De gratia Redemptoris

This thesis asks what the natural powers of man are worth in the moral order after original sin. According to the doctrine of the innovators of the sixteenth century, human nature has been inwardly corrupted by sin and no longer has liberty for good acts; similarly, in the doctrine of Baius and Jansenius, fallen man without grace cannot but sin. These errors have for the most part been dealt with already in the preceding thesis. But among Catholic theologians the Augustinians¹ affirm that without the help of grace every moral act of fallen man, although by its object and proximate end it can be good, nevertheless, with the last end in view, is not good but is always vitiated, at least by an evil love of self, by philautia; in the more restricted form which Berti proposes, it is conceded that a good act is possible in speculation, but not in practice. Yet this opinion does not seem to be admitted.

“Acts naturally honest”: Since morally indifferent acts are not found in the individual, the free acts of man are either morally good or morally evil; good acts can in themselves be either supernaturally good, that is, salutary acts, or merely naturally good, that is, honest acts, which lack the perfection proper to salutary acts; of these acts the thesis speaks. They are therefore natural acts, which are conformed to the natural norm of morals. The thesis does not say that all acts of this kind can be placed without the help of grace, but only that there are such acts as can be placed.

“By natural powers, without the help of grace”: Even in the state of fallen nature the physical and moral powers are present, such that those acts can be placed, that is: these acts do not exceed the physical and moral powers of fallen man. There is not required, therefore, an undue help of grace, by which the physical or moral powers of fallen man would be increased.

“Can”: The question is only about the power, not whether in fact such acts are found, or whether God always helps man by his grace, although this help is not necessary.

The thesis is laid down as morally certain².

The documents of the Church

St Pius V, Baius prop. 37: “He agrees with Pelagius, who acknowledges something naturally good, that is, which takes its origin from the powers of nature alone”³.

Clement XI, error 2 of Paschasius Quesnel: “The grace of Jesus Christ, the efficacious principle of every kind of good, is necessary for every good work: without it not only is nothing done, but nothing can be done”⁴. Error 39: “The will, which grace does not go before, has no light except to go astray, no ardour except to cast itself down, no strength except to wound itself; it is capable of every evil and incapable of any good”⁵.

The Fathers

ST AUGUSTINE: “Yet because the image of God in the human soul has not been so far worn away by the stain of earthly affections that no traces of it, as it were its last lineaments, have remained, whence it can deservedly be said that even in the very impiety of his life a man does some things of the law or understands them; if this is what was said, that the Gentiles who have not the law, that is, the law of God, do naturally the things that are of the law, and that men of this kind are a law to themselves and have the written work of the law in their hearts, that is, that what was impressed there through the image of God when they were created has not been wholly erased: even so that difference will not be disturbed, by which the New Testament is distant from the Old, in that through the New the law of God is written in the heart of the faithful, which through the Old was written on tables. For that is written there through renewal which has not been wholly erased through age. For just as the image of God itself is renewed in the mind of believers through the New Testament, which impiety had not utterly abolished; for there had remained, surely, that which the soul of man cannot but be, namely rational: so too there the law of God, not erased in every part through injustice, is assuredly written anew through grace. Nor could the law written on tables effect in the Jews that inscription, which is justification, but only prevarication.

For they too were men, and that power of nature was in them, by which a rational soul both perceives and does something lawful: but piety, which transfers to another life, blessed and eternal, has a law immaculate, converting souls⁶, that they may be renewed from that light, and there be done in them, The light of thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us⁷. Whence, being turned away, they deserved to grow old: but to be renewed they cannot except by Christian grace, that is, except by the intercession of the Mediator. For there is one God, and one mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus, who gave himself a redemption for all. From whose grace if those are alien of whom we speak, who after that manner of which we have said enough above do naturally the things that are of the law; what will their excusing thoughts profit them, in the day when God shall judge the secrets of men⁸, unless perhaps that they be punished more mildly? For as certain venial sins, without which this life is not led, do not hinder the just man from eternal life: so some good works, without which the life of any man, even the worst, is with the greatest difficulty found, profit the impious nothing unto eternal salvation”⁹.

St Augustine therefore acknowledges in the Gentiles honest works which were done without the grace of Christ, and which accordingly do not contribute to salvation; he admits not only the power but also the actual doing of such acts. The same doctrine is found in the texts cited in the preceding thesis¹⁰; cf. De peccatorum meritis et remissione, lib. 1 cap. 22 nr. 31¹¹.

ST FULGENTIUS: “That law of works, which cannot justify man, since by the works of the law no flesh shall be justified, can indeed be naturally in the heart of the Gentiles and in the heart of unbelieving Jews; yet without the faith of Christ it in no way justifies its followers, but holds them bound by the chain of impiety”¹².

REASON

The Augustinians concede the power for acts insofar as they are honest by their object and proximate end, and this seems evident; for those acts, being natural, do not exceed the physical natural powers; moreover some of them are so easy that the moral power to place them cannot be denied either. “Indeed for many men it is easier to show to their parents the love that is owed, to speak the truth, to give alms to the needy out of mercy, than to place the contrary evil acts”¹³. But the ordination to the last end which is required in an honest act can also be present. For that ordination already suffices which consists in this, that a man in acting follows the dictate of conscience¹⁴.

Further, it cannot be denied that an explicit ordination to God as last end is also naturally possible. For by natural reason alone man can know God as his last end in such a way that there arises in him the obligation of worshipping God and of tending to him; but no reason appears for denying the power, in consequence of this knowledge, of ordaining to this end an act honest in itself, so that one would have to say that all men are morally so corrupted that in an act good in itself they must necessarily turn away from God the last end, and vitiate that act by pride or by an evil love of self or in some other way. For the image of God is not wholly worn away in man.

Objections

1. The texts of the holy Fathers are brought forward, chiefly those of St Augustine and of his disciples, in which it is said that free will avails only for sinning. For example, St Augustine: “Neither does free will avail for anything but sinning, if the way of truth lies hidden; and when that which is to be done and to be striven for has begun not to lie hidden, unless it also delights and is loved, it is not done, it is not undertaken, it is not lived well. But in order that it be loved, the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, not through free will, which rises from ourselves, but through the Holy Spirit, who has been given to us”¹⁵.

I answer. The texts are in part to be understood in that sense, as is the doctrine which says that all things which unbelievers do are sins¹⁶. Sometimes, however, by such words it is declared that a man, unless he is helped by grace, certainly comes to sin¹⁷.

2. The Council of Orange, can. 22: “Concerning the things which are man's own. No one has of his own but lying and sin. But if a man has anything of truth and justice, it is from that fountain which we ought to thirst for in this desert, that being watered from it as by certain drops we may not fail on the way”¹⁸.

I answer. The canon is sentence 323 of those which Prosper culled from the works of St Augustine¹⁹; it is found in tractate 5 on the Gospel of John: “As the Lord willed, we have come to the day of our promise; he will grant this also, that we may be able to come to the fulfilment of that promise itself. For then those things which we say, if they are useful both to us and to you, are from him; but the things which are from man are lies; as our Lord Jesus Christ himself said: He who speaks a lie speaks of his own²⁰. No one has of his own but lying and sin. But if a man has anything of truth and justice, it is from that fountain which we ought to thirst for in this desert, that being watered from it as by certain drops, and meanwhile consoled in this pilgrimage, we may not fail on the way, and may be able to come to his rest and satiety. If therefore he who speaks a lie speaks of his own, he who speaks the truth speaks of God. John is truthful, Christ is the truth; John is truthful, but every truthful man is truthful from the truth: if therefore John is truthful, and a man cannot be truthful except from the truth; from whom was he truthful, except from him who said: I am the truth?”²¹

It is disputed among Catholics about the sense of canon 22²². Ernst wishes to understand it according to his explanation of the doctrine of St Augustine, that all the works of unbelievers are sins²³. — Scheeben thinks that the discourse is not specifically about man in the state of fallen nature, but about man in general, and that the sense is: if a man acts of his own, that is, according to his own judgment and his own will, and not according to the judgment and will of God, he sins; for there is neither truth nor goodness except dependently and under the influx of the fountain of all truth and goodness, God. Hence also canon 23: “Concerning the will of God and of man. Men do their own will, not God's, when they do what displeases God; but when they do what they will, in order to serve the divine will, although they act willingly what they act, it is nevertheless the will of him by whom both is prepared and is commanded what they will”²⁴. — De Blic interprets: that which a man has as his own is only sin; justice comes to him from grace²⁵.

On the opinion of Father Vazquez. It is true in this opinion that without congruous grace no honest act is done; further, that just as all things which are in the world and happen, so too the fact that a man has a congruous thought rather than one that is not congruous, is under divine providence; moreover, that a congruous thought is a greater good and a greater benefit than a thought that is not congruous. And all these things, as is clear, are conceded by theologians.

But it can be asked whether these things already suffice for this, that every congruous thought is truly grace, an undue gift, indeed the grace which Christ merited for us on the cross. This is generally denied by theologians, and rightly indeed, if the discourse is about a congruous thought which arises according to the common course of nature, that is, about such a one as is not brought about by a special divine intervention; for if this obtained, a gift supernatural in its mode would be had.

But many congruous thoughts are found in men according to the altogether common course of nature; for there are many honest things which naturally please man so much that he also wishes to do them. Thus it does not seem to be a special and undue benefit if sons recognize that their parents are to be loved, and that this pleases them so much that in fact they also love them. A man would seem to be a monster to whom, according to the common course of nature, no honest good were pleasing; much less can such a thing be affirmed of the whole human race. It belongs to providence naturally due that congruous thoughts come to a man, and not only incongruous ones. Thus, therefore, a congruous thought is something which is perfectly contained within the merely natural order, both as to substance and as to the mode by which it arises. But this congruous thought is due not only to the human race, but also in some way to individual persons.

But from the fact that we can ask God for congruous thoughts and give him thanks for them, it does not follow that they are graces in the proper sense; for not all things which can be asked of God and for which thanks can be given have the character of grace in the proper sense. Thus one can ask for health and other physical goods, which nevertheless are not on that account to be grace.

It is true that all things in the present order of providence are in some way ordered at length to the supernatural end, which holds also of the congruous thought. But just as not all the benefits of God are on that account grace, which is given from the merits of Christ, so neither is the congruous thought.

What has been said holds of the congruous thought in that universal sense in which Vazquez laid down his doctrine; yet by these things it is not affirmed that a congruous thought is never given, or cannot be given, on account of the merits of Christ; this can be conceded, as Suárez says, if that congruous thought in some way conduces to eternal life, whether of itself or by accident, by removing what prevents, for example by impeding sin²⁶.

On the opinion of Father Ripalda²⁷. In his work “De ente supernaturali”²⁸ he lays it down thus: “As often as a man does what has been given him so that he may produce a natural act of virtue, God is already present antecedently by the intrinsically supernatural help of grace, so that he may either produce that act intrinsically natural, extrinsically supernatural and consequently salutary, or, together with the act intrinsically natural, also elicit another act of the same virtue, intrinsically supernatural, about the same formal object, which is common to both the natural and the supernatural act: and thus there is no morally good effort of nature which some supernatural grace does not go before.” “In my opinion it is absolutely true that for any good moral work whatever, or for any act of moral virtue, the theological help of grace is necessary of itself for elevated rational nature, of which the Councils and Fathers of the Church have discoursed against the enemies of grace”²⁹.

Palmieri judges of this opinion: “The opinion of Ripalda, accepted according to its widest universality, cannot persuade us... If however it be restricted to the faithful alone: since no arguments stand in the way, and the reasons of Ripalda are most strong for this hypothesis, we judge it to be true. Nor moreover do we deny that gratuitous natural aids are always at hand for the Gentiles, which are extrinsically supernatural, given from the merit of Christ”³⁰. Pesch³¹ thinks: “This opinion can more easily be admitted if it is restricted to the faithful alone, than if it is extended also to unbelievers; because otherwise it is with difficulty explained why no adult man can be justified without faith properly so called”.