De gratia Redemptoris

It is not asked whether the natural love of God and the supernatural love are to be distinguished, which has been proved in the treatise on charity¹; the opposite has been condemned against Baius, prop. 34: “That distinction of the twofold love, namely natural, by which God is loved as the author of nature, and gratuitous, by which God is loved as beatifier, is vain and fictitious, and devised to mock the sacred Scriptures and the many testimonies of the ancients”². But it is asked whether the act of natural love, by which God is loved above all things, is possible for fallen man. That such a love is possible for innocent man in the merely natural order is easily conceded. Love above all things is understood not intensively but appreciatively, that is, the love by which God is preferred to every created being. A love of this kind necessarily includes the will not to sin, to fulfil the things which God wills. The discourse is not about love above all things effectively, that is, such that man in fact even in his works prefer God to all creatures; that this love is naturally impossible has been proved in the preceding thesis. But the discourse is about love above all things affectively, that is, whether such an affection can be elicited by man with his natural powers. And indeed only its possibility is asked, not whether such an act is in fact found. Nor is physical power meant, which is again conceded, but moral power, namely whether perhaps in such an act so great a difficulty is found that it is absolutely impossible for fallen man. The matter cannot be decided from the positive sources; because when in them the discourse is about the necessity of grace for loving God, salutary love is meant; and the opinions of theologians on this question are divided. But reason seems to be in favour of affirming that power.

For man by the natural light of reason can know that God is his last end, that he is infinitely good and most amiable; nor does there appear a reason why the affection of love towards God cannot follow such knowledge; for in this act as such there does not seem to be extraordinary difficulty, so that it should be called morally impossible. Nor does it seem impossible by reason of the purpose of not sinning, which, as has been said, is included in that act of love. Although it is true that man cannot by his natural powers carry out that purpose, it does not follow from this that he can never have an act of such a purpose, not even for a short time. For it is one thing to carry out a purpose in deed, and another to have the act of the purpose. It is not necessary that the man who elicits that act of love and thus has that purpose should at the same time always think of all the difficulties which stand in the way of carrying out the purpose; besides, it does not seem to have been proved that man cannot have a serious purpose concerning something which he cannot accomplish by his own powers.

Hence the opinion seems to be preferred which says that the act of the love of God above all things is, in the moral order, not absolutely impossible for fallen man. But since the act is merely natural, it is clear that it is not salutary, and therefore does not positively dispose for grace, much less is it immediately justifying³.