De gratia Redemptoris

By the sin of Adam the human race lost the gift of integrity; man was changed for the worse in body and in soul. Although nature is not intrinsically corrupted, man is nevertheless wounded in his natural endowments, since that harmony which was possessed by the gift of integrity has been impaired. So weak is man that without grace he certainly comes to mortal sin. It is of this weakness, and of the necessity of grace for healing this weakness, that the present thesis speaks. Grace is necessary in order that man may remain free from mortal sin.

“The adult sinner”: a man truly adult, who has sufficient knowledge of the natural law; who is in the state of sin, and proximately, indeed, original sin is meant; for the discourse concerns that weakness which in the present order comes from original sin. This weakness can be increased by personal sins.

“The whole natural law”: the natural law is that law which is inscribed in the heart of all men, which the adult cannot be ignorant of, which manifests itself in the dictate of conscience. It is usually defined as: the divine will commanding the observance of the natural order and forbidding its disturbance. It is called natural law because it is given with nature, through nature, in nature; and it is so called in distinction from positive law. The thesis treats of the observance of this law as a whole, because for the observance of one or another precept there is not, nor can it be proved, so great a difficulty.

“To observe as to substance”: a law is said to be observed as to substance when it is observed as to what it commands or forbids, but not in such a way, with that perfection, as is required for the work to be salutary; hence to observe as to substance is the same as to observe “merely honestly”, or “not salutarily”.

“For long”: it cannot be determined to a day and an hour, but it signifies a time which is morally reckoned as a longer time, for example several months, or a year.

“Cannot”: the discourse is not about physical impotence; for what the natural law prescribes cannot exceed the physical powers of this nature. It is therefore a question of moral impotence, that is, of a great difficulty in doing what is not physically impossible. This impotence is explained further below.

“Without grace”: without undue divine help. The discourse is not about grace insofar as it gives the physical power of acting¹, but about the help which assists against that moral impotence which arises from the weakness of nature; it is therefore medicinal grace against that weakness, and insofar as it in some way heals the wound, it is called healing grace.

The words of the thesis explained thus far affirm the fact itself, that such an impotence is found in man. Moral impotence, however, presupposes special difficulties which man cannot overcome. The words of the thesis which follow indicate whence these difficulties arise, or in what they consist.

“Temptation” is a solicitation to sin, either by hindering a good act from being done, or by enticing to the commission of a bad act; it arises either from corrupted nature itself (rebellious concupiscence), or from the world, or from the devil². Temptation can be unto mortal sin as well as unto venial sin; in the thesis only temptation unto mortal sin is meant.

“Grave” is that temptation which brings great difficulty. It is not therefore called grave by reason of the object to which it entices, as if the temptation to mortal sin were grave and that to venial sin light; but a temptation to mortal sin can be light, and a temptation to venial sin can be grave. This great difficulty consists for the most part in this, that the temptation strongly entices to sin and at the same time lasts longer; it is therefore great by reason of intensity and duration. “A light temptation, then, is said to be that which either on the part of the intellect has a small or ineffective persuasion, or on the part of the appetite a weak inclination; or that is also light which lasts only for a moment or a very brief time, although otherwise it may seem intense or vehement; but that is called grave which persuades obstinately over a long time, constantly and grievously, and it can be reckoned grave on this title even if at individual moments it is not very vehement, provided that either the persuasion is great in itself, or it is joined with some passion and inclination. But these degrees of temptations cannot be defined by a fixed rule or degree, but must be weighed by prudent judgment, and above all must be considered in comparison with the one who is tempted. For a temptation will be grave for one which would be light for another, on account of their various complexions, temperaments, habits or learning, all of which must be weighed”³.

“Occur”: not always and continually, but it is to be understood in the same way as “for long” above, namely that no one remains free from temptation for long.

“It seems to remain doubtful whether in fact every adult man is sometimes stirred by grave temptations to transgress the divine law in a grave matter. For there seem to be men so placid that they feel no vehement movements of the passions. To this it must be said: If we except those who, either by natural disposition or from illness or old age, are so feeble that nothing greatly matters to them, all men naturally have their own vicious inclinations, by which they are moved when occasion is given, one to avarice, another to anger, another to carnal pleasures, another to sloth in fulfilling the duties of his state, another to injuring charity by word or deed, another to other sins, so that of all it holds: ‘The flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh’ (Gal 5, 17; cf. Eph 6, 10 ff.). ‘Labour as a good soldier of Christ... For he also that striveth for the mastery is not crowned, except he strive lawfully’ (2 Tim 2, 3. 5). Wherefore the Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 13, admonishes all in the words of the apostle: ‘But yet let him that thinketh himself to stand, take heed lest he fall (1 Cor 10, 12), and with fear and trembling work out their salvation (Phil 2, 12)... For they ought to fear, knowing that they are born again into hope of glory and not yet into glory, because of the struggle which remains with the flesh, with the world, with the devil’ (Denz. n. 806). It can indeed happen that someone keeps himself free from grave sin through his whole life; it can also happen that someone, after a struggle long and faithfully overcome, arrives at such quiet that he no longer feels temptations very troublesome. But this very thing is a special gift of God, as St Augustine says: ‘O thou who sayest that thou hast not committed many crimes, why? under whose rule?... This thy God says to thee: I was ruling thee for myself, I was keeping thee for myself’ (Serm. 99, c. 6; M 38,598)”⁴.

“To overcome honestly”: a temptation can be overcome

a) from a bad motive; for example, not to get drunk in order to commit a homicide: he overcomes badly; for this neither is grace required nor is it given;

b) from a motive of supernatural honesty, for example from the love of God: he overcomes salutarily; for this elevating grace is required;

c) from a motive of natural honesty; for example from the natural love of the contrary good: he overcomes honestly; and it is of this that the thesis speaks.

So much for the sense of the thesis; some things still remain to be noted or further explained.

1. It is not asked whether in fact a man is ever found in such a temptation without the help of grace that is necessary; that this does not obtain will be shown in the last part of the treatise, where the distribution of graces is discussed. Hence nothing can be strictly proved either for or against the thesis from experience.

2. A further explanation of the impotence. As has already been said, the impotence is not physical; it could be asserted only by those who would say that human nature has been intrinsically corrupted by original sin. It is therefore moral impotence, a great difficulty in positing the act, which arises from the vehemence of the temptation and its duration. It is easily understood that a man whose knowledge all begins from sense, and which is always bound to matter, knows sensible things much more easily and clearly than spiritual things, and consequently that the will is more inclined and affected by sensible goods than by purely spiritual goods. Hence already of itself the knowledge of a spiritual good and its love is joined with some difficulty, if it is compared with the knowledge and love of sensible things; and thence some struggle between the flesh and the spirit can already begin, if the sensible good is unlawful for man. If then those unlawful sensible things are presented with greater vividness and clarity, a special effort is necessary for man to turn himself away from these things to the consideration of spiritual things, which effort can already be sufficiently difficult. The difficulty grows if there is added a direct solicitation on the part of men, or even on the part of the devil, so that it is morally scarcely possible for man to persevere in the consideration of spiritual goods. Perhaps a strong man can for a short time conquer such an assault, but if the temptation lasts long, rises again and again anew, the man's strength is diminished, the man is worn out, so that at length it is a matter of the greatest difficulty, a moral impotence, to resist longer: the man yields to the temptation.

This is antecedent moral impotence; but as long as the judgment of the man is not truly disturbed or taken away, and the man is not determined to one thing, so long does liberty remain; and as long as this is present, the possibility of the opposite act remains in relation to the particular act, and absolute impotence cannot yet be affirmed.

But man is worn out during that struggle, the intellect is obscured, the will is weakened, and matters come to such a point that man no longer resists with as great a will as he could of himself; the will contrary to the temptation becomes so weak that what in other circumstances would perhaps suffice no longer suffices in so vehement and so long-continued an assault. Thus ultimately the impotence to conquer the temptation arises from this, that the man in fact no longer wills as he can. Consequently, in relation to such a weak will there is absolute impotence. Therefore impotence as absolute is not merely antecedent, but consequent upon this weak free will. So St Augustine: “For the will of the saints is so kindled by the Holy Spirit that they are able because they so will; and they so will because God works that they will. For if in so great an infirmity of this life (in which infirmity, nevertheless, virtue had to be perfected in order to repress pride), their own will were left to them, so that they should remain, if they willed, in the help of God without which they could not persevere, and God did not work in them that they will, amid so many and so great temptations their will itself would succumb through its infirmity, and therefore they could not persevere, because, failing through infirmity, they would not will, or would not so will through the infirmity of the will as to be able. Help has therefore been brought to the infirmity of the human will, that it might be acted upon by divine grace indeflectibly and invincibly; and therefore, although weak, it should not fail, nor be conquered by any adversity”⁵.

From this question — namely, in what the impotence consists and how it is to be explained — there is altogether to be distinguished the other question, whence we know that all men in the present order are so impotent that they would sin without the help of grace. This knowledge we draw from revelation; for God knows what men would do under various conditions. Hence Pesch well says: ⁶ “We indeed do not know the wills of all men so perfectly that we could say a priori that no man wills sufficiently to be able, but this we learn from divine revelation. Nor, however, is it to be said that this absolute impotence is only consequent upon the foresight of God, as Suárez rightly notes (l. 1, c. 24, n. 24 f.), but it is consequent upon the defect of human fortitude or of the love of the honest good, and it is known through the foresight and revelation of God; for the foresight of God does not make the impotence, but manifests it”.

In the explanation given, man's liberty remains. For the impotence, insofar as it is antecedent, is not absolute, and leaves the possibility of the opposite act; but the absolute impotence, by which the opposite act is absolutely excluded, is consequent upon the man's free but weak will; the necessity, therefore, of succumbing to temptation is at no antecedent stage of the use of free will absolute, and so man's liberty is not taken away.

3. What kind of help is required? It follows from the nature of the impotence, which the help must heal. That moral weakness is founded on this, that the intellect knows spiritual things with more difficulty and is more inclined to sensible things; the opposite remedy, therefore, is a more easy and clearer knowledge of the spiritual good and a greater inclination of the will towards it. If a man, wearied in temptation, has already come to the point that he no longer wills as he can, and in such a condition his attention is directed by a special illumination of the intellect to the consideration of spiritual goods, and in the will a greater inclination to such a good arises, then the remedy against that weakness is already had. The help, therefore, is the illumination of the intellect and the inspiration of the will⁷.

4. In what way is this help gratuitous? In this question it is supposed that in fact that help is gratuitous, undue, is truly the grace of Christ, which is positively proved. It is not in itself necessary that that help — the illuminations of the intellect and the inspirations of the will — be entitatively supernatural. For the discourse is not about salutary acts, about a temptation to be overcome salutarily, but merely honestly; and the weakness of man itself can of itself be healed in individual acts by an entitatively natural help; therefore the gratuity of this help cannot of itself be derived from its entitative supernaturality. But an entitatively natural help can be undue according to the manner in which it is conferred: a help supernatural in a certain respect, and hence a true grace. God confers such an illumination of the intellect and such an inspiration of the will as would not be had under the concrete circumstances through the natural course of natural causes; therefore beyond the common and ordinary course of nature he puts into man those thoughts and inclinations of the will; they are therefore supernatural as to manner and so undue. Since whatever has the character of grace in the present order is conferred on account of the merits of Christ, those illuminations of the intellect and inspirations of the will are also truly the grace of Christ the Redeemer.

Suárez: “This motion, then, to speak briefly, is either an illumination of the intellect, by which the object is represented better and more strongly than through the common course of causes it could be, or some motion of the will, by which God makes that resistance sweet, or terrifies from that evil, as Augustine said in homil. 24 and 50. But I have said that the motion must be given in some way supernatural, because for the effect of which we treat it is not always necessary that it be supernatural in its entity, since the effect is not so excellent. It suffices, therefore, that it be conferred in a supernatural manner; and that manner consists in this, that such and so great a consideration or affection, or inordination, in such an occasion and point of time could not come about through the common course of natural causes, nor be procured by the human industry of the one who suffers the temptation. And therefore that motion has the true character of grace, especially if it is given in order to a supernatural end, as it is now given”⁸.

From what has been said — that medicinal help need not be entitatively supernatural — it does not follow that it cannot be, or is not in fact, entitatively supernatural. But if the temptation is conquered by an entitatively supernatural help, the act is not only naturally honest, but salutary. So Billot⁹, who thinks that a grace supernatural only as to manner is not to be admitted, but considers every help of grace to be entitatively supernatural. Ripalda had taught similarly. According to others, however, the grace which is granted to the faithful for overcoming temptation is always entitatively supernatural; but there does not seem to be sufficient reason for denying this simply in regard to those who do not yet believe, but rather it is to be assumed that to them also, at least sometimes, entitatively supernatural graces are granted for overcoming temptations. But if the grace is entitatively supernatural, then it is not only healing but also elevating, and it appears much more clearly to be a gratuitous gift.

Nevertheless, in every supposition that help seems to be in some measure due. For God owes to man those helps without which it is absolutely impossible for man to observe the natural law, to avoid personal mortal sins. For the discourse concerns some impotence which is founded in man's very nature, and which would be, or could be, the same or similar in the state of pure nature, in which without doubt such a help would have been due to nature.

To this some theologians reply that this weakness, although it would have been the same or similar in the order of pure nature, nevertheless in the present order comes from sin, and therefore appeal cannot be made to what would have been in the state of pure nature. For in the present order man has through sin lost every claim to that help which would have been due to him in the state of pure nature.

This reply supposes that man can suffer an essential loss, on account of original sin alone, in those things which nature itself demands, and which thus pertain to nature. But the opposite principle seems truer and is far more commonly used by theologians in the question of the consequences of original sin for the other life¹⁰. Consequently it must be said that even in this life man is not deprived, on account of original sin alone, of those things which nature itself demands of itself, without which it is absolutely impossible to avoid personal mortal sin.

Therefore it must be said: it is due to the man who is in original sin alone, who has not yet committed personal sins, that he not be in that absolute impotence of avoiding mortal sin; he ought to have the possibility of avoiding sin: there is due to him the help by which he can avoid sin. But there is not due to him any help that is supernatural as to manner or even entitatively, such as in the present order is in fact given. This supernatural help, whether as to manner or entitatively, in the present order also supplies what in the order of pure nature a merely natural help would have supplied. And so it remains true that that medicinal help, which in the present order is given on account of the merits of Christ, is truly undue, truly grace. As long as a man is in original sin alone, medicinal help, healing grace, is always at hand for him, and so in fact it is not impossible for such a man to avoid mortal sin. But if a man has committed personal sins, he has through his own fault made himself unworthy of the divine favour; whether, however, and how far God also offers his grace to such a man, must be said in the last part, which is on the distribution of grace¹¹.

Against the thesis are the Pelagians, of whom St Augustine said: “These men are... so great enemies of the grace of God, that they believe that without it man can do all the divine commandments”¹².

The qualification of this thesis. Suárez: “It is usually asked, however, how certain this assertion is. In this all theologians, especially the moderns, teach that it is certain and indubitable, because the contrary comes very close to the error of Pelagius. The difficulty is whether it is simply of faith; for some affirm it on account of the testimonies of Paul and of the councils which we have adduced. So Medina holds, on art. 4 and 8 of St Thomas cited above, whom several moderns imitate. But Soto, at the said chap. 21, does not think that it is of faith, because the testimonies adduced admit some interpretation not altogether improbable, and Torens follows him, book 1 of the Augustinian Confession, chap. 3. Valent. also indicates this, 2nd tome, disput. 8, quaest. 1, punct. 5, § 2, because he delivers it only as a theological opinion. And it also seems to me that it is not simply of faith, because I do not find an express and specific definition of the Church of this dogma under these terms of the proposition, namely concerning the observance of all the precepts of the natural law only as to avoiding the sins contrary to them. But the general definitions adduced above have the evasions also set out above, which, although they are sufficiently refuted, are not so evidently refuted that it is certain of faith that this particular dogma is contained under that general definition. And therefore it is enough to say that this doctrine is a theological conclusion so certain that the contrary is not only now temerarious, but even close to error”¹³. The same can be said today: it is not certainly established by definition; the thesis, abstracting from the further explanation disputed among theologians, is at least to be set down as theologically certain.

THE DOCUMENTS OF THE CHURCH

The Indiculus has already gathered several things pertaining here: “Chap. 3. That no one, even one renewed by the grace of baptism, is fit to overcome the snares of the devil and to conquer the concupiscences of the flesh, unless through the daily help of God he has received perseverance in a good life. This the doctrine of the same bishop (Innocent I) in the same pages¹⁴ confirms, saying: For although he had redeemed man from his past sins, nevertheless, knowing that he could sin again, he kept many things for his reparation, just as he could also correct him after these things, granting him daily remedies; relying and trusting on which, unless we strive, we shall in no way be able to overcome human errors. For it is necessary that, by whose help we conquer, when he does not help again we be conquered”¹⁵.

“Chap. 7. That also which has been established among the decrees of the Council of Carthage¹⁶ we embrace as proper to the Apostolic See, namely what is defined in the third chapter: That whoever says that the grace of God, by which we are justified through Jesus Christ our Lord, avails only for the remission of sins which have already been committed, and not also for help that they not be committed, let him be anathema. And again in the fourth chapter: That whoever says that the grace of God through Jesus Christ helps us not to sin only for this reason, that through it the understanding of the commandments is revealed and opened to us, that we may know what we ought to desire and what to avoid, but that it is not granted to us through it that we love and are able to do what we have known ought to be done, let him be anathema. For since the Apostle says: Knowledge puffeth up, but charity edifieth, it is very impious that we should believe that we have the grace of Christ for that which puffeth up, and have it not for that which edifieth, since both are the gift of God, both to know what we ought to do and to love in order to do it, so that, charity edifying, knowledge may not be able to puff up. But as it is written of God: Who teacheth man knowledge, so it is written also: Charity is of God. Likewise in the fifth chapter: That whoever says that the grace of justification is therefore given to us, that what we are commanded to do by free will we may be able to fulfil more easily through grace, as if, even if grace were not given, we could still, not indeed easily, but nevertheless fulfil the divine commandments without it, let him be anathema. For the Lord was speaking of the fruits of the commandments, where he did not say: Without me you can do it with more difficulty, but said: Without me you can do nothing”¹⁷.

The Council of Orange, can. 10: “The help of God is always to be implored even by those reborn and healed, that they may be able to come to a good end, or to persevere in a good work”¹⁸.

The Council of Trent says of the just themselves: “For they ought to fear, knowing that they are born again into hope of glory and not yet into glory, because of the struggle which remains with the flesh, with the world, with the devil, in which they cannot be conquerors unless with the grace of God they obey the Apostle saying: We are debtors not to the flesh, to live according to the flesh. For if you live according to the flesh, you shall die. But if by the spirit you mortify the deeds of the flesh, you shall live”¹⁹.

In these texts it is without doubt said that man without the grace of Christ cannot observe the commandments of God, cannot conquer in the struggle. But there is no explicit distinction between observing and conquering salutarily, and merely honestly. Yet it also clearly appears that the sense is that without grace man is conquered in that struggle, that is, that he comes to sin, which was to be established specifically against the Pelagians, who affirmed that man could by his own powers overcome temptation; this is also clearly taught in the Council of Trent. In some places the discourse is directly about those reborn and healed; if therefore they cannot overcome, much more does this hold of those not yet reborn and healed. What kind of grace is necessary is not further determined; several times, however, the discourse is about a remedy, a daily help, which can scarcely be understood otherwise than of actual help.

Thus in these texts is truly contained what the thesis affirms; but from what has been said it is also understood why several theologians hold that it is not certainly established by an explicit definition in relation to the merely honest observance of the commandments and to temptations merely honestly overcome.

SACRED SCRIPTURE

Sacred Scripture clearly teaches that man, even the justified, must undergo a grave and dangerous struggle against the enemies of his salvation, in which he cannot conquer without divine help: by his own natural powers, therefore, he will succumb.

Eph 6, 10 ff.: “For the rest, brethren, be strengthened in the Lord, and in the power of his might. Put you on the armour of God, that you may be able to stand (resist) against the wiles (deceitful machinations) of the devil; for our wrestling is not against flesh and blood (against men), but against principalities and powers, against the rulers of the world of this darkness, against the spirits of wickedness in high places (in the airy heaven; cf. 2, 2). Therefore take unto you the armour of God, that you may be able to resist in the evil day (difficult, exposed to the snares of the devil), and in all things perfect (to conquer, to overcome all things) to stand (to persist firmly, not to fall). Stand therefore, having your loins girt about with truth, and having on the breastplate of justice, and your feet shod with the preparation of the gospel of peace; in all things taking the shield of faith, wherewith you may be able (will be able) to extinguish all the fiery darts of the most wicked one; and take unto you the helmet of salvation, and the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God, by all prayer and supplication, praying at all times in the spirit; and in the same watching with all instance and supplication for all the saints”.

1 Petr 5, 8 f.: “Be sober and watch: because your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about seeking whom he may devour; whom resist ye, strong in faith”.

The Lord teaches us to pray: “And lead us not into temptation”²⁰, whose meaning Suárez well explains: “I say, therefore, that we ask that we not fall into a harmful temptation; for, as I said, these later petitions are about avoiding evil; and such a temptation is a grave evil; but that which is not harmful has rather the character of a good. But a temptation is called harmful which is going to overcome us; and of such it is true that we ask both that we not be conquered by it and that we not suffer it: yet if one considers it, these two, in respect of the same temptation, come to the same thing; for he who is assaulted by such a temptation is conquered, otherwise it is not harmful; but it was supposed to be going to be harmful in the foreknowledge of God; therefore, because we believe that he knows best which temptation is going to be harmful, we ask that he not lead us into it. And so the propriety of this word is excellently declared; for then what he permits is especially wont to be attributed to God, as if he did it, when from certain foreknowledge, and with the foreseen evil not standing in the way, he permits it”²¹.

Again the Lord admonishes: “Watch and pray, that you enter not into temptation. The spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is weak”²². To watch, although in this place it is said immediately in the proper sense, namely that the apostles stay awake, that they defend themselves from sleep; “nevertheless, deservedly, from one kind of actions which was necessary to them at that time and which Christ recommended as a care, a general lesson is drawn, proposed to all, that they watch, i.e. that they be cautious and solicitous and circumspect and assiduous in preventing dangers, in removing the incitements of sins: in foreseeing and examining the arts and frauds of those who strive to entice to sin”²³. Besides, the Lord admonishes that prayer must be made, to this end, that they not enter into temptation, which is either: that they not fall into temptation, or: that they not enter into temptation by the assent of the will, i.e. consent to it, succumb in it. Then the Lord adds the reason: the spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is weak; therefore even if the spirit is good, nevertheless prayer must be made, because from the side of the weak flesh difficulties will come, to overcome which divine help is necessary. “In order, therefore, that strength be present to overcome this weakness of the flesh, and that by that weakness the spirit itself not be weakened and miserably fall away from its good purpose, prayer is needed, by which those necessary strengths may be obtained from heaven”²⁴.

This struggle which is in man himself between the spirit and the flesh, St Paul describes in Rom 7, and teaches that only by the help of grace does man not succumb in it. Whatever be the explanation of the individual verses and words of this chapter, on which matter there are diverse opinions among Catholic exegetes²⁵, this at least is clear, that the apostle says that in himself, in his members, in his flesh there is a certain law which opposes itself to the law of God. Hence as soon as man has known the law of God, there arises in him a struggle between what he has known ought to be done and what the spirit also wills to do (v. 16, 21, 22), and the law which is in his members (v. 23). This law wills to lead him to sin, and would also lead him there, if he were not freed and helped by the grace of Christ: by this grace alone can he remain free from sin (indirectly, by giving thanks, v. 25; directly 8, 2 ff.).

It is asked who is to be understood by that “I”: a man under the Mosaic law; a justified Christian man (so later St Augustine)²⁶. It seems that it must be said: a man under the Mosaic law. But the Mosaic law is not considered here by the apostle insofar as, besides the things which the natural law prescribes, it also gave ceremonial precepts, but insofar as it says precisely: thou shalt not covet; for by this positive law the Jew also had knowledge of the natural law. Yet what the apostle says of that internal struggle holds not only of the Jews but also of the Gentiles; for they too, according to the apostle's doctrine (c. 2), have knowledge of the natural law, and hence, as regards that struggle, they were not in a better condition than the Jews.

Therefore according to the doctrine of sacred Scripture man on the way of salvation is assaulted by the devil, by the flesh; temptations occur to him which he will not overcome without divine help.

THE FATHERS

ST JOHN CHRYSOSTOM: “God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above what you are able. There are therefore temptations which cannot be borne. And which are they? All of them, so to speak; for the power lies in the help of God, which we draw to ourselves by our will. Wherefore, that you may learn accurately that we cannot easily bear without his help not only those which surpass our power but not even these human ones, he added: But will with the temptation also make issue, that you may be able to bear it”²⁷. — “Do not deprive the paralytic of praise, nor him nor any other man whosoever who is tempted and bears it patiently. For however often we philosophize, however much we be the strongest and most vigorous of all, if the help of God be absent, we shall not be able to resist even a moderate temptation. But why do I speak of us who are vile and abject? Let Paul be someone, or Peter; let it be James or John: deprived of heavenly aid, he is easily conquered and supplanted and falls... Nor is it only in dangers which exceed our powers, but in those also which do not exceed them, that we need heavenly help, that we may resist generously”²⁸.

ST AMBROSE: “If you consider that the just man is scarcely saved, you understand indeed that even his footsteps sometimes totter, and that the author of their decline seems to be God; because he himself also suffers the just to be tempted often, that being instructed by temptations they may be the more proved. But who is so strong as never to be moved in temptation, unless the Lord stand by him as helper”²⁹.

ST JEROME: “The Saviour in his passion is strengthened by an angel, and my Critobulus does not need the help of God, having the power of free will... What, he says, do you sleep? Rise and pray, that you enter not into temptation. He ought, according to you, to have said: What do you sleep? Rise and resist; for you have free will, and once the power has been granted you by the Lord, you need the help of no other. For if you do this, you will not enter into temptation”³⁰.

ST AUGUSTINE: “But they (the Pelagians) seem to themselves to speak acutely, as if any of us were ignorant of this, that if we do not will, we do not sin; nor would God command man what was impossible to the human will. But they do not see that for overcoming some things, either those which are evilly desired or those which are evilly feared, there is sometimes need of great and whole strength of will, which he foresaw that we would not perfectly apply in all things”³¹.

“The Pelagians think they know something great when they say: God would not command what he knew could not be done by man. Who does not know this? But he therefore commands some things which we cannot do, that we may know what we ought to ask of him. For faith itself is that which by praying obtains what the law commands. Finally, he who said: If thou wilt, thou shalt keep the commandments, says somewhat later in the same book of Ecclesiasticus: Who will give a guard to my mouth, and a cunning seal upon my lips, lest I fall by it, and my tongue destroy me?³² He had certainly already received the commandments: Refrain thy tongue from evil, and let thy lips not speak guile³³. Since therefore it is true what he said: If thou wilt, thou shalt keep the commandments, why does he ask that a guard be given to his mouth; like him who says in the Psalm: Set, O Lord, a guard to my mouth?³⁴ Why do not the commandment of God and his own will suffice him; since if he will, he will keep the commandments? How many commandments of God are against pride: he already knows them; if he will, he will keep them. Why then does he say a little later: O Lord, Father and God of my life, give me not the elation of the eyes? The law had already said to him: Thou shalt not covet³⁵: let him therefore will, and do what is commanded; since if he will, he will keep the commandments. Why does he go on and say: Turn away concupiscence from me? Against luxury God has commanded how many things: let him do them, because if he will, he will keep the commandments. What is it that he cries to God: Let not the appetite of the belly and sexual intercourse take hold of me?³⁶ If we said these things to him while present, he would most rightly answer us and say: From this prayer of mine, by which I ask these things of God, understand how I said: If thou wilt, thou shalt keep the commandments. For it is certain that we keep the commandments if we will; but because the will is prepared by the Lord, it must be asked of him that we will as much as suffices for us to do by willing. It is certain that we will when we will; but he makes us will the good, of whom it was said, which I put a little before: The will is prepared by the Lord³⁷; of whom it was said: The steps of man are directed by the Lord, and he will desire his way³⁸; of whom it was said: It is God who worketh in you both to will³⁹. It is certain that we do when we do; but he makes us do, by supplying most efficacious strength to the will, who said: I will make you walk in my justifications, and keep my judgments and do them. When he says: I will make you do, what else does he say but: I will take away from you the heart of stone, whence you did not do; and I will give you a heart of flesh, whence you may do? And what is this but: I will take away the hard heart, whence you did not do, and I will give an obedient heart, whence you may do? He makes us do, to whom man says: Set, O Lord, a guard to my mouth. For this is to say: Make me set a guard to my mouth; which benefit of God he had already obtained who said: I set a guard to my mouth”⁴⁰.

THE THEOLOGIANS

St Thomas: “Before the reason of man, in which mortal sin is, is repaired by justifying grace, it can avoid individual mortal sins, and for some time; for it is not necessary that it sin continually in act; but that it remain long without mortal sin cannot be. Whence also Gregory says on Ezechiel, that sin which is not immediately blotted out by penance draws by its own weight to another. And the reason of this is, that as the lower appetite ought to be subject to reason, so also reason ought to be subject to God, and to establish in him the end of its will; but by the end all human acts must be regulated, as by the judgment of reason the movements of the lower appetite must be regulated. As therefore, when the lower appetite is not totally subject to reason, it cannot be but that inordinate movements occur in the sensitive appetite, so also, when the reason of man is not totally subject to God, it follows that many inordinations occur in the very acts of reason. For when man has not his heart established in God, so as to be willing for no good to be obtained or evil to be avoided to be separated from him, many things occur on account of which, to be obtained or avoided, man withdraws from God, despising his commandments; and so he sins mortally; especially because in sudden matters man acts according to the end preconceived, and according to the pre-existing habit, as the Philosopher says in 3 Ethicorum; although from the premeditation of reason man can do something besides the order of the preconceived end, and besides the inclination of the habit. But because man cannot always be in such premeditation, it cannot happen that he remain long without acting according to the inclination of a will disordered from God, unless he be quickly repaired to the due order by grace”⁴¹.

In those things which the thesis affirms, the theologians agree; but in the further explanation they disagree, as was indicated in expounding the thesis.

If the question about temptations is put thus, whether man can overcome a grave temptation by his own powers, some deny it, at least if it is understood of all grave temptations taken collectively; others think that this must be denied even for individual grave temptations. Yet at once the question arises, how a grave temptation is to be defined; if it is defined as that which man cannot overcome by his own powers, the negative answer for individual temptations is necessary; but such a denial is a tautology. If, however, a grave temptation is conceived as that which brings great difficulty, perhaps it is more difficult to prove strictly an absolute impotence to overcome them individually.

OBJECTIONS

1. Absolute impossibility takes away liberty; but even in the state of fallen nature man is free; therefore absolute impossibility is not had.

I answer: I distinguish the major: an absolute impossibility that is simply antecedent takes away liberty, I let it pass; an absolute impossibility that is not simply antecedent but consequent upon the man's own weak volition, I deny.

2. God does not command impossible things; but he commands the observance of the natural law; therefore this observance is possible.

I answer: I distinguish the major: he does not command impossible things, that is, those which are possible neither with divine help nor without it, I grant; those which are impossible without divine help, I subdistinguish: if he were to deny this help without personal sin on man's part, I let it pass; if he grants this help to man, I deny. In this matter what the Council of Trent says also holds: “For God does not command impossible things, but by commanding he admonishes both to do what you can, and to ask what you cannot, and he helps you that you may be able”⁴². The minor is granted. I distinguish the consequence: the observance of the natural law is possible with divine help, I grant; without it, I deny.

3. But such help is due to man; therefore it is not grace. Proof of the subsumed minor: that is due to man without which he cannot but sin; but such is the help of which the thesis speaks; therefore it is due. The major seems evident; for it is impossible for God, under penalty of eternal damnation, to command man something which is absolutely impossible for all men.

I answer: I deny the subsumed minor; to its proof, I distinguish the major: a merely natural help would be due to man, without which he could not but sin, I grant or let it pass; a supernatural help, I deny. I counter-distinguish the minor: it is a natural help, I deny; it is supernatural, I grant.

But in this reply it is contained that the supernatural help which is in fact granted also supplies those things which in another order a natural help would have supplied; therefore this help can be called due insofar as it precisely takes the place of that merely natural help.

I answer: the whole is granted, according to the doctrine expounded above⁴³; yet it does not follow from this that the supernatural help which is given is due, and is not grace.

Other difficulties are easily solved if it is considered that sufficient help is at hand for all, and therefore that in fact the observance of the natural law is not impossible for man. For many objections see Beraza n. 202 ff., 297 ff.

It is not asked whether the natural love of God and the supernatural love are to be distinguished, which has been proved in the treatise on charity¹; the opposite has been condemned against Baius, prop. 34: “That distinction of the twofold love, namely natural, by which God is loved as the author of nature, and gratuitous, by which God is loved as beatifier, is vain and fictitious, and devised to mock the sacred Scriptures and the many testimonies of the ancients”². But it is asked whether the act of natural love, by which God is loved above all things, is possible for fallen man. That such a love is possible for innocent man in the merely natural order is easily conceded. Love above all things is understood not intensively but appreciatively, that is, the love by which God is preferred to every created being. A love of this kind necessarily includes the will not to sin, to fulfil the things which God wills. The discourse is not about love above all things effectively, that is, such that man in fact even in his works prefer God to all creatures; that this love is naturally impossible has been proved in the preceding thesis. But the discourse is about love above all things affectively, that is, whether such an affection can be elicited by man with his natural powers. And indeed only its possibility is asked, not whether such an act is in fact found. Nor is physical power meant, which is again conceded, but moral power, namely whether perhaps in such an act so great a difficulty is found that it is absolutely impossible for fallen man. The matter cannot be decided from the positive sources; because when in them the discourse is about the necessity of grace for loving God, salutary love is meant; and the opinions of theologians on this question are divided. But reason seems to be in favour of affirming that power.

For man by the natural light of reason can know that God is his last end, that he is infinitely good and most amiable; nor does there appear a reason why the affection of love towards God cannot follow such knowledge; for in this act as such there does not seem to be extraordinary difficulty, so that it should be called morally impossible. Nor does it seem impossible by reason of the purpose of not sinning, which, as has been said, is included in that act of love. Although it is true that man cannot by his natural powers carry out that purpose, it does not follow from this that he can never have an act of such a purpose, not even for a short time. For it is one thing to carry out a purpose in deed, and another to have the act of the purpose. It is not necessary that the man who elicits that act of love and thus has that purpose should at the same time always think of all the difficulties which stand in the way of carrying out the purpose; besides, it does not seem to have been proved that man cannot have a serious purpose concerning something which he cannot accomplish by his own powers.

Hence the opinion seems to be preferred which says that the act of the love of God above all things is, in the moral order, not absolutely impossible for fallen man. But since the act is merely natural, it is clear that it is not salutary, and therefore does not positively dispose for grace, much less is it immediately justifying³.