De gratia Redemptoris

The just man cannot merit of condignity the first efficacious grace after justification. For efficacious grace is already required for such a meritorious act. But neither, on the supposition of this first efficacious grace, can he merit of condignity the efficacious graces that follow; for if so, the just man, after receiving the first efficacious grace, would already be confirmed in grace by his merits, he would be impeccable. But from thesis 12, part 2, it is clear that the just man is in danger of sinning as long as he is a wayfarer, and not only in that space of time which lies between justification and the first efficacious grace.

Therefore the just man cannot merit for himself of condignity the gift of perseverance. For that includes a series of efficacious graces from the last justification to death, and death itself in the state of grace. That the gift of perseverance is not the object of merit of condignity, St Augustine shows in the book De dono perseverantiae (On the gift of perseverance), where he says: “Hence it is shown clearly enough that the grace of God, both for beginning and for persevering unto the end, is not given according to our merits, but is given according to his own most secret and at the same time most just, most wise, most beneficent will, since those whom he predestined he also called, with that calling of which it was said: The gifts and the calling of God are without repentance”¹. Theologians agree on this matter², and commonly propose it as theologically certain³.

But the just man can merit of congruity perseverance, if the first efficacious grace is excepted. For it seems congruous that God the heavenly Father, in view of the good works which his adopted sons perform, should have such care for them that they remain in grace. But since there is no divine promise concerning this matter, this merit of congruity is not infallible.

The just man can nevertheless impetrate the gift of perseverance by supplication, the first efficacious grace being again excepted, as is plain. So St Augustine: “This gift of God, then, can be merited by supplication”⁴, and for that reason he warns that the gift of perseverance must always be asked for. So St Thomas⁵: “Even those things which we do not merit, we impetrate by praying; for God hears sinners too asking pardon of their sins, which they do not merit, as is plain from Augustine on that text of Ioan. 9: We know that God doth not hear sinners, otherwise the publican would have said in vain: God, be merciful to me a sinner, as is said in Luc 18; and similarly one impetrates from God the gift of perseverance by asking, either for himself or for another, although it does not fall under merit”. Suárez⁶ sets the matter down as most certain. Christ promised: “All things whatsoever you shall ask in prayer, believing, you shall receive” (⁷). But prayer must be such as Christ willed: “We ought always to pray and not to faint”⁸.

Suárez explains the matter thus: “The just man's meriting or impetrating the gift of perseverance can be understood in two ways. First, by one act, or by several acts performed within a certain time, or up to a certain point of life, impetrating perseverance and, as it were, confirmation in grace for the rest of life. Secondly, successively through the whole time of life, impetrating perseverance as it were by parts, for example now impetrating efficacious help not to fall on the present occasion, and after it praying again and impetrating other help to keep the commandment that again occurs, and so on praying and never failing. I say therefore that the former way of meriting or impetrating perseverance is not infallible... If anyone prays perseveringly, asking for perseverance in grace, he will infallibly impetrate it, yet not in that first way which we have so far denied, but in the other, second way declared above. And so we say, secondly, that the just man, by persevering in the due manner in the insistence and frequency of prayer, can successively and infallibly obtain perseverance unto death. This is proved, because perseverance in praying, necessary for this impetration, is not merely some duration of one or another petition for some time; for this can neither be defined nor affirmed with foundation. Nor would that prayer be prudent by which someone asked to be given perseverance for the whole time of future life, even without a new diligence of procuring that same perseverance. Nor is there reason why we should believe that such a promise was made to any prayer. Therefore perseverance in prayer, required in such a matter, is that it be made not once only or twice, but that it last through the whole time of life, and especially that on the occasions that occur of keeping the commandments or overcoming temptations it be repeated with due confidence. For thus it will come about that, proceeding from one act to another, doing well and praying fittingly, he infallibly obtains perseverance. But this infallibility does not belong to this merit of congruity by reason of itself (so to speak), but by reason of the impetration, which properly answers to prayer or petition alone, as such. The reason is that this infallibility is founded solely on the divine promise, which is not found to have been made to the works of the just as meritorious of congruity, but only to prayer. Wherefore, that the fruit of this merit may be more certain, the petition for perseverance must always be joined to it. And for the same reason we must pray not only that we may not sin, but that we may persevere in prayer, since neither prayer nor perseverance in it can be without the grace of God, nor will it be without a congruous calling. And so this whole merit and impetration must have its beginning from some help conferred without merit or impetration”⁹.

It is an altogether probable view that the just man can merit of congruity reparation after a fall. So, against St Thomas¹⁰, very many theologians: St Bonaventure¹¹, Scotus¹², St Bellarmine¹³, Suárez¹⁴, Ripalda¹⁵. The sense of this doctrine is not that a man, after he has sinned, can merit of congruity justification¹⁶; but that by works done in the state of justice a man merits of congruity the grace of repentance and conversion after a fall. Indeed, if one supposes a man who had long remained in justice and had done many good works, and then nevertheless from weakness rather than from malice committed a mortal sin, it seems altogether congruous that the merciful God, in view of the good works he had previously done, should so help him that he in fact arrives at repentance. It is plain that the congruity is less if someone was perhaps only a short time in justice and did but few good works, and afterwards sinned much and from malice.

Temporal goods considered merely in themselves do not seem to be the object of merit, but insofar as they help on the way of salvation they can be the object of merit of congruity¹⁷.

As regards the merit of the just man for others, Suárez¹⁸ says: “The rule, then, is that the just man can merit of congruity for another what he can for himself, and something more”. This more is the first grace itself, which no one can merit for himself. “By the merit of congruity one can merit for another the first grace. For since a man established in grace fulfils the will of God, it is congruous according to the proportion of friendship that God should fulfil the will of the man in the salvation of another”¹⁹.