by the Arabs.12 Gradually prepared by these efforts, and likewise following in Aristotle’s footsteps, a more successful philosophy followed
- The moral philosophy of the Middle Ages, or scholastic philosophy, from the thirteenth century onward. St. Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) must rightly be named as the guide and leader of this school. With new zeal and renewed, careful inquiry, he too devoted himself to penetrating Aristotle’s works and, particularly concerning moral philosophy, commented on all ten of Aristotle’s books of ethics and eight of politics. In the Summa (philosophica) contra Gentiles he discussed profoundly and clearly God, creator and end of things, spiritual nature, man’s relation to God as supreme legislator and supreme good, and the fundamental truths that follow from this. In the Summa theologiae, through his doctrine of man’s end and of eternal law as the principle and norm of every legislation, including human legislation, he laid the uniquely true foundations of all natural law. In the same Summa he presented an entire treatise on the virtues with admirable clarity; and, in discussing justice, he also included its objective grounds, which constitute social law.13 We may omit the special theory of social government contained in the little work De regimine principum, which is commonly also counted among Aquinas’s works, but which, although begun by him, is now more commonly judged to have been written for the most part by another author, one of his disciples.
From this time onward, with so great a teacher guiding the way, the whole discipline of natural law began to be cultivated in a much more orderly and successful manner. Above all, that most fruitful part of his doctrine on eternal law and on natural law thereafter appears to have been set up almost as the criterion of Christian ethics. By this means, it also acquired such unity of deductive principle that nothing in itself would have prevented the science of natural law from being ranked alongside the others as a distinct academic discipline. Nevertheless, this had not yet been suitably permitted by academic practice and because of its close connection with moral theology and canon law. Nor did the need for or great benefit of such a change appear as long as Catholic unity ultimately ordered all disciplines to one supreme end. In fact, notwithstanding this friendly connection with the other sciences, natural law in the course of time also began to be cultivated more specifically with respect to those parts that concern the relations of social and public life. For from the sixteenth century onward, several eminent writers, relying on the foundations laid down by St. Thomas—such as Dominic Soto, Molina, Suarez, Lugo, and Lessius—published highly useful treatises on law or laws. We even find that serious questions of public law were during that period subjected partly to philosophical and partly to canonical examination and publicly discussed.
B. Moral philosophy emancipated from the direct influence of the Church.
Just as it did for philosophy as a whole, the “reformation of the sixteenth century” gave moral philosophy, or natural law, a new character. Since a large part of the international Christian family had openly broken away from the authority and unity of the Catholic Church, it could not but happen that, along with the division in religion, science too, partly turned away from the paths handed down by Catholic unity, should seek new ways for itself and assume, as it were, a new character analogous to the principle of division. This could be predicted all the more certainly because, from the previous century, the revival of classical studies had already given many people an occasion to diminish the authority of the ancient school or even to despise it publicly. Now, however, with the break openly declared and spreading day by day, a certain hostile animosity of minds was commonly added to the earlier criticisms; after this, very few learned men from the Protestant camp were able to rise above it toward a more objective assessment of the matter and a moderate judgment. Among these, it seems, must be numbered14
Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), who, by publishing De iure belli ac pacis (1625), first gave an impetus to separating natural law from the other disciplines and elevating it to the dignity of a special science; for this reason he is commonly called the “founder of natural law” (not without unjust exaggeration, if the matter rather than its form is considered).15 This man, distinguished no less by learning than by his zeal for integrity and moral goodness, had wisely foreseen, amid the political affairs in which his office engaged him, how great a ruin to the public moral sense—especially in the conduct of civil and international affairs—would be feared in the future after the moral and religious authority of the Church had been suddenly abolished and scorned, unless another support for order, no less international and historically effective, could be put in its place. Therefore he concluded that recourse must finally be made to the natural authority of all morality and justice, the only authority commonly acknowledged to remain after the new principle of “subjective examination” had been admitted in matters of faith: namely, the immutable natural law of God, written in the hearts of men. His first purpose, then, was to establish certain common principles of natural law, proximately for the international relations of peoples. But he understood that this could not be done without penetrating more generally and deeply into the moral and social nature of man. Thus the book entitled De iure belli ac pacis grew into a complete system of natural law. From this point onward, various forms of development in this period may conveniently be distinguished again.16
The first development, called the development of “natural law properly so called” (especially in Germany), extends from Grotius to Kant. Grotius’s book immediately began to enjoy the highest authority, as was sufficiently shown by its frequent editions up to nearly the middle of the eighteenth century, some adorned with annotations or commentaries by learned men such as Gronovius and Barbeyrac. The school that immediately followed Grotius recognized in man’s natural sociability, inseparable from rational nature and divinely implanted as a kind of law, the supreme principle from which juridical relations among men and consequently all social institutions were derived.
At the same time, Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) in England attempted, in his books De Cive and Leviathan, to establish a doctrine directly opposed to the Grotian principle: the doctrine of man’s naturally antisocial state. The controversy that arose between the followers of the two men gave Grotius’s defenders, both in England and in Germany, an occasion to develop his doctrine in various ways or transform it systematically. Thus in England Richard Cumberland took the occasion to found man’s sociability itself on the natural instinct of benevolence, a principle that thereafter received a fruitful and varied development in England. — Meanwhile Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677), having erected his materialistic-pantheistic system, gave new support to Hobbes and assimilated his own doctrine to Hobbes’s monstrous principles concerning law and morality.
In Germany, however, Grotius’s philosophy was partly established and partly transformed in various ways by Samuel Pufendorf (1632–1694), who sought to adapt it systematically to the academic curriculum and established the first public chair of natural law at Heidelberg; Christian Thomasius (1655–1728), who was the first to begin separating the doctrine of law, hitherto closely connected with moral science; and Heinrich Cocceji (1644–1719) and Samuel Cocceji (1679–1755), who, opposing not only Thomasius but also Pufendorf and in part Grotius on many points, rejected the principle of sociability and demanded recognition of the will of God alone in rational nature as the supreme legislative principle of law, thus preserving the undivided unity of law, ethics, and religion. Many others agreed with them, among them H. C. Kestner (1705) and, in part, Heineccius (1737).
Finally, Leibniz (1646–1716), and after him Wolff (1679–1754), followed a more distinctive path in constructing natural law; their system thereafter gained ever greater dominance, especially in Germany. Among other things, Leibniz was guided by this general principle: “The end of the science of natural law must not be confined within the limits of this life,” since he considered it impossible to assess correctly the true condition and destination of the present life without reference to the future life. Wolff, proceeding from Leibniz’s ideas, embraced the whole of moral philosophy together with the philosophy of law in a single system, almost by a mathematical method; he contended that all moral obligations and likewise the rights of man could be derived by reason, from one supreme principle of natural law promulgated by reason, namely, from the principle of pursuing one’s own perfection and that of others. From then until nearly the end of the eighteenth century, the influence of this philosophy informed not only all books on this subject not yet imbued with English sensualism or skepticism, but also the public chairs of natural law everywhere. Hence in France too, where the principles of Grotius and Pufendorf had often already been applied in public courts or in questions of the law of nations, Wolffian theories soon began to be mixed with them; Burlamaqui, De Felice, Vicat, and others share this same atmosphere. Indeed, the writings of Catholic scholars from the same period also commonly display, at least in their method, traces more or less of Pufendorf and Wolff; nevertheless, from another standpoint, they did not fail to scrutinize their many errors attentively and refute them with solid arguments. Among them were A. Muratori (1672–1750), Cardinal Gerdil (1718–1802), Concina, O.P.,17 Finetti,18 Lascaris Guarini,19 and, in Germany, A. Desing, O.S.B.,20 Ign. Schwarz,21 Jak. Zallinger,22 and others.
The second development comprises the school of empirical or broadly defined sensualist philosophy, which prevailed in England and France from the end of the seventeenth century onward, together with its theories of morals and law. The first foundations of this school were laid by Francis Bacon (1561–1626), while Locke (1632–1704) philosophically established and widely disseminated it through his Essay concerning Human Understanding (1690). His philosophy of law was also applied to political affairs (Two Treatises of Government [1690]) and became a principal school of modern democracy. From that time onward, empiricism increasingly began to shape both theoretical and practical philosophy throughout almost all of Europe, especially in France under the leadership of Condillac (1715–1780), often accompanied by political-democratic ideas.
This school must be divided into two distinct classes, especially with respect to moral philosophy: one materialistic, the other spiritualistic. From the former, in many forms and especially in France, the ethics of Epicurus was revived, soon opening a broad path for the political revolution, prepared in the meantime by Montesquieu, Voltaire, Diderot, and Rousseau. In England, from the same source arose the moral theory of utilitarianism, both individual and social or public; its latest form (after Bentham, Stuart Mill, and others) is exhibited today, under the influence of modern positivism, by the ethics of Spencer and Darwin. — Spiritualistic empiricism, however, which in moral science proceeds from psychological experience (Shaftesbury, 1671–1713), and teaches that its principle is situated proximately in some “moral common sense” naturally implanted in men, or in a “rational instinct,” or a sense of “moral sympathy” or “social benevolence,” had its principal seat in the “Scottish school,” led by Th. Reid (1710–1796) and Hutcheson (1669–1747). By way of reaction against English materialism and the skepticism connected with it, this school attained a broad following that lasted nearly to the present time.
The third development comprises the rationalist philosophy of morals and law, which received its form and name from Kant and philosophically completed the divorce of law from morality begun by Thomasius. In ethics it established the “autonomy” of reason (and hence the complete independence of morality from religion) and revived a certain apathetic Stoicism. In the science of law, it undertook to construct the whole discipline philosophically from the principle of individual freedom to be harmoniously reconciled with the equal freedom of all others. But more on this subject in the course of the book.
The fourth development (which will likewise be discussed more fully there) comprises the “reaction” of philosophy against Kantian legal “subjectivism.” This reaction arose in two forms: the first from the pantheistic “objective” principle (Schelling, Hegel), the other from the philosophically developed historical positivism of law (Stahl). In some way both contributed logically to founding and establishing the theory of modern public law—the first directly, the second indirectly and contrary to the subjective intention of its authors. At the expense of just civil freedom and even of conscience, this theory exaggerates the power of the public state beyond measure, confusing legal “objectivism” with legal despotism.
The fifth and final development may be called that which deliberately marks the science of our time as anti-Christian and presents the most recent form of the philosophy of morals and rights, if it is even proper to call it that: namely, one that is purely naturalistic-positivist and openly atheistic. In an international conspiracy, all those who despair of any transcendent sense of truth devote all their intellectual powers to cultivating it by every means and, if possible, adorning it with some sort of scientific apparatus, however false and absurd. They undertake now to prepare and win over future generations for social atheism, which they expect shortly to become universal.
C. The Christian restoration of natural law, happily begun by a new Catholic school.
It is certainly no wonder that, after so many and such great defeats and ruins caused by human reason emancipated from the guidance of heavenly light—which also disturbed Catholic science in many ways—Catholic scholars began seriously to look back at the beginnings of these evils. For no effective and suitable medicine for a disease can be prepared until its cause is understood. Indeed, nothing more grievous could have happened to philosophy as a whole, and especially to moral philosophy, than its reckless estrangement from the approved and safe paths of the ancients. For from this came every stain of evil; from this, freedom and audacity not so much to search for truth as to multiply error and spread moral destruction widely; from this, the danger of corrupting Christian doctrine in common; and finally from this, despite unanimity in faith, the broken unity of Catholic science in nearly every other aspect, so that it no longer confronted the ranks of its enemies as a united phalanx, but, its forces dispersed and every kind of weapon hastily employed—not always safely—sustained the struggle for truth. Already from the first decades of the nineteenth century, the most learned men, theologians as well as philosophers, were persuaded that the scientific inheritance handed down by the ancients but consigned to oblivion had to be recovered, and that the unity of the Christian school, outlined by its leader St. Thomas, had to be revived by united effort. These studies were not first aroused by the apostolic word of Pope Leo XIII, but were already in existence, and were confirmed, animated with new vigor, and propagated more widely. For some had long been present to lead the way boldly in this matter, then a new example; and once the way had been opened, men arose in every Catholic nation to follow it eagerly.
In Italy, the leader in restoring natural law according to the principles of the ancient scholastics and at the same time adapting it to the new age was Taparelli d’Azeglio, with his splendid work, still worthy of recommendation, Saggio teoretico di diritto naturale appoggiato sul fatto (1840–1843). Many soon followed him, especially in Rome and Naples, treating natural law either together with the rest of philosophy or separately. Among them were Dmowski, Solimani, Tolomei, Audisio, Liberatore, Tongiorgi, Cornoldi, the writers of the periodical Civiltà cattolica, Roselli, Zigliara, Sanseverino, Prisco, Signorello, Talamo, Tarino, and others. On public law more particularly, see, among others, C. Augias, Del Potere civile e dei suoi limiti, Ancona 1871.
Toward the end of the century came S. Schiffini, S.J., Disputationes philosophiae moralis (2 vols., 1892), and Ferretti, S.J., Institutiones philosophiae moralis (3 vols., 3rd ed., 1900).
In Spain, a similar regeneration of philosophy as a whole was initiated by Balmes (1810–1848); Donoso-Cortés (1809–1853) followed analogous principles in his political-social writings. Periodicals also joined in cultivating and establishing them more broadly, such as La Civilización and La Sociedad, both edited by Balmes, and La Ciencia cristiana. Finally, larger works appeared, such as that of Zephyrinus González, O.P., Cardinal Archbishop, Estudios sobre la Filosophia de Sto. Tomas (3 vols., 1864), and his Philosophia elementaris ad usum academicae ac praesertim ecclesiasticae iuventutis (2 vols., 2nd ed., Madrid 1877), as well as Philosophia elemental (1881). From the same illustrious prelate (d. 1895) came La Biblia y la Ciencia (1892). More particularly on natural law appeared Elementos de derecho natural, by D. Rafael Rodriguez de Cepeda, professor of that subject at the University of Valencia: part 1, Valencia 1887; part 2, Valencia 1888.
In France, the ongoing struggle against the false principles of modern “liberalism” gave many learned men an occasion to study continually the ancient weapons of truth, with which the works of St. Thomas are especially rich, and to wield them readily in modern battles of opinion. Usually, however, they employed these weapons without systematical arrangement or organization in the old manner, but first removed the scholastic covering and polished them in a modern style. In this task many orators and writers excelled through tireless industry; among them are the illustrious names not only of Pie, the distinguished bishop of Poitiers, but also of L. Veuillot. — The recently established Catholic Academies undertook to restore the philosophical sciences themselves according to the principles of the Christian school, not without hope of the richest fruit, despite the political bonds by which their adversaries strive to stifle all Catholic expansion. Moreover, in both France and Belgium, learned men were meanwhile present who effectively promoted the same end through suitable books and studies, including works specifically on questions of natural law. Among them deserve mention M** B** (de Lehen), Institutes de droit naturel (1866); de Margerie, De la famille, Leçons de philos. morale (1869); Onclaire, De la revolution et de la restauration des urais principes sociaux (1872); P. At, Le vrai et le faux en matiere d’autorite et de liberte (1874); P. Vallet, S.S., Praelectiones philosophicae ad mentem S. Thomae Aq. (2nd ed., Paris 1880); Ch. Perin, Les lois de la societe chretienne (1875); Moulart, L’eglise et l’etat (1879). Many other very useful works may also be referred here to some extent, such as P. Felix, Conferences de N. D. (1860–1861); Chesnel, Les droits de Dieu et les idees modernes; Laforet, Le syllabus et les plaies de la societe moderne; Keller, L’encyclique et les principes de 1789; to these may be added the principal promoters of the study of St. Thomas: van Weddingen, L’Encyclique de S. S. Leon XIII et la restauration de la philosophie chretienne (1880); Burquard, L’Encyclique “Aeterni Patris” (1884). Thereafter apologetic reasoning is commonly and suitably joined with philosophy, as in I. de Bonniot, S.J., Le miracle et ses contrefaçons (5th ed., 1895); P. Ch. M., doctor of law, Le droit social de l’eglise (1892); L’abbé de Baets, Les bases de la morale et du droit (1892); Fr. Xav. Schouppe, S.J., Le plan divin de l’univers. Aspect philosophique du monde et de son histoire. Entretiens entre un savant naturaliste et un theologien (1900). — A. Vermeersch, S.J. also serves natural law no less than canon law, with his scholastic disputations on questions of justice for contemporary use (1901).
Meanwhile Catholic England, which from the previous century onward has labored as far as possible for a broader restoration of Catholic affairs, is also producing worthy fruits of Catholic study. It has its own special history in this matter, recalled by P. Thureau-Dangin, La Renaissance catholique en Angleterre au XIXe siècle (1903). Moreover, it is well known how diligently and successfully English Catholic scholars, for decades, through books and writings as well as public periodicals such as The Month and The Dublin Review, have cooperated with the leaders of other nations in defending a truly Christian philosophy and in advancing Catholic science in every field.
In Germany and Austria, I. Kleutgen, S.J., gave both the occasion and the impetus for a more diligent review of the scholastics’ volumes through Theologie der Vorzeit (1853) and Philosophie der Vorzeit (1860–1863). Therefore, the principles of the ancients in moral and legal philosophy also began increasingly to be valued and restored. As a result, Catholic scholars either introduced a salutary Catholic moderation into the philosophy of law commonly received, as did Moy de Sons and F. Walter, or even tried to build the social order from the ground up on Christian foundations drawn from divine revelation, as did Count de Brandis, Der Staat auf christlicher Grundlage (1860).
After the sources of scholastic philosophy, especially St. Thomas Aquinas, had been more widely opened and admitted into scholarly use, many most welcome fruits soon matured from them. The volumes published in defense of Christian truth by A. M. Weiss, O.P., illustrate practical philosophy as a whole: Apologie des Christentums vom Standpunkt der Sitte und Kultur (5 vols., 3rd ed. 1894; 4th ed. of vol. I, 1905). Likewise, A. Stöckl, Das Christentum und die grossen Fragen der Gegenwart (3 vols., 1879). Add the weighty work on current affairs by Renninger, Die Grundlage christlicher Politik (1879). — Many other books have since contributed greatly to restoring and spreading more widely the principles of Christian philosophy, including moral philosophy: some directly adapted to give studious youth a fuller philosophical education, others to guide such studies in their ideal and practical direction. Among the writers deserving credit in this work, one must name above all A. Stöckl, Lehrbuch der Philosophie (3 vols., 7th ed. 1892); C. Gutberlet, Lehrbuch der Philosophie (6 vols., 1878–1884, 3rd ed. 1896–1900); Ethik und Naturrecht (3rd ed. 1901); and Ethik und Religion (1893). — Costa-Rosetti, S.J., treated moral philosophy as a whole in Latin and by the scholastic method in Philosophia moralis seu Institutiones Ethicae et Iuris naturalis (1886, 2nd ed. 1892); Victor Cathrein, S.J., in Moralphilosophie (2 vols., 1890, 4th ed. 1904) and Der Sozialismus (1890, 8th ed. 1903). — To these we add the practically related work of I. Biederlack, S.J., Einleitung in die soziale Frage (1895, 6th ed. 1904). Likewise, for nearly three decades, many Catholic writers have usefully contributed to clarifying the same social problem from the principles of Christian philosophy, partly under the leadership of the periodical Stimmen aus Maria-Laach.
III. On the division of practical philosophy as a whole.
1. On the common division of it into Ethics and natural law.
The ancients, understanding ius as law or as what is just in general, called all natural legislation in its full extent, whether of a merely ethical or a juridical order, “natural law”; hence, under the name of the science of natural law, they also included moral philosophy as a whole. As was said above, the first author of separating natural law from ethics and treating it independently was Christian Thomasius, whose new doctrine of the inner distinction between law and morality logically required this methodological innovation. Thus Thomasius first began to consider ethics and natural law, or the philosophy of law, either as wholly distinct sciences or at least as separate and coordinated parts of practical philosophy as a whole. This custom was subsequently adopted through usage not only by almost all jurists but also by philosophical schools, including those that opposed Thomasius’s error, from which it had originated, and sought rather to follow the footsteps of the ancients.
Indeed, even this method, if assessed solely in itself and according to its practical use not so much for philosophy as for jurisprudence, is not without some convenience or benefit. For it seems to have usefully provided that, more easily and clearly—as is especially important to jurisprudence—legal duties may be distinguished theoretically and practically from duties that are merely ethical, and objective obligations of law from the subjective aspect of the virtue of justice. Therefore, it is clear that Thomasius’s new opinion, as soon as it became known, was received with approval chiefly by jurists, while philosophers opposed it; and it is fair to doubt whether it would ever have prevailed in philosophy if Kant had not given it new support. After Kantian philosophy took the leading place in Germany, the complete separation of ethics and natural law could not only be admitted philosophically but had to be admitted logically, lest the practice of science conflict with its theory. For once this is admitted, there can be no greater unity between ethics and the philosophy of law than between internal (of reason) and external legislation. Ethics is therefore almost restricted to the internal operations and intentions of man alone, whereas the philosophy of law extends to all external human activity. Nor is it surprising that nearly the same separation was adopted by that philosophy of law which, rejecting all natural law, recognizes nothing other than positive law.
The matter is altogether different for Christian philosophy, which, with the ancients, cannot but profess the intimate union of law with moral science as a whole. Even according to this philosophy, the ethical and juridical must certainly be carefully distinguished. For moral rightness in human acts can be considered either simply and according to every aspect of moral rightness, or only partially according to aspects of justice. In the former case, human acts are examined insofar as they are generally morally good or morally bad; in the latter, insofar as they are objectively just or unjust. The former is the concern of ethics, the latter of natural law in the stricter sense, as its proper subject. And in nearly this way we in fact see the division of practical philosophy as a whole into ethics and natural law used in most compendiums that otherwise follow the scholastics’ tradition, so as not to differ from the customary usage in the schools.
But everyone can see how little such a division satisfies the logical conditions of a sound division, whose first requirement is that the parts be divided from one another not merely by a difference of name, but in reality and by the proper subject matter of the argument, and be separated by the limits of the things to be treated. Ethics and natural law, though included under the general unity of practical philosophy, do not, however, constitute coordinated parts with respect to their subject matter; rather, one is logically subordinated to the other as a species to a genus, so that one requires the other as its complement. For either the discussion of the whole of moral goodness, or moral rectitude, with which ethics is concerned, must be defective and incomplete, or else it must include the whole account of justice, both subjective and objective, since this displays a special part of the whole rectitude of human actions. But a treatment of law, if wholly detached from ethics, indeed if it does not continually profess its ethical character as well, must depart from the truth of Christian law, which has its foundation and measure in ethics, and necessarily decline into the modern mechanism of law.
Therefore, lest the method of the science disagree with the subject and the truth, care must be taken that its very arrangement and division make clear that natural law, or the philosophical science of law, is to be separated neither as a discipline in itself alien to ethics nor to be coordinated with it logically as a part of practical philosophy, but rather is contained within ethics as a whole as its special part. It may therefore rightly be called social ethics, or even social law, if one prefers, with the ancients, to call ethics as a whole natural law.
2. What division seems preferable as a substitute for the commonly received one.
Guided by the considerations set out above, Taparelli had not without reason decided to abandon altogether the common division of this discipline and substitute for it another less exposed to the errors of pseudo-philosophy. Accordingly, he restored the name natural law from its modern narrowness to its original breadth of meaning, making it equivalent to the whole philosophy of morals.
But once the commonly transmitted formula of division has been rejected, there is not left only one way by which the matters to be treated can be arranged in a suitable order; that order will indeed vary according to the different end one has proposed to oneself as the immediate aim in teaching and explaining them. For one arrangement of the subject is generally needed if a science is treated in an extensive discourse and by some analytical method, another if the same science is adapted to academic instruction. Solimani (Institutiones Ethicae, Dicaeologiae, Eudaemonologiae, Rome 1847) wished practical philosophy to be divided into three parts, so as in a way to resolve it into three distinct yet related sciences: ethics, treating morals according to the standard of moral virtue; dicaeology, treating law; and eudaemonology, treating happiness. But this division, though new in form, seems to depart little from the old common one. For although it joins the science of law to the norm of justice, as the very name Dicaeology indicates, it otherwise retains those very disadvantages objected to the rejected division, separating in like manner things that should indeed be distinguished but should not be separated and loosed from their natural unity.
Accordingly, that division seems preferable to the others which proceeds from general things to particular ones, from principles to their applications, and at the same time professes the unity of moral philosophy as a whole under the one general name natural law.
Thus, indeed, natural law as a whole divides of itself into two parts: one general (General Natural Law), the other special or applied (Special Natural Law).
General natural law is concerned with examining and establishing the general principles of morals, both ethical (General Ethics) and naturally juridical (Social Law in General).
Special natural law applies those general principles in due order to the special conditions and relations of the human being acting morally, both individual and social; and the latter according to the various levels of human society provided for by nature, so that by rational inference it may derive and determine the special natural duties and rights of human beings, whether as individuals or gathered into social unity.