De gratia Redemptoris

“Actual aids”, as distinct from the permanent habitual gifts, are those which are conferred for individual acts, and which are the principles of a salutary act.

“Internal graces”, as distinct from external graces, are that which is in the higher faculties of the soul¹.

“Are”: this does not mean that the essence of actual grace is simply exhausted in illuminations and inspirations, but that, abstracting for the present from this question, it only says positively that they belong to actual grace.

“Illuminations of the intellect and inspirations of the will”: this is according to the manner of speaking now current, which refers illuminations to the intellect and inspirations to the will. Hence it must be noted that those words do not have this exclusive meaning in the sources. Those illuminations of the intellect and inspirations of the will are acts by which a man supernaturally knows, or is supernaturally affected towards something, is inclined, wills something.

“Immediate”: since the discourse concerns the help of grace, those illuminations and inspirations are understood which are caused by God in man. Both understanding and willing can be caused by God immediately and mediately. The intellect is illuminated mediately when some truth is proposed to it (e.g. in the preaching of the gospel), by which a man according to the laws of nature is moved to know something. Such an illumination belongs to external graces. Mediate too must be called the illumination when species are indeed immediately infused into the intellect, but the act of cognition follows simply according to merely natural principles; this, as is plain, is possible only if those infused species belong to the merely natural order; from this example, however, it appears that the infusion of species as such does not of itself mean an immediate illumination, if a special cooperation in the intellection itself does not accede; but this is necessary if the species are of another order (species infused per se), and in that case this cooperation is not lacking. In such a supposition, however, immediate illumination is not constituted by the infusion of species, but by the cooperation in the intellection itself. Hence by immediate illumination we understand the immediate cooperation of God in the intellection itself. But in every operation of the creature, and so also in every intellection, the immediate concurrence of God is required. Of this natural concurrence there is no question now, but of that operation of God in human intellection by which it becomes entitatively supernatural, salutary. It was said above that the supernaturalness of a salutary act consists in this, that its very physical being belongs to the supernatural order; if therefore God so influences that an act of knowledge of such entitative perfection arises, there is had an immediate illumination of the intellect. The supernatural act of the wayfarer does not have, as we proved in the treatise on the virtues, a formal object essentially different from the corresponding natural act, nor does it differ essentially from the natural act in its manner of operating about the material object; of itself the supernatural act requires the proposal of the material object in the same way as the natural act. “If, at the presence of such an object, the intellect with the general concurrence of God so acts as the nature of it demands, there is no immediate illustration of the intellect by God. But if God, the object indeed being proposed externally, himself acts physically in the mind by his power, elevating it with an undue light, so that it apprehends the truth as it is expedient unto salvation, i.e. by an act which according to its internal entity is proportioned to the supernatural last end, such an intellectual act we rightly call an immediate illustration”²

The will is inspired mediately by this, that the intellect proposes an object to it (whether by mediate or by immediate illustration) and the will according to the laws of nature is affected towards that object; this mediate inspiration of the will is of itself conjoined with the illustration of the intellect. The will is inspired immediately by God if God immediately causes such a movement of the will as in its physical being belongs to the supernatural order, and which is therefore a salutary movement.

Petavius³ thought that a mediate inspiration of the will sufficed; but far more commonly an immediate inspiration is taught.

“Indeliberate and deliberate acts”: deliberate acts are those which, and insofar as, depend on the free choice of man; indeliberate are those which anticipate the free choice of man, or which persist against the will of man. They can be acts of the will or of the intellect. Deliberate acts are done by man in a special way, insofar as by using his liberty he elicits them or permits them to persist; man does not exercise this dominion in the origin of indeliberate acts, and so those are in a certain manner done in us without us, that is, without us freely choosing or consenting; “in us but without us” does not mean that those acts are not elicited by a vital faculty.

Acts of the intellect are simple and comparative apprehension, speculative and practical judgment; all those acts can be entitatively supernatural, and since by them a man can be brought to a salutary act, all of them can of themselves have the character of actual grace; at least, however, this must be said of practical judgment. But the affections of the will are love (of benevolence and of concupiscence) and hatred, joy and fear; all can be supernatural and the principle of a salutary act; all therefore can be actual grace⁴

THE DOCUMENTS OF THE CHURCH

INDICULUS, cap. 5: “Therefore indeed, because the will is prepared by the Lord⁵ and that they may do something good, he himself touches the hearts of his sons with fatherly inspirations”⁶. — Cap. 6: “God works in the hearts of men and in their free will itself”⁷.

ARAUSICANUM, can. 4: Through the infusion and operation of the Holy Spirit the will is prepared by the Lord; can. 5: Through the gift of grace, that is, through the inspiration of the Holy Spirit correcting our will; can. 6: Through the infusion and inspiration of the Holy Spirit it is brought about in us that we believe etc.; can. 7: we cannot by the vigour of nature do any good thing that pertains to salvation without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit; can. 8: no one can come to the Lord unless the Father draw him⁸.

CONC. TRIDENTINUM, cap. 5: The beginning of justification must be taken from the grace of God, that is, from his calling; God touches the heart of man through the illumination of the Holy Spirit; cap. 6: Being excited and helped by divine grace, they are disposed unto justice, they conceive faith from hearing, they are moved freely towards God⁹.

Pius V condemns the errors of Baius, err. 63: “But also that distinction of a twofold justice, the one which is wrought through the Spirit of charity indwelling, the other which is wrought indeed from the inspiration of the Holy Spirit exciting the heart to penance, but not yet indwelling the heart and pouring charity into it, by which the justice of the divine law is fulfilled, is likewise rejected”. — Err. 64: “Likewise also that distinction of a twofold vivification, the one by which the sinner is vivified while there is inspired in him by the grace of God the purpose and beginning of penance and of a new life, the other by which he is vivified who is truly justified and is made a living branch in the vine, Christ, is equally fictitious and in no way consonant with the Scriptures”¹⁰ Cf. Err. of Jansenius 2 and 4¹¹; err. of the synod of Pistoia 21¹², the Vatican Council sess. 3 cap. 3 repeats the words of the council of Orange, can. 7¹³.

1. The discourse concerns the aids of actual grace as distinct from the habitual gifts which are infused in justification: in the controversy with the Semi-Pelagians the question was precisely of that help of grace which precedes faith and justification; the Council of Trent distinguished the acts preceding justification (cap. 5 and 6) from the virtues which are infused in justification; against Baius that distinction is explicitly defended; in the controversy against the Jansenists the question was chiefly of actual grace.

2. These aids of grace are called illumination, illustration, inspiration, as is plain from the texts; they are referred to the intellect and to the will.

3. They are movements immediately from God: that they are in a special way from God had to be established precisely against the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians; in thesis 8 we showed that the acts disposing to justification are entitatively supernatural, and therefore also the principle from which they proceed is actual grace; this, however, is not explained if God moves only mediately, by proposing the object, but he must himself produce a movement entitatively supernatural. This holds both of the movement of the intellect and of the movement of the will; for God is said to move to knowing and to willing, so that those motions are distinguished. But if the motion of the will were only by means of the motion of the intellect, the reason for distinguishing those motions as diverse graces would not appear.

4. Indeliberate acts: for the question is of the movements which precede the free will; of movements which a man can still freely admit or reject (conc. trid. cap. 5; the controversy with the Jansenists, propositions of Jansenius 2 and 4; conc. vat. sess. 3 cap. 3). — Deliberate acts: Arausic. can. 17 “The fortitude of the Gentiles, worldly desire makes; but the fortitude of Christians, the charity of God, which is poured forth in our hearts, not through the choice of the will, which is of ourselves, but through the Holy Spirit, who is given to us”¹⁴

SACRED SCRIPTURE

1. Among the aids by which God helps unto salutary acts are the illuminations of the intellect: 2 Cor 3, 5: Our sufficiency to think anything is from God¹⁵; cf. 2 Cor 4, 6. — Eph 1, 16 ss.: “I cease not to give thanks for you, making remembrance of you in my prayers: that the God of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Father of glory, may give you the spirit of wisdom and of revelation, in the knowledge of him: the eyes of your heart enlightened, that you may know what is the hope of his calling, and what are the riches of the glory of his inheritance...”. — 1 Io 2, 20: “But you have the unction from the Holy One, and know all things”; 27: “And the unction which you have received from him, let it abide in you. And you have no need that any man teach you: but as his unction teacheth you of all things, and is truth, and is no lie”.

2. God helps by working in the will itself: Phil 2, 13: “For it is God who worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish, according to his good will”¹⁶. — 2 Thess 2, 16: “Now our Lord Jesus Christ himself, and God and our Father, who hath loved us, and hath given us everlasting consolation, and good hope in grace, exhort your hearts, and confirm you in every good work and word”. Cf. 2 Tim 1, 7.

3. The illustration of the intellect is immediate; for in the texts adduced under 1) the external proposal of doctrine through preaching is already presupposed; moreover St John distinguishes the unction which they have from the external proposal of doctrine. — The inspiration of the will, of which Sacred Scripture speaks, is at least mediate, namely by means of the illustration of the intellect; but when God is said to work the very willing, it can easily be understood of an immediate operation.

4. Indeliberate acts: Christ says that he came to call sinners (Mc 2, 17); God called those whom he predestinated (Rom 8, 30); Act 16, 14: “And a certain woman named Lydia... a worshipper of God, heard: whose heart the Lord opened to attend to those things which were said by Paul;” cf. Luc 24, 45. Apoc 3, 20: “Behold, I stand at the gate and knock: if any man shall hear my voice and open to me the door, I will come in to him and will sup with him, and he with me”. By all these are indicated movements which precede the free choice of him who is called, whose heart is opened, at whose door there is knocking.

5. Deliberate acts: 1 Cor 13, 4 ss. many things are described which proceed from charity; but charity in this place can easily be understood as the act of charity — Hebr 11 many witnesses of efficacious faith are brought forward, who were led by faith to other salutary acts. — Iac 2, 20 ss. shows that faith must lead to good works; and if it does not do so, it is dead.

THE FATHERS

St Ignatius: “Only ask for me strength, both internal and external, that I may not only speak but also will, that I may not only be called but be found a Christian”¹⁷ — Clement of Alexandria: “The thoughts of those who are endowed with virtue come to be through divine inspiration, when the soul is in some way disposed and the divine will is transmitted into human souls, certain ministers of God lending help to such ministrations”¹⁸

St Ephraem: “The good Lord labours at these two things: he does not wish to compel our liberty, nor does he permit us to be slack. For if he uses compulsion, he takes away the power of choice; but if he uses indulgence, he deprives the soul of his help. The Lord, knowing that if he compels he deprives us, if he withdraws help he loses us, if he teaches he gains us, neither compels nor withdraws help, as the Evil One does, but teaches, instructs and gains, as one who is good”¹⁹

St John Chrysostom: “God, as one who is merciful and beneficent, beloved, does all things and works that we may be splendid in virtue; and since he wills us to be acceptable and approved, he allures and draws all men to himself willing, not by force or necessity, but by persuasion and his benefits. Wherefore of those who came, some received him, others did not”²⁰.

St AUGUSTINE: “He calls from every side to correction, he calls from every side to penance, he calls by the benefits of creation, he calls by imparting the time of living, he calls through the reader, he calls through the preacher, he calls through intimate thought, he calls through the scourge of reproof, he calls through the mercy of consolation: Long-suffering and of much mercy”²¹. “God teaches sweetness by inspiring delight, he teaches discipline by tempering tribulation, he teaches knowledge by insinuating cognition. Since therefore some things are such that we learn them only that we may know them, but others that we may also do them; when God teaches those things, he so teaches that we may know what is to be known, by opening the truth; he so teaches that we may do what is to be done, by inspiring sweetness”²². “For it is God who worketh in you both to will and to work, according to his good will²³. Where he shows sufficiently (the Apostle) that even the good will itself is made in us by God working”²⁴. — “The will itself, unless something occurs which delights and invites the mind, can in no way be moved; but that this should occur is not in the power of man”²⁵.

“Let us be wise insofar as it is granted; and let us understand, if we can, that the Lord God, being good, for this reason sometimes does not grant even to his saints, for some just work, either sure knowledge or victorious delight, that they may know that not from themselves but from him they have the light by which their darknesses are enlightened, and the sweetness by which their earth brings forth its fruit. But when we entreat from him his help for doing and perfecting justice, what else do we entreat than that he open what was hidden, and make sweet what did not delight?”²⁶

“How do I believe by will, if I am drawn? I say: it is a small thing that you are drawn by will, you are drawn also by pleasure... Further, if it was lawful for a poet to say: his own pleasure draws each man; not necessity, but pleasure; not obligation, but delight: how much more strongly ought we to say that a man is drawn to Christ, who takes delight in truth, takes delight in blessedness, takes delight in justice, takes delight in eternal life, which whole is Christ?”²⁷. — “See how the Father draws: by teaching he delights, not by imposing necessity”²⁸.

“God converted and turned away his wrath²⁹ into gentleness. But who does not see that it is much greater to convert and turn wrath from its contrary into gentleness, than to incline to something a heart preoccupied with neither affection, but standing midway between the two? Let them read therefore and understand, let them consider and confess, that not by the law and doctrine sounding outwardly, but by an internal and hidden, wonderful and ineffable power, God works in the hearts of men not only true revelations, but good wills also”³⁰.

St PROSPER: “The Truth says: No man cometh to me, unless the Father who sent me draw him³¹. If therefore no man comes unless he is drawn, all who in any way come are drawn. The contemplation therefore of the elements, and the most ordered beauty of all things that are in them, draws to God. For the invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, are understood and seen by the things that are made³². The narrators of things done draw: those who tell the praises of the Lord and his virtues and his wonderful works which he has done inflame the mind of the hearer³³. Fear draws: for the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom³⁴. Joy draws, since: I rejoiced at the things that were said to me: we shall go into the house of the Lord³⁵. Desire draws, since: my soul longeth and fainteth for the courts of the Lord³⁶. Delights draw: for how sweet are thy words to my palate! more than honey to my mouth³⁷. And who could perceive or recount through what affections the visitation of God leads the human mind, so that what it fled it follows; what it hated it loves; what it loathed it hungers for; and by a sudden wonderful change, things that were closed to it become open; things that were burdensome become light; things that were bitter become sweet; things that were dark become bright? But all these things one and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to every one according as he will³⁸. For God, who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, hath shined in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God, in the face of Christ Jesus³⁹ that is, in the manifestation of his Son, who is in the glory of the Father”⁴⁰.

THE THEOLOGIANS

Among theologians there are diverse opinions about the nature of actual grace; the dispute, however, concerns grace insofar as it is elevating, the principle of a supernatural act. A man adorned with sanctifying grace and the infused virtues has, through those very infused habits, a physical power to place acts entitatively supernatural; therefore the very posse of such acts is not now to be conferred on him through elevating actual help. But a man who lacks supernatural habits is not physically able for such acts; therefore the very posse must be conferred on him through actual help. In order, then, that the nature of elevating grace may be known, grace is considered in a man without infused habits, and it is inquired how in such a man acts entitatively supernatural arise.

To avoid confusions, it must be noted from the outset that the question is not what divine help is required for a created power to pass into act, as is asked in philosophy when the divine concurrence is in question. For if it is asked thus, the physical power to act in the created subject is already presupposed. In the present question, however, it is presupposed precisely that this very physical power is not yet present, and it is asked what must be done, or what is done, that a man not furnished with supernatural habits may have the physical power of placing entitatively supernatural acts of the intellect and will.

One opinion, which is defended not only by the “Thomists” but also by many other theologians, conceives the matter roughly thus: just as God, in order that a man may permanently be able to place entitatively supernatural acts, infuses supernatural habits by which the faculties are permanently elevated, so before the infusion of those habits the natural faculty is elevated in a similar way. But since the elevation is not permanent but only for a single act, it is not made through any habit, but through a created entity not permanent but fluid, which ceases once the act is placed. This entity is not a vital act of the faculty of the intellect or will, but is received in the faculty itself antecedently to the act and is its physical principle; since it is not a vital act, it is usually called a non-vital entity. The further explanation of this entity is not the same in all; it is disputed whether it is a quality, an incomplete quality, fluid, or rather a motion. In this, however, they agree, that it is a physical entity produced by God alone, non-vital, not permanent but fluid, which by its physical influx is the cause of an entitatively supernatural act; it is called physical premotion⁴¹. God therefore, in this opinion, elevates the natural faculty through a created entity, and the faculty, intrinsically elevated, elicits an entitatively supernatural act.

The principal reason for this opinion is: a supernatural act is a simple entity, which according to its whole being is supernatural, in which therefore there is not something natural and vital, and another thing supernatural, but the whole act is vital and supernatural. The whole act is from the vital faculty, and the whole act is also from God, which holds of every act of any creature. An act can indeed be considered as it is an entity, a vital entity, a supernatural entity, but to all these there corresponds one simple physical being, which is not composed of one thing and another. But in order that the faculty may elicit such a simple vital act, supernatural in its physical entity, it must already before placing the act have the power of causing an entity of such perfection; and this power is given to it precisely by the entity received in the faculty, by which the faculty is elevated to place such an act.

The supernatural indeliberate act therefore arises in this way, that God by a supernatural premotion elevates the natural faculty, and together with it produces the act itself. In a similar way, after the indeliberate act, the deliberate act arises by the help of another fluid entity received in the faculty, if indeed the deliberate act is distinct from the indeliberate act; for according to some it is possible that an indeliberate act becomes deliberate in that, with the access of advertence of reason, the indeliberate act already existing is retained and continued, in which case a new physical premotion does not appear necessary.

If it has just been said that God and the elevated faculty produce the supernatural act, this is so to be understood that the vital faculty itself, elevated, produces the whole supernatural act; therefore the faculties themselves, intellect and will, elevated by a created entity, influence proximately and immediately the production of the supernatural act. The matter is not therefore to be conceived as the more recent Thomists would have it, as if only that created entity by which the faculty is elevated produced the vital supernatural act proximately and immediately, and the vital faculty would be said to influence the production of the act only remotely and radically, insofar as it is the subject sustaining that created entity and insofar as it receives in itself the act produced. Thus there would no longer be had an act of the intellect and will⁴².

Without doubt this opinion explains how the act of knowing and willing arises vital and intrinsically supernatural; the analogy also with the habitual help which is conferred by the infusion of the virtues favours this opinion. On the other hand, however, it must be confessed that it is not easy to conceive accurately what that fluid entity is. If it is said to be a motion received in the faculty, it seems already to be the act of the faculty itself and not something antecedent to it and causing it; for according to the principle: the act of the mover in the moved is the motion of the moved itself, the motion received is motion, but the motion of a vital faculty is the vital act itself. If, however, it is said not to be a motion, it seems to be conceived after the manner of some habit; but a fluid habit would again be a very difficult thing. Perhaps the matter could be thought out by analogy with the offered concurrence: just as the second act, insofar as it depends on God, is the concurrence of God conferred, considered terminatively, so the first (proximate) act, insofar as it depends on God, is the concurrence of God offered, considered terminatively; perhaps therefore the matter could be conceived in a similar way, so that the operation of God in the first act of the faculty, exceeding the exigencies of the creature and elevating the faculty itself, is precisely that which is called physical premotion. But it must be conceded that that great difference remains, of which there was already question at the outset, namely that the matter concerns the communication of some new posse, and the question could recur, what specifically in the first act is that by which this new posse is had.

From the theological sources this opinion cannot be proved. It is indeed said that God by grace calls, draws, excites, knocks at the door of men, and similar things; but calling, drawing etc. are not from the one who is called, drawn etc.; therefore they are something antecedent to the vital act. It must be answered, however, that the Fathers say that God calls through knowledge, by teaching; therefore through the indeliberate acts themselves and not through something antecedent to them; and to such acts the metaphorical locution about calling etc. is most easily applied. For by these acts God calls us, draws us to place salutary deliberate acts. If it is said, grace is in us without us; therefore it is something antecedent to the act of the faculty, the answer is: it is in us without us freely choosing, I grant; without us vitally operating, I deny. And if finally it is said that our acts, since they are effects of grace, cannot be grace itself, the answer is: salutary deliberate acts are effects of grace, namely of the indeliberate acts; but the indeliberate acts are called grace, because they are caused by God from a special goodness of God and in a manner altogether undue. Therefore a proof of this opinion from the sources is not had; but neither is this affirmed by all its defenders; they at least think that their opinion is the only one by which the things that are found in the sources can be explained.

If, however, the opinion is understood in such a way that only that created entity antecedent to the vital act is properly grace, and the indeliberate acts themselves are excluded from the notion of grace, then what the sources furnish no longer seems sufficient for them, as is plainly evident from the texts adduced above. Nor in such a supposition would it be explained how elevating actual grace confers also moral strength, unless someone wishes to make the supposition that elevating and healing grace are always really distinct aids, and that healing grace is never elevating — a supposition which in so universal a form will find few defenders. If, however, this opinion holds, together with that fluid entity, the indeliberate acts themselves also as actual grace, hardly anything can be said against it from the sources of revelation, except that it establishes something beyond what is found in the sources.

There is another opinion, which is defended by Molina, Suárez and many Molinists. It proceeds from this, that in the sources actual grace always appears as an act of the intellect and will; on the other hand, that internal elevation which the former opinion establishes is either impossible, or at least a very difficult matter and therefore not to be admitted unless it is absolutely necessary; they think, however, that such a necessity is not present, since the matter can be explained without that fluid entity.

For God, as the supreme Lord of the creature, can by his omnipotence in creatures and through them effect all those things which do not imply absolute repugnance. To this divine power in creatures corresponds the power which is called obediential⁴³. Thus God can elevate the intellectual creature to the strictly supernatural order and communicate to it, through a created gift as a formal cause, the fellowship of the divine nature (sanctifying grace), and powers by which it may elicit entitatively supernatural acts which correspond to this supernatural order (the infused virtues). In receiving these gifts the creature behaves passively, and so the obediential power is passive. But after it has received those gifts, the creature, actively operating, can place entitatively supernatural acts, and so the obediential power is rightly called active. This all must concede who hold that the elevated faculty elicits the supernatural act not only remotely and radically, but proximately and immediately⁴⁴. But according to Molina and Suárez, the active obediential power must be admitted in a still stricter sense, namely so that the created faculty, not yet intrinsically elevated but internally altogether unchanged, and therefore in this sense operating with natural powers, can with the divine concurrence — undue, supernatural, simultaneous — elicit entitatively supernatural acts. For what God can effect in the creature by means of a created entity, he can by his omnipotent power effect also immediately, without a created entity of this kind, unless there is a repugnance from the nature of the effect; such would be had, for example, in producing a created act of cognition without the cooperation of the cognitive faculty; but in the present question such a repugnance is not present.

The origin of the supernatural indeliberate act, of a good thought, of an inclination of the will, must according to this opinion be conceived thus: God, by his omnipotent power assisting the created faculty internally unchanged, so cooperates supernaturally with the creature in producing the act itself, that a vital act arises which is entitatively supernatural; this divine concurrence is in no way previous, but absolutely simultaneous, so that in the sign antecedent to the act itself nothing created entitatively supernatural is found in the agent creature, but the first created supernatural entity existing in the faculty is the indeliberate act itself. The act therefore arises as supernatural not through an internal elevation received in the faculty, but through an elevation which is called external; the creature in producing this act operates according to a strictly active obediential power. The act insofar as it proceeds from the creature is vital, insofar as God concurs in that special manner, it is supernatural.

Pesch, who defends this opinion, expounds it thus: “God therefore, intimately conjoined with the created intellect and will and constituting with them one adequate principle of the act, concurs with the created faculty beyond its natural power, and thus there is had a faculty truly and really elevated, although according to its internal constitutives it is not at all changed nor has it acquired any new quality. For whatever a created quality conjoined with the faculty can do efficiently, this the divine omnipotence conjoining itself immediately with the faculty can do. Hence it is understood why this elevation is called external... If therefore it is asked: is this conjunction of the divine omnipotence with the faculty of man an elevation of the faculty in the first act? the answer is: it is a true and real elevation of the faculty in the first act, not however internal, but external. It is not internal, because the faculty is not intrinsically changed. It is nevertheless a true and real external elevation of the faculty, because the faculty, to which the divine omnipotence is conjoined in that way, truly and really can something to which it is by itself alone and with only the natural concurrence in no way able. This passive elevation of the created faculty in the first act is its obediential power; for the obediential power is not something absolute in the creature, but includes a respect to God willing to use the creature as an instrument for producing an effect beyond the natural power of the creature. And so the elevation of the faculty in the first act is this very faculty looking to God prepared to concur supernaturally...

Therefore the sole cause of the elevation or of the power of placing supernatural acts is God; but supernatural acts are placed not by God alone nor by man alone but by both. Without the activity of man the act would not be vital, without the special divine motion the act would not be supernatural... Man is a cause subordinate to the divine causality. Nevertheless by reason of vitality he is a principal cause, though under God; by reason of supernaturalness, however, he is only an instrumental cause... But because the whole act is both vital and supernatural, the whole is both from man and from God concurring supernaturally... Yet both God and man are a partial cause with the partiality of a cause, since neither God nor man can produce the act separately. Rightly too God is said to influence not only the act but also the created cause itself, because holding it subject to himself he moves it as an instrument to the supernatural act”⁴⁵.

As the difficulty of the former opinion lies in explaining the nature of that fluid created entity, so the difficulty of this opinion lies in the external elevation of the faculty.

For there seems to be found in the act elicited by the faculty something which is not from the faculty itself, and it does not appear how this is possible in an entity altogether physically simple; there seems to be in the effect a composition of a natural vital entity, which is from the faculty, and of an entitatively supernatural perfection, which seems to be from God alone, since the created faculty does not appear able to attain efficiently the supernatural perfection itself, because nothing supernatural is found in it.

But the defenders of this opinion would deny the supposition, namely that the created faculty is not really elevated; for according to them it is truly and really elevated, not indeed by an internal change of itself, and therefore not intrinsically, but nevertheless externally elevated; and the whole act according to them is from the faculty externally elevated, and the whole act is from God.

It cannot be denied that the matter is difficult; but it must also be conceded that a repugnance in this opinion cannot be shown; which is already difficult in general in a supernatural matter. In the most supernatural act, namely the immediate vision of God, in a created adequate cause there is not yet a sufficient reason for the second act of vision, as was shown in the treatise De Deo uno, and yet that act is possible.

The supernatural indeliberate act itself in this opinion is actual grace itself, that is, the principle of the supernatural deliberate act, the salutary act. But in explaining the influx of the indeliberate act into the origin of the deliberate act there is again a twofold opinion: Molina and those who follow him think that the indeliberate act influences the origin of the deliberate act not only morally but also physically. For by this, that a supernatural indeliberate act exists in the faculty, the faculty itself is intrinsically elevated, and with the divine concurrence corresponding to the intrinsically elevated faculty it can place a supernatural deliberate act, a salutary act. The principle therefore of the salutary act is the will elevated by a supernatural indeliberate act, that is, the will elevated by actual grace, for the indeliberate act is actual grace itself. The supernatural indeliberate act itself therefore confers physical strength on the will, strengthens the will, that it may be able to place a salutary act. This way of conceiving the matter agrees greatly with the manner of speaking of the Fathers and councils, according to which precisely through the acts which God works in us without us, that is, through the indeliberate acts, a man receives vigour for placing salutary acts. Thus the matter is conceived if the deliberate act is an act distinct from the indeliberate act. But if the deliberate act is nothing else than the indeliberate act, which with the access of advertence of reason becomes deliberate, no new divine help is required.

Suárez, however, who does not admit a physical influx of act into act, again requires for the salutary deliberate act an external elevation, as for the indeliberate act. In this matter the opinion of Molina seems to be preferred.

So, with the opinions both on internal and on external elevation thus expounded, let each see which he finds more probable. In either opinion there are great difficulties, and to each its own probability must be conceded. The opinion of external elevation adds nothing to what is found in the sources, and preserves excellently that the indeliberate acts are actual grace; in the opinion of internal elevation it is more easily conceived how the supernatural indeliberate act arises. “Moreover this question is not of as much moment as might appear from the manner of speaking of many theologians, nor does it constitute a radical difference between the opinion of the Thomists and the opinion of the theologians of the Society of Jesus”⁴⁶. For this controversy is not about physical premotion, but about physical predetermination.

After we have seen what actual grace is, namely supernatural indeliberate and deliberate acts, and how these acts arise in a man who does not have the infused virtues, there remains briefly to be said of actual grace in the just man, or even in the sinner who still has the infused virtue of faith and hope as regards the acts pertaining to these virtues. Since the sources from which we proved that actual graces are those supernatural indeliberate and deliberate acts are altogether universal, it is plain that actual grace, even for a man furnished with supernatural habits, is the same acts. But in these men, in order that such supernatural acts may arise, there is not required the internal elevation described above (through a fluid entity) or the external elevation of the faculty, since through the supernatural habits there is already present the power for entitatively supernatural acts. In them therefore actual grace is not required for that precise reason, that the power for a supernatural act be present.

It is disputed among theologians whether in the just man actual grace, insofar as it is elevating, is altogether necessary. Some¹, Soto, Molina, St Bellarmine, Billot, deny it; others, Perrone, Mazzella, Pesch, Hugon, Beraza, affirm it; to some the affirming opinion seems to be a dogma of faith, to others the more common or the more probable opinion. It may perhaps rightly be asked whether all understand the question in the same sense².

The question therefore is whether God in the just man causes supernatural acts, chiefly indeliberate ones, which are grace, and therefore the principle of salutary acts, and causes them not only by proposing the object (external grace), but by operating intrinsically the act in the vital faculty itself.

And the question thus proposed seems altogether to be affirmed. For very many texts adduced in the thesis (God works in us without us, God illuminates, inspires etc.) are universal and hold not only of unbelievers but also of the just; and in them precisely is found actual grace, the principle of the salutary act. And it would be a sufficiently marvellous thing if a man vitally united with Christ as the branch with the vine were to receive from him only a vital principle and powers for operating, and the vine were not to pour its sap into the branches for bearing fruit. Moreover God dwells in the soul of the just man, and indeed according to the doctrine of the Fathers precisely so as secretly to act in them, that they may fulfil the will of the Father, that they may be more renewed, sanctified and advance.

Another question is whether the supernatural indeliberate acts caused by God in the just are to be called a special gift of God. This operation of God in the soul of the just man certainly corresponds to the supernatural state of the man himself, and to that extent those acts are connatural to this state; yet it does not follow from this that they are something natural. But if someone calls a special gift only that which exceeds the gifts connatural to the state, he must say that such a character of special gift is not found in these acts; but again it does not follow from this that the character of supernatural actual grace is not found in them.

A question could still be raised why the operation of God in causing those indeliberate acts is necessary, whether for exciting the habit or for some other reason. The fact itself does not depend on the solution of this question; it remains even if we cannot indicate the reason why God willed the matter so.

There has often been question already of the division into elevating and healing grace; now, however, we treat of the division which is connected with those things that have been said in this part about the nature of actual grace.

Exciting (calling) and helping grace: God works in the human intellect a supernatural knowledge and in the will a supernatural inclination toward some good: the indeliberate acts are actual grace¹. Thus a man is stirred and called by God to the placing of a salutary act. Let us suppose that a man thus stirred in fact proceeds to a salutary act. The created principle of this act is the faculty elevated by actual grace², which operates, as is clear, with God concurring according to the nature of the agent principle³. Thus actual grace first stirred the man to the good work, and further was in fact the principle of the salutary act; hence it is rightly said that it helped the man in placing the salutary act⁴. Inasmuch as it stirs, actual grace precedes the salutary act and does not include it; indeed it can be without it. But inasmuch as the salutary act in fact proceeds from it, it precedes that salutary act as its principle, yet connotes its placing. Exciting grace can be without the consent of the will; helping grace includes it.

This division of grace is used in the Council of Trent, chap. 5: “The beginning of justification must be taken from the calling of God... that... through his exciting and helping grace... they may be disposed”⁵. Likewise chap. 6: “But they are disposed to that justice itself when, stirred by divine grace and helped...”⁶. The Vatican Council, sess. 3 chap. 3: “The most benign Lord both stirs the erring by his grace and helps them”⁷. St Augustine: “But that we turn to God, we cannot unless he stirs and helps”⁸. St Bernard: the strivings of our free will toward good “are both vain, if they are not helped by grace, and of no account, if they are not stirred”⁹. The same is indicated in Sacred Scripture: Apoc 3, 20; cf. Eph 5, 14; Rom 8, 26.

Operating and cooperating grace. This division can easily be understood, and is understood by many to be really identical with the preceding one: operating grace, which works in us without us, which precedes free consent, which stirs a man to the good work; cooperating grace, which cooperates in producing the salutary act, and which therefore is helping grace.

ST AUGUSTINE: “The apostle Peter did not yet have that charity itself, when out of fear he denied the Lord three times. For fear is not in charity, as John the evangelist says in his Epistle; but perfect charity casts out fear¹⁰. And yet, though small and imperfect, it was not wanting when he said to the Lord: I will lay down my life for you¹¹: for he thought he could do what he felt he willed. And who had begun to give him this charity, even small as it was, but he who prepares the will, and by cooperating perfects what he begins by operating? For he himself, when he begins, works that we may will, who cooperates with those who will, perfecting. Wherefore the Apostle says: I am certain that he who works a good work in you will perfect it unto the day of Christ Jesus¹². To will, therefore, he works without us; but when we will, and so will as to do, he cooperates with us: yet without him either working that we will, or cooperating when we will, we can do nothing for the good works of piety. Of him working that we will, it is said: For it is God who works in you, both to will. But of him cooperating when we already will and by willing do: We know, he says, that to those who love God all things work together unto good”¹³. St Augustine therefore seems to understand operating grace as that which precedes our will, and cooperating grace as that which cooperates with our will; and which moreover helps so that the work willed may also be given over to execution.

ST THOMAS applies this division both to actual and to habitual grace: “Grace can be understood in two ways: in one way, the divine help which moves us to will and to act well; in another way, the habitual gift divinely bestowed on us. And in either way grace, thus named, is fittingly divided into operating and cooperating.

For the operation of any effect is not attributed to the thing moved but to the mover; in that effect, therefore, in which our mind is moved and does not move, while God alone moves, the operation is attributed to God; and according to this it is called operating grace. In that effect, however, in which our mind both moves and is moved, the operation is attributed not only to God but also to the soul; and according to this it is called cooperating grace.

But there is in us a twofold act: the first indeed is the interior act of the will, and as regards this act the will is as moved, while God is as moving, especially when the will begins to will good, which before it willed evil; and therefore, inasmuch as God moves the human mind to this act, it is called operating grace. The other act, however, is exterior, and since it is commanded by the will, as has been said above, it follows that as regards this act the operation is attributed to the will; and because God also helps us to this act, both inwardly by confirming the will, that it may arrive at the act, and outwardly by supplying the faculty of acting, as regards this kind of act it is called cooperating grace; whence, after the words already quoted, Augustine adds: That we will, he works; but when we will, that we may accomplish, he cooperates with us. So then, if grace be taken for the gratuitous motion of God, by which he moves us to a meritorious good, grace is fittingly divided into operating and cooperating.

But if grace be taken for the habitual gift, then there is a twofold effect of grace, as of any other form whatever, of which the first is being, the second is operation; as the operation of heat is to make hot, and the outward heating. Thus habitual grace, inasmuch as it heals the soul, or justifies it, or makes it pleasing to God, is called operating grace; but inasmuch as it is the principle of a meritorious work, which proceeds from free will, it is called cooperating”¹⁴.

ST BELLARMINE: “It must therefore be said that operating grace is that which effects in a man the first act of the deliberate will, such as is conversion, whether from unbelief to faith, or from the other sins to penance; but cooperating grace is that which effects the consequent acts of the will, such as to will to pray, to will to seek a priest, to will to do good works, and others like them. These are immediately followed by external acts, so that operating grace is nothing else than the special efficacious help in respect of the first act of the will, while cooperating grace is the special help in respect of the following acts”¹⁵.

Others again have other explanations, so that in each author one must attend carefully to how he understands this division.

Prevenient and subsequent grace. The Council of Trent declares “that the beginning of justification itself in adults must be taken from the prevenient grace of God through Christ Jesus, that is, from his calling”¹⁶, where prevenient grace appears to be the same as calling grace.

According to the different term before which grace is called prevenient, this division can be understood in different ways.

ST AUGUSTINE: “We too work, but we cooperate with him working, because his mercy has gone before us¹⁷. He goes before us that we may be healed, because he will also follow after, that being now healed we may be strengthened; he goes before us that we may be called, he will follow after that we may be glorified; he goes before us that we may live piously, he will follow after that we may live with him for ever, because without him we can do nothing”¹⁸. “If no Christian will dare to say: It is not of God who shows mercy, but of man who wills, lest he contradict the apostle most openly, it remains that it be understood as rightly said for this reason: It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy¹⁹, that the whole be given to God, who both prepares the good will of man that it may be helped, and helps it when prepared. For the good will of man goes before many gifts of God, but not all; and those which it does not itself go before, among them is it also itself. For both are read in the holy utterances: both His mercy will go before me²⁰ and His mercy will follow me²¹. He goes before the one who wills not, that he may will; he follows the one who wills, lest he will in vain”²².

ST THOMAS: “As grace is divided into operating and cooperating according to different effects, so also into prevenient and subsequent, however grace be taken. Now there are five effects of grace in us: of which the first is that the soul be healed; the second, that it will good; the third, that it efficaciously work the good it wills; the fourth, that it persevere in good; the fifth, that it attain to glory. And therefore grace, according as it causes in us the first effect, is called prevenient in respect of the second effect; and as it causes the second in us, it is called subsequent in respect of the first effect. And as one effect is posterior to one effect and prior to another, so grace can be called prevenient and subsequent according to the same effect in respect of different things. And this is what Augustine says in the book De natura et gratia: He goes before, that we may be healed; he follows after, that being healed we may be strengthened; he goes before, that we may be called; he follows after, that we may be glorified”²³.

All three divisions can easily and aptly be reduced to the first, so that exciting (calling), operating and prevenient grace are understood as one and the same on one side, and helping, cooperating and subsequent grace on the other.

It is disputed among theologians whether exciting grace is really distinct from helping grace. The answer depends in great part on the opinion which one defends about the nature of actual grace. Those who hold it to be a created flowing being, whether with or without indeliberate acts, for the most part affirm a real distinction, inasmuch as they require a new created flowing being for the placing of a deliberate act²⁴. Those who with Molina defend an external elevation and at the same time hold that the indeliberate act is the physical principle of the deliberate act deny that they are really distinct graces. Those who with Suárez defend an external elevation but deny that the indeliberate act is the physical principle of the deliberate act require, for the placing of the deliberate act, another external elevation of the faculty, and hence can say that helping grace adds something to exciting grace.

The real distinction has no foundation in the sources; rather it could be said that the sources favour identity²⁵.