De gratia Redemptoris

From what has been said it is clear that man does not behave merely passively in his justification, but must cooperate, prepare and dispose himself. This disposition is proximately moral, and this is conceded by all; for by these acts man is rendered morally more apt to receive justice. Among theologians, however, as was already indicated above, it is controverted whether those acts are also a physical disposition for justification. This question can be put whether one holds that grace is created, or holds, with St Thomas¹ and the more common opinion, that it is educed from the obediential potency of the soul. This physical disposition is affirmed by Billuart² and others; but more commonly it is denied³.

That a physical disposition for justification is not universally necessary is clear from this, that in the justification of infants it is not present. A special reason would therefore have to be indicated why it is necessary in adults. Moreover, a physical disposition in the manner of a first act seems not to be admitted; for it would have to be a supernatural habit. But if grace, as it is a supernatural habit, required a physical disposition, the same would have to be said of that habit which physically disposes, and so one would proceed to infinity. If, however, the question is about the disposing acts themselves, whether they are a physical disposition, this seems to be denied of the remotely disposing acts, because they are no longer present when the justifying form is infused. There would remain, then, only the question of that last disposing act which is simultaneous with the reception of the form; for example, in justification through an act of contrition or of perfect charity outside the sacrament. In such a case the argument drawn from the remotely disposing acts would indeed not hold; but neither does there seem to have been brought forward up to now any argument by which a physical disposition is truly proved. Besides, since grace, according to the more probable opinion, is subjected in the substance of the soul, a physical disposition of the substance of the soul would have to be indicated; but the acts, if they disposed physically, would dispose the faculties. Hence the opinion which says that the acts are a moral disposition, and not a physical one, seems altogether to be preferred⁴.