De Deo uno
Heinrich Lennerz (1880–1961)
First published 1955
Lennerz's De Deo uno (Romae, 1955, editio quinta): his Gregorian course on the one God. The rights of the original Latin are held by the Deutsche Region der Jesuiten, K.d.ö.R., München.
Introduction
Pars I: On the knowability of God
Sectio I: On natural knowledge of God
The teaching of the Church on natural knowledge of God
Thesis I: God, the beginning and end of all things, can be known with certainty from created things by the natural light of human reason
Thesis II: The existence of God can be demonstrated
Thesis III: Natural knowledge of God in this life is only mediate
Thesis IV: By this natural knowledge we know God not through his proper form but through the form of creatures, which are his effects; yet we know not merely extrinsic denominations but truly, although imperfectly, the quiddity of God
Sectio II: On supernatural knowledge of God
Thesis I: The intuitive vision of God is possible for human beings
Thesis II: The intuitive vision of God is absolutely supernatural
Sectio III: On the universality of knowledge of God
Thesis I: Knowledge of God is so universal that there are no adult negative atheists
Pars II: On the divine perfections
Pars III: On the knowledge of God
Thesis I: God knows himself and all things that exist and can exist besides himself, including those that will occur through the free action of creatures and those that would occur if certain conditions were fulfilled
On the division of divine knowledge
On the knowledge of God which is the cause of things
Further explanations concerning the knowledge of God
From the history of theologians' opinions on divine knowledge of future contingents
Thesis II: God does not know absolutely future free acts in a cause proximately ready to act, nor in a decree of physical predetermination, but, given his knowledge of conditionally future free acts, in a decree to bring about the conditions
Thesis III: God does not know conditionally future free acts in a moment prior to their futurition
Pars IV: On providence and predestination
Sectio I: On divine providence
Thesis I: God governs by his providence all things that he has created
Sectio II: On predestination and reprobation
Historical survey
Thesis I: In the present order of salvation restored by Christ, God sincerely wills the salvation of all adults by an antecedent will: there is therefore no positive antecedent reprobation
On the term of the antecedent will
Thesis II: The doctrine that maintains negative antecedent reprobation must not be admitted
Thesis III: Predestination taken as a whole is gratuitous; but the predestination of adults to glory taken precisely as such is after foreseen merits
On the effects of predestination and reprobation
512. The opinions of theologians on the effects of predestination and reprobation differ greatly among themselves, and this already because of the diverse positions they defend concerning predestination and reprobation2. With LESSIUS3, we think that “one need not labor greatly to explain which graces or good works are effects of predestination and which are not.” The answer depends in large measure on the way the matter is considered.
Those things may rightly be called effects of predestination which effectively contribute to attaining eternal life, such as an efficacious call to faith, justification, in general all efficacious graces, merits acquired by grace, perseverance, and the bestowal of the eternal reward. Since, however, a predestined person can sin on the way to eternal life, whether by mortal or venial sin, it is usually asked whether the permission of sin in the predestined person—or rather, the bestowal of merely sufficient aid—is an effect of predestination. An affirmative answer can be given: for when God freely chose the present order, he knew that a person would indeed sin, but would turn back after sinning, and that the sin might perhaps become an occasion for greater virtue. In a similar way, all the circumstances of a predestined person’s life can in some respect be considered effects of predestination.
513. Those who teach negative reprobation identify several effects of reprobation; for example, BILLUART says: “The permission of sin not to be remitted, the denial of grace, blindness, hardening, and finally eternal damnation are proper effects of reprobation, because they have the three required conditions: they are from God with the intention of manifesting his justice, and they effectively conduce to this end.” But since, according to what was said in thesis 13, there is no negative reprobation, but only consequent positive reprobation, it is clear that the sole effect of reprobation is eternal damnation. The goods and graces, even merely sufficient ones, that such a person receives from God are effects of God’s antecedent salvific will, which persists at every moment logically prior to final impenitence.