De gratia Redemptoris

It defends predestination to glory taken precisely before foreseen merits. “Predestination to glory precedes predestination to grace”¹. For them he “by the good pleasure of his will decreed to confer such grace as would restrain the concupiscence remaining even in the baptized, for the struggle especially in the last period of life, so that they might finally persevere and be efficaciously brought to glory”². The rest are negatively reprobate. “Negative reprobation has its cause on the part of the reprobate, namely original sin.” To these “God, the Lord of his gifts, would not impart so great a grace” as to the predestined³.

“Sufficient grace, then, in the Thomistic sense and in ours, is that which gives the power, not the will; or if it gives the will, that is so invalid and imperfect that it does not overcome the contrary desires of the lusting flesh, unless a most ardent and most powerful charity supervene. Of this kind are the inspirations and pious desires of the soul which move the perverse soul and excite it somewhat, but do not draw it to conversion. This sufficient grace St Augustine experienced in himself a little before his conversion, and expressed it in these words in the eighth book of his Confessions, chapter 5: ‘But the new will which had begun to be in me, that I might worship thee freely and will to enjoy thee, O God, my only sure delight, was not yet able to overcome my former will, strengthened by age.’ From these it is clear that sufficient grace always produces some effect, namely a pious motion of the soul and a good will, but an invalid one, to which free will resists. It follows also that grace which in one man is sufficient is efficacious in another, whose old and fleshly will does not so conflict with the new and spiritual will as to dissipate the soul by its discord; and that the same grace is such in respect of one work, for example prayer, as is not efficacious in comparison with other works, for example the observance of all the divine commandments; and finally it is established that every grace of God, however small, is in itself sufficient for salutary works, as we have said elsewhere, that is, it does not effect salutary acts on account of the obstacle of carnal and stronger delight, although it gives the will the power to overcome it, if it will. But in order that it will, there is required in this state a holy victorious delight, which is not rejected by any hard heart: and this we say is efficacious grace. Therefore efficacious grace is that which is always conjoined with its effect, that is, charity, which gives the power and the will, and so much will as easily to overcome the will of the flesh desiring contrary things, and not only gives the power to act well, but effects the action itself...

But although we are most concordantly joined with the Thomists in the confession of sufficient and efficacious grace, and agree that free will accomplishes nothing good unless it be bent and determined to the act by victorious grace, we nevertheless dissent from them not only in explaining the nature of grace, but also in that they are unwilling to admit a graduality in the same grace, and most constantly hold that grace which is sufficient and inefficacious in one man cannot be efficacious in another, because sufficient and efficacious help differ from one another in species and in nature. But we contend that the same delight in number, which in some less blinded and hardened — for example in the Tyrians and Sidonians — would be efficacious and would draw them to penance, is inefficacious in others affected by greater blindness and hardness; nor is anything thereby derogated from efficacious grace, since if God inspires such a delight as overcomes perverse cupidity, he does this by the good pleasure and purpose of his will, and to those whom he wills efficaciously to act well he imparts such charity as is never rejected by their heart, however hard”⁴. Then it is laid down: “Proposition I. Grace is the inspiration of holy love; nor is it distinguished from actual charity... Proposition II. Efficacious grace is victorious delight, or charity, which overcomes contrary cupidity”⁵, “Proposition III. Delight is not the same in all, but now efficacious, now inefficacious, and charity and grace have their degrees, from which, without any prejudice to the absolute will of God, his wonderful economy together with the true freedom of our will can easily be discerned”⁶. “Proposition IV. This doctrine has nothing in common with the Jansenist heresy. Proof; for Jansenius... places the efficacy of grace in a victorious delight which is altogether separated from the deliberation and indifference of free will. But we say that this delight is indeed indeliberate insofar as it is inspired by God; and therefore we most firmly hold that through the first indeliberate act we merit nothing, unless the deliberate assent of free will be added, since merit cannot exist without the indifference of freedom. But this victorious delight is conjoined with deliberation in comparison with the works which are effected by the free will excited by this delight. For although this efficacious grace is antecedent, and God without us brings it about that we will, nevertheless through it the good is not proposed to us under every aspect of good, as it is proposed to the blessed through the light of glory, and therefore there remains an indifference of judgment and true freedom, which the blessed in heaven cannot have... Wherefore from this victorious delight the effect indeed follows infallibly, in that the mind embraces the good which delights it more, but it follows freely, because in this life no good so delights that some aspect of evil cannot be apprehended in it...

With equal right we disagree concerning inefficacious grace. For first we confess that any grace whatever in this state, whether small or great, is the grace of Christ. Then we maintain that there is given an inefficacious grace to which the will resists. And finally that through sufficient grace there is given us the power of fulfilling the divine commandments, and that a true and proper power, but not so strong and ready that efficacious grace is not necessary for placing the act”⁷.

In this system it is laid down that grace is efficacious of itself. “The last opinion is that of the Thomists and of all the Augustinians, who affirm that efficacious grace is so of itself, and is not made such either by the cooperation of free will or by congruous circumstances; and that it is most certainly and infallibly conjoined with its effect, not vaguely as it is comprehended in the heap of all graces, but insofar as it is an individual and peculiar premotion and inspiration conferred on men, not by a suspended and indifferent will of God, but by an absolute and most full one: so that this grace gives the power, the will and the performance, nor does it cooperate because we will, but we will because it operates”⁸.

Therefore grace is efficacious of itself, in the sign antecedent to the consent of free will; but this grace, efficacious of itself, differs from inefficacious grace only in degree; and the same grace altogether, which in one man is efficacious, can be inefficacious in another.

From these things it already appears that this doctrine is not to be admitted.

For this grace, efficacious of itself, is either conjoined with the consent by metaphysical necessity, so that dissent is metaphysically repugnant, and thus the free act is already determined in the sign antecedent to the election of free will and independently of it, and there is antecedent necessity: freedom is lacking; or between grace efficacious of itself and the consent of free will that antecedent necessity which takes away freedom does not exist, and dissent remains possible, and thus the metaphysical infallibility by which efficacious grace is conjoined with the consent of free will is not explained, unless scientia media be admitted, which nevertheless is absolutely denied in this system.

Moreover the same grace can be efficacious of itself in one man, which is inefficacious in another. If God gives this grace to some man, he knows that it is efficacious in this man, not efficacious in that one; therefore he knows that this grace in this man is greater than the man's free resistance and that it will prevail; similarly of the other man he knows that the same grace is less than the man's free resistance, and that it will not prevail. How then is that infallible knowledge explained by which God knows that another decision of the creature is metaphysically excluded? The free decision of the creature in the sign antecedent to its election would already have to be determinately true, otherwise it is not determinately knowable; but a free act is not determinately true in every sign antecedent to its futurity.

Finally, if victorious delight is absolutely necessary for a salutary act, something is lacking to non-victorious delight which is absolutely necessary for the act on the part of the operating principle; therefore non-victorious delight is not truly sufficient grace.

There are added the difficulties arising from the opinion of predestination to glory taken precisely before foreseen merits; from the claim that charity alone is grace; from the claim that a man always follows the greater delight, etc.

Therefore the efficacy of grace is not to be explained by victorious delight.