De gratia Redemptoris

What the adult sinner can and must do with the help of grace

According to the innovators of the sixteenth century, man was wholly corrupted by original sin, lost free will, can no longer do any good, nay whatever he does is sin. Hence it is clear that he cannot actively cooperate in his justification, but behaves merely passively in receiving justice. By fiducial faith he apprehends the merits of Christ and his justice is imputed to him. Fiducial faith is not an active cooperation in justification, but rather a passivity, it is the mere instrument by which justice is apprehended. But this faith is absolutely certain, and therefore the man justified (imputatively) is absolutely certain of his justification; hence there is nothing of uncertainty, no doubt about the imputed justice. This according to them is the true doctrine of justification through faith alone¹.

Against these errors the Council of Trent set forth the true Catholic doctrine, according to which the adult man in his justification does not behave merely passively, but must prepare himself through acts of the virtues with the help of grace. By these acts, however, he does not merit justification, but disposes himself for it, so that justice is conferred also according to the measure of this disposition. The doctrine of justification through fiducial faith is rejected, and with it the doctrine of the empty confidence of the heretics which coheres with it.

In the three following theses we shall treat 1) of the disposition of the adult for justification; 2) of the necessity of grace for this disposition; 3) of the supernatural character of the disposing acts.

The thesis, as is clear, has three parts: 1) justification is entirely gratuitous, not from merit; 2) man must prepare and dispose himself; 3) fiducial faith is rejected.

Merit in the widest sense can be described as: a work worthy of retribution. It is therefore a work that essentially regards another, the one who retributes. The retribution consists in this, that for what someone by his work confers on another, something corresponding is conferred on him. For there to be any question of merit, then, the work must be in the power of the one acting (a work performed with advertence of reason, freely posited), and it must redound to the utility or the harm, the honour or the dishonour of another. For if these are lacking, there can be no question of retribution. In itself merit can be said of good and of evil, and is so said: to merit a reward, to merit punishment; but evil merit is customarily called demerit. Good merit, then, or merit without qualification, is a good work rendered in the service (the utility, the honour) of another, worthy of retribution, that is, of reward.

To say that a work is worthy of some reward states a perfection of that work, by which it is suited to such a retribution; this value of the work is called aptitudinal merit, merit in the first act. For from the sole fact that someone has performed a work of such value, he does not yet thereby have actual merit with another; but its acceptance must be added, so that aptitudinal merit becomes merit in the second act. Therefore for formal merit in the second act both the value of the work and its acceptance are required. This acceptance can precede the work itself, or follow upon the completed work.

According to the varying proportion between the meritorious work and the reward, a distinction is drawn between merit of condignity and merit of congruity. “A man is said to merit ex condigno when an equality is found between the reward and the merit according to a right estimate; ex congruo, however, only when such equality is not found, but the gift is bestowed solely according to the liberality of the giver, as being merely fitting”¹. There is said to be an “equality according to a right estimate”, that is, quantitative equality is not required (as, for example, is often had in the buying and selling of goods), but, as St Thomas explains in the same place, an equality of proportion²; and regard must also be had to the person in whose service the work redounds and who rewards. Thus everyone judges that a man who is richer and nobler gives a greater reward than one less rich and less noble. According to St Thomas this equality of proportion is present if the reward, in respect of the one rewarding, is not a greater work than the meritorious work in respect of the one meriting.

On account of that equality, the acceptance being posited, the reward is due from justice; and indeed, if the equality is quantitative, from the rigour of justice; if it is an equality of proportion, not from the full rigour of justice. The dignity of a meritorious work is measured both from the work itself in itself and also from the person performing it.

Only merit of condignity is merit in the strict sense, and it is this that is meant when merit is spoken of without qualification.

Merit is of congruity if that equality is not present, yet a certain dignity is found in the work, on account of which it is fitting to give a reward which in fact exceeds the value of the work. In such a supposition the one in whose service another has worked is not bound to retribution; but the matter can so stand that it is nevertheless congruous to give some reward; for example, if someone has attempted to perform a work in another's service, but without fault, through defect of powers or for another reason, could not complete a work of condignity. The conferral of a reward for merit of congruity does not proceed from justice but from liberality or mercy. Merit of congruity, if it has annexed a promise of God to render the reward, is infallible; otherwise it is fallible. Merit of congruity is not merit in the proper sense, but merit broadly so called.

Disposition, which according to the philosophers belongs to the first species of quality, and which they understand in various ways, can be taken for any accident whatsoever that prepares the subject for something else, or for a quality by which the subject is apt for something, for receiving some form. Palmieri³ defines it as “the real bearing of the subject, by which the subject, of itself indifferent, is constituted, once actuated, as more or less proximately suited to receiving the form”. If it constitutes the subject remotely suited, it is a remote disposition; if proximately, a proximate one; a remote disposition is connected with the form mediately, a proximate one immediately. There is a further distinction between physical and moral disposition, according as it renders the subject physically or morally suited to receiving the form.

From this positive disposition is distinguished negative disposition, which is the absence of an impediment to the entry of the form; but this is disposition in a less proper sense.

Disposition can be considered as achieved and as in the making; as achieved it is the suitability described up to this point; as in the making it is either the production of that suitability (positive disposition) or the non-posing of an impediment (negative disposition).

From what has been said the difference between merit and disposition appears: merit essentially regards another, in whose service the work is performed; in disposition no such relation to another is contained. Dispositive acts as such are not necessarily a service, but as such they express a perfection of the subject, by which the subject is rendered suited to receiving the form. Yet the same acts which are a disposition can at the same time have the character of a service towards another, and so at the same time have the character of merit.

I. Nothing of what precedes justification merits it.

It must be noted that it is not enough to show that man cannot merit justification by acts of his natural powers, nor by the works of the law; nor is it enough to show that that grace which, as will be said in the following thesis, is necessary for the disposing acts is not the object of merit; for in this way it is not yet excluded that man can merit justification by the very acts which he elicits with the help of grace granted without merit; but it must be shown that justification itself is not, in itself, the object of the merit of the sinner who is to be justified. In this part merit is understood as merit of condignity. So understood, this part is of faith.

THE DOCUMENTS OF THE CHURCH

The Council of Trent, sess. 6, cap. 7, assigns solely our Lord Jesus Christ as the meritorious cause of justification⁴. Then in cap. 8 it explains how the words of the Apostle, that we are justified freely, are to be understood: in that sense, namely, “which the constant consensus of the Catholic Church has held and expressed”, that is, that “we are said to be justified freely because none of those things which precede justification, whether faith or works, merits the grace of justification itself; for if it is grace, it is now not from works, otherwise, as the same Apostle says, grace is now not grace”⁵.

SACRED SCRIPTURE

Rom 3, 24: “being justified freely by his grace”, the very words which the Council of Trent explains. — 4, 1 ff. shows that if justification were from works it would be according to debt and not according to grace; but justification is according to the purpose of grace. — 11, 6 establishes the same principle cited by the Council of Trent: “but if it is by grace, it is now not by works: otherwise grace is now not grace”. — Eph 2, 8: “for by grace you are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves: for it is the gift of God, not of works, that no man may glory”. — Tit 3, 4 ff.: “But when the benignity and humanity of our Saviour God appeared, not by the works of justice which we have done, but according to his mercy he saved us by the laver of regeneration and of the renewal of the Holy Spirit... that being justified by his grace, we may be heirs according to the hope of eternal life”. — Cf. Io 15, 4.

THE FATHERS

St Augustine: “But this grace of Christ, without which neither infants nor grown men can be saved, is not rendered for merits but is given freely; for which reason it is also called grace. Being justified, he says, freely by his blood”⁶. “What merits of his own, then, will the man who has been delivered boast of, when, if what was due to his merits were rendered him, he would be nothing but condemned? Are there then no merits of the just? There are indeed, because they are just. But that they might become just, they were not merits”⁷. — St Prosper: “Man, therefore, being justified, that is, made pious out of impious with no good merit preceding, receives a gift by which gift he may also acquire merit”⁸. — “But if you also direct the gaze of your mind to those who, after passing a long life in shameful deeds and crimes, are renewed at the very end of life by the sacrament of Christ's baptism, and are transferred into the fellowship of the heavenly kingdom without any support of good works, with what understanding will you grasp the divine judgment, except that you acknowledge without doubt that the gifts of God are gratuitous; and that as there are no crimes so detestable that they can keep out the gift of grace, so there can be no works so excellent that what is bestowed freely should be owed to them by the judgment of retribution? For the redemption of the blood of Christ would grow cheap, and the prerogative of human works would not yield to the mercy of God, if the justification which is wrought by grace were owed to preceding merits, so that it would not be the gift of the giver but the wage of the worker”⁹.

REASON

Reason easily understands that man, a sinner and an enemy of God, cannot perform a work of such value before God as to merit of condignity the participation of the divine nature, generation from God, adoptive sonship, and so the inheritance of eternal life.

II. The adult man must prepare and dispose himself for justification by the acts of the virtues.

What is affirmed is a positive and indeed moral disposition, and so understood this part is of faith; whether these acts are also a physical disposition is controverted, on which matter a few things will be said at the end of this part.

THE DOCUMENTS OF THE CHURCH

The Council of Trent¹⁰: in chapter 5 it treats of the necessity of preparation for justification; men are disposed for their own justification by freely assenting to and cooperating with the grace of God. And it condemns the opposite opinion in can. 4: “If anyone says that the free will of man, moved and excited by God, does not by assenting to God exciting and calling cooperate in any way, so as to dispose and prepare itself to obtain the grace of justification, and that it cannot dissent if it wishes, but that, like something inanimate, it does nothing at all and is merely passive: let him be anathema.” In can. 5 the opinion is condemned which denies that free will remains after the sin of Adam. — In chapter 6 it describes the manner of preparation by enumerating the various acts occurring in it: dogmatic faith, fear of the justice of God, hope in the mercy of God, the beginning of the love of God, aversion from sin, penance, the purpose of receiving baptism, of a new life and of keeping the commandments. Several texts of sacred Scripture are added in which this doctrine is stated. As is clear from the history of the council, it did not wish to declare that all those acts are necessary before all justification¹¹. The opposite doctrine, that those acts are not only not a disposition for justification but are sins, is condemned in can. 7 and 9. Can. 9: “If anyone says that the impious is justified by faith alone, so as to understand that nothing else is required by way of cooperation for obtaining the grace of justification, and that it is in no way necessary that he be prepared and disposed by the movement of his own will: let him be anathema.” — Cap. 7: “This disposition or preparation is followed by justification itself.” Each one receives his own justice “according to the measure which the Holy Spirit divides to each as he wills, and according to each one's own disposition and cooperation”. In chapter 8 it explains what it is to be justified by faith, namely that faith is the beginning, the foundation and the root of all justification.

SACRED SCRIPTURE

The Council of Trent already cited several texts of sacred Scripture at the end of chapter 6. The following texts are arranged according to the order in which the council describes the manner of preparation.

Faith: Rom 3, 28. 30: “For we account a man to be justified by faith without the works of the law... for there is one God, who justifies the circumcision by faith and the uncircumcision through faith”. — 5, 2: “Through whom (Jesus Christ) we also have access by faith into this grace wherein we stand and glory in the hope of the glory of the sons of God”. — Gal 3, 8: “But the Scripture, foreseeing that God justifies the Gentiles by faith, foretold to Abraham: In thee shall all nations be blessed. Therefore they who are of faith shall be blessed with faithful Abraham”. — 3, 24: “Wherefore the law was our pedagogue in Christ, that we might be justified by faith”. — Phil 3, 9: “that I may gain Christ and be found in him, not having my own justice, which is of the law, but that which is of the faith of Christ Jesus: which is of God, justice in faith, to know him...”. — Hebr 11, 6: “But without faith it is impossible to please God. For he who comes to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of those who seek him”. From this last text it also appears that that faith is dogmatic which has truths to be admitted as its object¹².

Fear: Eccli 1, 27: “The fear of the Lord drives out sin” (a text cited by the Council of Trent). Cf. Prov 4, 27.

Hope: Matth 9, 2 (Marc 2, 5): “Be of good heart, son, your sins are forgiven you” (cited by the Council of Trent). — Prov 28, 25: “But he who hopes in the Lord shall be healed”.

Love: Luc 7, 47: “Many sins are forgiven her, because she loved much”. — Io 14, 23: “If anyone loves me, he will keep my word, and my Father will love him, and we will come to him and make our abode with him”. — Cf. 1 Io 3, 14.

Penance: Ez 18, 21: “But if the wicked does penance for all his sins which he has committed, and keeps all my commandments, and does judgment and justice, he shall live and not die”. — Matth 4, 17: “From that time Jesus began to preach and to say: Do penance, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand”. — Luc 13, 1-9 on the necessity of penance, on the barren fig tree; cf. Luc 24, 47. — Actus 2, 38: “But Peter said to them: Do penance, and be baptized every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ for the remission of your sins, and you shall receive the gift of the Holy Spirit” (a text cited by the Council of Trent).

Works of mercy: Tob 12, 9: “For alms deliver from death, and it is that which purges away sins, and makes one find mercy and eternal life”. Cf. Dan 4, 24.

Generally, cooperation is required: Zach 1, 3: “Turn to me, says the Lord of hosts, and I will turn to you, says the Lord of hosts” (cited by the Council of Trent). — 1 Reg 7, 3: “Prepare your hearts to the Lord” (cited by the Council of Trent).

Man, therefore, must by his acts concur towards his own justification. To these acts there applies the definition of disposition given above: for by them man prepares himself and renders himself ever more suited to receiving justification; a true connexion, too, is established between those acts and justification: justification is by faith, through faith, of faith, because she loved much; fear drives out sin, alms purges away sins and makes one find eternal life. All this cannot be said of a merely prerequisite condition.

THE FATHERS

Clement of Alexandria: “This great change, therefore, proceeds from God, whereby it comes about that a man, from being an unbeliever made a believer, believes through hope and fear. But faith appears to us to be the first inclination to salvation, after fear and hope, advancing out of penance together with continence and endurance, lead us to love and knowledge”¹³. — “When we hear: your faith has saved you, we do not take him (Christ) to be saying simply that those will be saved who have believed in any way whatever, unless works also have followed. For he spoke that word to the Jews alone, who had lived according to the law and without reproach, and who lacked only faith in the Lord”¹⁴. — Origen: “He who dies in his sins, even if he says that he believes in Christ, has not really believed in him; for even if it is called faith, yet if it exists without works, such faith is dead, as we read in the epistle which is circulated under the name of James”¹⁵. — St Gregory of Nyssa: “Joining and weaving justice together with faith, (Paul) prepares through them a breastplate for the armed man, shielding the soldier rightly and safely by both. For it is impossible that the man who uses one of the two, separated from the other, be safely armed. For neither is faith without the works of justice sufficient to save, nor again is the justice of life of itself, with faith separated from it, safe for salvation”¹⁶. — St John Chrysostom: “He who believes in the Son has eternal life... Do you say, then, that it suffices to believe in the Son in order to have eternal life? By no means. Hear Christ himself declaring this in these words: Not everyone who says to me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven; and blasphemy against the Spirit suffices to thrust a man into hell. And why do I speak of parts of the doctrine? For even if a man believes rightly in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, if he does not live rightly, faith will profit him nothing for salvation”¹⁷. — St Jerome: “...because the just man lives by faith... We must consider, then, that he did not say that man or husbandman lives by faith, lest he give occasion for despising the works of the virtues; but the just man lives by faith, so that whoever was a believer and was to live by faith could not otherwise come to faith, or live in it, unless he had first been just and had ascended, by purity of life, as by certain steps, to faith”¹⁸. — St Augustine: “But if anyone says that faith merits the grace of doing well, we cannot deny it; indeed we most willingly confess it. For we wish our brethren, who glory much in their own works, to have that faith by which they obtain charity, which alone truly works well”¹⁹. — “You will be the work of God, not only because you are a man, but also because you are just. For it is better to be just than to be a man. If God made you a man, and you make yourself just, you do something better than God did. But God made you without you. For you contributed no consent so that God might make you. How could you consent, who did not exist? He, therefore, who made you without you does not justify you without you. He made you without your knowing it; he justifies you with your willing it”²⁰. — St Fulgentius: “Without faith it is impossible to please God. For faith is the foundation of all good things, faith is the beginning of human salvation. Without it no one can belong to the number of the sons of God, because without it neither does anyone in this age obtain the grace of justification, nor will he possess eternal life in the age to come; and if anyone here does not walk by faith, he will not arrive at sight. Without faith every labour of man is empty”²¹. — St Gregory the Great: “Neither does faith avail without works, nor do works without faith, unless perhaps they are done in order to receive faith; as Cornelius, before he was a believer, merited to be heard for his good works; from which it is gathered that he was doing good works in order to receive faith”²².

Objections

1. Faith alone without works is a sufficient disposition for justification. Rom 3, 28: “For we account a man to be justified by faith without the works of the law”. — Eph 2, 8. 9: “For by grace you are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves: for it is the gift of God, not of works, that no man may glory”. — Resp. a) From the context it is clear that in Rom 3, 28 faith is directly opposed to the works of the law, and that there, and in Rom 4 and Eph 2, 8. 9, the discourse is about works without faith, done outside faith, and about such things on account of which man could attribute salvation to himself (glory), that is, about meritorious works; but works done by a believer with the help of grace (cf. the following thesis) are not excluded, since they only dispose for justification and do not take away its gratuitousness. Therefore a distinction can be made: the works of the law and works done without faith are excluded, I concede; other works of the virtues, I subdistinguish: as strictly meritorious of justification, I concede; as disposing, again I distinguish: if they were merely natural, I concede; if they are performed with the help of grace, I deny. — b) Explicitly sacred Scripture teaches that faith alone does not suffice. Iac 2, 24: “Do you see that a man is justified by works, and not by faith only?” In the epistles of St Paul other things besides faith are required, 1 Cor 7, 19; 13, 1 ff.; Gal 5, 6. See also the texts adduced in the argument. — c) But justification can be attributed to faith in a special way, because, as Trent says, faith is the beginning of human salvation, the foundation and the root of all justification. Often, too, faith is understood not only as the act of the virtue of faith, as it is distinguished from the other virtues, but in a broader sense, as including a life according to that faith.

2. There seems to be an opposition between Rom and Iac; for in Rom it is said that Abraham was justified not from works, but in Iac from works. — Resp. Iac shows that it is not enough merely to believe, that is, to admit a religious truth (2, 19: because there is one God), unless a life according to this faith follows and the commandments of God are kept; faith without works is dead (2, 17. 20. 26). True faith, living faith, is proved by works. Such was the faith of Abraham. Nor would his faith have been unto salvation for him, unless he had also obeyed the God whom he believed. “Faith cooperated with his works, and by works faith was made perfect.” But all these things are not denied in the epistle to the Romans. The faith which St Paul demands is not a dead faith but a living one, which is a true conversion to God. The apparently contrary words are explained from this, that St Paul attacks those who do not embrace the faith and wish to obtain salvation without faith and outside faith by their own works; James, on the other hand, attacks those who have embraced the faith but do not live according to their faith, and think that they can be saved by faith alone without the works which ought to proceed from faith. St Augustine: “Men, however, not understanding what the Apostle himself says: we account a man to be justified by faith without the works of the law, thought that he was saying that faith suffices for a man even if he lives badly and has no good works. Far be it that the vessel of election should have thought so, who, when he had said in a certain place: for in Christ Jesus neither circumcision is of any avail nor uncircumcision, presently adds: but faith which works through love. This is the faith which separates the faithful from the unclean demons; for they too, as the apostle James says, believe and tremble, but they do not work well”²³.

3. The faith required for justification is not dogmatic faith. On this matter see De virtutibus, thes. 1.

4. If justification is from works, it is no longer gratuitous. — Resp. I distinguish: if it is from natural works meritorious of condignity, I concede; if it is from works performed with the help of grace as disposing, I deny.

From what has been said it is clear that man does not behave merely passively in his justification, but must cooperate, prepare and dispose himself. This disposition is proximately moral, and this is conceded by all; for by these acts man is rendered morally more apt to receive justice. Among theologians, however, as was already indicated above, it is controverted whether those acts are also a physical disposition for justification. This question can be put whether one holds that grace is created, or holds, with St Thomas¹ and the more common opinion, that it is educed from the obediential potency of the soul. This physical disposition is affirmed by Billuart² and others; but more commonly it is denied³.

That a physical disposition for justification is not universally necessary is clear from this, that in the justification of infants it is not present. A special reason would therefore have to be indicated why it is necessary in adults. Moreover, a physical disposition in the manner of a first act seems not to be admitted; for it would have to be a supernatural habit. But if grace, as it is a supernatural habit, required a physical disposition, the same would have to be said of that habit which physically disposes, and so one would proceed to infinity. If, however, the question is about the disposing acts themselves, whether they are a physical disposition, this seems to be denied of the remotely disposing acts, because they are no longer present when the justifying form is infused. There would remain, then, only the question of that last disposing act which is simultaneous with the reception of the form; for example, in justification through an act of contrition or of perfect charity outside the sacrament. In such a case the argument drawn from the remotely disposing acts would indeed not hold; but neither does there seem to have been brought forward up to now any argument by which a physical disposition is truly proved. Besides, since grace, according to the more probable opinion, is subjected in the substance of the soul, a physical disposition of the substance of the soul would have to be indicated; but the acts, if they disposed physically, would dispose the faculties. Hence the opinion which says that the acts are a moral disposition, and not a physical one, seems altogether to be preferred⁴.

Above¹ the difference between disposition and merit was indicated, and it was said there that the act which is a disposition can at the same time be a merit. But since in the first part of this thesis merit of condignity has already been excluded, the question concerns merit of congruity alone. This too is a question on which not all theologians say the same thing². Billuart³ says of this matter: “Before all else, that equivocation may be removed and certain contrary opinions about merit of congruity reconciled, it must be observed that we distinguish, with the Author here⁴ at a. 6, a twofold merit of congruity: one proper and strict, the other broad and improper. Merit of congruity, and that the strict, we place in a right of friendship to a reward, whereby it is distinguished from merit of condignity, which imports a debt of justice. Merit of congruity taken broadly and improperly we place in the claim of a form by way of disposition or of impetration. Some, however, confuse these two merits of congruity; whence arises the discord between us and them, while they say that certain things fall under merit of congruity which we deny; but, as is plain, the controversy is about the name only, and comes from a different understanding of merit of congruity.” Then he lays down this assertion: “No one can merit for himself the first habitual grace, neither by condignity nor by proper congruity, but by improper congruity only.” And the reason is plain, because that right of friendship which is had in merit of congruity is found only in a friend of God, in a man already justified. In this view, therefore, all merit of congruity properly so called must be denied to those who are still in the state of sin⁵.

Moreover, the far more common opinion of theologians is that the state of grace is not required for merit of congruity, and consequently that it does not include a “right of friendship”; hence theologians generally do not have that distinction between merit of congruity strictly and broadly taken. And so they more commonly teach as well that the acts disposing to justification possess also the character of merit of congruity. — Besides, the FATHERS attribute some merit to these acts. ST JEROME: “Those who simply confess their sins merit clemency from the Saviour by their humility”⁶. — ST AMBROSE: “Peter therefore wept, and wept most bitterly, wept that he might wash away his offence with tears: and do you, if you wish to merit pardon, wash away your guilt with tears”⁷. ST AUGUSTINE: “They can indeed say that the remission of sins is a grace which is given to no preceding merits. For what good merit can sinners have? But not even that remission of sins is without some merit, if faith obtains it. For the merit of faith is not nothing, by which faith that man said: Lord, be merciful to me a sinner; and he went down justified by the merit of faithful humility, since he who humbles himself shall be exalted”⁸. — “But we know that God does not hear sinners, etc. He who is still unanointed speaks (namely the blind man). For God also hears sinners. For if God did not hear sinners, that publican would in vain have cast down his eyes to the earth and struck his breast, saying: Lord, be merciful to me a sinner. And that confession merited justification, as this blind man merited illumination”⁹. In the COUNCIL OF TRENT the Fathers, by denying merit, did not wish to exclude merit of congruity, as is clear from history¹⁰.

Some theologians dispute whether the act proximately and immediately disposing to justification is from habitual grace itself. This dispute arose chiefly on account of a certain difficult text of St Thomas¹¹, which the disciples of St Thomas themselves explain in different ways. Billuart¹² says: “It will perhaps seem strange that theologians should toil and torment themselves so in explaining this difficulty, when they themselves confess it to be more subtle than useful. We therefore, who pursue usefulness rather than subtlety, will set out briefly the various opinions on this matter and leave them to the judgment of the reader. Among the theologians who disagree on this point, then, some say that these further dispositions to habitual grace are effectively from actual help transiently communicated. So, among the Thomists, John of St Thomas, Sylvius, Contenson, with several outsiders. Some say that they are effectively from habitual grace itself. So Gonet, Serra and others. St Thomas seems to favour each opinion, and hence the difficulty is increased. A third opinion, which strives to reconcile both, says that these acts, the last disposing to justification, are effectively from the infused virtue of charity and of penance, communicated not permanently by way of habit but transiently by way of actual help and motion. So most recently our very wise Goudin.” On this question and the mind of St Thomas see Pesch, 5, 360; Stufler, D. Thomae doctrina de Deo operante 223 ff.; Lange, 343 ff.

III. The doctrine of fiducial faith must be rejected.

According to Luther the sinner apprehends justice by a firm faith, by absolute confidence that God in his mercy does not impute sin for Christ's sake, but holds the man as just. This justice, apprehended by fiducial faith, must be retained by the same faith. It is not lawful to doubt of one's justification; a doubt of this kind would by that very fact take away justice. Sometimes a distinction is drawn between fiducial and special faith, in the sense that fiducial faith is that by which justice is apprehended, and special faith that by which it is retained; but it is altogether the same faith, considered under a different respect. This doctrine therefore essentially includes absolute certainty, absolute confidence concerning the justice obtained. Hence the question of the certainty of grace is intimately connected with the question of fiducial faith. Against this doctrine stands this third part of the thesis.

St Thomas¹³ teaches on this matter: by revelation a man can know that he has grace, if God reveals this to him; by himself he cannot know it with certainty; but he can know it conjecturally by certain signs, inasmuch as he perceives that he delights in God and despises the things of the world, and inasmuch as the man is not conscious to himself of any mortal sin. Similarly Gabriel Biel¹⁴ denied strict certainty. Although texts are found in Scotus in which strict certainty seems to be denied¹⁵, yet several theologians thought that he affirmed such certainty, and they defended this doctrine. Hence in the Council of Trent, when this question was to be treated, disputes arose¹⁶, lest the opinion of the heretics should be condemned in such a form as would at the same time decide a doctrine then controverted among Catholics. There were several in the council who either defended that a man without a special revelation could be certain of his justification, or at least favoured this doctrine (card. Del Monte, and above all Ambrose Catharinus O. P.). Whoever, after receiving the sacrament, if he has sincerely done on his part all that is required for its fruitful reception, should not believe that he is in the state of grace, would distrust divine grace. There was one opinion in the council against the heretics, namely that a man, if he has not a special revelation, is not bound to believe that he is in grace, and that, if he did not believe it, he would lose grace; but on the question whether a man could have certainty of the state of grace, opinions were and remained divided in the council¹⁷. A special difficulty was found in the term “certainty of faith”, which could be understood in various ways. At length there was added “which cannot be subject to falsehood”, by which words the opinion of the heretics was clearly signified, and to this formula all consented.

THE DOCUMENTS OF THE CHURCH

COUNCIL OF TRENT: chap. 9, “Against the vain confidence of heretics. But though it is necessary to believe that sins are neither remitted nor ever have been remitted except freely by divine mercy for Christ's sake, yet it must not be said that sins are remitted or have been remitted to anyone who boasts of confidence and certainty of the remission of his sins and rests in that alone, since this vain confidence, remote from all piety, can exist among heretics and schismatics, and indeed in our own time is preached with great contention against the Catholic Church. Nor must it be asserted that those who are truly justified ought to settle with themselves, without any doubt at all, that they are justified, and that no one is absolved from sins and justified unless he certainly believes that he is absolved and justified, and that absolution and justification are accomplished by this faith alone, as though he who does not believe this doubts of the promises of God and of the efficacy of the death and resurrection of Christ. For as no devout man ought to doubt of the mercy of God, of the merit of Christ, and of the virtue and efficacy of the sacraments, so may anyone, while he regards himself and his own infirmity and indisposition, be fearful and afraid about his own grace, since no one can know with the certainty of faith, which cannot be subject to falsehood, that he has obtained the grace of God”¹⁸. — Can. 12: “If anyone says that justifying faith is nothing else than confidence in the divine mercy remitting sins for Christ's sake, or that this confidence alone is that by which we are justified: let him be anathema.” — Can. 13: “If anyone says that it is necessary for every man, in order to obtain the remission of sins, to believe with certainty, and without any hesitation about his own infirmity and indisposition, that his sins are remitted to him: let him be anathema.” — Can. 14: “If anyone says that a man is absolved from sins and justified by this, that he certainly believes himself to be absolved and justified, or that no one is truly justified unless he who believes that he is justified, and that by this faith alone absolution and justification are accomplished: let him be anathema”¹⁹.

SACRED SCRIPTURE

On the one hand no text of sacred Scripture is found in which our own justice is proposed as the object of faith; on the other hand it positively teaches the things that exclude fiducial faith in one's own justification. Phil 2, 12: “work out your salvation with fear and trembling”. But fiducial faith properly excludes fear and trembling. — Prov 20, 9: “Who can say: My heart is clean, I am pure from sin?” He who has fiducial faith ought to say this, inasmuch as he altogether admits freedom from sin. — 2 Pet 1, 10: “Wherefore, brethren, labour the more that by good works you may make sure your calling and election.” Therefore grace is not preserved by fiducial faith alone. — Eccles 9, 1: “There are just men and wise men, and their works are in the hand of God: and yet man knoweth not whether he be worthy of love or hatred”. Although the text does not properly deal with our question (man knows neither love nor hatred), in tradition nevertheless it is quite often applied to this matter. St Jerome explains it thus: “Now this is the sense: In this too I gave my heart and desired to know whom God loved and whom he hated. And I found that the works of the just are indeed in the hand of God, and yet whether they are loved by God or not they cannot now know, and waver amid ambiguity”²⁰. — Cf. Eccli 5, 5; 1 Cor 4, 4.

THE FATHERS

ST JEROME. See above on Eccles 9, 1. — ST AUGUSTINE: “For however great the justice with which a man is endowed, he ought to consider lest something be found in him to be blamed which he himself does not see, since the just king sits on the throne, whose thought they cannot escape, not even those things of which it is said: Who understands his sins?”²¹. — ST GREGORY THE GREAT: “But what your sweetness (Gregoria) has added in your letters, that you are importunate with me until I write to you that it has been revealed to me that your sins are forgiven, you have asked a thing both difficult and even useless: difficult indeed, because I am unworthy that a revelation should be made to me; useless truly, because you ought not to be made secure about your sins, except when in the last day of your life you will no longer be able to bewail those same sins”²².

THE THEOLOGIANS

The theologians, as is plain, deny the doctrine of Luther, and hold generally that we cannot believe that we are in the state of grace except on account of a special revelation on this matter²³. For those things cannot be believed which God has not revealed; but the justification of individual men has not been revealed by God; therefore it is not an object of divine faith. It has indeed been revealed that God remits sins, but when certain conditions have been fulfilled; that those conditions have been fulfilled in a particular case, however, has not been revealed; therefore a special revelation is required for a man to be able to believe by divine faith that he is in the state of grace.

Further, most commonly and almost unanimously the theologians hold that not even theological certainty is had concerning one's own justification²⁴. For in the syllogism: “God has revealed that he remits sin under these conditions; but I have fulfilled those conditions; therefore I am in the state of grace”, the minor does not have that absolute certainty by which error would be altogether excluded. Hence they teach that conjectural knowledge can be had and is had, that is, a certain moral certainty in the broader sense; indeed they think it good for a man not to have absolute certainty, because of the danger of presumption. But by no means do they therefore teach that men must always doubt and hesitate about their reconciliation with God.

St Bellarmine: ²⁵ “The third opinion, which is the more common in the Church²⁶, does not indeed take away all fear, yet it takes away all anxiety and hesitation and even doubt itself, if a man is called doubtful who does not dare to assent to the other side. For the argument is not good: Catholics have not the certainty of faith about their justification, therefore they always doubt, hesitate, are anxious; just as neither would one rightly conclude on the other side: Catholics are not anxious nor do they hesitate about their justification, therefore they are certain with the certainty of faith that their sins are forgiven them. For something intermediate is given between these extremes, namely a certain moral certainty on the part of the intellect, and hope and confidence on the part of the will.

Moreover, solid consolation and peace, tranquillity and interior joy are far better engendered in Catholics by a good conscience, by contrition, by charity, by the pursuit of good works, by frequent reception of the Eucharist, by the visitation of the Holy Spirit, which is the hidden manna which no man knows but he who receives it, than by that empty confidence and truly rash presumption in the Lutherans. For of a good conscience the Apostle writes, 2 Cor 1: Our glory is this, the testimony of our conscience. And St John in his first epistle, chap. 3: if our heart does not reprehend us, we have confidence with God. Of true contrition Solomon writes, Prov 14: the heart that knows the bitterness of its own soul, in its joy a stranger shall not be mingled. For truly an incredible joy arises from this, that a man sees himself most bitterly bewailing his sins. Moreover charity begets joy and peace before all else. Hence it is said, Gal 5: The fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy and peace, etc.

But from patience, to pass over other things now, a most solid consolation arises. For as the apostle says, Rom 5: We glory in tribulations, because tribulation works patience, and patience probation, and probation hope, but hope does not confound, etc. And 2 Cor 7: I am filled with consolation, I overflow with joy in all our tribulation. And chap. 8: We make known to you, brethren, the grace of God which is given in the churches of Macedonia, that in much experience of tribulation their abundance of joy was...

The holy Fathers too, whose testimonies the adversaries have wrongly adduced for the certainty of faith, and especially Cyprian, Ambrose, Augustine and Leo, gathered the security of the soul not from faith in the remission of sins, but from the consciousness of charity and of good works. It pleases me, moreover, in the name of the others, to write here the testimony of St Bernard, whence solid consolation is to be sought. Thus therefore he speaks in sermon 69 on the Canticle: How great, think you, is the grace of familiarity that arises from this dwelling together of the soul and the Word; how great the confidence that follows from familiarity? There is not, as I think, anything that such a soul should now fear to say, my beloved is mine: which, from the fact that it feels that it loves and vehemently loves, does not at all doubt that it is also vehemently loved, and concerning its singular intention, solicitude, care, works, diligence and zeal, with which it unceasingly and ardently watches how it may please God, it equally and indubitably recognizes all these things in him, remembering his promise: in what measure you shall have measured, it shall be measured to you again. Therefore from its own things, which are with God, it recognizes, nor does it doubt that she who loves is loved. And below: not only does he make you certain of your love, if indeed you love him, but also of his solicitude, which he bears for you, if he has felt you solicitous for him.

This certainty, therefore, we gladly acknowledge, which does not arise from the presumption of imputed justice, nor is it the certainty of the Catholic faith, but arises from the experience of charity and of good works, and by this can be called moral and conjectural certainty”

Objections

There are several texts of sacred Scripture which were adduced either by the heretics for a special faith in one's own justification, or by Catholics for its strict certainty. Yet no text is had which deals with a special faith in one's own justification; other texts indeed say that all are justified through the faith of Christ, but say nothing about the conditions fulfilled; several deal with moral certainty, which all theologians admit, and which a man can have by examining his conscience, or from the fact that he leads a truly Christian life and exercises the works of charity. Let there be some examples:

Jn 3, 21: “but he that doeth truth cometh to the light, that his works may be made manifest, because they are done in God”. — I answer. “To come to the light” in this place does not signify to come into the state of grace; the text does not deal with our question.

Jn 13, 35: “By this shall all men know that you are my disciples, if you have love one for another”. — I answer. The sign of Christianity is mutual charity, the new commandment of Christ; those who exercise it are thereby known by others to be true Christians; but it is not said that others thereby know by faith or by absolute certainty that they are in the state of grace, nor that they themselves know this; they can nevertheless, from a good Christian life, have that moral certainty which all admit. The same must be said to 1 Jn 3, 14; 4, 12; 5, 19.

Jn 14, 17: “but you shall know him (namely the Spirit of truth, whom the Father will give), because he shall abide with you and shall be in you”. — I answer. The disciples will know the Spirit of truth because he will be with them, by the help of the Spirit; but the discourse is not about their knowing that the Spirit is in their soul as indwelling; therefore the discourse is not about our question.

Jn 14, 20: “In that day you shall know that I am in my Father, and you in me, and I in you”. — I answer. Several understand with St Augustine “in that day” of the day of eternity, of the blessed vision of God; yet it seems better understood of the time after the resurrection of Christ: for then the apostles will always better know the divinity of Christ and his intimate union with his own (cf. 15, 5: the vine, the branches), as of the head with the members. But it is not said that the justified man must believe his own justice, or that he has absolute certainty; individual men can have moral certainty of it.

Acts 13, 39: “In this (Christ) every one that believeth is justified”. — I answer. If the conditions have been fulfilled; but that they have been fulfilled is not had by divine faith, nor by that absolute certainty, but by moral certainty.

Rom 3, 21 f.: “But now without the law the justice of God is made manifest, being witnessed by the law and the prophets. Even the justice of God, by faith of Jesus Christ, unto all and upon all them that believe in him: for there is no distinction”. — I answer. Justice is not from the law, but without the law unto all who believe. The conditions having been fulfilled, all, not only Jews but also Gentiles, are justified without the works of the law. Cf. Rom 4, 14; 16, 22.

Rom 5, 1: “Being justified therefore by faith, let us have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ”. — I answer. The justified man is no longer an enemy of God but in peace with God, and of this relation to God he has such certainty as excludes anxiety and hesitation; but for this moral certainty broadly taken suffices.

Rom 8, 1-18. If a man walks not according to the flesh but according to the spirit, he has that moral certainty so often mentioned; and the testimony of the Holy Spirit of which the apostle speaks is not a special revelation about one's own justification, but, as Bellarmine says, “the experience of a certain sweetness and interior peace, which engenders only conjectural certainty”.

Rom 8, 38 f.: “For I am sure that neither death nor life... nor any other creature shall be able to separate us from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus our Lord”. — I answer. 1) Some understand the text of those who are truly predestined, and of them it holds that no creature shall separate them from the love of God; but individuals, without a special revelation, do not know whether they are predestined. 2) I am sure signifies: I have a firm confidence that by the power of the grace of Christ we overcome all difficulties; but for such firm confidence moral certainty suffices²⁷.

1 Cor 2, 12: “But we have received not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God; that we may know the things that are given us from God”. — I answer. From the whole context it is plain that the apostle does not speak of the justification of individuals, but of the gifts which have been brought by Christ, and of which we cannot have knowledge through the spirit of the world, but through the Spirit of God. Therefore the discourse is not about our question.

1 Cor 11, 28: “But let a man prove himself: and so let him eat of that bread, and drink of the chalice”. — I answer. This proof does not lead to the certainty of faith, but to that moral certainty which a good conscience provides.

2 Cor 1, 12: “For our glory is this, the testimony of our conscience, that in simplicity of heart and sincerity of God, and not in carnal wisdom, but in the grace of God, we have conversed in this world: and more abundantly towards you”. — I answer. The apostle begins to explain why he did not come to Corinth earlier; he appeals to the testimony of his conscience, that he did not act in carnal wisdom, but in sincerity and charity. Therefore nothing about our question.

2 Cor 13, 5: “Try your own selves if you be in the faith; prove ye yourselves. Know you not your own selves, that Christ Jesus is in you, unless perhaps you be reprobates? But I trust that you shall know that we are not reprobates”. — I answer. The Corinthians must examine their conscience concerning their living faith; but this examination does not lead to the certainty of faith, nor to absolute certainty, nor does the apostle say such a thing. “Reprobates” is not to be understood of “reprobation”, but signifies unfit, useless: “unless perhaps you are not genuine, namely Christians”.

Eph 3, 12: “In whom (Christ) we have confidence and access with assurance by the faith of him”. — I answer. Confidence ought not to presuppose absolute certainty, but moral certainty broadly taken²⁸.

In the course of the preceding thesis it has already been said more than once that the acts preparing for justification must be performed with the help of grace. It is of this necessity of grace that the present thesis must treat.

“To elicit these acts”: the discourse, then, is about the acts of the sinner by which he is prepared for justification. These acts we call “salutary,” because they positively advance a man toward salvation, or conduce to it, whether mediately or immediately, according as they are a mediate or an immediate disposition. It must be noted, however, that besides these acts there are others also which are called salutary, namely the meritorious acts of the just man; the discourse on these occurs in the third part.

“Even to the very beginning of faith”: the thesis is altogether universal: it extends to all the disposing acts; but “even to the beginning of faith” is added expressly on account of the error of the Semi-Pelagians. The beginning of faith is really the same as the beginning of conversion; it comprises the first desire of salvation together with the antecedent knowledge, the first good will of man in order to salvation, the pious affection of credulity, the imploring of divine help. Therefore grace is necessary for these acts also, by which the motion toward salvation begins; no act is excepted.

“Grace” is necessary: by grace we understand a gratuitous gift, the help of God. That this help is truly gratuitous, that is, undue, is properly shown in thesis 8; yet for the most part it is already contained in the present thesis, inasmuch as without grace there is neither a disposition for grace nor a merit of grace. Since this help is given for eliciting those acts, it ought not of itself to be a permanent help. In the treatise On the virtues¹ it is shown as more probable that habits are not infused before the first justification; consequently it must be said that the help which is given before the first justification is not a habitual gift, but a transient and actual one. For this reason, in distinction from the habitual gifts, it is called actual grace. But the man who has sinned after the first justification can retain the habits of faith and hope², and of itself the wording of the thesis could be satisfied if with the help of those habits he elicited acts disposing him to the third justification. Whether and how far actual grace is necessary for the use of those habits is disputed among theologians, and the discourse returns to this matter later.

“Internal grace”: that is, grace which is in the soul itself, or rather in its higher faculties, the intellect and the will. It is called internal in opposition to external graces, such as are the incarnation of the Word itself, revelation, preaching, the Church, the sacraments, the examples of the saints, and so on.

“Absolutely necessary”: that is, in the present order there can be no salutary act at all, no act disposing to justification, without grace. The powers of man without grace do not suffice; it is through grace that those acts first become possible for man: grace is not required for being able more easily, but for being able simply. The question, moreover, concerns the fact alone; not whether this comes from the nature of the thing or from a positive divine ordinance.

Against this thesis stand, first of all, the Pelagians and the Semi-Pelagians.

The Pelagians (Pelagius, Caelestius, Julian)³ indeed affirmed in words some divine grace; for God gave man his nature and a free will, and so bestowed on him the ability to do good, to fulfil the commandments, to avoid sin; this ability, therefore, is not from us but from God; therefore it is grace. To will and to work thereafter, according to them, is from ourselves. Moreover God gave the law, the doctrine, and so showed men what they ought to do (therefore an external grace). By this external grace it is made easier for man to do what he ought to do. Whether the Pelagians later admitted an internal grace of the intellect is disputed; but certainly they did not admit it for being able simply, but for being able more easily. An internal grace of the will they always denied, since it could not be reconciled with free will. Caelestius: “If I do nothing without the help of God, and every single one of my works is his, then it is not I who labour, but the help of God will be crowned in me, and he gave in vain the power of choice, which I cannot fulfil unless he himself always assists me. For the will is destroyed which needs the aid of another. But God gave free choice, which is not free otherwise than if I do what I will”⁴. Julian: “The freedom of choice, by which man is emancipated from God, consists in the possibility of admitting sin and of abstaining from sin”⁵.

The Semi-Pelagians, or Massilians (Cassian, Vincent of Lérins, Faustus)⁶ altogether defended against the Pelagians the necessity of grace for salutary acts; they denied, however, the necessity of grace specifically for the acts which constitute the “beginning of faith.” The process of justification can be compared with the healing of a sick man. The healing itself is from the physician alone, and from the means which the physician supplies. But before the healing, in order that the physician may begin to heal him, the sick man must acknowledge his misery, trust in the physician and implore his help. These acts do not belong to the healing itself, but precede it. Similarly, at least speaking generally, in the process of justification the sinner must first, by his own powers, know and acknowledge his misery, desire salvation, believe in Christ and trust in him, and implore divine help. And if he has done this, God will begin the “healing,” conferring the graces necessary for salutary acts. If, however, a man does not do these things, he must ascribe it to himself that he does not receive grace; for God offers his grace indifferently to all. These antecedent acts are called the “beginning of faith”; for them, according to the Semi-Pelagians, grace is not required, and on them, in the common view, depends whether a man receives salutary grace⁷.

Against this, then, it must be said: even those first acts are truly salutary acts, remotely disposing to justification, and for them too internal grace is absolutely required; in other words: there are no acts positively ordaining to salvation without grace; therefore for the first grace, which God confers on man, there is no disposition. The work of salvation in each man begins with God.

In the time of the first scholastics affirmations are found which, if taken at face value, have perhaps a Pelagian sense, but from the mind of the authors themselves they do not seem to be so understood⁸. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries similar things are found, and some theologians seem in fact not to have defended sufficiently the necessity of grace for all the acts preparing for justification⁹.

THE DOCUMENTS OF THE CHURCH

Council of Carthage (418), canon 4: “Likewise, whoever says that the same grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord helps us to avoid sin for this reason alone, that through it the understanding of the commandments is revealed and opened to us, so that we may know what we ought to desire and what to avoid, but that through it it is not granted us that we may love and be able to do what we have learned must be done: let him be anathema”¹⁰. — Canon 5: “Likewise it has pleased [the council] that whoever says that the grace of justification is given to us for this reason, that what we are commanded to do by free will we may be able to fulfil more easily through grace, as if, even if grace were not given, we could fulfil the divine commandments, not indeed easily, but still without it: let him be anathema. For the Lord was speaking of the fruits of the commandments when he did not say: Without me you can do it with more difficulty, but said: Without me you can do nothing”¹¹. Cf. the tractatory epistle of Zosimus¹²; in the Council of Ephesus the Pelagians are condemned¹³.

INDICULUS¹⁴: After the authorities have been cited, it continues: “By these ecclesiastical rules, therefore, and by documents taken from divine authority, we have been so confirmed, with the Lord's help, that we profess God to be the author of all good affections and works, and of all efforts and all virtues by which from the beginning of faith one tends toward God, and we do not doubt that all the merits of man are preceded by his grace, through whom it comes about that we begin to will and to do some good”¹⁵.

COUNCIL OF ORANGE: Canon 3: It is from grace that God is invoked by us; canon 4: it is from grace that we will to be cleansed from sin. Canon 5: “If anyone says that the beginning of faith, as also the increase of faith, and the very affection of credulity, by which we believe in him who justifies the ungodly and come to the regeneration of holy baptism, is not through the gift of grace, that is, through the inspiration of the Holy Spirit correcting our will from unbelief to piety, but is naturally in us, he is proved an adversary of the apostolic dogmas, blessed Paul saying: We are confident that he who has begun a good work in you will perfect it unto the day of Christ Jesus¹⁶; and that: To you it is given for Christ not only to believe in him, but also to suffer for him¹⁷; and: By grace you are saved through faith, and this not from yourselves: for it is the gift of God¹⁸. For those who say that the faith by which we believe in God is natural, define all those who are alien to the Church of Christ as in some way faithful.” — Canon 6: “If anyone says that mercy is conferred from on high on us who believe, will, desire, strive, labour, pray, watch, study, ask, seek, knock without the grace of God, and does not confess that it is wrought in us by the infusion and inspiration of the Holy Spirit that we may believe, will, or be able to do all these things as we ought, and subjects the help of grace to human humility or obedience, and does not consent that it is a gift of that same grace that we are obedient and humble, he resists the apostle saying: What have you that you have not received?¹⁹ and: By the grace of God I am what I am”²⁰. — Canon 7: “If anyone affirms that by the vigour of nature, without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, who gives to all sweetness in consenting and believing the truth, a man can think, as is expedient, or choose some good pertaining to the salvation of eternal life, or consent to the saving, that is, the evangelical preaching, he is deceived by a heretical spirit, not understanding the voice of God in the Gospel saying: Without me you can do nothing²¹; and that of the Apostle: Not that we are fit to think anything of ourselves as from ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God”²². — Canon 9: “It is a divine gift that we think rightly and keep our feet from falsehood and injustice; for as often as we do good, God works in us and with us that we may work.” Cf. canons 14; 15; 16; 20; 22. — “And so, according to the sentences of the sacred Scriptures written above, or the definitions of the ancient Fathers, this we must both preach and believe, God being favourable: that by the sin of the first man free will was so inclined and weakened that no one thereafter can either love God as he ought, or believe in God, or do good for God's sake, unless the grace of divine mercy has preceded him.” — “This also we salutarily profess and believe, that in every good work we do not begin first and afterwards are helped by God's mercy, but he himself, with no merits preceding, first inspires in us both faith and love of himself, so that we may faithfully seek the sacraments of baptism and after baptism be able, with his help, to fulfil the things that are pleasing to him”²³.

BONIFACE II in the confirmation of the Council of Orange²⁴: “And therefore, since on this matter many Fathers and, before the rest, Augustine of blessed memory, bishop, and also Our predecessors, the bishops of the Apostolic See, are proved to have discoursed with such abundant reasoning that it ought no longer to be doubtful to anyone that faith itself also comes to us from grace, We have thought it superfluous to give a lengthy reply; especially since, according to the sentences which you have sent from the Apostle, in which he says: I obtained mercy to be faithful²⁵, and elsewhere: To you it is given for Christ not only to believe in him, but also to suffer for him²⁶, it appears evidently that the faith by which we believe in Christ, as also all good things, comes to individual men from the gift of grace from on high, not from the power of human nature. Which we rejoice that Your Fraternity also, in a conference held with certain bishops of the Gauls, has thought in accordance with the catholic faith: namely in those matters in which, as you have indicated, they defined with one consent that the faith by which we believe in Christ is conferred by the prevenient grace of the Godhead; adding also that there is absolutely nothing good according to God which anyone can either will or begin or complete without the grace of God, our Saviour himself saying: Without me you can do nothing²⁷. For it is certain and catholic that in all good things, of which faith is the head, the divine mercy precedes us even against our will, that we may persevere in faith, as the prophet David says: My God, his mercy shall prevent me²⁸; and again: My mercy is with him²⁹ and elsewhere: His mercy shall follow me³⁰. Similarly blessed Paul says: Or who has first given to him, and it shall be recompensed to him? For of him, and through him, and in him are all things³¹. Whence we wonder exceedingly at those who think otherwise, that they are still weighed down to such a degree by the remnants of the old error as to believe that one comes to Christ not by the benefit of God but by nature; and to say that the good of nature itself, which is known to have been depraved by the sin of Adam, is rather the author of our faith than Christ; nor do they understand that they are crying out against the sentence of the Lord saying: No one comes to me unless it has been given him by my Father³²; but also that they oppose blessed Paul crying out to the Hebrews: Let us run to the contest set before us, looking to the author and finisher of faith, Jesus Christ³³. Since these things are so, we cannot find what in believing in Christ without the grace of God they would assign to the human will; since Christ is the author and finisher of faith. Wherefore, greeting you with fitting affection, we approve your confession written above, as consonant with the catholic rules of the Fathers”³⁴.

COUNCIL OF TRENT, sess. 6 cap. 5: “It declares, moreover, that the beginning of justification itself in adults must be taken from the prevenient grace of God through Jesus Christ, that is, from his calling, by which they are called while no merits of theirs exist, so that those who had been turned away from God by their sins, by his exciting and helping grace to convert themselves to their own justification, freely assenting to and cooperating with that same grace, may be disposed...”³⁵. And the corresponding canon 3: “If anyone says that without the prevenient inspiration of the Holy Spirit and his help a man can believe, hope, love or repent as he ought, so that the grace of justification may be conferred on him: let him be anathema”³⁶. Similarly cap. 6: “Aroused by divine grace and helped”³⁷.

THE VATICAN COUNCIL: For faith grace is necessary. Sess. 3 cap. 3; can. 5³⁸.

SACRED SCRIPTURE

The principal texts of Sacred Scripture, which teach the necessity of grace for every salutary act, are employed from the beginning of the controversy with the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians both in the documents of the Church and in the holy Fathers.

1. On every salutary act in general: Io 15, 5: “I am the vine, you are the branches: he who abides in me and I in him, he bears much fruit: because without me you can do nothing.” The text is universal: without me nothing; it treats of internal grace: from the parable itself. The text speaks immediately of “bearing fruit,” which is proximately understood of meritorious acts. For the discourse is directly about those who are united with the Lord, not about sinners. But v. 5 is altogether universal, and the branch separated from the vine not only cannot bear fruit, but can do nothing at all, especially nothing toward being again vitally united with the vine. Thus a man separated from Christ the vine, a sinner, is spiritually dead: Eph 2, 1: “dead in your offences and sins”; v. 3: “children of wrath”; v. 5: “when we were dead in sins, he quickened us together in Christ, by whose grace you are saved...” In this universal sense Io 15, 5 was used by the Fathers and councils in the Pelagian and Semi-Pelagian controversy. St Augustine: “Lest anyone should think that the branch can of itself bear even some small fruit, when he had said: he bears much fruit, he did not say: without me you can do a little, but: you can do nothing. Whether therefore little or much, it cannot be done without him, without whom nothing can be done”³⁹.

2. Salutary thought: 2 Cor 3, 5: “Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves as from ourselves, but our sufficiency (fitness) is from God.” The Apostle, accused of arrogance and pride, shows that the source of his confidence is not himself but God, to whom he attributes all things: through Christ the mediator he has that confidence toward God, the source of confidence: we are not of ourselves fit, but from God. “To think” not a few, on account of the context, understand of devising the ways and reasons by which the apostolic preaching can be made effective; others, however, in a more universal sense, of thinking every good thing that pertains to salvation. Thus in the controversy with the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians: Council of Orange can. 7; St Augustine: “And therefore, commending this grace, which is not given according to any merits, but produces all good merits: not that we are fit, he says, to think anything as from ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God. Let those attend here and weigh these words who think that the beginning of faith is from us and the supplement of faith from God. For who does not see that to think is prior to believing? No one surely believes anything unless he has first thought that it is to be believed. For although certain thoughts fly before the will to believe, however swiftly, however rapidly, and it follows so immediately as to accompany it as it were most closely joined, yet it is necessary that all things which are believed be believed by a preceding thought. Although even to believe itself is nothing other than to think with assent”⁴⁰. This more universal explanation is founded also in the text itself, for the Apostle continues: “who also (καί) has made us fit ministers of the new testament,” passing by the particle “also” from the universal statement to the special: our whole fitness is from God, and we owe this also to him, that we are fit ministers of the New Testament. But if it were not so understood, there would be a tautology: as regards the apostolic ministry our fitness is from God, who also made us fit ministers.

3. On salutary willing and working: Phil 2, 12. 13: “With fear and trembling work out your salvation. For it is God who works in you both to will and to accomplish, for his good will.” The Apostle exhorts the Philippians to strive to attain salvation by working strenuously, with fear and trembling, that is, with religious solicitude to satisfy their duty and their conscience⁴¹; for in this work they depend wholly on God and his benevolent will: for it is God who effects in you both the will and the execution, according to his good will, to manifest his benevolence toward you, out of benevolence. St Augustine: “For God not only gave and assists our ability, but also works in us to will and to work, not because we do not will or do not act, but because without his help we neither will anything good nor do it”⁴².

The texts brought forward are altogether universal, and therefore hold also of the very beginning of faith. But the words of the Lord in Io 6, 44 are specifically about faith: “No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him.” Therefore, external grace being supposed, the preaching of Christ, no one can come to Christ, that is, believe (v. 65. 66), unless the Father draws him; therefore no one can believe in Christ without internal grace; therefore internal grace is absolutely necessary for believing itself.

Besides these texts, several others were in use in the controversy with the Pelagians, which perhaps, if considered bare in themselves, are not necessarily to be explained in that sense. Thus especially 1 Cor 4, 7: “For who distinguishes you? What have you that you have not received? But if you have received it, why do you glory as if you had not received it?” Of which text St Augustine says: “By which testimony I myself also was chiefly convinced, when I was in like manner in error, thinking that the faith by which we believe in God was not a gift of God but was from ourselves in us, and that through it we obtain the gifts of God, by which we live temperately and justly and piously in this world”⁴³. And afterwards: “To be able to have faith, as to be able to have charity, is of the nature of men; but to have faith as to have charity is of the grace of the faithful. That nature, therefore, in which the possibility of having faith was given us, does not distinguish man from man; but faith itself distinguishes the faithful from the unbeliever. And hereby, when it is said: For who distinguishes you? What have you that you have not received? whoever dares to say: I have faith of myself, therefore I have not received it, surely contradicts this most manifest truth, not because to believe or not to believe is not in the choice of the human will, but because in the elect the will is prepared by the Lord”⁴⁴. Similarly the Council of Orange can. 6⁴⁵.

Cornely says of this text: “For the rest, this verse, according to the common explanation of almost all interpreters, treats of natural gifts, with which the leaders of factions were puffed up, not of supernatural graces”⁴⁶. But it is rightly applied also to the gifts of grace; for if man of himself does not even have the natural gifts by which he is distinguished from others and in which he can glory, this holds a fortiori of the gifts of grace. Other texts which were used are Ps 58, 11; 88, 25; Prov 8, 35 (LXX, The will is prepared by the Lord); Rom 10, 20; 11, 35 ss.; 1 Cor 7, 25; 12, 3; 15, 10; Phil 1, 6. 25; Hebr 2, 1.

THE FATHERS

Before the Pelagian heresy arose this question was not treated by the Fathers ex professo⁴⁷, nor is it surprising that the Fathers, since at that time they were defending human liberty, did not always speak also of the necessity of grace⁴⁸.

ST CYRIL OF JERUSALEM: “It is God's part to confer grace; yours, to receive and keep it. Do not therefore despise grace because it is given gratis; but rather, having received it, keep it religiously”⁴⁹. — ST GREGORY OF NAZIANZUS: “For since some there are who are so lifted up in mind by their right actions as to ascribe the whole to themselves, and to give no thanks to the Creator and Author of their wisdom and the supplier of all good things, the discourse teaches them⁵⁰, that even to will rightly itself needs divine help; indeed the very choice of the things that are right is a certain divine gift flowing from the goodness of God. For that we are saved must be both from ourselves and from God. Therefore he says: Not of him who wills, that is, not of him only who wills, nor of him only who runs, but also of God who shows mercy. Thus, since willing itself also is from God, with the best right he assigned the whole to God”⁵¹. — ST JOHN CHRYSOSTOM: “God awaits occasions from us, that he may display great liberality. Therefore let us not, through sloth, deprive ourselves of his gifts, but let us hasten and press on to grasp the beginning and the way that leads to virtue, so that, aided by help from on high, we may be able to reach the end also. For it is not possible for us to do any good rightly without the aid of grace from above”⁵². — “Vocation indeed and purification are from grace; but that the called man remain and keep these things, clothed in pure garments, proceeds from the zeal of the called. But we are called not from merit, but from grace”⁵³. — ST AMBROSE: “Fear the Lord and presume of the Lord; for the Lord will send his angels round about those who fear him and will deliver them⁵⁴. You see surely that everywhere the power of the Lord cooperates with human endeavors, so that no one can build without the Lord, no one begin anything without the Lord”⁵⁵.

ST AUGUSTINE is the one who chiefly attacked the opposing error; since several of his texts have already been brought forward, let it suffice here to add one more: “Such and so great doctors⁵⁶ saying that there is nothing of which we may glory as of our own, which God has not given us, and that not even our heart and our thoughts are in our own power, and giving the whole to God, and confessing that we receive from him, that we who are to persevere may be converted to him, that what is good may seem good to us also, and that we may will it, that we may honour God and receive Christ, that from being undevout we may become devout and religious, that we may believe in the Trinity itself, and confess with our voice also what we believe: these things surely they attribute to the grace of God, acknowledge as God's gifts, and testify that they are from him, not from us”⁵⁷.

ST PROSPER OF AQUITAINE: “But how do you not notice that you fall into that loss, in that, whether you will or not, you are convicted of saying that the grace of God is given according to our merits; when you affirm that something of good work on the part of men themselves precedes, on account of which they obtain grace? For the faith of one who asks, the piety of one who seeks, the insistence of one who knocks, cannot be held to be of no merit; especially since all such are said to receive, to find, and to enter. In which it is superfluous, indeed impious, so to wish to make room for merits existing before grace, that what the Lord says should not be wholly true: No one comes to me unless the Father who sent me draws him⁵⁸, which would by no means be said, if the conversion of anyone were to be believed without the illumination of God, or if in any way the will of man could extend itself to God without God”⁵⁹.

ST LEO THE GREAT: “Without God there is no (virtue), nor does it obtain the property of deity unless it is quickened by the Spirit of its author. For when the Lord says to his disciples: Without me you can do nothing⁶⁰, there is no doubt that a man doing good has from God both the effect of the work and the beginning of the will”⁶¹. — ST FULGENTIUS: “Hold most firmly and doubt in no way that a man, whom neither ignorance of letters nor any weakness or adversity prevents, can indeed read the words of the holy law and of the Gospel, or hear them from the mouth of any preacher; but that no one can obey the divine commandments unless God has preceded him with his grace, so that he may perceive with the heart also what he hears with the body, and, having received from on high a good will and strength, may both will and be able to do the commandments of God”⁶².

THE THEOLOGIANS

That the theologians now agree on this matter is plain; on the earlier scholastics see what has been said above; St Thomas treats our question in S. Th. 1, 2 q. 109 a. 6; 2, 2 q. 6 a. 1. 2.

Objections

1. The Semi-Pelagians appealed to various texts of Sacred Scripture: Prov 16, 1: “It is man's part to prepare the soul.” 16, 9: “The heart of man disposes his way.” — Zach 1, 3: “Turn to me, says the Lord of hosts, and I will turn to you.” — Matth 7, 7: “Ask and it shall be given you; seek and you shall find; knock and it shall be opened to you.” — Act Ap 16, 31: “Believe in the Lord Jesus and you shall be saved, you and your household.” — Rom 7, 18: “To will is present with me, but to accomplish that which is good I find not.”

I answer. Council of Trent, sess. 6 cap. 5: “Whence in the sacred letters, when it is said: Turn to me and I will turn to you, we are reminded of our liberty; when we answer: Convert us, O Lord, to you, and we shall be converted⁶³, we confess that we are preceded by the grace of God.” Hence I distinguish: In the preparation a free cooperation of man is required: I grant; that this is or can be without the help of grace: I deny.

To the examples, however, which they bring forward about Zacchaeus, about the good thief, and so on⁶⁴, it must be said with the Council of Orange: “Whence it is most manifestly to be believed that the faith, so admirable, of that thief whom the Lord recalled to the fatherland of paradise, and of Cornelius the centurion to whom the angel of the Lord was sent, and of Zacchaeus who deserved to receive the Lord himself, was not of nature, but the gift of divine largess.”

2. Of the Fathers who wrote before the Pelagian heresy arose, it has already been said above. That they were not Pelagians or Semi-Pelagians Petavius shows, De Deo, lib. 9, cap. 4 ss. Rightly also in this matter applies what St Augustine said of St Chrysostom in the question of original sin: “But, you will say, why did he not himself add ‘their own’ (namely sins)? Why, we think, except because, disputing in the catholic Church, he did not think he would be understood otherwise, and, assailed by no such question from anyone, he spoke the more securely while you were not yet disputing”⁶⁵.

Since, according to the preceding thesis, internal grace is absolutely necessary for all the acts by which the sinner is prepared for justification, not only for being able more easily but for being able simply, those acts must possess some perfection which cannot be attained by the proper powers of fallen man. But the help which God grants, and by which those acts are made possible, is grace, that is, an undue gift; and it is on this note of the undue that the Fathers insisted strongly against the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians¹. It is impossible for a man by his own powers alone to merit that help, or positively to dispose himself for it; for those acts would then be salutary, and therefore impossible without grace. Hence the question now arises how the impossibility of performing those acts is to be understood, whence it is to be explained, and of what nature is the gratuitousness of that help.

It could perhaps of itself be the case that those acts did not of themselves exceed what is of itself possible by natural powers, but that man through original sin was so weakened in his powers that he could no longer perform those acts, and that God out of mercy supplied his help. Thus the acts would belong to the natural order, and the help would not need to transcend the merely natural order. The acts would be more difficult than could be performed by fallen man with his powers weakened.

But it can also be the case that those acts have a perfection which exceeds the natural order, and that accordingly the help which God confers gives man the power of performing acts which transcend the powers of nature. And this is the judgment enunciated in the thesis: the acts by which the sinner disposes himself for justification are entitatively supernatural², that is, they belong according to their physical being to that order in which are the grace of justification and the vision of God.

The sense of this doctrine, then, is: God willed that the acts disposing to justification, from the very beginning of faith, be of the strictly supernatural order; and the help necessary for these acts is in the same way in the supernatural order, and therefore in the strict sense undue. This grace, then, is physically necessary for such acts, and it is rightly called elevating grace, since it elevates the faculties of man so that they are capable of producing acts entitatively supernatural.

The supernatural is understood as a gift of God positively undue to created nature and superadded to it. The supernatural is distinguished as to manner, when the gift conferred on the subject is natural but the manner in which it is conferred is undue; as to substance, when the gift itself is positively undue; as relatively supernatural, if it is not undue to every created being; as absolutely supernatural, if it is undue to every created being, or exceeding the order of creatures, and therefore pertaining to the divine order.

The question under this aspect seems to have been explicitly treated chiefly after the Council of Trent, although it was already in some way contained in the doctrine of the earlier theologians. Among the post-Tridentine theologians there is a great consensus in this matter as regards the fact itself³. There is not, however, a consensus of theologians on the question whether to the entitatively supernatural acts of wayfarers there corresponds a proper supernatural formal object which cannot be attained by natural powers⁴. Finally, there is no consensus of theologians in the qualification of this sentence. But the sentence enunciated in the thesis can now, it seems, be called common, or at least the more common, among theologians.

It must be well noted that the thesis treats only of the acts by which the sinner is disposed for justification; the discourse on the acts of the just returns in the third part. Further, if in this thesis the necessity of grace is explained from the fact that the disposing acts are entitatively supernatural, so that grace is necessary as elevating, it is not denied that it is also necessary inasmuch as it strengthens the powers weakened by sin, that is, inasmuch as it is healing; but of this matter it must properly be spoken in the following section.

Proof

I. From the authority of the theologians, who teach this almost commonly.

II. In the preceding thesis it was proved that internal grace is absolutely necessary for the acts disposing to justification, and that not only for being able more easily but for being able simply; but this necessity can be explained only from the fact that the entitative perfection of those acts exceeds the order of the things which are possible by the natural powers of men; therefore those acts are entitatively supernatural.

Proof of the minor: If the matter concerned only entitatively natural acts, which are more difficult than could be performed by the weakened powers of fallen man, grace would properly be necessary for being able more easily, and not for being able simply.

Man after original sin has not lost his liberty, although it has been weakened, and he can, as is shown in the following section, perform naturally honest acts without grace; if, therefore, grace is so necessary for the good acts which prepare for justification that without it it is impossible for man to perform them, there must be found in them some perfection which is not in naturally good acts.

This perfection cannot consist in a mere external divine acceptance, so that a good act performed without grace and a good act performed with grace would differ only in this, that God wills not to accept the former as a disposition for justification, but wills so to accept the latter. For thus it would not remain true that man without grace is unable to perform such an act; for the necessity proved in the preceding thesis seems to be such that something is lacking to the powers of man for performing those acts, which could no longer be said in this hypothesis.

Nor can this perfection consist in this, that the salutary act is performed with greater delight, spiritual relish, and so on; for thus it would no longer be understood why grace is necessary for being able simply; and moreover for salutary acts a special delight or facility is never required as essential.

Finally, the opinion seems excluded which would say that the perfection of the salutary act consists in this, that it is supernatural in becoming, but not in having become; for thus there would be an act which according to its whole entity could be produced even without grace; and moreover an act is disposing not by reason of its origin, but because it is such.

“And so it remains that we say that a good act, as is expedient for salvation, enjoys that perfection which is intrinsically supernatural, that is, intrinsically more excellent than the perfection which can be acquired for acts by the powers of nature; and therefore that the mode of perfection which is signified by the words as is expedient is an intrinsic mode of the act, by which its essence is constituted; and that therefore on account of that perfection which is proper to an intrinsically supernatural act, grace is required that it may be done by us”⁵.

This note of undue gift must still be briefly explained.

1. Actual grace is not due by the exigency of nature itself. According to the Baianists the gifts conferred on Adam in creation were due to integral nature; now, however, they are undue, inasmuch as human nature by sin has positively made itself unworthy of these gifts¹. The Baian propositions have been condemned: “The raising and exaltation of human nature to the fellowship of the divine nature was due to the integrity of the first condition, and therefore must be called natural, and not supernatural.” — “Absurd is the opinion of those who say that man from the beginning, by a certain supernatural and gratuitous gift, was raised above the condition of his nature, so as to worship God supernaturally by faith, hope and charity.” — “By vain and idle men, according to the folly of the philosophers, was devised the sentence, which is to be rejected as Pelagianism, that man was from the beginning so constituted that by gifts superadded to nature he was raised by the bounty of the Creator and adopted as a son of God.” — “False is the opinion of the doctors that the first man could have been created and instituted by God without natural justice”².

Since the elevation of nature into the supernatural order is absolutely undue, it follows that those helps of grace also, which are of that same order, are in the same way undue to nature.

Special in this question is the opinion of the Augustinians. According to them the only ultimate end possible to man is the intuitive vision of God itself; but this end is so sublime that it cannot be attained by the natural powers of man. But God owes it to himself that, if he creates man, he also make possible for him the attainment of his end; otherwise human nature would be more wretched than a non-rational creature, which possesses the powers to attain its end; God therefore owes it, whether by the title of providence or out of fittingness, to give man supernatural helps by which he can arrive at his end³. But this opinion is not to be admitted; for its supposition is not true, namely that the only end possible to man is the intuitive vision of God, and that in rational nature there is a remote right to the heavenly inheritance.

If, therefore, the supernatural order of grace is plainly outside every exigency of human nature, there is in it no positive ordination either to the end itself or to the supernatural means of obtaining it. But since man is an intellectual nature, the possibility of elevation into this order is present. This possibility or capacity immediately means the non-repugnance of such an elevation. Thus in intellectual nature there is an obediential potency for this elevation and for receiving the helps of this order, that is, that potency by which the creature obeys the Creator, so that he can make it fit for something which exceeds the powers of the creature. This obediential potency is passive in the sense that the creature of itself is only capable of receiving those gifts and helps passively; but once grace is received, man can and ought to cooperate actively.

2. From what has been said it follows that by merely natural acts man cannot positively prepare himself to obtain those supernatural helps: he can neither merit them nor positively dispose himself for them. These things have already been proved in the thesis itself; for such acts would be salutary; but salutary acts are strictly supernatural; therefore naturally impossible. Thus for the first supernatural grace there is no positive preparation at all; but with supernatural grace received, man can and ought thereafter, through salutary acts, prepare himself for other graces up to the very attainment of justification.

3. By natural prayers grace cannot be obtained. Petitionary prayer is the asking of things fitting from God. It supposes the desire of the good which is expected from God. The petition is properly the manifestation of this desire, and thereby the manifestation of one's own need; it appeals to the goodness of God, that he may wish to succour this need. The efficacy of prayer, then, is other than the efficacy of merit: merit is a service rendered to another, and as such appeals to his justice or equity; prayer, however, by showing one's own necessity, appeals to mercy. Hence of itself it would not be against the gratuitousness of grace if God willed to be moved to give grace to one who asked for it. That nevertheless by natural prayers grace cannot be obtained is plain:

a) Such prayer supposes the desire of grace; but this cannot be without grace.

b) That prayer would positively avail for salvation, and would therefore be a salutary act; but for a salutary act grace is required; therefore.

c) If a natural petition of grace were efficacious, man would positively dispose himself for grace; for by efficacious prayer we dispose ourselves to receive the gifts of God.

Therefore there is nothing in man but a merely passive potency for receiving the first actual elevating grace.