De gratia Redemptoris

This note of undue gift must still be briefly explained.

1. Actual grace is not due by the exigency of nature itself. According to the Baianists the gifts conferred on Adam in creation were due to integral nature; now, however, they are undue, inasmuch as human nature by sin has positively made itself unworthy of these gifts¹. The Baian propositions have been condemned: “The raising and exaltation of human nature to the fellowship of the divine nature was due to the integrity of the first condition, and therefore must be called natural, and not supernatural.” — “Absurd is the opinion of those who say that man from the beginning, by a certain supernatural and gratuitous gift, was raised above the condition of his nature, so as to worship God supernaturally by faith, hope and charity.” — “By vain and idle men, according to the folly of the philosophers, was devised the sentence, which is to be rejected as Pelagianism, that man was from the beginning so constituted that by gifts superadded to nature he was raised by the bounty of the Creator and adopted as a son of God.” — “False is the opinion of the doctors that the first man could have been created and instituted by God without natural justice”².

Since the elevation of nature into the supernatural order is absolutely undue, it follows that those helps of grace also, which are of that same order, are in the same way undue to nature.

Special in this question is the opinion of the Augustinians. According to them the only ultimate end possible to man is the intuitive vision of God itself; but this end is so sublime that it cannot be attained by the natural powers of man. But God owes it to himself that, if he creates man, he also make possible for him the attainment of his end; otherwise human nature would be more wretched than a non-rational creature, which possesses the powers to attain its end; God therefore owes it, whether by the title of providence or out of fittingness, to give man supernatural helps by which he can arrive at his end³. But this opinion is not to be admitted; for its supposition is not true, namely that the only end possible to man is the intuitive vision of God, and that in rational nature there is a remote right to the heavenly inheritance.

If, therefore, the supernatural order of grace is plainly outside every exigency of human nature, there is in it no positive ordination either to the end itself or to the supernatural means of obtaining it. But since man is an intellectual nature, the possibility of elevation into this order is present. This possibility or capacity immediately means the non-repugnance of such an elevation. Thus in intellectual nature there is an obediential potency for this elevation and for receiving the helps of this order, that is, that potency by which the creature obeys the Creator, so that he can make it fit for something which exceeds the powers of the creature. This obediential potency is passive in the sense that the creature of itself is only capable of receiving those gifts and helps passively; but once grace is received, man can and ought to cooperate actively.

2. From what has been said it follows that by merely natural acts man cannot positively prepare himself to obtain those supernatural helps: he can neither merit them nor positively dispose himself for them. These things have already been proved in the thesis itself; for such acts would be salutary; but salutary acts are strictly supernatural; therefore naturally impossible. Thus for the first supernatural grace there is no positive preparation at all; but with supernatural grace received, man can and ought thereafter, through salutary acts, prepare himself for other graces up to the very attainment of justification.

3. By natural prayers grace cannot be obtained. Petitionary prayer is the asking of things fitting from God. It supposes the desire of the good which is expected from God. The petition is properly the manifestation of this desire, and thereby the manifestation of one's own need; it appeals to the goodness of God, that he may wish to succour this need. The efficacy of prayer, then, is other than the efficacy of merit: merit is a service rendered to another, and as such appeals to his justice or equity; prayer, however, by showing one's own necessity, appeals to mercy. Hence of itself it would not be against the gratuitousness of grace if God willed to be moved to give grace to one who asked for it. That nevertheless by natural prayers grace cannot be obtained is plain:

a) Such prayer supposes the desire of grace; but this cannot be without grace.

b) That prayer would positively avail for salvation, and would therefore be a salutary act; but for a salutary act grace is required; therefore.

c) If a natural petition of grace were efficacious, man would positively dispose himself for grace; for by efficacious prayer we dispose ourselves to receive the gifts of God.

Therefore there is nothing in man but a merely passive potency for receiving the first actual elevating grace.