Theodor Meyer, Ius naturae generale

Theodor Meyer

Theodor Meyer, Ius naturae generale

Theodor Meyer

Institutiones iuris naturalis, Pars I: Ius naturae generale

First published 1906

Theodor Meyer’s Ius naturae generale from the second corrected edition (1906), in Latin with an original English translation. Preface and proemium included; the navigational contents and publisher advertisements are excluded.


Introductio I: Preface

Since the new edition of this Part I departs in no way from the principles of doctrine handed down and defended in the first edition, but is concerned rather with explaining them more fully wherever that seems fitting in light of the present character of the times, it seems quite sufficient for our purpose to offer the benevolent reader here a few remarks that, in the penultimate decade of the nineteenth century, we thought should be set out in the preface to the first edition—namely, about the author’s mind and the internal plan of the book.

As the book itself declares on its title page, it has followed as its principal guide in doctrine the Angelic Doctor.

There is surely no need here to give any other reason for this than the one that Leo XIII, the supreme teacher on earth of all saving truth and the illustrious patron of philosophy restored from its genuine principles, marked out for the Christian world no less truly than clearly. For St. Thomas Aquinas embraced philosophy as a whole, but especially moral questions and those pertaining to the right ordering of private, social, and public life, with such abundance of learning, harmonious unity, and lucid firmness and universality of principles, that one may most truly say of him that he “both vanquished all the errors of earlier times at once and supplied the most invincible weapons for overthrowing those that, in their perpetual succession, will arise in the future.” — From among the great number of those who have explained and illuminated the volumes of the holy Doctor in their commentaries, in this general part we have especially chosen to consult Suarez, commended not only for his penetrating inquiry into things but also for the safe moderation of his doctrine, and deservedly honored with the title of eminent Doctor. Moreover, it was necessary to look repeatedly to later writers in this discipline, especially more recent ones—not, indeed, so that the doctrine of St. Thomas might in some fashion be supplemented from such new sources, as though newly discovered, or by major additions to its truths; for in these writers, at least on moral matters, one will scarcely find anything truly established and secure that was not already asserted in some way by the Angelic Doctor, either explicitly or by way of passing suggestion, and for the most part treated more purely and fully. Such attention is necessary, in part so that new errors—which must be refuted by ancient truth—may be known from their own new sources, and in part so that the historical development of the science and its present condition may be made clear.

In arranging and composing the book, the author had nothing more at heart than to adapt it fruitfully to scholastic use. Accordingly, he strove to serve above all the students’ benefit and sound formation, while not neglecting more than was fitting the convenience or legitimate requirements of teachers. To this end, besides the systematic derivation of doctrine from a few highly fruitful principles, it seemed more useful to provide not a profuse abundance of subjects and arguments but a substantial and harmonious completeness of instruction, with an ample supply of necessary material suitably arranged in its proper places, together with sober and concise expression in explaining and confirming them. From the same concern for brevity, it seemed best to restrict the scholastic apparatus of theses in the order of proofs to a few fundamental principles of the institutions, while including very many other heads of doctrine logically connected with them, though often weighty in themselves, in the form of corollaries. Since their particular rationale is suggested rather than presented through explicit argument, teachers thereby have ample material to explain and illuminate more fully. Should they ever wish to vary or multiply the theses themselves, those same corollaries or the other materials inserted outside the order of the theses provide suitable matter. In the notes on resolving difficulties, we have chosen in general only to indicate the sources and main points of objections and the method of resolving them, so that the students themselves, as they cast each item into the proper form of objection or solution, may not lack suitable dialectical exercise. That certain fundamental doctrines of moral philosophy, drawn from various branches of metaphysics, are prefaced under the name “propaedeutic synopsis” is indeed not without some inconvenience, since those wishing to enter the inner chambers of the house might prefer an open and unobstructed door to one that must be laboriously opened after first overcoming obstacles. Such inconvenience, however, seems to be compensated by a real benefit. For every moral philosophy, unless it wishes to be a mere empirical phenomenology, must rest on certain metaphysical principles; and it can pursue its own proper course as a science all the more readily and clearly, the more the principles it must presuppose from elsewhere are already present to the students’ minds. Now it often happens, indeed usually, that those who first approach moral philosophy have by no means yet completed the whole of theoretical philosophy, nor can they be considered sufficiently fortified by those metaphysical doctrines themselves. In general, therefore, the more solid progress of moral science is served by presenting these doctrines beforehand in some brief overview; although the prudent judgment of teachers should decide in each case how necessary or useful their use is, and how much fuller explanation they may sometimes require.

Finally, timely provision has been made for the benefit of those who use Part II, “Special Natural Law” (1900), so that all the marginal numbers—which had hitherto been inserted in Part I, alongside the page numbers, to mark suitably the course of the subject matter and exposition, and which are frequently cited or invoked in Part II—have been preserved intact in their respective places in this new edition of Part I, without disturbing anything.

With these remarks made, nothing remains but to implore the grace of God, best and greatest, that he may deign to be present with his heavenly blessing both to the work and to the most noble end it strives to serve.

Exaeten, 4 March 1906.

Th. M.

Introduction

“Every systematic inquiry undertaken by reason concerning some subject must begin from a definition, so that it may be understood what it is that is being discussed.” Moral philosophy, also called practical philosophy, and equally and very broadly known by the name natural law, is the science which, from the principles of reason, teaches the norms of rightness proper to all free human activity as such—I mean both objective and subjective rightness, which is absolutely fitting to human activity insofar as it proceeds from freedom, according to its individual or social relations. All of this is implicitly contained in the very brief formula by which it can be defined just as aptly: The science of moral rightness from the principles of reason.

This definition contains above all two distinctive features by which this discipline is distinguished from every other: one drawn from its object, the other from its source.

  1. Its proper object is moral rightness. The word “right” (from “to direct”) is transferred from physical motion to every kind of motion, including spiritual ones, and in itself seems to denote something that tends toward a predetermined goal without deviating this way or that. Hence every kind of rightness implies a relation to some goal of direction, or norm according to which something ought to be arranged or done. Accordingly, as many kinds of rightness as there are different norms to which something must conform, or different ends toward which any given thing ought to be directed by its nature, can be conceived. Thus speech is called logically or grammatically correct insofar as it satisfies the rules of logic or grammar; every art, and the physical order itself, has its own rightness according to its proper laws of operation. By a similar account, therefore, moral rightness is to be understood as that which is proper to human conduct, that is, to free actions as such. Hence moral rightness is whatever in free activity conforms to the norm to which every free action as such must by its nature conform, according to all its connatural relations; therefore, it properly signifies nothing other than the order to be established in free actions as such. For the proper order of each operation consists in its direction toward its due end. Thus, just as moral rightness, or this due order, in its full extent constitutes the formal object, so the whole of free activity, insofar as it is subject to this measure of rightness, constitutes the material object of the whole moral science.

If, then, one asks in what way moral philosophy constitutes a part of universal philosophy and what place it occupies among the other philosophical disciplines, both questions must be assessed from this same property of its object.

Moral philosophy has in common with all philosophical disciplines that it investigates the true from the principles of reason; it differs from each one, however, just as the character of truth found in moral rightness differs from the character of truth that corresponds to each discipline as its proper object. Now all truth that can be attained by human reason, according to its various relations to the powers of the soul, is reduced to two highest classes: one comprises speculative truths, the other practical truths. In both classes the intellect alone is the proximate faculty at work, but it works in an entirely different way. For in knowing speculative truth, the intellect acts, as it were, entirely on its own and enjoys the truth as something proper to itself. But in discerning practical truth, it performs its function rather as a servant of the will, supplying the fruit of its knowledge to the will as a rule for action. Man, endowed with intellect, is assimilated to God as absolute intelligence; and endowed with free will, he is assimilated to him as the absolutely wise and holy creator and ordainer of things. Accordingly, he is created not only to contemplate spiritually, as an object of enjoyment, what is accessible to the intellect, but also, made in some way by rational nature a participant in the divine exemplars that are present to the eternal will in its activity, he is called to imitate the most holy ordainer of things and to cooperate with him in some way. Thus, everything that can be an object of human science pertains to one or the other order of truth, either speculative or practical, so that the whole scope of philosophy is contained in the examination, by the light of reason, of these two questions: 1. What is, or what does something have being as (whether ontological or logical, for example)? — 2. What ought to be, or to come to be (that is, as dependent on a rational and free efficient cause)? — The former is the concern of theoretical or speculative philosophical disciplines, the latter of practical ones. Once this most general and logically adequate division of universal philosophy has been made, it is easy to see what place and rank belongs in it, by virtue of its object, to each discipline considered philosophical.

Indeed, moral philosophy holds the foremost place among the practical disciplines, though it is foremost without being the only one. For there are as many provinces, as it were, of practical truths as there are specifically different ends of rational activity according to which something is understood to be done or omitted; all of them are comprised by practical philosophy in the broad sense. Properly speaking, this term in a certain way denotes a genus under which, alongside moral philosophy, are counted as species logic, which teaches the rules for thinking rightly, aesthetics, mechanics, and other disciplines. Nevertheless, moral philosophy is rightly also called practical philosophy par excellence. For it stands out above all other practical disciplines chiefly in this respect: the rightness of action it considers is measured not hypothetically or contingently, nor by some end or other, but necessarily; it belongs to free actions as such not merely relatively but absolutely.

  1. This science is said to draw its principles “from reason,” a source it shares with all philosophy and by which it is distinguished from moral theology. For although moral theology concerns the same object and likewise teaches norms of conduct, it derives them not from the dictate of natural reason alone but also from the deposit of divine revelation and ecclesiastical laws, and professes to confirm them by positive authority, whether divine or ecclesiastical.

There is no need here either to list individually or to refute the insane efforts of those who, introducing the principles of “positivism” into philosophy as a whole and especially into moral science itself, wish to substitute a merely empirical source (according to the principles of “evolution” developed by Herbert Spencer and Darwin) for its rational and metaphysical source, and thus make moral science almost equivalent to natural history. These are follies of modern atheism, to be assessed elsewhere according to their merits.

We do not, however, wish moral philosophy to reject every kind of positive experience completely. Clearly, the source of a science and its external aids, whether useful or necessary, must be carefully distinguished. Hence nothing prevents something that reason itself excludes as a source from legitimately being called in from outside in some way as an aid, and often it should be.

Indeed, two such aids to moral philosophy, external to its source, must be named above all: the positive authority of God who reveals and the history of peoples and human customs. For who would deny that a philosopher too, in order to use the light of reason safely and fruitfully, must repeatedly turn to these two for guidance? — Indeed, he must continually observe truth made certain by divine testimony as a guide along the way, and history as a companion. He must be guided by the guide’s heavenly light, which as it were shows in advance the path and its destination, lest human understanding, while proudly relying on itself and presuming to investigate truth as though groping along unknown roads, miserably stray from the path of truth into every kind of falsehood. He must use the assistance of the companion so that, having learned from it what moral teachings have continually imbued the human race through all the changes of generations, places, and times, he may more easily distinguish the genuine and immutable declarations of natural reason from their adventitious corruptions.

Moreover, both aids are necessary lest philosophy—which must consider not only an ideal but also a real world, and not only metaphysically true human beings but also human beings embodied in flesh and blood and subject to the real conditions of life—abstract itself excessively from this reality of life and its practical assessment. Indeed, unless the history of ages and the actuality of the present time are continually kept before one’s eyes in the science of morals, especially of social law, it will easily happen either that time and effort are spent on useless questions rather than on useful and necessary ones, or that universal principles, once established, though true in themselves and to be asserted invincibly as such, are nevertheless sometimes applied to concrete affairs less truly and rightly. A philosopher must likewise be said to turn away from the real world toward a merely fictitious one if, surrounded on every side by Christian light, he deliberately closes his mind’s eyes to it and presumes to affect ignorance of the most illustrious fact of Christian revelation, preferring a scant knowledge of the history of peoples to the rich light of Christian philosophy. For although each philosopher draws his arguments from the natural light of reason alone, the light of reason is nevertheless one thing for the Christian philosopher, who uses it augmented and confirmed from outside, and another thing for the pagan, who was unfortunately lacking such aid.

Once these points about the nature and proper character of natural law have been set out, there is no need to speak further in a special chapter about its dignity or usefulness. When the private and public affairs that surround us speak for themselves in a loud voice, words seem superfluous. Indeed, who would devote himself to this science today without being inwardly persuaded that from it above all we must gather weapons against the many errors hostile to the true happiness of men and to all human society, and that from it too we must prepare remedies suited to healing social diseases and most effective by nature? — Who, surveying the countless and most serious “questions” that agitate our age—questions, I say, both ecclesiastical-political, political-social, pertaining to social economy, and of other such kinds, which arise day by day—would fail to understand that nearly all must be solved, objectively assessed, and directed above all from the sound principles of natural law, with the aid of Christian light?

II. On the origin and progress of the science of natural law.

We do not undertake here to present a complete survey of history, much less a special history of this science. Certainly this is not because we think that institutions of natural law can wholly dispense with it; rather, it seemed far more useful to students if the necessary historical notions were not taught separately, collected into one compendium, but instead inserted into the institutions themselves as occasion arises and as the arguments under discussion require, so that, once the origin and inner relation of doctrines advanced over time by various writers have been understood, and with certain criteria of truth already illuminating the way, the doctrines may be gathered more easily and accurately into one view. There is no reason to say exactly the same things twice. Besides, the special and fuller history of any science, if we do not wish to increase darkness rather than light in students’ minds, should occupy not the beginning but the end of its treatment.

Therefore, it seems that nothing else is needed here except to note the principal periods and, as it were, stages of natural law in general, by which those beginning the study of this science may be suitably assisted and guided when they later encounter particular historical evidence.

As for the first origin of natural law, we have as its most certain witness rational nature itself. As soon as it is developed to exercise its proper intellectual functions, it cannot help inclining toward the investigation of practical truth, just as it does toward speculative truth. Thus, if by natural law or moral philosophy we consider not so much the formal shape of the science, which is certainly of more recent origin, as its material complement in some way, it is beyond doubt that this science arose along with rational man himself, just as all philosophy did. Indeed, over the centuries we see practical philosophy to have been inseparable from theoretical philosophy, either accompanying it or following it, and sharing almost the same fortunes. But that part of philosophy concerned with conduct displays in itself even more clearly, for more than one reason, the common fortunes of philosophy as a whole. For since it concerns the full ordering of human life, both private and public, it must above all display all the influences that, arising from movements and passions of the will, anticipate the operation of the intellect and not rarely turn it away from the light of truth toward favored errors. Moreover, the subject matter of moral philosophy is such that its instruction will be more true and right the more clearly the true relation of man to God, the creator and ultimate end, is understood. Hence, especially from the practical character of philosophy, it becomes clear how rightly a person thinks, even theoretically, about God and man.

Therefore, since the criterion of this science in some way lies in the right knowledge and assessment of God and man, and no knowledge is more right or perfect than what we have learned through Christ the Lord, an obvious reason seems to be supplied for dividing the whole historical course of natural law into two stages, as it were: one traversed before the Gospel of Christ was proclaimed, and the other after. From the former we learn what human reason by nature, deprived of the fuller supernatural light, can do by itself to rightly order human life; from the latter we see both the marvelous fruitfulness and security of that same human reason in gathering the happy fruits of knowledge, for as long as it also admitted the guidance of heavenly light in a pure pursuit of truth, and its most wretched ruin and relapse into the shameful darkness of errors once it began to reject that offered aid with pride or even attack it with hostility.

Moral philosophy before Christ.

According to the intention of the divine creator, the human race was never destined to live without all supernatural light, guided only by reason. From its beginnings it had been enriched and equipped with a certain treasure of divine revelation, which had to be carefully guarded and handed down to later generations as a precious inheritance. But after the first fall, human vices multiplied, and in the end scarcely even obliterated traces of this original institution remained in the minds and customs of the nations. Thus—whatever modern naturalism may object—it is clear that our race was not gradually raised from some original state of beasts to human culture through successive evolution; on the contrary, it continually declined from happier beginnings, especially as regards the moral notions necessary for life. This is apparent even from the fact, now certainly proved by stone monuments, that among the most ancient peoples recorded by history, monotheism everywhere preceded polytheism. Therefore, before the coming of Christ, if we except the one people of Israel, distinguished by God’s special guidance, the opinions and doctrines of wise men and philosophers served all nations as lamps by which they were directed in pursuing moral goodness or happiness in private and public life. And indeed, the most ancient peoples—Indians, Chinese, Chaldeans, and Egyptians—each had their own moral philosophy, according to the degree and character of their culture.

Above all, Greek philosophy exercised an influence both on the general cultivation of minds and, specifically, on the practical assessment and ordering of life. Because of this influence, which extended into every later age, two schools in particular must be named: the Platonic and the Aristotelian (Peripatetic). Both were built on Socratic principles and shared from them a common eudaemonistic-rational character, though not in the same way. For Socrates understood man’s supreme good to be happiness, not attained by chance but acquired through knowledge and effort; hence a man must strive to carry out more consistently what he has seen more clearly. Through his doctrine of “ideas,” Plato opened the way, to some extent, for all later philosophical idealism, while Aristotle, through his analytical-empirical method, prepared the way rather for realism. — Next, the schools of Zeno (Stoic) and Epicurus must be named above all; both proceeded to some extent from Socrates’ ideas but followed paths wholly opposed to one another, especially in moral doctrine. The latter taught that man’s supreme good lies in the greatest sensual enjoyment; the former, in “wisdom” alone considered in itself, excluding every pathological consideration. Accordingly, the one is rightly considered a kind of leader of materialism, the other of pure moral rationalism.

Roman philosophy, and in particular the branch concerned with conduct, came almost entirely from Greek sources or at least received much of its formation from them. Above all, it followed partly the theories of Zeno and partly those of Epicurus. Among all the Romans who treated this discipline philosophically, M. T. Cicero stands out; his books De officiis, De finibus bonorum et malorum, and De legibus contain many splendid precepts about morals and institutions, although not wholly free of errors. Likewise, Seneca, following in the Stoics’ footsteps and avoiding not all of their deviations, nevertheless wrote many useful things about moral precepts.

Moral philosophy after Christ.

In the stage of this science following the proclamation of Christ’s Gospel, two periods must be distinguished: one in which it was cultivated under the direct influence of Christian light and within the bosom of the Catholic Church, and another in which, torn away from the Church’s guidance, it began to pursue an independent course. A third period, although historically only just beginning, may rightly be added: it may aptly be called the Christian restoration of natural law.

A. Moral philosophy under the direct influence of the Gospel and the Church of Christ, and therefore rightly deserving the name Christian philosophy, is again divided according to the two ages it comprises: the age of the early Church, or the holy Fathers, and the age of the Middle Ages, or the scholastics.

  1. The holy Fathers and ecclesiastical writers of the early centuries also made use of the aid of philosophy in many ways, at least the most prominent among them, who were more directly confronted by the remaining outposts of paganism, so that they might more effectively implant in human minds the salutary dogmas of the Christian faith and its precepts of conduct, dispelling the darkness of pagan superstitions, and at the same time set up the kingdom of Christ as a spiritual fortress against the proud errors of human wisdom. They did so also with this aim: both to turn whatever pagan philosophers are known to have said in conformity with truth and moral goodness toward commending the far more sublime and abundant truth of Christianity, and to use the light of Christianity to restore to truth and purity what those philosophers taught erroneously or mixed with error. Thus, while correcting above all the errors of the ancients that pertained to morals and the right ordering of life, the holy Fathers and other ecclesiastical writers illustrated the doctrine of conduct in splendid works, not only theologically but also philosophically. And although they did not treat moral philosophy as a special body of science, they nevertheless left to the studies of posterity an almost boundless treasure of doctrine in this field, suited not only to private but also to public life; in so doing, they prepared both the foundations and the elements for its eventual systematic construction. In this work we see Plato and Aristotle, in turn, called into the service of Christian doctrine. In general, the Fathers followed Plato’s footsteps more in showing the supreme good, and Aristotle’s more in describing the moral virtues.

Of the writers of this age, it will suffice to mention by name Clement of Alexandria, Origen, St. Basil, St. Gregory Nazianzen, St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. John Chrysostom, St. Ambrose, and St. Augustine. Everyone knows how much this Doctor of the Church stood out even among the philosophers of his age, both for his extensive learning and for the depth of his doctrine. In practical philosophy too, he treated not only moral doctrine but also social institutions, especially in his great work De civitate Dei. For this reason, many succeeding centuries celebrated him as a most trustworthy guide.

From the eighth century onward, Christian philosophy began increasingly to be built upon Aristotelian philosophy. Although many subtle commentaries were written on Aristotle’s ethical books, however, these studies were then undertaken with less success and reliable fruit for science because the very interpretation of the works of the Stagirite that circulated was unsafe and had been distorted by the Arabs. Gradually prepared by these efforts, and likewise following in Aristotle’s footsteps, a more successful philosophy followed

  1. The moral philosophy of the Middle Ages, or scholastic philosophy, from the thirteenth century onward. St. Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) must rightly be named as the guide and leader of this school. With new zeal and renewed, careful inquiry, he too devoted himself to penetrating Aristotle’s works and, particularly concerning moral philosophy, commented on all ten of Aristotle’s books of ethics and eight of politics. In the Summa (philosophica) contra Gentiles he discussed profoundly and clearly God, creator and end of things, spiritual nature, man’s relation to God as supreme legislator and supreme good, and the fundamental truths that follow from this. In the Summa theologiae, through his doctrine of man’s end and of eternal law as the principle and norm of every legislation, including human legislation, he laid the uniquely true foundations of all natural law. In the same Summa he presented an entire treatise on the virtues with admirable clarity; and, in discussing justice, he also included its objective grounds, which constitute social law. We may omit the special theory of social government contained in the little work De regimine principum, which is commonly also counted among Aquinas’s works, but which, although begun by him, is now more commonly judged to have been written for the most part by another author, one of his disciples.

From this time onward, with so great a teacher guiding the way, the whole discipline of natural law began to be cultivated in a much more orderly and successful manner. Above all, that most fruitful part of his doctrine on eternal law and on natural law thereafter appears to have been set up almost as the criterion of Christian ethics. By this means, it also acquired such unity of deductive principle that nothing in itself would have prevented the science of natural law from being ranked alongside the others as a distinct academic discipline. Nevertheless, this had not yet been suitably permitted by academic practice and because of its close connection with moral theology and canon law. Nor did the need for or great benefit of such a change appear as long as Catholic unity ultimately ordered all disciplines to one supreme end. In fact, notwithstanding this friendly connection with the other sciences, natural law in the course of time also began to be cultivated more specifically with respect to those parts that concern the relations of social and public life. For from the sixteenth century onward, several eminent writers, relying on the foundations laid down by St. Thomas—such as Dominic Soto, Molina, Suarez, Lugo, and Lessius—published highly useful treatises on law or laws. We even find that serious questions of public law were during that period subjected partly to philosophical and partly to canonical examination and publicly discussed.

B. Moral philosophy emancipated from the direct influence of the Church.

Just as it did for philosophy as a whole, the “reformation of the sixteenth century” gave moral philosophy, or natural law, a new character. Since a large part of the international Christian family had openly broken away from the authority and unity of the Catholic Church, it could not but happen that, along with the division in religion, science too, partly turned away from the paths handed down by Catholic unity, should seek new ways for itself and assume, as it were, a new character analogous to the principle of division. This could be predicted all the more certainly because, from the previous century, the revival of classical studies had already given many people an occasion to diminish the authority of the ancient school or even to despise it publicly. Now, however, with the break openly declared and spreading day by day, a certain hostile animosity of minds was commonly added to the earlier criticisms; after this, very few learned men from the Protestant camp were able to rise above it toward a more objective assessment of the matter and a moderate judgment. Among these, it seems, must be numbered

Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), who, by publishing De iure belli ac pacis (1625), first gave an impetus to separating natural law from the other disciplines and elevating it to the dignity of a special science; for this reason he is commonly called the “founder of natural law” (not without unjust exaggeration, if the matter rather than its form is considered). This man, distinguished no less by learning than by his zeal for integrity and moral goodness, had wisely foreseen, amid the political affairs in which his office engaged him, how great a ruin to the public moral sense—especially in the conduct of civil and international affairs—would be feared in the future after the moral and religious authority of the Church had been suddenly abolished and scorned, unless another support for order, no less international and historically effective, could be put in its place. Therefore he concluded that recourse must finally be made to the natural authority of all morality and justice, the only authority commonly acknowledged to remain after the new principle of “subjective examination” had been admitted in matters of faith: namely, the immutable natural law of God, written in the hearts of men. His first purpose, then, was to establish certain common principles of natural law, proximately for the international relations of peoples. But he understood that this could not be done without penetrating more generally and deeply into the moral and social nature of man. Thus the book entitled De iure belli ac pacis grew into a complete system of natural law. From this point onward, various forms of development in this period may conveniently be distinguished again.

The first development, called the development of “natural law properly so called” (especially in Germany), extends from Grotius to Kant. Grotius’s book immediately began to enjoy the highest authority, as was sufficiently shown by its frequent editions up to nearly the middle of the eighteenth century, some adorned with annotations or commentaries by learned men such as Gronovius and Barbeyrac. The school that immediately followed Grotius recognized in man’s natural sociability, inseparable from rational nature and divinely implanted as a kind of law, the supreme principle from which juridical relations among men and consequently all social institutions were derived.

At the same time, Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) in England attempted, in his books De Cive and Leviathan, to establish a doctrine directly opposed to the Grotian principle: the doctrine of man’s naturally antisocial state. The controversy that arose between the followers of the two men gave Grotius’s defenders, both in England and in Germany, an occasion to develop his doctrine in various ways or transform it systematically. Thus in England Richard Cumberland took the occasion to found man’s sociability itself on the natural instinct of benevolence, a principle that thereafter received a fruitful and varied development in England. — Meanwhile Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677), having erected his materialistic-pantheistic system, gave new support to Hobbes and assimilated his own doctrine to Hobbes’s monstrous principles concerning law and morality.

In Germany, however, Grotius’s philosophy was partly established and partly transformed in various ways by Samuel Pufendorf (1632–1694), who sought to adapt it systematically to the academic curriculum and established the first public chair of natural law at Heidelberg; Christian Thomasius (1655–1728), who was the first to begin separating the doctrine of law, hitherto closely connected with moral science; and Heinrich Cocceji (1644–1719) and Samuel Cocceji (1679–1755), who, opposing not only Thomasius but also Pufendorf and in part Grotius on many points, rejected the principle of sociability and demanded recognition of the will of God alone in rational nature as the supreme legislative principle of law, thus preserving the undivided unity of law, ethics, and religion. Many others agreed with them, among them H. C. Kestner (1705) and, in part, Heineccius (1737).

Finally, Leibniz (1646–1716), and after him Wolff (1679–1754), followed a more distinctive path in constructing natural law; their system thereafter gained ever greater dominance, especially in Germany. Among other things, Leibniz was guided by this general principle: “The end of the science of natural law must not be confined within the limits of this life,” since he considered it impossible to assess correctly the true condition and destination of the present life without reference to the future life. Wolff, proceeding from Leibniz’s ideas, embraced the whole of moral philosophy together with the philosophy of law in a single system, almost by a mathematical method; he contended that all moral obligations and likewise the rights of man could be derived by reason, from one supreme principle of natural law promulgated by reason, namely, from the principle of pursuing one’s own perfection and that of others. From then until nearly the end of the eighteenth century, the influence of this philosophy informed not only all books on this subject not yet imbued with English sensualism or skepticism, but also the public chairs of natural law everywhere. Hence in France too, where the principles of Grotius and Pufendorf had often already been applied in public courts or in questions of the law of nations, Wolffian theories soon began to be mixed with them; Burlamaqui, De Felice, Vicat, and others share this same atmosphere. Indeed, the writings of Catholic scholars from the same period also commonly display, at least in their method, traces more or less of Pufendorf and Wolff; nevertheless, from another standpoint, they did not fail to scrutinize their many errors attentively and refute them with solid arguments. Among them were A. Muratori (1672–1750), Cardinal Gerdil (1718–1802), Concina, O.P., Finetti, Lascaris Guarini, and, in Germany, A. Desing, O.S.B., Ign. Schwarz, Jak. Zallinger, and others.

The second development comprises the school of empirical or broadly defined sensualist philosophy, which prevailed in England and France from the end of the seventeenth century onward, together with its theories of morals and law. The first foundations of this school were laid by Francis Bacon (1561–1626), while Locke (1632–1704) philosophically established and widely disseminated it through his Essay concerning Human Understanding (1690). His philosophy of law was also applied to political affairs (Two Treatises of Government [1690]) and became a principal school of modern democracy. From that time onward, empiricism increasingly began to shape both theoretical and practical philosophy throughout almost all of Europe, especially in France under the leadership of Condillac (1715–1780), often accompanied by political-democratic ideas.

This school must be divided into two distinct classes, especially with respect to moral philosophy: one materialistic, the other spiritualistic. From the former, in many forms and especially in France, the ethics of Epicurus was revived, soon opening a broad path for the political revolution, prepared in the meantime by Montesquieu, Voltaire, Diderot, and Rousseau. In England, from the same source arose the moral theory of utilitarianism, both individual and social or public; its latest form (after Bentham, Stuart Mill, and others) is exhibited today, under the influence of modern positivism, by the ethics of Spencer and Darwin. — Spiritualistic empiricism, however, which in moral science proceeds from psychological experience (Shaftesbury, 1671–1713), and teaches that its principle is situated proximately in some “moral common sense” naturally implanted in men, or in a “rational instinct,” or a sense of “moral sympathy” or “social benevolence,” had its principal seat in the “Scottish school,” led by Th. Reid (1710–1796) and Hutcheson (1669–1747). By way of reaction against English materialism and the skepticism connected with it, this school attained a broad following that lasted nearly to the present time.

The third development comprises the rationalist philosophy of morals and law, which received its form and name from Kant and philosophically completed the divorce of law from morality begun by Thomasius. In ethics it established the “autonomy” of reason (and hence the complete independence of morality from religion) and revived a certain apathetic Stoicism. In the science of law, it undertook to construct the whole discipline philosophically from the principle of individual freedom to be harmoniously reconciled with the equal freedom of all others. But more on this subject in the course of the book.

The fourth development (which will likewise be discussed more fully there) comprises the “reaction” of philosophy against Kantian legal “subjectivism.” This reaction arose in two forms: the first from the pantheistic “objective” principle (Schelling, Hegel), the other from the philosophically developed historical positivism of law (Stahl). In some way both contributed logically to founding and establishing the theory of modern public law—the first directly, the second indirectly and contrary to the subjective intention of its authors. At the expense of just civil freedom and even of conscience, this theory exaggerates the power of the public state beyond measure, confusing legal “objectivism” with legal despotism.

The fifth and final development may be called that which deliberately marks the science of our time as anti-Christian and presents the most recent form of the philosophy of morals and rights, if it is even proper to call it that: namely, one that is purely naturalistic-positivist and openly atheistic. In an international conspiracy, all those who despair of any transcendent sense of truth devote all their intellectual powers to cultivating it by every means and, if possible, adorning it with some sort of scientific apparatus, however false and absurd. They undertake now to prepare and win over future generations for social atheism, which they expect shortly to become universal.

C. The Christian restoration of natural law, happily begun by a new Catholic school.

It is certainly no wonder that, after so many and such great defeats and ruins caused by human reason emancipated from the guidance of heavenly light—which also disturbed Catholic science in many ways—Catholic scholars began seriously to look back at the beginnings of these evils. For no effective and suitable medicine for a disease can be prepared until its cause is understood. Indeed, nothing more grievous could have happened to philosophy as a whole, and especially to moral philosophy, than its reckless estrangement from the approved and safe paths of the ancients. For from this came every stain of evil; from this, freedom and audacity not so much to search for truth as to multiply error and spread moral destruction widely; from this, the danger of corrupting Christian doctrine in common; and finally from this, despite unanimity in faith, the broken unity of Catholic science in nearly every other aspect, so that it no longer confronted the ranks of its enemies as a united phalanx, but, its forces dispersed and every kind of weapon hastily employed—not always safely—sustained the struggle for truth. Already from the first decades of the nineteenth century, the most learned men, theologians as well as philosophers, were persuaded that the scientific inheritance handed down by the ancients but consigned to oblivion had to be recovered, and that the unity of the Christian school, outlined by its leader St. Thomas, had to be revived by united effort. These studies were not first aroused by the apostolic word of Pope Leo XIII, but were already in existence, and were confirmed, animated with new vigor, and propagated more widely. For some had long been present to lead the way boldly in this matter, then a new example; and once the way had been opened, men arose in every Catholic nation to follow it eagerly.

In Italy, the leader in restoring natural law according to the principles of the ancient scholastics and at the same time adapting it to the new age was Taparelli d’Azeglio, with his splendid work, still worthy of recommendation, Saggio teoretico di diritto naturale appoggiato sul fatto (1840–1843). Many soon followed him, especially in Rome and Naples, treating natural law either together with the rest of philosophy or separately. Among them were Dmowski, Solimani, Tolomei, Audisio, Liberatore, Tongiorgi, Cornoldi, the writers of the periodical Civiltà cattolica, Roselli, Zigliara, Sanseverino, Prisco, Signorello, Talamo, Tarino, and others. On public law more particularly, see, among others, C. Augias, Del Potere civile e dei suoi limiti, Ancona 1871.

Toward the end of the century came S. Schiffini, S.J., Disputationes philosophiae moralis (2 vols., 1892), and Ferretti, S.J., Institutiones philosophiae moralis (3 vols., 3rd ed., 1900).

In Spain, a similar regeneration of philosophy as a whole was initiated by Balmes (1810–1848); Donoso-Cortés (1809–1853) followed analogous principles in his political-social writings. Periodicals also joined in cultivating and establishing them more broadly, such as La Civilización and La Sociedad, both edited by Balmes, and La Ciencia cristiana. Finally, larger works appeared, such as that of Zephyrinus González, O.P., Cardinal Archbishop, Estudios sobre la Filosophia de Sto. Tomas (3 vols., 1864), and his Philosophia elementaris ad usum academicae ac praesertim ecclesiasticae iuventutis (2 vols., 2nd ed., Madrid 1877), as well as Philosophia elemental (1881). From the same illustrious prelate (d. 1895) came La Biblia y la Ciencia (1892). More particularly on natural law appeared Elementos de derecho natural, by D. Rafael Rodriguez de Cepeda, professor of that subject at the University of Valencia: part 1, Valencia 1887; part 2, Valencia 1888.

In France, the ongoing struggle against the false principles of modern “liberalism” gave many learned men an occasion to study continually the ancient weapons of truth, with which the works of St. Thomas are especially rich, and to wield them readily in modern battles of opinion. Usually, however, they employed these weapons without systematical arrangement or organization in the old manner, but first removed the scholastic covering and polished them in a modern style. In this task many orators and writers excelled through tireless industry; among them are the illustrious names not only of Pie, the distinguished bishop of Poitiers, but also of L. Veuillot. — The recently established Catholic Academies undertook to restore the philosophical sciences themselves according to the principles of the Christian school, not without hope of the richest fruit, despite the political bonds by which their adversaries strive to stifle all Catholic expansion. Moreover, in both France and Belgium, learned men were meanwhile present who effectively promoted the same end through suitable books and studies, including works specifically on questions of natural law. Among them deserve mention M** B** (de Lehen), Institutes de droit naturel (1866); de Margerie, De la famille, Leçons de philos. morale (1869); Onclaire, De la revolution et de la restauration des urais principes sociaux (1872); P. At, Le vrai et le faux en matiere d’autorite et de liberte (1874); P. Vallet, S.S., Praelectiones philosophicae ad mentem S. Thomae Aq. (2nd ed., Paris 1880); Ch. Perin, Les lois de la societe chretienne (1875); Moulart, L’eglise et l’etat (1879). Many other very useful works may also be referred here to some extent, such as P. Felix, Conferences de N. D. (1860–1861); Chesnel, Les droits de Dieu et les idees modernes; Laforet, Le syllabus et les plaies de la societe moderne; Keller, L’encyclique et les principes de 1789; to these may be added the principal promoters of the study of St. Thomas: van Weddingen, L’Encyclique de S. S. Leon XIII et la restauration de la philosophie chretienne (1880); Burquard, L’Encyclique “Aeterni Patris” (1884). Thereafter apologetic reasoning is commonly and suitably joined with philosophy, as in I. de Bonniot, S.J., Le miracle et ses contrefaçons (5th ed., 1895); P. Ch. M., doctor of law, Le droit social de l’eglise (1892); L’abbé de Baets, Les bases de la morale et du droit (1892); Fr. Xav. Schouppe, S.J., Le plan divin de l’univers. Aspect philosophique du monde et de son histoire. Entretiens entre un savant naturaliste et un theologien (1900). — A. Vermeersch, S.J. also serves natural law no less than canon law, with his scholastic disputations on questions of justice for contemporary use (1901).

Meanwhile Catholic England, which from the previous century onward has labored as far as possible for a broader restoration of Catholic affairs, is also producing worthy fruits of Catholic study. It has its own special history in this matter, recalled by P. Thureau-Dangin, La Renaissance catholique en Angleterre au XIXe siècle (1903). Moreover, it is well known how diligently and successfully English Catholic scholars, for decades, through books and writings as well as public periodicals such as The Month and The Dublin Review, have cooperated with the leaders of other nations in defending a truly Christian philosophy and in advancing Catholic science in every field.

In Germany and Austria, I. Kleutgen, S.J., gave both the occasion and the impetus for a more diligent review of the scholastics’ volumes through Theologie der Vorzeit (1853) and Philosophie der Vorzeit (1860–1863). Therefore, the principles of the ancients in moral and legal philosophy also began increasingly to be valued and restored. As a result, Catholic scholars either introduced a salutary Catholic moderation into the philosophy of law commonly received, as did Moy de Sons and F. Walter, or even tried to build the social order from the ground up on Christian foundations drawn from divine revelation, as did Count de Brandis, Der Staat auf christlicher Grundlage (1860).

After the sources of scholastic philosophy, especially St. Thomas Aquinas, had been more widely opened and admitted into scholarly use, many most welcome fruits soon matured from them. The volumes published in defense of Christian truth by A. M. Weiss, O.P., illustrate practical philosophy as a whole: Apologie des Christentums vom Standpunkt der Sitte und Kultur (5 vols., 3rd ed. 1894; 4th ed. of vol. I, 1905). Likewise, A. Stöckl, Das Christentum und die grossen Fragen der Gegenwart (3 vols., 1879). Add the weighty work on current affairs by Renninger, Die Grundlage christlicher Politik (1879). — Many other books have since contributed greatly to restoring and spreading more widely the principles of Christian philosophy, including moral philosophy: some directly adapted to give studious youth a fuller philosophical education, others to guide such studies in their ideal and practical direction. Among the writers deserving credit in this work, one must name above all A. Stöckl, Lehrbuch der Philosophie (3 vols., 7th ed. 1892); C. Gutberlet, Lehrbuch der Philosophie (6 vols., 1878–1884, 3rd ed. 1896–1900); Ethik und Naturrecht (3rd ed. 1901); and Ethik und Religion (1893). — Costa-Rosetti, S.J., treated moral philosophy as a whole in Latin and by the scholastic method in Philosophia moralis seu Institutiones Ethicae et Iuris naturalis (1886, 2nd ed. 1892); Victor Cathrein, S.J., in Moralphilosophie (2 vols., 1890, 4th ed. 1904) and Der Sozialismus (1890, 8th ed. 1903). — To these we add the practically related work of I. Biederlack, S.J., Einleitung in die soziale Frage (1895, 6th ed. 1904). Likewise, for nearly three decades, many Catholic writers have usefully contributed to clarifying the same social problem from the principles of Christian philosophy, partly under the leadership of the periodical Stimmen aus Maria-Laach.

III. On the division of practical philosophy as a whole.

1. On the common division of it into Ethics and natural law.

The ancients, understanding ius as law or as what is just in general, called all natural legislation in its full extent, whether of a merely ethical or a juridical order, “natural law”; hence, under the name of the science of natural law, they also included moral philosophy as a whole. As was said above, the first author of separating natural law from ethics and treating it independently was Christian Thomasius, whose new doctrine of the inner distinction between law and morality logically required this methodological innovation. Thus Thomasius first began to consider ethics and natural law, or the philosophy of law, either as wholly distinct sciences or at least as separate and coordinated parts of practical philosophy as a whole. This custom was subsequently adopted through usage not only by almost all jurists but also by philosophical schools, including those that opposed Thomasius’s error, from which it had originated, and sought rather to follow the footsteps of the ancients.

Indeed, even this method, if assessed solely in itself and according to its practical use not so much for philosophy as for jurisprudence, is not without some convenience or benefit. For it seems to have usefully provided that, more easily and clearly—as is especially important to jurisprudence—legal duties may be distinguished theoretically and practically from duties that are merely ethical, and objective obligations of law from the subjective aspect of the virtue of justice. Therefore, it is clear that Thomasius’s new opinion, as soon as it became known, was received with approval chiefly by jurists, while philosophers opposed it; and it is fair to doubt whether it would ever have prevailed in philosophy if Kant had not given it new support. After Kantian philosophy took the leading place in Germany, the complete separation of ethics and natural law could not only be admitted philosophically but had to be admitted logically, lest the practice of science conflict with its theory. For once this is admitted, there can be no greater unity between ethics and the philosophy of law than between internal (of reason) and external legislation. Ethics is therefore almost restricted to the internal operations and intentions of man alone, whereas the philosophy of law extends to all external human activity. Nor is it surprising that nearly the same separation was adopted by that philosophy of law which, rejecting all natural law, recognizes nothing other than positive law.

The matter is altogether different for Christian philosophy, which, with the ancients, cannot but profess the intimate union of law with moral science as a whole. Even according to this philosophy, the ethical and juridical must certainly be carefully distinguished. For moral rightness in human acts can be considered either simply and according to every aspect of moral rightness, or only partially according to aspects of justice. In the former case, human acts are examined insofar as they are generally morally good or morally bad; in the latter, insofar as they are objectively just or unjust. The former is the concern of ethics, the latter of natural law in the stricter sense, as its proper subject. And in nearly this way we in fact see the division of practical philosophy as a whole into ethics and natural law used in most compendiums that otherwise follow the scholastics’ tradition, so as not to differ from the customary usage in the schools.

But everyone can see how little such a division satisfies the logical conditions of a sound division, whose first requirement is that the parts be divided from one another not merely by a difference of name, but in reality and by the proper subject matter of the argument, and be separated by the limits of the things to be treated. Ethics and natural law, though included under the general unity of practical philosophy, do not, however, constitute coordinated parts with respect to their subject matter; rather, one is logically subordinated to the other as a species to a genus, so that one requires the other as its complement. For either the discussion of the whole of moral goodness, or moral rectitude, with which ethics is concerned, must be defective and incomplete, or else it must include the whole account of justice, both subjective and objective, since this displays a special part of the whole rectitude of human actions. But a treatment of law, if wholly detached from ethics, indeed if it does not continually profess its ethical character as well, must depart from the truth of Christian law, which has its foundation and measure in ethics, and necessarily decline into the modern mechanism of law.

Therefore, lest the method of the science disagree with the subject and the truth, care must be taken that its very arrangement and division make clear that natural law, or the philosophical science of law, is to be separated neither as a discipline in itself alien to ethics nor to be coordinated with it logically as a part of practical philosophy, but rather is contained within ethics as a whole as its special part. It may therefore rightly be called social ethics, or even social law, if one prefers, with the ancients, to call ethics as a whole natural law.

2. What division seems preferable as a substitute for the commonly received one.

Guided by the considerations set out above, Taparelli had not without reason decided to abandon altogether the common division of this discipline and substitute for it another less exposed to the errors of pseudo-philosophy. Accordingly, he restored the name natural law from its modern narrowness to its original breadth of meaning, making it equivalent to the whole philosophy of morals.

But once the commonly transmitted formula of division has been rejected, there is not left only one way by which the matters to be treated can be arranged in a suitable order; that order will indeed vary according to the different end one has proposed to oneself as the immediate aim in teaching and explaining them. For one arrangement of the subject is generally needed if a science is treated in an extensive discourse and by some analytical method, another if the same science is adapted to academic instruction. Solimani (Institutiones Ethicae, Dicaeologiae, Eudaemonologiae, Rome 1847) wished practical philosophy to be divided into three parts, so as in a way to resolve it into three distinct yet related sciences: ethics, treating morals according to the standard of moral virtue; dicaeology, treating law; and eudaemonology, treating happiness. But this division, though new in form, seems to depart little from the old common one. For although it joins the science of law to the norm of justice, as the very name Dicaeology indicates, it otherwise retains those very disadvantages objected to the rejected division, separating in like manner things that should indeed be distinguished but should not be separated and loosed from their natural unity.

Accordingly, that division seems preferable to the others which proceeds from general things to particular ones, from principles to their applications, and at the same time professes the unity of moral philosophy as a whole under the one general name natural law.

Thus, indeed, natural law as a whole divides of itself into two parts: one general (General Natural Law), the other special or applied (Special Natural Law).

General natural law is concerned with examining and establishing the general principles of morals, both ethical (General Ethics) and naturally juridical (Social Law in General).

Special natural law applies those general principles in due order to the special conditions and relations of the human being acting morally, both individual and social; and the latter according to the various levels of human society provided for by nature, so that by rational inference it may derive and determine the special natural duties and rights of human beings, whether as individuals or gathered into social unity.

Sectio I: General Ethics

Liber I: Book One. The Natural Elements and Conditions of Human Action

On the elements and natural conditions of the human act.

Prologue.

  1. If we wish properly to know and define by natural light the norms of rightness suited to human activity, we must begin by examining the inner nature of the human act, guided above all by psychology. For this is a condition common to every practical science: it cannot possibly lack the foundation of a logically prior speculative science, on which it rests like a kind of consequent structure. The subject of this book is the laying of such a foundation, which is common and necessary to the whole philosophy of morals. Indeed, with regard to the human act that we undertake to examine, moral science is chiefly interested in investigating two things: first, what end is naturally proposed to it? Second, from what internal principle and under what condition does it proceed? These questions are evidently psychological in themselves; yet they are psychological in such a way that they are no less connected with cosmology and natural theology. It follows that they cannot be fully resolved from their internal rational foundations or wholly illuminated unless various metaphysical teachings are repeatedly invoked, as if borrowed from each of those parts of theoretical philosophy in turn. Therefore, before treating the human act itself in particular in two chapters, we thought it appropriate to offer by way of synthesis a brief compendium of propaedeutic philosophy to serve that discussion either as a general preamble of doctrine or as a common foundation. The chapter that we place first in this book belongs to that purpose.

Chapter I. Propaedeutic Synthesis on the Activity of Secondary Causes, or on Natural Action in General

Propaedeutic synthesis on the activity of “secondary causes,” or on the natural act in general.

Article 1.

General notion of natural acts. — Cosmological principles to be presupposed in this treatise.

  1. Psychology and cosmology teach that every subsisting created being is endowed with some proper operation or action, and hence with its own powers of acting: from the lowest inorganic substance, whose elementary powers we admire throughout the marvelous structure of earth and heaven, up to spiritual substance, which holds the highest place in the series of created things and likewise excels through the most perfect of all acts, the spiritual one. Indeed, it is by this very property of powers and action that we distinguish the different substances of things and their different species. We call operations specifically proper to things natural actions, from the nature from which they proceed as from their own principle.

  2. Accordingly, as many natural actions can be distinguished as there are natures or different species of things, and as many highest kinds of natural actions as there are highest kinds of substance. Thus inorganic substance has one natural operation proper to it, vegetative substance another, sensitive or animal substance another, and rational substance yet another.

  3. The idea of action can more easily be described from its logical elements than defined. For every action logically presupposes a power or faculty; the concept of power, in turn, involves the idea of a subject that has the power, and of a thing that is possible. The latter is proximately and immediately the action itself corresponding to the power; mediately it is what is done, or the object both of the action and of the power. Since nothingness cannot be acted upon, this object must be a real entity. Likewise, anything can be a cause, or act, only insofar as it is—that is, has being—and therefore every act is proportionate to the being of the agent, or, as St. Thomas says: “Every agent acts insofar as it is in act.” For this reason actions and faculties of every kind are named from the being of their subject, as, for example, human action, animal action, and so on.

In every action, then, three things in particular are to be considered in its analysis: the subject endowed with faculties, the object, and the action itself, insofar as it is the exercise of a faculty.

  1. A further way of describing action is drawn from the notion of motion. For although motion, too, can suitably be illuminated by action, according to Aristotle’s well-known definition: “Motion is the act of a being in potency insofar as it is in potency”, it is no less true, conversely, that every action suggests the idea of a kind of motion. This is evident from the fact that the object of an action is also called its terminus or end. For an action, insofar as it is motion or a kind of tendency, is terminated or brought to its end by its object. In motion, too, three things can chiefly be considered: beginning, progress, and terminus, or the starting point, the terminus toward which it moves, and the intermediate direction. When applied to action, these three correspond analogically to its a) subjective principle, endowed with faculties, b) object, and c) the action itself as the exercise of a faculty. Thus all the doctrine about action that may generally be desired concerns these three moments of action and their relations to one another.

  2. Nevertheless, to attain a genuine understanding of the character of this motion that we observe in nature, some empirical observation alone, carried out like an anatomical analysis, would by no means suffice. Indeed, what is most important to know about it—namely, toward what such a phenomenon is directed, or from what it comes—would have to be called an insoluble riddle for science forever, unless cosmological principles, pursued at a deeper level, shed light on the solution of these questions.

The following two principles, fundamental and essentially presupposed in the present discussion, are especially to be named:

I. That this universe was created by God the Creator, infinitely wise and holy.

II. That there is in the world an order of things directed to ends.

These two are also reducible, in a certain respect, to one, namely to the principle of creation, insofar as the being of one is understood to follow necessarily from the other.

Both of these, besides being known from divine faith, are not only the most precious safeguard of all sound philosophy but also its defense, secured by unshakable arguments and never to be overcome by any efforts of either pantheism or naturalism.

  1. This is at the same time the firmness of moral science, since it is built, together with all its deductions, upon this foundation alone, which is as necessary as it is secure. To make this apparent in a preliminary survey, it is useful here to list certain principal elements of doctrine contained implicitly in those two cosmological principles, each of which in turn is fertile in conclusions. For what they state in the briefest summary can be resolved into roughly the following doctrines:

  2. God, just as he is the first cause of all things, is also the common and ultimate end of all things: “the Alpha and the Omega.” Hence all creatures, each and every one, must by the Creator’s will be destined for the glory of God, which we call external glory.

  3. But this will of God cannot be ineffectual; rather, it must manifest its efficacy in creatures themselves, not only through a certain proportionate aptitude, but also through direction and a fitting impulse, by which each is moved, according to its degree and mode, to complete the end set before it.

  4. Therefore the whole universe of things, with all its parts, can be considered as placed by the very act of creation in a motion infinitely varied yet one, toward the common end appointed by the Creator. This motion consists in the natural operations of creatures. Accordingly, as many stations, so to speak, along its course can be distinguished as there are particular and proper ends of things, or different natural things; so that a different natural end corresponds to a different motion or natural act, and a different being from which it proceeds corresponds to a different motion.

  5. God the Creator and governor is the first cause of this motion; the secondary causes are contained in the very being of things and constitute it. For through its being each thing is naturally fitted and disposed to fulfill its own destiny by acting; conversely, therefore, it is clear that “every act is proportioned to the being of the agent as an effect to its cause.”

With these points established, it is now easy to set down certain heads of doctrine about natural action according to the threefold moment that we said must be considered in it. They are gathered from the principles already indicated, almost as corollaries, and for this reason we have chosen to call them axioms. Although they should not be considered self-evident, they have long been established by the testimony both of the ancients and of the Christian School, and by certain arguments of theoretical philosophy, so that those approaching moral philosophy from metaphysics need not prove them anew one by one; rather, for present purposes, they may suitably be presented in a concise survey.

Article 2.

On the subjective principle of natural action.

§ 1. On nature.

  1. Axiom I. The proper principle of a natural action is the nature of the acting subject.

The word nature (φύσις), both in common usage and especially among more recent philosophers, is ambiguous in itself because of the variety of its meanings. For example, “nature” plainly means something quite different when, following more recent philosophy, the term is restricted almost entirely to the complex of material and sensible things or powers, and is used to express the dualism displayed in this world by spirit and matter (“Geist und Natur”); something different again when we speak of nature and art; and still something else when, in the sense of Christian dogma, we speak of nature and grace, of the natural and the supernatural. It is hardly surprising that so great a variety in the use of the same word across different disciplines has often given even sound minds—but minds not on their guard—occasion to think and speak less rightly about nature in theological matters. It is therefore necessary to determine more precisely the sense in which we intend to use that word here, all the more because the concept of nature will serve as a foundation before the others throughout this whole inquiry, upon which the most weighty heads of doctrine will subsequently be built.

Accordingly, following the mind of Aristotle, which scholastic doctors later adopted throughout and cultivated for the most fruitful use of Christian science, we call the nature of anything, whether spiritual or material, its very being, insofar as it has within itself a principle of motion (whether of actively producing or passively receiving), by which it is adapted to complete its own proper end. Thus Aristotle says: “The first and properly so-called nature is the substance of those things that have within themselves, as what they are, a principle of motion.”

He illustrates the same point with examples, such as a statue, which as such has no nature but is a work of art; yet it has a nature insofar as it is wood or stone, because only in virtue of this does it have within itself a principle of motion or change (“einen substanziellen Grund der Bewegung, d. i. Veränderung”). Since, however, motion of this kind, grounded in the substance of things, cannot be fortuitous but, in light of creation, must necessarily be called directed to an end, Aristotle’s idea is rightly completed by Christian philosophy into the following definition of nature:

A substantial principle of motion implanted in created things, by which each is directed and impelled toward its own proper end.

Explanation. “Principle of motion” means action in the broadest sense; “substantial” means identical with the very substance of things. Thus being, substance, and the nature of things denote the same reality, but differ formally: being signifies the very existence of things without distinction as to any relation it may have; substance signifies it with reference to accident; and nature, finally, signifies that same being insofar as it is a principle of the final motion proper to those things. — “By which each is directed toward its own proper end,” that is, an internal end, the end of its work appointed by the Creator; “and impelled,” that is, not merely disposed by some aptitude that is indifferent in itself, but directed by some causality of motion and positive final inclination proceeding from the substance itself.

Moreover, both Aristotle and the Scholastics assume that this principle of motion in things is either active or passive: that is, either a principle of moving or of undergoing and receiving motion. In either case, the motion derives from its principle the fact that it is natural to the thing. Furthermore, they say that the active principle itself is either of such a kind that a thing can move itself, or can produce motion only outside itself—that is, motion that passes over to another. They teach that only in the former is the proper principle of life present.

  1. Axiom II. The concept of nature and the concept of the end of a thing appointed by the Creator are correlative to one another.

This is clear from nn. 6 and 7. For just as natural motion takes its measure from the proper end of a thing, so too does the principle from which that motion proceeds. Accordingly, just as particular natures correspond to the particular ends of things in a like subordination to one another, so too some kind of universal nature (a system of natures) must be conceived, corresponding to the universal end of creation and arising from particular natures that, through their fitting subordination, converge toward some supreme unity. It is often in roughly this sense that the word nature is used collectively, as, for example, when one says: the order of nature; God is glorified through nature.

  1. Axiom III. The wondrous harmony of motions that flourishes from this, by which each created thing, under the guidance of its nature, contributes to fulfilling the idea of the whole creation, constitutes the universal natural order. Its two chief members are distinguished according to the diversity of the things to be ordered: the moral order on the one hand, and the physical order (or natural order in the narrower sense) on the other. The former concerns the ordering of the motions of spiritual substance, the latter the motions of irrational beings.

Moreover, since the supreme end of creation, God’s external glory, must be fulfilled proximately in the moral order—that is, through intellects—it follows that the physical order contributes to producing the universal order of nature together with the moral order, while nevertheless being subordinated to the latter by its own nature and directed to it as its proximate end.

  1. Axiom IV. If a natural subject of actions is composed of different beings in such a way that from them a physically one being is formed, this natural composition does not prevent the whole composite from having one nature, just as it has one corresponding end.

For this unity is required by the very physical unity of the being, by which it is constituted as one suppositum of natural activity. In this way, a natural composite may, by reason of its constituents, participate in both the orders of creation mentioned above—the moral and the physical—with one subordinated to the other, within the unity of its nature; and thus represent within itself, as in a microcosm, the natural order of the whole universe. It is clear that, on earth, man alone is such a composite.

§ 2. On faculties as instruments of nature.

  1. Axiom V. Every natural action proceeds from nature through faculties, which therefore are to be regarded as so many instruments subordinate to nature.

This truth follows as a corollary from what was explained above (n. 5) about the idea of action. For the being of a creature is plainly not the same as its acting, since acting is shown to be a mere accident of that being; otherwise, a created being could never cease or change its action. Therefore, in every created subject, simply because it can pass from a state of rest to a state of action, some capacity to act—to do what it is not yet actually doing—must be presupposed before the act, that is, a faculty through which

  1. Axiom VI. A faculty is by its very nature inclined toward act, by the force of the moving principle—that is, nature—whose instrument it is (Axiom I); but, in order to pass from inertia into act, it needs an object external to itself (to the faculty itself), by which it is aroused.

For an act cannot tend toward nothingness; and unless the object were external to the faculty, the act by which the acting subject tends toward it could not be motion—that is, a coming to be. (Nothing, however, prevents the object from being internal to the acting subject itself.) It is likewise clear that, as the faculty tends toward the act by which it is completed, it also tends through the act toward that same object toward which the act tends immediately. Hence the object has the character of a completion, by which both the act and the faculty are perfected.

  1. Axiom VII. Just as a different nature corresponds to the particular end of a given being, so the diversity of objects specifies different faculties even within the same subject.

This is to be understood of the specific diversity of objects alone, not of their individual diversity. Thus, for example, the faculty of sight differs from the faculty of hearing, just as light differs from sound; but neither light of different colors nor different kinds of sound can specify a faculty. The object proper to a faculty and specifying it is called its formal object, which is distinguished from its material objects as a species is distinguished from the individuals contained under it. Therefore, the formal object of each faculty can be only one, whereas its material objects can be numberless.

  1. Axiom VIII. In an acting subject, two modes of activity are distinguished for producing a complete natural act: apprehension and expansion; apprehensive faculties correspond to the former, expansive faculties to the latter.

We do not call every incipient modification that takes place in an operating being a natural act properly speaking or complete, but only that which is brought to completion in the natural tendency toward a certain terminus or end to be attained proximately. For a subject’s actual tendency of this kind, which is remotely possible by the very power of the faculty of acting with which it is endowed, must acquire some further element on the side of the object in order to become proximately possible. Through that element the faculty is brought to completion in its proximate capacity, or the act is made proximately and simply possible (Axiom VI), even if it does not follow from this alone, or always of necessity (as happens in a free subject). This prior activity, necessary to a subject in order to receive that required completion of the faculty, is called apprehension (in the broadest sense of the word); the powers that nature assigns in every being to this function are called apprehensive powers or apprehensive faculties. We call expansion the natural tendency itself, which proceeds from a faculty made proximally ready toward its terminus; and the faculties that immediately serve this tendency are called expansive. These latter, then, pertain to producing the natural act itself insofar as it is a final motion, whereas the former are rather preparatory to that same act and are concerned in themselves with its possibility.

  1. Axiom IX. In the same nature, expansive faculties are proportionate to apprehensive faculties.

For apprehension itself contains the condition and measure of the possibility of the expansion that follows it. But from the perfect proportion of equality that exists between apprehension and the possible expansion—by which expansion cannot exceed the limits of apprehension—it by no means follows in itself and for every kind of natural action that actual expansion is always as great as apprehension, nor that it can never be omitted or suspended or confined within narrower limits.

  1. Axiom X. The cause of any natural act, then, is found neither wholly on the side of the tending subject nor wholly on the side of the apprehended object, but must be traced to both in a certain proportion.

The well-known principle of metaphysical and moral science, “The object specifies the act,” refers to the element that the object contributes to the act. But the object can exert this specifying influence upon an act properly natural only insofar as, through prior apprehension, it has become the formal terminus of the tendency, and not according to its material extension of being in itself.

  1. Axiom XI. Natural activity does not depend to the same degree in every nature on an external influence received through apprehension; rather, four degrees of dependence or independence are distinguished here on earth, corresponding to the four kinds of substance: 1. inorganic substance, 2. organic vegetative substance, 3. sensitive or animal substance, 4. rational animal substance. For the higher we ascend in this series of created beings from the lowest to the higher degrees, the greater independence of nature in acting from externally received influence that determines it through apprehension we observe; the more we see the causality of the act increase on the side of the subject and decrease on the side of the object; the more apprehension itself is variously modified in relation to its end and subordinated to an internal command; and the more the action of a being departs from a narrow determination to one thing and approaches the broadest and indefinite objective determinability, whose highest degree we recognize in the elective freedom of the rational will.

  2. Axiom XII. Apprehension and expansion, which concur in completing one natural motion, nevertheless, when considered separately, do not exhibit the same character of motion.

For through apprehension the subject in a way draws the object toward itself, assimilating it to itself by subjective representation and adapting it to its own capacity. By contrast, through expansion the subject moves outward toward the real object, adapting itself to that object so as to be united with it.

  1. Axiom XIII. The nature of a being, considered concretely, is most truly exhibited by the whole complex of all its natural faculties, harmoniously converging toward the unity of a natural tendency.

For nature, as a principle of natural action, can be known in no other way than through the very action of which it is the principle; and this action is immediately proportionate to the faculties themselves, insofar as they serve the same nature.

Note. On the subject of this whole article, cf. Kleutgen, Philos. der Vorzeit II, section 7: “On Nature,” especially nn. 685–791, where he explains at greater length the doctrine of St. Thomas, following Aristotle, and of the Scholastic doctors both on the concept of nature and on nature’s final activity, and illuminates it by comparison with the principal doctrines of more recent philosophy. See also Taparelli, Diritto nat. I, nn. 5 sq.

Article 3.

On the terminus of natural action, or on good and end in general.

  1. Axiom XIV. The terminus of a natural action, formally considered as such, can only be a good

A good, considered universally, is, as metaphysics establishes, whatever is fitting for the perfection of a nature, or whatever is a perfection with respect to some nature, or preserves or increases it. The reason a subject is impelled by nature toward motion or tendency toward some object—that is, toward an act—can only be that it lacks some perfection fitting to it, and by this absence is, as it were, thrown out of equilibrium. Hence every natural action tends formally toward that by which nature is perfected, that is, toward a good.

Moreover, just as nature acts only through faculties, so too it is perfected in its faculties or through them. Therefore, the concept of good, taken formally, always involves a relation to some nature in general, or proximately to some faculty of it, to be completed or perfected. Hence good in general is rightly defined also as “whatever can be desired,” that is, that toward which some faculty can tend as its terminus.

From this we conclude that a good is whatever is, or has being, because every being has both the character of a perfection in relation to some faculty or nature to be completed and the quality of being desirable.

The direct opposite of good is evil, which is therefore usually defined as privation of good. Thus, through the good of which it is a privation, evil likewise has a relation to some nature or subject deprived of a perfection fitting to it. “Evil is nothing other than the privation of that which one is naturally meant and ought to have.” — Evil is also called a negation of reality (nothingness, metaphysical evil); but even when understood in this way, evil involves the idea of the privation of a fitting good—not with respect to some determinate nature or faculty, but in relation to natures and faculties taken indeterminately and in general. For nothingness is incapable of perfecting any nature or determining any tendency. Finally, a thing is called good or evil when it participates in good or evil.

  1. Axiom XV. End and good, though formally distinct by their concepts, are nevertheless convertible objectively or materially

The same terminus of action, which is called a good, is called an end (in the broader sense) insofar as it concerns the perfection of a nature or faculty, and insofar as the natural action or tendency is brought to its end through it. In the narrower sense, however, an end designates the terminus of an action that is sought through rational apprehension and intention; thus, along with the idea of a terminus, it joins the idea of a certain causality, by which the terminus, rationally apprehended, contributes to producing motion by moving, and because of which the end is also called a final cause. In this sense, when the activity of creatures is at issue, the word end is restricted to designating the terminus of human action alone, and is usually defined as: that for the sake of which something is done.

  1. Axiom XVI. Whether end is taken as the terminus of action in general or in the narrower sense, it is distinguished according to the progression found in natural activity: proximate, intermediate, and ultimate.

The proximate end is the object immediately attained by the agent; the intermediate end is an object to be obtained by means of the proximate end, either intended by the agent or appointed by the Creator for it to obtain, and at the same time referred to a further end. Finally, the ultimate end is that in which every tendency comes to rest and is completed, with every relation to a further end removed. This end is called ultimate in a qualified or negative sense, or ultimate simply or positively, according as, once obtained, the agent’s nature comes to rest in it without excluding a further tendency, or is so perfectly completed by it that nothing remains toward which it might extend itself.

Taking into account as well the final order intended by the Creator himself, we distinguish the internal and external ultimate end of a being or nature. The internal ultimate end of a creature is that by which its nature is fully perfected; its external ultimate end, which coincides with the universal end of creation, is that to which its nature, in being perfected within itself, is referred according to the Creator’s final plan. — This division presupposes another well-known division of end from metaphysics, namely into the end of the work and the end of the agent, which can be applied both to human and divine works. We call the end of the work that toward which a being or its action tends by its nature and destination; the end of the agent is that which someone wishes to attain by acting, or by means of the work.

  1. Axiom XVII. The good and proximate end of a faculty is its act, since through the act the faculty is completed and perfected proximately in that toward which it is ordered by nature. Likewise, an object attained is the proper good and proximate end of the act itself. Therefore, deprivation of the object is the faculty’s proper evil, which must not, however, be confused with the evil of the nature or being.

  2. Axiom XVIII. In every series of activity toward some common ultimate end (whether ultimate simply or in a qualified sense), each intermediate terminus, as such, derives its character of good from the very terminus or ultimate end of the tendency.

The reason is that each intermediate terminus, as such, is desirable because of the end to which it leads.

  1. Axiom XIX. The formal object of each faculty is also its proper and formal good—that is, a good through which and by participation in which its material objects have their goodness with respect to that faculty. For the whole reason for a faculty’s inclination toward a material object is its natural inclination toward its formal object, in which all the perfection of which it is capable is conceived to be contained. The material object therefore receives from that formal object its whole relation to the perfection of the same faculty and its desirability (cf. Axiom VII).

  2. Axiom XX. If a particular object fully matches a faculty—that is, is really equivalent to the whole comprehension of its formal object—the faculty can tend no further toward act, but necessarily comes to rest once that object is attained. If it does not match it, however, the faculty’s rest upon attaining that object is only partial and pertains only to the preceding act; accordingly, by its nature it must itself strive onward to new acts, reaching toward its full completion.

  3. Axiom XXI. According to the different relations of desirability among the objects toward which a faculty can tend, three kinds of good are distinguished: the fitting good, the useful good, and the pleasant good

A good is called fitting (that is, fitting for the perfection of a faculty) insofar as it is naturally desired not for the sake of something else but for its own sake; it is called useful insofar as it is desired not for its own sake but only in relation to something else, to which it leads. A pleasant good is anything whatever (whether otherwise fitting in itself or useful) insofar as it is considered chiefly as bringing rest to a faculty through its attainment.

Accordingly, only the fitting good, since it alone corresponds in itself to the ultimate end of the tendency, has the character of good properly and in itself. For both the useful and pleasant goods derive all their goodness from it: the useful good does so because it is found formally only in intermediate ends, which derive their goodness from the ultimate end (Axiom XVIII); the pleasant good does so because it depends on the fitting good as something that naturally follows from it. Therefore, as such, it is not a good in itself (bringing perfection), but is inseparably joined to the attainment of a good and to that extent participates in the same goodness. For the sense of rest, or cessation of the tendency that follows in a faculty when an object or good is attained, is called pleasure.

Likewise, the character of evil properly and in itself is to be located solely in the privation of a fitting good. For from this privation derive their character of evil both acts that depart from an object naturally due to them and the feelings of sadness and pain that follow the privation of an object.

  1. Axiom XXII. Although what has been said about a faculty’s relation to its object generally also applies to the relation between the nature of the whole subject and the terminus toward which a being strives by its natural activity, this terminus of the nature must nevertheless not be confused with the termini or objects of the individual faculties.

— For

  1. The good, end, and perfection of a being stand to the good, end, and perfection of its individual faculties as the whole specific nature of the being stands to its subordinate individual faculties—roughly, as the resultant of powers suitably composed into one system of motions stands to those same component powers taken individually. Hence

  2. The good of a being is not whatever is the object or good of some faculty, but only that which is suitably subordinated to the end of the whole nature.

  3. Hence the common distinction between true good and apparent or false good is derived. The true good of a being is that which perfects its nature; false and apparent good, by contrast, perfects one or more of its faculties considered individually and in themselves, but not as subordinated to its nature.

  4. Just as with respect to individual faculties, so too with respect to the whole nature of a being, three kinds of good are distinguished: fitting, useful, and pleasant. A good fitting to a being is for that very reason its true good; the useful and pleasant are goods insofar as they participate in the fitting good or derive their goodness from it.

  5. Axiom XXIII. The proper and therefore highest good of each being—its natural end—is known from its nature, that is, from all its faculties subordinated to one specific tendency.

And since this specific tendency or expansion is proportionate to its specific apprehension, the natural end or terminus toward which the nature of each being tends is also determined through that being’s specific apprehension.

Article 4.

On action itself as motion toward a terminus.

  1. Action, insofar as it is a tendency toward a terminus, can be considered under two formal aspects: either as a way and means of attaining a good, or as a motion tending toward some appointed goal. As a means to a good, action participates in the goodness of its terminus, just as a useful good participates in a fitting good. Hence it is called good or evil according as it truly leads to a fitting good or turns away from it toward a merely apparent good; and an action is better or worse insofar as it leads to the good more surely and rightly, or turns away from it farther, and insofar as the good it procures or deprives us of is greater and more universal. By contrast, if action is considered rather as a motion toward a due goal, abstracting from its goodness, it is called right or not right according as it is directed toward the goal or deviates from it.

The former aspect corresponds to eudaemonology, the latter to deontology. But since the character of good is objectively inseparable from the end or goal of a tendency, it is clear that in morals eudaemonology can and indeed must be distinguished from deontology, but cannot be separated from it at all. For in some way what St. Augustine emphasizes about man holds of every creature: “Man must become happy from the same source from which he becomes good.” Therefore, when we establish a twofold rule of natural actions, one deontological and the other eudaemonological, we intend to note not a material difference between them, but a formal one, which is of the greatest importance for the whole science of morals.

  1. Axiom XXIV. The nature of each being is the proximate rule of rightness for all its natural action (the deontological rule).

For every motion is called right when it tends toward its goal without deviating in either direction. Nature, however, as the directing principle of that motion toward the end appointed for a being, is correlated with this end (Axioms I and II). Therefore, a natural motion or act is right insofar as it conforms to nature.

  1. Axiom XXV. Under the guidance of nature, every created being infallibly attains its true good (end) and its perfection, unless in some way it deviates from that path (the eudaemonological rule).

For the nature of each being is adapted by its most wise Creator to attain its internal end, and its perfection is contained in this end. Nevertheless, Axiom XXII should be carefully noted.

Epilogue

to the propaedeutic synthesis.

  1. Whatever we have understood in this first chapter to belong to natural acts in general must also belong in common, specifically, to the human act considered according to its generic character. Thus, as we begin to treat the human act in particular, we are already familiar with its general outlines; indeed, by means of these we also have the path and method indicated in advance by which to proceed further in investigating what is proper to it according to its species. The very notion of motion suggests this path of its own accord, since motion is common to the human act and every natural act. Therefore, by analogy, so to speak, with what was noted in general in this propaedeutic chapter about the principle and object of natural actions, a special analysis of the human act must again chiefly examine those elements that constitute it insofar as it is a natural motion and distinguish it essentially from every other: namely, its subjective principle and objectively appointed end. For in that psychological motion these two mark, as it were, the extreme termini of its direction: one the terminus from which, the other the terminus toward which. It is evident that these points, fixed as it were at either end of the motion, and their proper relation must first be known before we can rightly discern and measure the quality of rightness or lack of rightness in the tendency between them. This will provide the third topic for examining the human act, reserved for Book II.

But, so that the principle and end of human acts may be treated in an orderly way in the chapters immediately following, it seems that we should speak first of the end and then of the principle, since the end, although last in actual execution, nevertheless holds first place in the order of intention and causality of actions. This does not prevent us, while investigating the end itself, from anticipating in some degree certain more general notions about the subjective principle, which are dialectically presupposed for defining the end correctly.

Chapter II. The Natural End of Human Acts and of the Human Being

Chapter III. The Principle of Human Acts

Liber II: Book Two. The Moral Attributes of the Human Act

Liber III: Book Three. The Complete Norm of Human Acts, or Law

Liber IV: Book Four. The Human Being’s Subjective Moral Formation

Sectio II: Social Right in General

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