De gratia Redemptoris

The words of the thesis are taken from can. 32 of the Council of Trent.

“Justified”: that a man may be able to merit, he must be in the state of grace, vitally united with Christ. Io 15, 4: “As the branch cannot bear fruit, unless it abide in the vine, so neither can you, unless you abide in me”. The sinner has no merit strictly so called before God. Further, a man must be in the state of the way¹.

“By good works”: good works are those by which a man observes the commandments or counsels of God, by which he acts according to the will of God. But such a work, in order to be meritorious, must be free; for a meritorious work is one worthy of retribution; therefore in the work a man must contribute something of his own, and this only insofar as he is free. Freedom from coercion does not suffice, but freedom from necessity is required, as was defined against Jansenius², that is, freedom of indifference, and this either of exercise or of specification, at least if it is between acts of diverse moral goodness. Whether it suffices for merit if freedom of exercise is absent and there is only freedom of specification between acts of the same moral goodness, is disputed; but it seems better to deny it, because it does not appear how in such a supposition a man can really contribute something of his own³. Properly meritorious of itself is the act of the will alone, for that alone is intrinsically free and moral, the other acts only extrinsically and in their dependence on the act of the will; but it is clear that external acts can increase merit by increasing the intensity and duration of the internal act.

“Through the grace of God and the merit of Jesus Christ”: by our own natural powers we have no merit properly so called before God; the whole possibility of meriting is from divine grace, which is granted to us on account of the merit of Christ, and so our whole merit is essentially founded upon and depends upon the merit of Christ. “For since Christ Jesus himself, as the head into the members⁴ and as the vine into the branches⁵, continually pours his virtue into the justified themselves, which virtue always precedes, accompanies and follows their good works, and without which they could in no way be pleasing and meritorious to God: nothing further is to be judged wanting to the justified themselves, so that they... should not be reckoned to have merited”⁶.

“Truly merits”: what merit is has been explained at pag. 135 ss. That the merit of which the Council speaks in this place is to be understood as the merit of condignity is clear both from the history of the definition itself⁷ and from the words themselves; for to merit truly is to merit in the proper sense, which cannot be said of the merit of congruity; the Council cites the words of St Paul concerning the crown to be rendered by the “just judge”⁸; but the merit to which a reward from justice corresponds is the merit of condignity.

That a work may be meritorious of condignity, equality is required between the work and the reward, which reward must be given from justice if the work has been accepted. These things are verified in the good works of the just. There is an equality, not indeed quantitative, which is not required, but of proportion. The reward is heavenly glory; but the just man is a partaker of the divine nature, an adopted son of God, and so is in the same order of supernaturalness in which the reward is; by this his dignity the acts also are dignified, the works which he does as an adopted son of God; besides, these very works are also in the same order according to their entity, because they are entitatively supernatural acts. As therefore there is a proportion between the grace which makes us sons of God and heirs of eternal life, and this eternal life itself, so there is the same proportion between the supernatural works of the sons of God and eternal life. The dignity of the works of the just in the present order grows further from this, that the just man as a living member is intimately united with Christ, that he has from the merit of Christ the power to merit, and that through our meritorious works the merits of Christ are applied to us. The other thing required for the merit of condignity is acceptation; and this is had in this case through God's own promise that he wills to give eternal life as a reward for good works.

Therefore eternal life is given to the just after death not only by title of inheritance, but also as a condign reward, by title of a certain justice. But this justice seems to be in some way legal justice, and most of all distributive; according to St Thomas there is there even a certain commutative justice⁹, which can rightly be said on account of God's promise made before the work was performed. But although true justice intervenes in rendering the reward, yet the rigour of justice is not there; for since the works which we can do from our own proper powers have no proportion to the eternal reward, the whole possibility of meriting rests upon the gifts freely conferred on us by God. “When God crowns our merits”, says St Augustine, “he crowns nothing else than his own gifts”.

“Increase of grace”: this is understood of sanctifying grace. It has already been shown in thesis 12 that the justice of the just man grows through the good works which he does; now it is said more precisely that that increase of grace is given precisely as a reward for the good work. Therefore the good works of the just man do not only stand as a disposition, in whose presence God would increase grace, but they are meritorious of this increase, so that the increase of grace truly has the character of a reward for the good work. Hence those things which avail in relation to disposition cannot for that very reason be applied to the increase which a man has merited for himself.

“Eternal life, the attainment of eternal life, the increase of glory”: eternal life, although it is a grace, the inheritance of an adopted son, is nevertheless also a reward for a meritorious work: “And therefore eternal life is to be set before those who work well unto the end¹⁰ and hope in God, both as a grace mercifully promised to the sons of God through Christ Jesus, and as a reward to be faithfully rendered according to the promise of God himself for their good works and merits”¹¹. Since the reward of the increase of grace can already be conferred in this life, the reward of eternal life is granted only in the other life; a man therefore merits eternal life “to be attained also in its own time”¹²; for the condition is: “if nevertheless he departs in grace”. Since the just man merits through good works the increase of grace, and since glory is given according to the degree of grace and holiness, it is clear that through good works there is had also the merit of the increase of glory; this is understood of itself of essential glory, although the increase of accidental glory is not excluded.

THE DOCUMENTS OF THE CHURCH

CONC. ARAUSIC. can. 18: “Grace is preceded by no merits. A reward is owed to good works, if they are done; but the grace which is not owed precedes, that they may be done”¹³.

CONC. TRIDENTINUM speaks rather often of merit; besides the principal texts, cap. 16 and can. 32, cf. can. 2; can. 24 (good works are the cause of increasing justification); can. 26.

Pius V condemned the propositions of Baius: Prop. 2: “As an evil work is by its nature meritorious of eternal death, so a good work is by its nature meritorious of eternal life”¹⁴. Cf. prop. 3-6; 8; 10: “... the resurrection of the body is properly to be ascribed to the merits of Christ alone”. Prop. 11: “That we who have lived piously and justly in this mortal life unto the end of life attain eternal life, is not properly to be assigned to the grace of God, but to the natural ordination established at the very beginning of creation by the just judgment of God: nor in this retribution of goods is regard had to the merit of Christ, but only to the first institution of the human race, in which it was established by the natural law that by the just judgment of God eternal life be rendered to the obedience of the commandments”. — 12: “It is the opinion of Pelagius that a good work done without the grace of adoption is not meritorious of the kingdom of heaven”. — 13: “Good works done by the sons of adoption do not receive the character of merit from the fact that they are done through the spirit of adoption dwelling in the hearts of the sons of God, but only from the fact that they are conformable to the law, and that by them obedience is rendered to the law”. Similar things in prop. 14, 15. — 17: “They think with Pelagius who say that it is necessary for the character of merit that a man be raised by the grace of adoption to the deified state”. — 18: “The works of catechumens, such as faith and penance done before the remission of sins, are merits of eternal life: which life they themselves will not attain unless the impediments of their preceding sins be first removed”.

SACRED SCRIPTURE

Sacred Scripture affirms, between the works of the just who are on the way and eternal life, the relation which is between a truly meritorious work and its reward. For it calls eternal life a reward, a prize, a crown; eternal life is a recompense, a retribution; it is given for good works and according to the measure of works; it is given by a just judge. But the acceptation of God is contained in this, that God has promised eternal life as a reward, etc., for good works.

Reward: Matth 5, 11 s.: “Blessed are you when they shall revile you, and persecute you, and shall say all that is evil against you, untruly, for my sake: be glad and rejoice, for your reward is great in heaven”. Cf. 5, 46; 6, 1; 10, 42. — 1 Cor 3, 8: “But every man shall receive his own reward according to his own labour”. — V. 14: “If any man's work abide, which he has built upon it, he shall receive a reward”. — 2 Io 8: “Look to yourselves, that you lose not the things which you have wrought: but that you may receive a full reward”. — Apoc 11, 18: “And thy wrath is come, and the time of the dead to be judged, and to render a reward to thy servants the prophets, and to the saints, and to them that fear thy name, small and great, and to destroy them that have corrupted the earth”. — 22, 12: “Behold, I come quickly: and my reward is with me, to render to every man according to his works”. But a reward is that which someone merits by a work performed for another, and which is justly paid to him: Matth 20, 8, the parable of the labourers in the vineyard: “Call the labourers and pay them their hire”, concerning which he had agreed with them in v. 2; cf. v. 14: “Take what is thine and go”. Cf. Luc 10, 7; 1 Tim 5, 18; Iac 5, 4.

Recompense: Hebr 10, 35: “Do not therefore lose your confidence, which has a great recompense”. Cf. 11, 6. 26; 2 Cor 6, 13. Recompense (μισθαποδοσία) is the payment of a reward.

Prize: Phil 3, 14: “I press towards the mark (I run towards the goal, the end), to the prize of the supernal vocation of God in Christ Jesus”. The prize is the reward which the president of the contest in the public games gives to the victor of the contest; cf. 1 Cor 9, 24: “Know you not that they who run in the race, all run indeed, but one receives the prize? So run that you may obtain”.

Crown: 2 Tim 4, 7 s.: “I have fought the good fight, I have finished my course, I have kept the faith. As to the rest, there is laid up for me a crown of justice (a crown, the reward of justice, Zorell), which the Lord, the just judge, will render to me in that day: and not to me only, but to them also that love his coming”. Cf. 2 Tim 2, 3. 5. — Iac 1, 12: “Blessed is the man that endures temptation: for when he has been proved, he shall receive the crown of life, which God has promised to them that love him”. — Apoc 2, 10: “Be thou faithful unto death, and I will give thee the crown of life”.

Retribution: Col 3, 23 s.: “Whatsoever you do, do it from the heart, as to the Lord, and not to men: knowing that you shall receive of the Lord the retribution of inheritance”.

For good works: Matth 25, 34 s.: “Possess the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world: for I was hungry and you gave me to eat...”. — 2 Cor 4, 17; 5, 10.

According to works: Matth 16, 27: “For the Son of man shall come in the glory of his Father with his angels: and then will he render to every man according to his works”. — Rom 2, 6; 1 Cor 3, 8; Apoc 22, 12. — 2 Cor 9, 6: “He who sows sparingly shall also reap sparingly: and he who sows in blessings (ἐπ’ εὐλογίαις. Εὐλογία here signifies liberality; hence ἐπ’ εὐλογίαις in opposition to “sparingly” signifies “largely”; Zorell) of blessings shall also reap”.

The just judge: 2 Tim 4, 7 s.

THE FATHERS

St Justin: “Having been taught by the prophets that punishments and torments and good recompenses are rendered according to the merit of each one's actions, we also show forth the truth”¹⁵.

St Theophilus: “Read the prophetic Scriptures diligently, and they will guide you more safely, that you may escape eternal punishments and attain the eternal goods of God. For he who gave a mouth for speaking, and formed ears for hearing, and made eyes for seeing, will examine all things and will pass a just judgment, giving to each one his reward according to his merits”¹⁶.

St Irenaeus: “Let us reckon the crown precious, namely that which is acquired for us by struggle, and not one that grows of itself. And the more it comes to us through struggle, the more precious it is; and the more precious, the more let us always love it. But neither are those things loved in like manner which come of themselves, as those which are found out with much solicitude”¹⁷.

Tertullian: “A good deed has God for its debtor, as also an evil one, because the judge is the recompenser of every cause”¹⁸.

St Hippolytus: “Before whose (God the Word's) judgment all standing, men, angels, demons, will utter this one voice, saying thus: Thy judgment is just. The equity of which voice the retribution made to both shows; since to those who do well eternal enjoyment is justly rendered, but to the covetous of evil things eternal punishment is paid back”¹⁹.

St Cyprian: “Buy for yourself a white garment, that you who were naked according to Adam and before were foul and loathsome may be clothed with the shining raiment of Christ. And you who are a wealthy and rich matron, anoint your eyes not with the devil's antimony but with the eye-salve of Christ, that you may be able to come to the sight of God, while you merit God by your conduct and works”²⁰.

St Cyril of Jerusalem: “The root of every good work is the hope of the resurrection; for the expectation of the reward strengthens the soul to undertake good works. And indeed every labourer is ready to endure labours if he has looked forward to the reward of his labours; but for those who labour with no reward set before them, the mind falls together with the body beforehand”²¹.

St Basil: “Tell me, I pray, of what times will you demand the reward — of those in which you lived, or of those which followed after death? But in the time when you were living, given over to the pleasures of life and dissolving in delights, you did not endure even to look upon the needy; but now what action is there of a dead man? and what reward of work is owed to him? Show your works and demand the recompense”²².

St Ambrose: “The scale of our merits hangs upon each one of us, and by the slight weights of a good deed or of a degenerate crime it is often inclined this way and that... On the day of judgment either our works will help us, or they themselves will plunge us into the deep, sunk as by a millstone”²³.

St Jerome: “God created us with free will, nor are we drawn to virtues or to vices by necessity. Otherwise, where there is necessity, there is no crown”²⁴. — “It is now our task to prepare for ourselves different rewards in proportion to the diversity of our virtues”²⁵.

St Augustine: “He has granted pardon, he will render the crown: he is the giver of pardon, the debtor of the crown. Whence a debtor? Has he received anything?... The Lord has made himself a debtor, not by receiving, but by promising. It is not said to him: Render what you have received; but: Render what you have promised”²⁶. — “It is commanded that we live rightly, with this reward certainly set before us, that we may merit to live blessedly for ever. But who can live rightly and work well, unless justified by faith?”²⁷.

“Nor let a man say to himself: If it is from faith, how is it gratis? For what faith merits, why is it not rather rendered than given? Let not a faithful man say these things, because, when he has said: I have faith that I may merit justification, it is answered him: What have you that you have not received²⁸? When therefore faith obtains justification, as God has divided to each one the measure also of faith²⁹, no human merit precedes the grace of God, but grace itself merits to be increased, that being increased it may merit also to be perfected, the will accompanying and not leading, following and not going before”³⁰.

“For he (God) has been made a debtor, not by receiving anything from us, but by what it pleased him to promise. For in one way we say to a man: You owe me because I gave you; and in another way we say: You owe me because you promised me... In that way, then, we can demand of our Lord, saying: Render what you promised, because we have done what you commanded; and this you have done, because you have helped those who laboured”³¹.

“What merits, then, will the delivered man boast of, when if what was worthy of his merits were rendered, he would be nothing but condemned? Are there therefore no merits of the just? There are plainly, because they are just. But that they might become just, they had no merits”³². — “What then is the merit of man before grace, by which merit he may receive grace, when our every good merit is wrought in us by grace alone, and when God crowns our merits he crowns nothing else than his own gifts”³³. — “For when he had said: The wages of sin is death³⁴, who would not judge that he would most fittingly and consequently add, if he said: But the wages of justice is life eternal? And it is true; because as to the merit of sin death is rendered as its wages, so to the merit of justice eternal life is rendered as its wages”³⁵.

St Prosper: “The man therefore justified, that is, made pious from impious, with no good merit preceding, receives the gift by which gift he may acquire merit also”³⁶. — The same (?): “It has been shown, as I judge, abundantly by these testimonies, although other documents too could have been gathered, that the faith by which the impious is justified is not had except from the gift of God, and is bestowed with no merits preceding, but is given for this, that it may be the beginning of merits; and that, when it has been given though not asked for, the other goods follow from its petitions”³⁷.

St Fulgentius: “He therefore who has given us what we may owe by rendering, will himself give us the ability by which we may render what we owe. He therefore is the author of the debt who is the author of the gift; for he has deigned to make himself a debtor by his own liberality, not because being in need he received from anyone, but because being abundant he bestowed largely”³⁸.

St Gregory the Great: “The good which we do is both God's and ours: God's through prevenient grace, ours through the obedient free will. For if it is not God's, whence do we give him thanks for ever? Again, if it is not ours, whence do we hope that rewards will be rendered to us? Because therefore we give thanks not without reason, we know that we are preceded by his gift; and again, because we seek a retribution not without reason, we know that with free will following we choose the good things which we would do”³⁹.

THE THEOLOGIANS

It is clear that the theologians agree in the things which the thesis affirms. They raise, however, certain special questions, in which diverse opinions are held:

The first sanctifying grace is not the object of merit, but only the increase of grace; for as long as a man is without sanctifying grace he is unjust, a sinner, and as such he cannot have merit of condignity before God. But a similar reasoning does not hold in relation to heavenly glory. Moreover, in Sacred Scripture eternal life is simply proposed as a reward, as the object of the merit of the just, and not merely as its increase. Hence many theologians hold that the first glory itself is given not by the title of inheritance alone but also by the title of merit. So Suárez¹, Vázquez² and others. De Lugo³, Ripalda⁴ and others deny it, according to whom the first glory is given by the title of inheritance alone.

Some think that the solution of the question depends on the view whether the last act disposing to justification proceeds effectively from sanctifying grace or not⁵, and that only on the former supposition can the first glory be said to be the object of merit. St Bellarmine, however, shows that the solution cannot be derived from that, but from the question whether one and the same thing can be due on various titles, which must certainly be affirmed. Thus the glory of the body was due to Christ by reason of the hypostatic union, and was also the object of merit. “But if it be granted, which is what we contend for, and what St Thomas teaches in 3 Sent. dist. 18 quaest. 1 art. 5, that one and the same thing can be due on various titles, without doubt that last disposition, continued after the infusion of grace, will be meritorious of eternal life, as St Thomas confirms in 1, 2 quaest. 112 art. 2 ad 1”⁶. Whether this view can appeal to the Council of Trent, which says that eternal life and the increase of glory are objects of merit, is not certain, since in the history of this definition it does not appear that the council wished to touch or to define this question.

The meritorious act is entitatively supernatural. Those, then, who say that a supernatural act necessarily has a formal object proper to itself, which is unattainable by natural powers, must necessarily affirm the same of the meritorious act. But from the fact that someone, as we have done, does not hold this view to be true, the matter is not for that reason decided. For God could of himself have established for the meritorious act the condition that it must proceed from some motive known by faith¹, for example the motive of acquiring supernatural beatitude; on this supposition the act would have to proceed from such a motive in such a way that by his act the man willed to tend to that end.

Those who affirm the necessity of a motive known by faith must of themselves concede that acts can be found in the just man which are neither sins nor meritorious, but indifferent in relation to eternal life — namely those acts which do indeed proceed from an honest motive, but are not ordered by the man's intention to the end known by faith, God, eternal life.

But those who deny that necessity say: Every just man has faith, has ordered himself to God, to the supernatural end, to eternal life; through the supernatural habits he can elicit acts that are entitatively supernatural. If now from some honest motive, not precisely known by faith, he elicits a morally good act, he himself remains in his ordering and tendency to his end, and by that very fact proceeds on the way to this end, without its being necessary to order the act by a special intention to God or to the attainment of eternal life. For every honest end is in fact ordered to the supreme end and subordinated to it; and the man who acts has chosen God as his last end when he became a believer and was justified, and so also by reason of the subject the act has that order to God, to eternal life, which is required.

On this matter there are very many disputations; Lange² gives the best survey of the more recent controversies, and finally concludes³: “Historically and speculatively our question is solved with difficulty. Most theologians affirm the necessity of some motive of faith. Many testimonies of the Fathers also seem to require it. But it can be disputed when faith has sufficient influence on works.”

Besides, it can also be asked whether the views differ speculatively, that is, in the explanation itself, or are in reality so very different. For even those who require the necessity of a “good intention” concede that it need not be actual and explicit, but that a virtual and implicit one suffices. For example, Pesch writes thus⁴: “From what has been said it is manifest how faith is necessary for each salutary work, and how it is not. For faith is required first of all for this, that a man be able to have the intention of a supernatural end and be moved towards it. Hence in each work faith must have efficacy to this extent, that the man walk within the way and not take steps outside the way. For this, however, there is no need that in each work an act of faith be elicited or the intention of the supernatural end renewed. But as he who, undertaking a pilgrimage to a distant city, elicits at the outset a firm purpose of going there, and by virtue of this purpose proceeds on the journey as long as he has not placed a contrary act, either explicitly or implicitly..., so the Christian who has once elicited a firm purpose of acquiring eternal life by his acts acts from this purpose as long as he does not revoke it, neither negatively nor positively, neither explicitly nor implicitly, which revocation is present in every grave sin. If, however, he has revoked it, a new conversion to the end is required... Nor is the thought that this act in particular has been revealed by God as salutary necessary in every good work, since Christians know that the observance of the natural law too has been proposed by God to us as the way to the supernatural end, as for example in the Sermon on the Mount... If, however, a Christian were to do works naturally honest only for the sake of the honesty of this world, so that through them he in no way tended to the supernatural end, he would not only not act well, but would sin, because he would not wish to conform himself to the divine ordinance... That vehement dispute which is stirred among later theologians on this matter seems to have arisen from the fact that some did not always sufficiently attend to what was required for the intention of the end to influence the choice of means and to dignify it, and therefore demanded too much; while others interpreted this exaggerated concept in a bad sense and so attacked a chimera. Surely any good Christian, asked why he does good works, will answer: Because I wish to come to heaven. This habitual intention plainly suffices for a man to act from the motive of faith. Wherefore such men are not to be disturbed about the motives of their good works, but simply exhorted to renew the good intention more often. This intention in ordinary men hardly ever proceeds from a philosophical consideration of natural honesty, but rather from the doctrine of faith concerning the heavenly kingdom to be obtained by merits.” Much less again does it seem to be required in the opposite view.

The question proposed treats only of what is absolutely required for a meritorious act; it is plain of itself that the act is better and more meritorious the more perfectly the “good intention” is present and influences the act.

It must be premised that the Church condemned the following propositions against Quesnel: Prop. 53: “Charity alone in a Christian manner performs (Christian actions) through relation to God and Jesus Christ”. — 54: “Charity alone is what speaks to God; it alone God hears”. — 55: “God crowns only charity: he who runs from another impulse and from another motive runs in vain”. — 56: “God rewards only charity: since charity alone honours God”¹. Hence it must now be said that it is not only acts elicited by charity that are meritorious. Nor does the Council of Trent restrict merit to acts of charity, but speaks universally of good works.

Some theologians hold that an act of virtue is not meritorious² unless it proceeds imperatively or virtually from an act of charity previously elicited. So several Thomists and Augustinians; besides St Bonaventure³, St Bellarmine⁴. But neither does the Council of Trent speak of this condition, though it indicated everything that is required for merit⁵. It requires the state of grace and good works. Can it be said that an act of virtue not commanded by charity is not a good work?

Hence preference is to be given to the view which is defended by very many theologians, and which Suárez states thus: “acts of the infused virtues performed by a man in grace are meritorious of condignity of supernatural beatitude by the force of their own goodness and connatural weight or relation to that end, without any other, so to speak extrinsic, relation accruing to them through a past or present act of charity”⁶.

This view corresponds perfectly to what the Council of Trent teaches, and adds no new condition to the conditions of merit established by the council. But if it is objected that the council requires works to be done “in God”, it must be answered that “in God” is not the same as “from charity”; the good works which are done by a just man under the influence of Christ, with the help of grace, are done in God. Nor does Sacred Scripture say that, for a work to be meritorious, it is required that it proceed from charity; cf. for example Matth 5 on the beatitudes. Therefore no other ordering “to the end of charity” is required in a meritorious work than that which consists in this, that the man who acts be in the state of grace and charity and, as an adopted son of God, do what God wills and what pleases God; thus in the work itself there is an ordering to the last end. If the condition which the other view establishes were so necessary that without it a work would not be meritorious, God would have made this clear.

Since the act of charity is the noblest act of the virtues and the most meritorious, it is plain that the acts of the other virtues are better the more charity influences them.

In this question we suppose that every supernatural act of virtue in the just is meritorious; it is only asked whether the increase of grace which a man has merited for himself by such acts is conferred immediately after the merit. For there are some theologians who think that this increase is had at once only if the man is disposed to receive it. This view seems to have arisen chiefly from what St Thomas says in 1, 2 q. 114 a. 8 ad 3. According to some, that disposition is then present in a man if the act of virtue is equally or more intense than the habit of grace; others think that the increase of grace which a man has merited for himself by remiss acts is given only in the other life.

In the sources of revelation nothing is found for this view. The increase of a supernatural habit must not be compared simply with the increase of a natural habit, in which the act itself as a physical cause contributes to the increase of the habit. But this in no way obtains in the meritorious work in relation to the supernatural habit; rather, God works the increase of the habit physically, and indeed as a reward, a retribution. But no reason appears why God cannot and will not give such an increase as a reward if the meritorious act is less intense. In this view there seems to be insufficient attention to the great difference which exists between disposition and merit. Altogether, therefore, preference is to be given to the view which says that the increase of grace is always conferred immediately after the meritorious act, even if that act is less intense. The Council of Trent says simply that the just grow in the justice received through good works, through the observance of the commandments, that they go from virtue to virtue, are renewed from day to day, nor does it ever indicate that they do not grow in justice unless their acts are equally or more intense than the habit.

There are those who say that at least for practice the former view is safer; for they think there is a danger that a man find himself deceived in the judgment, when he believes that through all those acts he has acquired an increase of grace which nevertheless he does not obtain. This could perhaps be said if that view had foundations in the sources of revelation. But since these are not found, neither is that danger present. For what was said before holds in this place too: if a greater intensity of the act were a condition as necessary as is affirmed, God would have made this clear.

But since merit grows with the goodness of the act, the faithful are to be exhorted to ever greater fervour, not indeed that they may merit the increase of grace altogether, but that they may have greater merit and be more pleasing to God.

The question could still be touched on in this place, whether the meritorious act must proceed from actual grace; but it seems better to speak of this matter in the fourth part, where the nature of actual grace is treated.

Objections

Very many objections of the innovators against the Catholic doctrine on merit are found in St Bellarmine, De iustificatione, lib. 5.

1. When eternal life is called a reward in Sacred Scripture, this is not to be understood in the proper sense but in a figurative one; for eternal life is called an inheritance; but an inheritance is not a reward; for it is due to sons because they are sons, not because they merited it by their labours.

I answer. “Since in the Scriptures eternal life is called a reward no less often, perhaps even more often, than an inheritance, how will Calvin prove that it must be called an inheritance properly and a reward improperly, and not rather the contrary, a reward properly and an inheritance improperly? Then, what if both can be said properly? For eternal life has the character of a reward and of an inheritance. For it is given by promise to those who labour, which is proper to a reward; and it is not given except to sons, which is proper to an inheritance”¹

“But if an inheritance is due to sons because they are sons, what need is there to labour to obtain it?

The answer is ready to hand: for although eternal life is given to little children who die soon after baptism by the title of inheritance alone, nevertheless God willed that his sons who have the use of reason should acquire it by their own labours and merits, so that eternal life should be due to them on a double title, namely the title of inheritance and the right of reward; for since it is more honourable to have something by merit than by mere donation, God, in order the more to honour his sons, granted them this besides, that they should procure eternal life for themselves by merits. For the glory of his body and the exaltation of his name were due to Christ himself by this very fact, that he was the Son of God; and yet because he humbled himself, becoming obedient unto death, therefore God exalted him and gave him a name which is above every name. To pass over for the present the fact that to the merits of works there is rendered some degree of eternal glory, which those who rejoice in the title of inheritance alone do not attain”²

2. From Matth 25 (possess the kingdom... for I was hungry) merit is not proved. For “‘for’ does not state a cause, but only an order and consequence: God willed that the works of mercy should first be done by the elect, and that the kingdom should afterwards be obtained by them” (Calvin).

I answer. Whether “for” can sometimes indicate only order, I pass over; certainly it can also signify causality. That it is to be understood thus in this place is plain a) from the parallel member: Go, you cursed, into eternal fire, for I was hungry and you gave me not to eat... But no one says that here only order is indicated and not causality; b) from the fact that in other places the attainment of glory is attributed to the works themselves (cf. the texts cited in the argument).

3. Ps 102, 4: “Who (the Lord) crowneth thee in mercy and compassion”; therefore not on account of merit, out of justice.

I answer. Beatitude is attributed to mercy “not because it is not a true reward of merit, but because the merits themselves have been given out of mercy. For a man cannot do meritorious works unless he has first been justified. But he is justified not from works, but from grace and mercy. Wherefore St Augustine too is accustomed to distinguish thus, saying that to justice itself eternal life is a reward, not a grace; but to the man himself it is a grace, not a reward, since to man justice is a grace”³

4. Luc 17, 10: “When you shall have done all the things that are commanded you, say: We are unprofitable servants; we have done that which we ought to do”. Therefore merit does not arise from works.

I answer. “As St Augustine expounds, serm. 3 de verbis Domini, we can be called unprofitable servants when we have kept all the divine commandments, since we do nothing beyond what we owe, and could ask nothing from it as a just reward, unless God had willed to make a liberal covenant with us. For by our condition we are the slaves of God, and if he wills, he can bind us to all works whatever that please him without any reward. This condition of ours, then, Christ wills us to acknowledge in order to preserve humility. Although by the gratuitous covenant which he deigned to make with us, we can say with the Apostle: There is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the just judge will render to me in that day. For the Lord himself also says: Didst thou not agree with me for a penny? Take what is thine and go. O great, says Augustine, is the goodness of God: when by our condition we owe him obedience as servants to a lord, he promises us the rewards of friendship, so that he may extort from us the service of due servitude”⁴

5. Rom 6, 23 says: “For the wages of sin is death, but the grace of God is life everlasting”, and it does not say: the wages of good works is eternal life; therefore eternal life is not the object of merit.

I answer. “St Augustine diligently solves this argument in epist. 105, in the Enchiridion cap. 107, and especially in the book De gratia et libero arbitrio cap. 8 and 9. But he says two things. First, that the Apostle could rightly have said, the wages of justice is eternal life, as he said, the wages of sin is death. And this confession of St Augustine utterly cuts the throat of the adversaries' case. Secondly, that it was not said, the wages of justice is eternal life, as the wages of sin is death, lest anyone should think that we have justice from ourselves as we have sins from ourselves. And so eternal life is called a grace, not because it is not the reward of merit, but because we have the merits themselves from grace”⁵

6. A great injury is done to Christ if anything is attributed to our merits, as though the merits of Christ were not sufficient.

I answer. “The more rhetorically, or rather tragically, the adversaries amplify this argument, the more empty it is found to be when it is discussed. For the merits of the just are not opposed to the merits of Christ, but are born from them, and whatever praise the merits of the just have, all of it redounds to the praise of the merits of Christ. For he is the vine, we the branches; and as the branch cannot bear fruit unless it abide in the vine, so neither can we do anything without Christ. And as no one was ever so foolish as to say that the glory of the vine is diminished if its branches bear much fruit, so no one, unless plainly foolish, can say that the glory of Christ is diminished if his servants, through his grace, through his spirit, through the faith and charity inspired by him, do good works which are so truly just that a crown of justice is owed to them by a just judge.

But, they say, if the merits of men are required, then the merits of Christ were not sufficient.

It is not so. For the merits of men are not required because the merits of Christ are insufficient, but because of their very great efficacy. For the works of Christ merited before God not only that we should obtain salvation, but also that we should obtain it through our own merits. Or, what is the same, they merited for us not only eternal salvation but also the power of meriting...

But at least, they say, glory is divided between God and man, if we attain salvation not by his merits alone but also by our own.

Nor is that true. For our merits are the gifts of Christ. And although in the good work which we do with God's help nothing is ours that is not God's, nor is anything God's that is not ours, but God does the whole and man does the whole: yet the reason why that work is worthy of eternal life depends entirely on grace. Finally, we are no less bound to Christ, nor do we refer our salvation whole and entire to him any the less, when we acquire it by our own merits, than if we received it without any merits of ours; indeed we confess ourselves much more his debtors now, since we are saved not only through his grace, but are saved through it in a most noble and most honourable manner”⁶

7. Rom 8, 18: “For I reckon that the sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the glory to come that shall be revealed in us”. Therefore St Paul denies the condignity of works with future glory.

I answer. The Greek text has οὐκ ἄξια, that is, “they are not weighty”, if they are compared with future glory⁷; the discourse is not about the condignity by which some work is meritorious of condignity.

In substance the same is found in St Bellarmine⁸: “For the Apostle speaks of the substance of the works themselves, not of an absolute proportion. For the sufferings of this time are brief, that glory is eternal; yet there is a proportion between these sufferings and that glory, on account of the dignity of the charity from which they proceed. For the passion of Christ too was much briefer than the eternal punishments of the damned, and yet on account of the dignity of the person suffering it was most worthy to satisfy most justly for those punishments. And the delights of sinners are incomparably less than the torments of hell, and yet on account of contempt of God they are most worthy to be punished with those torments.⁹ And the seed is much smaller, as regards bulk, than the tree itself; and yet there is so great a proportion between the seed and the tree that by a kind of natural justice the tree is owed to the seed rightly sown. And so blessed Paul says indeed in 2 Cor 4 that the sufferings of this time are momentary and light, if they are compared with the weight of eternal glory which we await, and yet he adds that these same momentary and light sufferings work the weight of eternal glory; but he understands them to work it without doubt not physically but morally, that is, not efficiently but meritoriously, and by this very fact to be worthy that that glory, however great and eternal, be attributed to them by a just judgment”.

Similarly St Thomas¹⁰: “The meritorious work of man can be considered in two ways: in one way according as it proceeds from free will; in another way according as it proceeds from the grace of the Holy Spirit. If it be considered according to the substance of the work and according as it proceeds from free will, then there cannot be condignity there on account of the greatest inequality; but there is congruity on account of a certain equality of proportion. For it seems congruous that to a man working according to his own power God should recompense according to the excellence of his power. But if we speak of the meritorious work according as it proceeds from the grace of the Holy Spirit, then it is meritorious of eternal life by condignity. For thus the value of the merit is attended to according to the power of the Holy Spirit moving us to eternal life, according to that of Ioannis 4: He shall become in him a fountain of water springing up unto life everlasting. The price of the work is attended to also according to the dignity of grace, through which man, made a partaker of the divine nature, is adopted as a son of God, to whom an inheritance is due from the very right of adoption, according to that of Rom 8: If sons, then heirs.”

8. In this doctrine God would be a debtor to man; but this is impossible; therefore.

I answer with St Augustine: “The Lord made himself a debtor, not by receiving, but by promising”¹¹. — Bellarmine: “A promise made with the condition of a work not only makes the thing promised due — for he who has promised is bound by justice to stand by his promises — but also brings it about that he who has fulfilled the work is said to have merited the thing promised and to be able to demand it as a reward by his own right”¹².

The just man cannot merit of condignity the first efficacious grace after justification. For efficacious grace is already required for such a meritorious act. But neither, on the supposition of this first efficacious grace, can he merit of condignity the efficacious graces that follow; for if so, the just man, after receiving the first efficacious grace, would already be confirmed in grace by his merits, he would be impeccable. But from thesis 12, part 2, it is clear that the just man is in danger of sinning as long as he is a wayfarer, and not only in that space of time which lies between justification and the first efficacious grace.

Therefore the just man cannot merit for himself of condignity the gift of perseverance. For that includes a series of efficacious graces from the last justification to death, and death itself in the state of grace. That the gift of perseverance is not the object of merit of condignity, St Augustine shows in the book De dono perseverantiae (On the gift of perseverance), where he says: “Hence it is shown clearly enough that the grace of God, both for beginning and for persevering unto the end, is not given according to our merits, but is given according to his own most secret and at the same time most just, most wise, most beneficent will, since those whom he predestined he also called, with that calling of which it was said: The gifts and the calling of God are without repentance”¹. Theologians agree on this matter², and commonly propose it as theologically certain³.

But the just man can merit of congruity perseverance, if the first efficacious grace is excepted. For it seems congruous that God the heavenly Father, in view of the good works which his adopted sons perform, should have such care for them that they remain in grace. But since there is no divine promise concerning this matter, this merit of congruity is not infallible.

The just man can nevertheless impetrate the gift of perseverance by supplication, the first efficacious grace being again excepted, as is plain. So St Augustine: “This gift of God, then, can be merited by supplication”⁴, and for that reason he warns that the gift of perseverance must always be asked for. So St Thomas⁵: “Even those things which we do not merit, we impetrate by praying; for God hears sinners too asking pardon of their sins, which they do not merit, as is plain from Augustine on that text of Ioan. 9: We know that God doth not hear sinners, otherwise the publican would have said in vain: God, be merciful to me a sinner, as is said in Luc 18; and similarly one impetrates from God the gift of perseverance by asking, either for himself or for another, although it does not fall under merit”. Suárez⁶ sets the matter down as most certain. Christ promised: “All things whatsoever you shall ask in prayer, believing, you shall receive” (⁷). But prayer must be such as Christ willed: “We ought always to pray and not to faint”⁸.

Suárez explains the matter thus: “The just man's meriting or impetrating the gift of perseverance can be understood in two ways. First, by one act, or by several acts performed within a certain time, or up to a certain point of life, impetrating perseverance and, as it were, confirmation in grace for the rest of life. Secondly, successively through the whole time of life, impetrating perseverance as it were by parts, for example now impetrating efficacious help not to fall on the present occasion, and after it praying again and impetrating other help to keep the commandment that again occurs, and so on praying and never failing. I say therefore that the former way of meriting or impetrating perseverance is not infallible... If anyone prays perseveringly, asking for perseverance in grace, he will infallibly impetrate it, yet not in that first way which we have so far denied, but in the other, second way declared above. And so we say, secondly, that the just man, by persevering in the due manner in the insistence and frequency of prayer, can successively and infallibly obtain perseverance unto death. This is proved, because perseverance in praying, necessary for this impetration, is not merely some duration of one or another petition for some time; for this can neither be defined nor affirmed with foundation. Nor would that prayer be prudent by which someone asked to be given perseverance for the whole time of future life, even without a new diligence of procuring that same perseverance. Nor is there reason why we should believe that such a promise was made to any prayer. Therefore perseverance in prayer, required in such a matter, is that it be made not once only or twice, but that it last through the whole time of life, and especially that on the occasions that occur of keeping the commandments or overcoming temptations it be repeated with due confidence. For thus it will come about that, proceeding from one act to another, doing well and praying fittingly, he infallibly obtains perseverance. But this infallibility does not belong to this merit of congruity by reason of itself (so to speak), but by reason of the impetration, which properly answers to prayer or petition alone, as such. The reason is that this infallibility is founded solely on the divine promise, which is not found to have been made to the works of the just as meritorious of congruity, but only to prayer. Wherefore, that the fruit of this merit may be more certain, the petition for perseverance must always be joined to it. And for the same reason we must pray not only that we may not sin, but that we may persevere in prayer, since neither prayer nor perseverance in it can be without the grace of God, nor will it be without a congruous calling. And so this whole merit and impetration must have its beginning from some help conferred without merit or impetration”⁹.

It is an altogether probable view that the just man can merit of congruity reparation after a fall. So, against St Thomas¹⁰, very many theologians: St Bonaventure¹¹, Scotus¹², St Bellarmine¹³, Suárez¹⁴, Ripalda¹⁵. The sense of this doctrine is not that a man, after he has sinned, can merit of congruity justification¹⁶; but that by works done in the state of justice a man merits of congruity the grace of repentance and conversion after a fall. Indeed, if one supposes a man who had long remained in justice and had done many good works, and then nevertheless from weakness rather than from malice committed a mortal sin, it seems altogether congruous that the merciful God, in view of the good works he had previously done, should so help him that he in fact arrives at repentance. It is plain that the congruity is less if someone was perhaps only a short time in justice and did but few good works, and afterwards sinned much and from malice.

Temporal goods considered merely in themselves do not seem to be the object of merit, but insofar as they help on the way of salvation they can be the object of merit of congruity¹⁷.

As regards the merit of the just man for others, Suárez¹⁸ says: “The rule, then, is that the just man can merit of congruity for another what he can for himself, and something more”. This more is the first grace itself, which no one can merit for himself. “By the merit of congruity one can merit for another the first grace. For since a man established in grace fulfils the will of God, it is congruous according to the proportion of friendship that God should fulfil the will of the man in the salvation of another”¹⁹.