De gratia Redemptoris

The meritorious act is entitatively supernatural. Those, then, who say that a supernatural act necessarily has a formal object proper to itself, which is unattainable by natural powers, must necessarily affirm the same of the meritorious act. But from the fact that someone, as we have done, does not hold this view to be true, the matter is not for that reason decided. For God could of himself have established for the meritorious act the condition that it must proceed from some motive known by faith¹, for example the motive of acquiring supernatural beatitude; on this supposition the act would have to proceed from such a motive in such a way that by his act the man willed to tend to that end.

Those who affirm the necessity of a motive known by faith must of themselves concede that acts can be found in the just man which are neither sins nor meritorious, but indifferent in relation to eternal life — namely those acts which do indeed proceed from an honest motive, but are not ordered by the man's intention to the end known by faith, God, eternal life.

But those who deny that necessity say: Every just man has faith, has ordered himself to God, to the supernatural end, to eternal life; through the supernatural habits he can elicit acts that are entitatively supernatural. If now from some honest motive, not precisely known by faith, he elicits a morally good act, he himself remains in his ordering and tendency to his end, and by that very fact proceeds on the way to this end, without its being necessary to order the act by a special intention to God or to the attainment of eternal life. For every honest end is in fact ordered to the supreme end and subordinated to it; and the man who acts has chosen God as his last end when he became a believer and was justified, and so also by reason of the subject the act has that order to God, to eternal life, which is required.

On this matter there are very many disputations; Lange² gives the best survey of the more recent controversies, and finally concludes³: “Historically and speculatively our question is solved with difficulty. Most theologians affirm the necessity of some motive of faith. Many testimonies of the Fathers also seem to require it. But it can be disputed when faith has sufficient influence on works.”

Besides, it can also be asked whether the views differ speculatively, that is, in the explanation itself, or are in reality so very different. For even those who require the necessity of a “good intention” concede that it need not be actual and explicit, but that a virtual and implicit one suffices. For example, Pesch writes thus⁴: “From what has been said it is manifest how faith is necessary for each salutary work, and how it is not. For faith is required first of all for this, that a man be able to have the intention of a supernatural end and be moved towards it. Hence in each work faith must have efficacy to this extent, that the man walk within the way and not take steps outside the way. For this, however, there is no need that in each work an act of faith be elicited or the intention of the supernatural end renewed. But as he who, undertaking a pilgrimage to a distant city, elicits at the outset a firm purpose of going there, and by virtue of this purpose proceeds on the journey as long as he has not placed a contrary act, either explicitly or implicitly..., so the Christian who has once elicited a firm purpose of acquiring eternal life by his acts acts from this purpose as long as he does not revoke it, neither negatively nor positively, neither explicitly nor implicitly, which revocation is present in every grave sin. If, however, he has revoked it, a new conversion to the end is required... Nor is the thought that this act in particular has been revealed by God as salutary necessary in every good work, since Christians know that the observance of the natural law too has been proposed by God to us as the way to the supernatural end, as for example in the Sermon on the Mount... If, however, a Christian were to do works naturally honest only for the sake of the honesty of this world, so that through them he in no way tended to the supernatural end, he would not only not act well, but would sin, because he would not wish to conform himself to the divine ordinance... That vehement dispute which is stirred among later theologians on this matter seems to have arisen from the fact that some did not always sufficiently attend to what was required for the intention of the end to influence the choice of means and to dignify it, and therefore demanded too much; while others interpreted this exaggerated concept in a bad sense and so attacked a chimera. Surely any good Christian, asked why he does good works, will answer: Because I wish to come to heaven. This habitual intention plainly suffices for a man to act from the motive of faith. Wherefore such men are not to be disturbed about the motives of their good works, but simply exhorted to renew the good intention more often. This intention in ordinary men hardly ever proceeds from a philosophical consideration of natural honesty, but rather from the doctrine of faith concerning the heavenly kingdom to be obtained by merits.” Much less again does it seem to be required in the opposite view.

The question proposed treats only of what is absolutely required for a meritorious act; it is plain of itself that the act is better and more meritorious the more perfectly the “good intention” is present and influences the act.