De gratia Redemptoris

Since, according to the preceding thesis, internal grace is absolutely necessary for all the acts by which the sinner is prepared for justification, not only for being able more easily but for being able simply, those acts must possess some perfection which cannot be attained by the proper powers of fallen man. But the help which God grants, and by which those acts are made possible, is grace, that is, an undue gift; and it is on this note of the undue that the Fathers insisted strongly against the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians¹. It is impossible for a man by his own powers alone to merit that help, or positively to dispose himself for it; for those acts would then be salutary, and therefore impossible without grace. Hence the question now arises how the impossibility of performing those acts is to be understood, whence it is to be explained, and of what nature is the gratuitousness of that help.

It could perhaps of itself be the case that those acts did not of themselves exceed what is of itself possible by natural powers, but that man through original sin was so weakened in his powers that he could no longer perform those acts, and that God out of mercy supplied his help. Thus the acts would belong to the natural order, and the help would not need to transcend the merely natural order. The acts would be more difficult than could be performed by fallen man with his powers weakened.

But it can also be the case that those acts have a perfection which exceeds the natural order, and that accordingly the help which God confers gives man the power of performing acts which transcend the powers of nature. And this is the judgment enunciated in the thesis: the acts by which the sinner disposes himself for justification are entitatively supernatural², that is, they belong according to their physical being to that order in which are the grace of justification and the vision of God.

The sense of this doctrine, then, is: God willed that the acts disposing to justification, from the very beginning of faith, be of the strictly supernatural order; and the help necessary for these acts is in the same way in the supernatural order, and therefore in the strict sense undue. This grace, then, is physically necessary for such acts, and it is rightly called elevating grace, since it elevates the faculties of man so that they are capable of producing acts entitatively supernatural.

The supernatural is understood as a gift of God positively undue to created nature and superadded to it. The supernatural is distinguished as to manner, when the gift conferred on the subject is natural but the manner in which it is conferred is undue; as to substance, when the gift itself is positively undue; as relatively supernatural, if it is not undue to every created being; as absolutely supernatural, if it is undue to every created being, or exceeding the order of creatures, and therefore pertaining to the divine order.

The question under this aspect seems to have been explicitly treated chiefly after the Council of Trent, although it was already in some way contained in the doctrine of the earlier theologians. Among the post-Tridentine theologians there is a great consensus in this matter as regards the fact itself³. There is not, however, a consensus of theologians on the question whether to the entitatively supernatural acts of wayfarers there corresponds a proper supernatural formal object which cannot be attained by natural powers⁴. Finally, there is no consensus of theologians in the qualification of this sentence. But the sentence enunciated in the thesis can now, it seems, be called common, or at least the more common, among theologians.

It must be well noted that the thesis treats only of the acts by which the sinner is disposed for justification; the discourse on the acts of the just returns in the third part. Further, if in this thesis the necessity of grace is explained from the fact that the disposing acts are entitatively supernatural, so that grace is necessary as elevating, it is not denied that it is also necessary inasmuch as it strengthens the powers weakened by sin, that is, inasmuch as it is healing; but of this matter it must properly be spoken in the following section.

Proof

I. From the authority of the theologians, who teach this almost commonly.

II. In the preceding thesis it was proved that internal grace is absolutely necessary for the acts disposing to justification, and that not only for being able more easily but for being able simply; but this necessity can be explained only from the fact that the entitative perfection of those acts exceeds the order of the things which are possible by the natural powers of men; therefore those acts are entitatively supernatural.

Proof of the minor: If the matter concerned only entitatively natural acts, which are more difficult than could be performed by the weakened powers of fallen man, grace would properly be necessary for being able more easily, and not for being able simply.

Man after original sin has not lost his liberty, although it has been weakened, and he can, as is shown in the following section, perform naturally honest acts without grace; if, therefore, grace is so necessary for the good acts which prepare for justification that without it it is impossible for man to perform them, there must be found in them some perfection which is not in naturally good acts.

This perfection cannot consist in a mere external divine acceptance, so that a good act performed without grace and a good act performed with grace would differ only in this, that God wills not to accept the former as a disposition for justification, but wills so to accept the latter. For thus it would not remain true that man without grace is unable to perform such an act; for the necessity proved in the preceding thesis seems to be such that something is lacking to the powers of man for performing those acts, which could no longer be said in this hypothesis.

Nor can this perfection consist in this, that the salutary act is performed with greater delight, spiritual relish, and so on; for thus it would no longer be understood why grace is necessary for being able simply; and moreover for salutary acts a special delight or facility is never required as essential.

Finally, the opinion seems excluded which would say that the perfection of the salutary act consists in this, that it is supernatural in becoming, but not in having become; for thus there would be an act which according to its whole entity could be produced even without grace; and moreover an act is disposing not by reason of its origin, but because it is such.

“And so it remains that we say that a good act, as is expedient for salvation, enjoys that perfection which is intrinsically supernatural, that is, intrinsically more excellent than the perfection which can be acquired for acts by the powers of nature; and therefore that the mode of perfection which is signified by the words as is expedient is an intrinsic mode of the act, by which its essence is constituted; and that therefore on account of that perfection which is proper to an intrinsically supernatural act, grace is required that it may be done by us”⁵.

This note of undue gift must still be briefly explained.

1. Actual grace is not due by the exigency of nature itself. According to the Baianists the gifts conferred on Adam in creation were due to integral nature; now, however, they are undue, inasmuch as human nature by sin has positively made itself unworthy of these gifts¹. The Baian propositions have been condemned: “The raising and exaltation of human nature to the fellowship of the divine nature was due to the integrity of the first condition, and therefore must be called natural, and not supernatural.” — “Absurd is the opinion of those who say that man from the beginning, by a certain supernatural and gratuitous gift, was raised above the condition of his nature, so as to worship God supernaturally by faith, hope and charity.” — “By vain and idle men, according to the folly of the philosophers, was devised the sentence, which is to be rejected as Pelagianism, that man was from the beginning so constituted that by gifts superadded to nature he was raised by the bounty of the Creator and adopted as a son of God.” — “False is the opinion of the doctors that the first man could have been created and instituted by God without natural justice”².

Since the elevation of nature into the supernatural order is absolutely undue, it follows that those helps of grace also, which are of that same order, are in the same way undue to nature.

Special in this question is the opinion of the Augustinians. According to them the only ultimate end possible to man is the intuitive vision of God itself; but this end is so sublime that it cannot be attained by the natural powers of man. But God owes it to himself that, if he creates man, he also make possible for him the attainment of his end; otherwise human nature would be more wretched than a non-rational creature, which possesses the powers to attain its end; God therefore owes it, whether by the title of providence or out of fittingness, to give man supernatural helps by which he can arrive at his end³. But this opinion is not to be admitted; for its supposition is not true, namely that the only end possible to man is the intuitive vision of God, and that in rational nature there is a remote right to the heavenly inheritance.

If, therefore, the supernatural order of grace is plainly outside every exigency of human nature, there is in it no positive ordination either to the end itself or to the supernatural means of obtaining it. But since man is an intellectual nature, the possibility of elevation into this order is present. This possibility or capacity immediately means the non-repugnance of such an elevation. Thus in intellectual nature there is an obediential potency for this elevation and for receiving the helps of this order, that is, that potency by which the creature obeys the Creator, so that he can make it fit for something which exceeds the powers of the creature. This obediential potency is passive in the sense that the creature of itself is only capable of receiving those gifts and helps passively; but once grace is received, man can and ought to cooperate actively.

2. From what has been said it follows that by merely natural acts man cannot positively prepare himself to obtain those supernatural helps: he can neither merit them nor positively dispose himself for them. These things have already been proved in the thesis itself; for such acts would be salutary; but salutary acts are strictly supernatural; therefore naturally impossible. Thus for the first supernatural grace there is no positive preparation at all; but with supernatural grace received, man can and ought thereafter, through salutary acts, prepare himself for other graces up to the very attainment of justification.

3. By natural prayers grace cannot be obtained. Petitionary prayer is the asking of things fitting from God. It supposes the desire of the good which is expected from God. The petition is properly the manifestation of this desire, and thereby the manifestation of one's own need; it appeals to the goodness of God, that he may wish to succour this need. The efficacy of prayer, then, is other than the efficacy of merit: merit is a service rendered to another, and as such appeals to his justice or equity; prayer, however, by showing one's own necessity, appeals to mercy. Hence of itself it would not be against the gratuitousness of grace if God willed to be moved to give grace to one who asked for it. That nevertheless by natural prayers grace cannot be obtained is plain:

a) Such prayer supposes the desire of grace; but this cannot be without grace.

b) That prayer would positively avail for salvation, and would therefore be a salutary act; but for a salutary act grace is required; therefore.

c) If a natural petition of grace were efficacious, man would positively dispose himself for grace; for by efficacious prayer we dispose ourselves to receive the gifts of God.

Therefore there is nothing in man but a merely passive potency for receiving the first actual elevating grace.