De Deo uno

460. Predestination, the plan of the transmission of a rational creature to the end of eternal life, can be considered completely and incompletely, as was said above, nr. 376. This is a distinction on the part of the object. For not only does the plan of the whole order exist in the divine mind, but so too does the plan of the individual members of this order and of their mutual relations—for example, that a person attain faith and justification; that an increase of grace be due to a good work performed in the state of grace; an increase of glory, to merit; and so forth. In the first part of the thesis the subject is complete predestination, that is, insofar as it concerns the whole series of effects, from the first calling to the attainment of eternal life; in the other part, incomplete predestination—not predestination specifically to grace, faith, justification, or an increase of grace, but only to glory.

461. Since the thesis in a certain way inquires into the reason for predestination, it does not mean the reason for the divine act itself, but the reason with respect to those predestined. “No one, then, was so irrational as to say that merits are the cause of divine predestination on the part of the act of the one predestining. Rather, the question is whether predestination has some cause on the part of its effect. And this is to ask whether God preordained that he would give the effect of predestination to someone on account of some merits” (S. TH., 1 q. 23 a. 5).

462. We answer with St. THOMAS: “We can consider the effect of predestination in two ways. In one way, in particular; and thus nothing prevents one effect of predestination from being the cause and reason of another: the later effect being the cause of the earlier according to the character of a final cause, while the earlier is the cause of the later according to the character of a meritorious cause, which is reduced to the disposition of matter. For example, if we say that God preordained that he would give someone glory on account of merits, and preordained that he would give someone grace so that he might merit glory. In another way, the effect of predestination can be considered in general; and thus it is impossible that the whole effect of predestination in general have any cause on our part, because whatever in a human being orders that person toward salvation is wholly included under the effect of predestination, even preparation for grace itself; for this happens only through divine assistance, according to the words of Lam. ult.: ‘Convert us, O Lord, to yourself, and we shall be converted.’”

463. The first part of the thesis is against the SEMIPELAGIANS (cf. above, nr. 431, class 4), and is of faith.

The other part is against the opinion of SCOTUS, the BAÑEZIANISTS, BELLARMINE, and SUÁREZ (class 2 above, nr. 431). In this part the subject is only adults; moreover, it concerns predestination to glory taken precisely as such. This is affirmed to be after foreseen merits, meaning after supernatural merits (that is, acquired through the aid of supernatural grace in the state of justice), foreseen by the knowledge of vision. The question is not: Why does God in fact confer eternal life on this or that person? Rather: Why did God absolutely decree that he would give eternal life to this or that person? Is this absolute will of God prior or subsequent to the foreseen merit of the human being?

464. The opposing opinion conceives the matter as follows: God conditionally wills the salvation of all human beings, unless a greater good would thereby be impeded. But if all were saved, a greater good—namely, the beauty of the universe arising from the existence of damned human beings, and the manifestation of divine justice in those damned—would be impeded. Hence, by an absolute will, God wills the salvation of only some human beings. (At this point the universal salvific will already ceases.) From all human beings he effectively chooses certain particular persons, each to a determinate degree of glory, and therefore prior to their foreseen merits. All and only those so effectively chosen are saved; the conditional salvific will with respect to these particular persons becomes absolute. He passes over all the rest and does not effectively choose them for glory, likewise prior to their foreseen demerits. The serious conditional salvific will with respect to all those negatively reprobated ceases (cf. the preceding thesis). Thus he gratuitously chooses those to be saved (before their foreseen merits); but he does not choose adults gratuitously to be saved. Rather, he wills that they merit for themselves the degree of glory determined for them by God. Therefore he confers on them the gift of final perseverance, chooses such graces for them, and orders and directs their lives so that they infallibly merit for themselves that degree of glory (the formal predetermination of salutary acts), and die in such a state of merits. Thus glory is predestined before foreseen merits: in the order of intention, the end comes first; but glory is conferred after and on account of merits: in the order of execution, the end comes last. As for the reprobate: consequent upon antecedent absolute negative reprobation, God denies them the gift of final perseverance and permits a final sin that will not be remitted; they receive merely sufficient grace and die in mortal sin; positive reprobation follows.

465. In our opinion, the matter is conceived as follows: God sincerely wills the salvation of all, as a grace mercifully promised to the children of God through Jesus Christ, and as a reward faithfully to be rendered, by God’s own promise, for their good works and merits (cf. Conc. Trid., s. 6 cap. 16; Denz 809). This will is not absolute but, with respect to adults, conditional—namely, if they faithfully cooperate with grace and die in grace. Consequent upon this gratuitous, conditional will to save all, he wills to make the attainment of eternal life possible for everyone; therefore he wills to give everyone the graces necessary for adults to be able to merit salvation for themselves, if they so will. The preparation and bestowal of grace, then, flow from a sincere, conditional salvific will, which ceases only consequent upon foreseen final impenitence.

God knows by his knowledge of conditionally future things what would happen in various possible orders. For example, God knows with certainty that, in a particular order in which Peter exists, he would gratuitously give him this or that grace (without any foreseen merit of Peter), because he has a conditional will to save him, and that he would give this grace so that Peter might use it. God knows that, if he gave this grace, Peter would cooperate in this or that way; God would gratuitously bring him to justification; after justification Peter would cooperate with the divine graces and merit for himself a determinate increase of grace; God would increase his grace on account of that merit. Further, God would give him graces so that Peter might use them, but Peter would not cooperate and would sin. God, however, would gratuitously give graces; Peter would cooperate again, convert, and be gratuitously justified in the sacrament of Penance. From then on he would pray much to receive the gift of perseverance, and God would grant him that gift. Peter would die in the state of grace, with a determinate degree of grace and determinate merits acquired through free cooperation with grace. On account of those merits God would will to give him a determinate degree of glory as a just reward. There could be another possible order in which God would give Peter other graces, and Peter would cooperate more perfectly than in the first example, and would die with a greater degree of grace and greater merits; hence God would will to give him a greater degree of glory as a reward. A third possible order could be one in which perhaps everything proceeded in a similar way to the first, up to Peter’s sin. After the sin, God would again grant him helps of grace by which he could come to penance and again to justification; God would will to give these because his salvific will toward Peter still remained, and for the purpose that Peter freely use them. Yet Peter would not will to do so, would not pray, and would freely remain in sins. Since God’s salvific will toward him would always remain, the helps of grace by which he could come to conversion would not be denied him. Yet Peter would not will to use them; on the contrary, he would sin more and at last die in final impenitence, in mortal sin, with a determinate degree of demerits. Then God’s conditional salvific will toward him would cease, and God would will to damn him with the just punishment of hell. Many other possible orders could likewise be imagined. If God chose the first or second order, Peter would be predestined; but not if he chose the third.

466. In fact, God chose the present order, in which matters concerning Peter are as described above in the first order. Why God chose the present order rather than another, we do not know, since God has revealed nothing about this; yet we know that he chose it with supreme freedom and wisdom. From the theses proved thus far and from the present thesis, it also follows that God did not choose the present order consequent upon an absolute decree to save particular human beings, and only them (including Peter), and to exclude the rest from eternal salvation. We therefore admit that we have no knowledge at all of why God chose the present order rather than another in which the essential conditions would have been the same (the supernatural order, original sin, redemption through the Incarnate Word, the same angels and human beings). It should be noted, however, that according to Molina’s teaching God did not choose this order because of a foreseen use of free will, which, according to Molina, is not even a necessary condition of this choice.

467. Just as it was true now, prior to the absolute decree of the present order, that God would will to give Peter these graces, Peter would cooperate, and so on, as described above in the first order, so consequent upon that decree it holds that God absolutely wills freely to give Peter that grace, because he has a conditional will to save him, and will give him this grace so that Peter may use it; Peter will cooperate freely. God absolutely wills to bring him to first justification; after justification Peter, with the help of grace, will merit such an increase of grace; God wills to increase his grace on account of the merit. Then Peter will not cooperate with grace and will sin; God wills freely to give graces, Peter will cooperate, will again be gratuitously justified in the sacrament, and will pray for the gift of perseverance. God wills to grant this gift after that prayer has been foreseen; Peter will die in the state of grace with a determinate merit; on account of those merits God absolutely wills to give Peter glory in a determinate degree. The conditional will to save Peter becomes absolute after the merits acquired with the help of grace have been foreseen by the knowledge of vision. This is the plan of Peter’s transmission to eternal life existing in the divine mind: Peter’s predestination. In this order the institution of the supernatural order itself and the universal salvific will are wholly gratuitous; predestination specifically considered to grace, faith, and justification is gratuitous; predestination to perseverance is after the prayer foreseen by the knowledge of vision; predestination to glory taken precisely as such is after Peter’s supernatural merits foreseen by the knowledge of vision. Thus predestination taken completely is gratuitous. In the order of execution God will in fact give all these things (grace, faith, justification, perseverance, glory) for the same reason for which they were predestined.

468. But if the present order chosen by God were such that matters concerning Peter were as described above in the third order, then consequent upon the absolute will by which God chose this order, the following would hold: everything would be as in the first order up to Peter’s sin. Then, after the sin, God absolutely wills to give him helps of grace by which he can come to penance and justification; God wills to give these helps because his serious conditional salvific will toward Peter remains, and he wills to give them for the purpose that Peter use them. Peter, however, does not will to do so, does not pray, and freely remains in sins; God’s salvific will toward him remains, and therefore God does not will to deny him the helps of grace by which he can attain conversion. Peter, however, does not will to use them, remains in sins, and dies in final impenitence, in mortal sin, with a determinate degree of demerits. God’s salvific will toward Peter ceases; God absolutely wills to damn him with the just punishment of hell. Peter belongs to the non-predestined; he is reprobate. In such an order God’s conditional salvific will toward this reprobate is serious and endures throughout his whole life; it remains at every point prior to final impenitence. There is no antecedent reprobation, either positive or negative; positive reprobation, however, follows Peter’s final impenitence foreseen by the knowledge of vision.

1. Predestination taken completely is gratuitous

469. Predestination taken completely would not be gratuitous (or would arise from the merit of the predestined) if all the effects of predestination arose from the merit of the predestined. But many effects of predestination do not arise from the merit of the predestined; therefore predestination taken completely is gratuitous.

a) The institution of the supernatural order is wholly gratuitous; restoration after Adam’s sin through Christ the Redeemer is gratuitous; the salvific will, which is the foundation of all predestination, is gratuitous.

b) The beginning of faith does not arise from merits but from grace: CONC. ARAUSIC., can. 25 (DENZ 200); CONC. TRID., s. 6 c. 5 (DENZ 797).

c) Justification does not arise from merit but is gratuitous. An increase of grace is in part due to merit, but in part is not due to merit—namely, what is obtained in the sacraments ex opere operato; likewise, what is granted as the fruit of prayer is not strictly due to merit. So too, the gift of perseverance cannot strictly be merited, but can be obtained by humble prayer.

From all these things, which we assume to have been proved in other treatises, it is clear that predestination to faith, to first grace, and to justification is gratuitous. By that very fact it is already established that predestination taken completely does not arise from the merits of the predestined, but is gratuitous (cf. the reasoning indicated above by St. THOMAS, nr. 462). Nor is this matter disputed among Catholics.

d) Finally, the very choice of the present order, by which the predestined are distinguished from the non-predestined, does not arise from the merits of the predestined.

2. Predestination of adults to glory taken precisely as such is after foreseen merits.

470. Argument 1. God’s salvific will is sincerely universal at every point prior to final impenitence; in other words, there is no antecedent negative reprobation, as was proved in the preceding thesis. But if adults were not predestined to glory taken precisely as such after foreseen merits, but before foreseen merits, antecedent negative reprobation would have to be admitted. Therefore the predestination of adults to glory taken precisely as such is after foreseen merits.

Proof of the minor. At the same point at which all who are to be saved are absolutely predestined to glory, the salvific will toward all the rest ceases. For by absolutely choosing those particular people, and only them (exclusively), for salvation, God absolutely excludes from salvation all who are not so chosen. Therefore, if the predestination of adults to glory taken precisely as such were before foreseen merits, the salvific will toward the rest would cease before their foreseen demerits, and there would be antecedent negative reprobation.

The absolute, exclusive choice of some portion of humanity for glory is itself already an absolute exclusion of the rest from glory, whether by a positive act or by the mere omission of an efficacious choice.

471. The argument rests on this: predestination to glory taken precisely as such, before foreseen merits, necessarily entails antecedent negative reprobation of those who are not predestined. Father BILLOT thought predestination before foreseen merits without antecedent reprobation was possible. He distinguishes three rational moments. The first moment is of divine knowledge, “in which all and each of the actualizable orders of providence are present to the divine intellect, according to the whole content of agents and helps, and the corresponding outcome or event of each.” The second moment is of love and election, “in which the divine will determines itself concerning one end which it knows will in fact be attained in one particular order, and absolutely wills that end. This is, of course, the end known concretely as arising from this particular order: the end toward which all the circumstances contained in it are known to converge, directly or indirectly. This end, I say, is the glory of God shining forth in the glory and eternal salvation of these particular people, each of whom would have come to perdition in infinitely many other hypotheses.” “By its own most free good pleasure alone, the divine will is determined absolutely to will the end of salvation for these designated people rather than for others who would be saved in another possible order” ¹. “Finally, the third rational moment is considered, in which, consequent upon willing the end, God decrees to put into execution the whole order corresponding to the event by which the willed end is to be attained. This is the moment of predestination and reprobation. For since the intelligible plan of that order contains both the foreknown transmission of these people to eternal life and the foreknown falling away of others from salvation, God decrees to bring about the former and, for this very purpose, to permit the latter. By the addition of this decree, God already has, with respect to some, foreknowledge and preparation of calling, justification, and the consequent glorification (and this is predestination); with respect to others, however, foreknowledge and permission of falling away (and this is reprobation)” ².

472. It is thus clear that predestination to glory taken precisely as such occurs before foreseen merits. How, however, this does not involve antecedent negative reprobation is explained as follows: “In the second rational moment, which is the moment of election, the divine will by its absolute decree is directed solely to the good of the end, namely, the victory and salvation of the elect. In the third moment, which is the moment of predestination and reprobation, God does not decree for some a foreseen, inefficacious series of means because he is bound by a prior decree not to save them, but only because it happens that such a series (otherwise entirely sufficient) is contained in that order of providence in which, by his wisdom, he foreknows that everything converges toward the best end intended beforehand—that is, the salvation, glory, virtue, and perfection of the predestined—and thereby toward the manifestation of his goodness and mercy. Hence God does not deliberately and by a predetermined plan will for some an inefficacious grace precisely insofar as it is inefficacious; and since the inefficacy of grace has no other cause than the failure of free will, it follows that each and every person truly has the power to attain salvation, and that God by a true antecedent will confers everything required on his part” ³.

473. Yet it seems that one must say that in this system there is in fact antecedent negative reprobation, and that it is contained in the second moment, namely, that of love and election. For in this moment particular people are chosen absolutely and exclusively for eternal glory; and consequent upon this absolute and exclusive choice, the order in which these people alone attain salvation is chosen in the third moment. By that very fact, in the second moment all the rest are absolutely excluded from attaining glory, and God must choose the order in which only those chosen people will be saved; he can no longer choose an order in which others too would attain eternal glory. Therefore, consequent upon the absolute choice in the second moment, he must choose an order in which the other human beings belonging to that order do not receive the gift of perseverance, but receive graces that are not ultimately efficacious; that is, he must choose an order in which all except those chosen in the second moment die in mortal sin. The exclusive, gratuitous, absolute choice of some is necessarily the absolute non-choice of the rest; and just as the absolute choice for glory is before foreseen merits, so too the absolute non-choice of the rest is in the same moment, that is, prior to their foreseen demerits: antecedent negative reprobation.

474. Argument 2. A conditional will to confer something does not become an absolute will unless the condition is fulfilled, or foreseen as fulfilled. But God’s conditional will to confer eternal glory on adults has this condition: if they merit glory for themselves. Therefore this will becomes absolute only after merits have been foreseen.

For the major: If that will were already absolute in an antecedent moment, then, independently of that condition, the will would in fact not be truly conditional.

For the minor: God promises glory to adults as a reward for merit, a crown and prize for struggle and victory. But what God promises in this way he does not absolutely will to give independently of those merits. Therefore God’s will to confer glory on adults is conditional: if they merit it for themselves.

The final major is proved at length in the treatise on merit: CONC. ARAUS., can. 18 (Denz 191); CONC. TRID., s. 6 cap. 16 (Denz 809); can. 26 (Denz 836); can. 32 (Denz 842); Matth 16, 27; Rom 2, 6; 1 Cor 3, 8; 9, 24 ss.; 2 Tim 4, 7; Iac 1, 12; 1 Petr 5, 4; Apoc 2, 7; 3, 5. See the texts of the FATHERS in R ser. 367.

475. The following objection is customarily raised against this argument:

1. Eternal life is promised not only as a reward but also as an inheritance. Therefore, under this title it can be willed absolutely without regard to merits, and thus predestined before foreseen merits.

I answer. I distinguish the antecedent: that it is to be given to adults as an inheritance if the conditions have been fulfilled, I grant; that it is to be given without regard to their merits, I deny. And accordingly I distinguish the consequence: it can be predestined for adults before foreseen merits conditionally, I grant; absolutely, I deny. Rom 8, 17: “But if children, then heirs also: heirs indeed of God, and joint heirs with Christ; yet so, if we suffer with him, that we may also be glorified with him.”

2. Nor does anything against the argument follow from the fact that our merits are from grace. For even if in that sense merits are gifts of God, it does not follow that predestination is before foreseen merits; it follows only that glory cannot be merited by natural merits, which the thesis does not affirm either.

476. 3) The whole doctrine of merit from which the argument proceeds concerns the order of execution, in which the means come first and the end last. But the question of predestination concerns the order of intention, in which the end comes first. Therefore the argument is invalid.

I answer a) No trace of this inverted order of intention is found in the sources of revelation. But even setting that aside, the following holds: if God does not in fact confer glory on adults (in the order of execution) unless the conditions have been fulfilled, it seems impossible that he absolutely willed to confer it (in the order of intention) without regard to those conditions.

b) This inverted order does not seem to agree with the teaching of the Fathers and theologians who wrote before this opinion arose, and whose teaching is that God’s gifts are predestined in the same order in which they are conferred in time. Thus St. AUGUSTINE, De praedest. Sanctorum, c. 10 nr. 19: “The only difference between grace and predestination is that predestination is the preparation of grace, while grace is the gift itself” (ML 44, 974; R 1986). De dono perseverantiae, c. 16 nr. 39: “Indeed, since it is clear that God prepared some things to be given even to those who do not pray, such as the beginning of faith, and others to be given only to those who pray, such as perseverance to the end, surely one who thinks he has this from himself does not pray that he may have it” (ML 45, 1017; R 2001); nr. 60: “If there are some who have not yet been called, let us pray that they be called; for perhaps they have been predestined to be granted through our prayers, and to receive the same grace by which they may will and become elect” (ML 45, 1029). ST. THOMAS, In ep. ad Rom., c. 8, l. 6: “Concerning the order of foreknowledge and predestination, some say that foreknowledge of good and evil merits is the reason for predestination and reprobation, so that God is understood to predestine some because he foreknew that they would act well and believe in Christ; and on this account the text is read thus: ‘Those whom he foreknew would be made conformable to the image of his Son, these he predestined.’ This would indeed be said reasonably if predestination regarded only eternal life, which is given for merits. But every salutary benefit divinely prepared for a human being from eternity falls under predestination; hence, by the same reasoning, he prepared from eternity all the benefits he confers on us in time. Therefore, to posit that some merit on our part is presupposed, foreknowledge of which is the reason for predestination, is nothing other than to posit that grace is given on account of our merits, that the beginning of good works is from us, and their completion from God.” Therefore, according to St. Thomas, they are prepared in the same way as they are conferred: whoever says they are prepared on account of merits must say they are conferred because of merits; and what is conferred because of merits is prepared because of merits, while what is not conferred because of merits is not predestined because of merits. He states the same principle in 1 q. 23 a. 5, where he asks whether foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination. “But against this is what the Apostle says to Tit 3: ‘Not by works of justice which we have done, but according to his mercy, he saved us.’ Now, just as he saved us, so he predestined us to be saved” ⁴.

c) The whole doctrine of an order of intention inverted with respect to the order of execution in our question rests on the principle that in predestination God must first absolutely intend the end, and then choose the means to that end. It will be shown later (nr. 506) that this principle is not correctly applied in this matter.

477. Argument 3. The holy Fathers teach that glory, eternal life, was prepared after foreseen merits ⁵.

ST. EPIPHANIUS, Adv. haeres. panarium, haer. 69 nr. 58, explaining Matth 20, 43, says: “It is not mine to give you; but if you have labored, it will be prepared for you by my Father” (MG 42, 293 s.).

ST. JOHN CHRYSOSTOM, In Matth., hom. 80 nr. 2: “Inherit what was long ago owed to you; for before you existed, he says, these things were prepared for you, because I knew that you would become such people” (MG 58, 719); cf. In Eph., hom. 1 nr. 2; In Rom., hom. 15 and 16.

ST. CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA, In epist. ad Rom 8, 30: “Those whom he foresaw long beforehand as the ones who would be, he predestined to share in future goods; he also called those same people so that through faith they might attain justification in him, and sin no more” (MG 74, 828 s.).

ST. HILARY, In psalm. 64 nr. 5: “Many are called, but few are chosen.… Thus election is not a matter of indiscriminate judgment, but a distinction made by selection according to merit. Blessed, then, is the one whom God has chosen; blessed because worthy of being chosen. We should know, moreover, for what he was chosen as blessed here, namely, for what follows: ‘He shall dwell in your tabernacles’” (ML 9, 415).

ST. JEROME, In Matth 25, commenting on the words of vv. 34–39, says: “This is to be understood according to God’s foreknowledge, for whom future things are already accomplished” (ML 26, 189). Therefore, because he foresaw that they would act in this way, he prepared the kingdom for them. Cf. Epist. 120 (ML 22, 1000).

ST. AMBROSE, De fide, l. 5 c. 6 nr. 83: “Finally, referring to the Father, he added, ‘for whom it was prepared’ ⁶, to show that the Father too is accustomed to grant things not in response to requests but according to merits, because ‘God is no respecter of persons’ ⁷. Hence the Apostle also says, ‘whom he foreknew, he also predestined’ ⁸: for he did not predestine them before he foreknew them; rather, he predestined rewards for those whose merits he foreknew” (ML 16, 665; R 1272). ST. FULGENTIUS, Ad Monimum, l. 1 c. 24: “Therefore, to show what he foreknew was to be repaid and what was to be given as a gift, God predestined to punishment those whom he foreknew would depart from him through the fault of an evil will, and predestined to the kingdom those whom he foreknew would return to him with the help of prevenient mercy and remain in him with the help of subsequent mercy” (ML 65, 171). De veritate praedestinationis, l. 3 c. 5: “To this predestination belong both the gratuitous justification of the Redeemer and the just recompense of the Judge; to this predestination belongs the mercy Paul obtained so that he might be faithful, and the crown of justice which the Lord, the just Judge, will render him on that day—not to Paul alone, but also to all who love his coming.… For just as by mercy he prepared for them the gratuitous gift of justification, so by justice he prepared the reward of eternal justification. The work of grace in all the predestined is begun by gratuitous mercy and brought to completion by just recompense” (ML 65, 655).

See also what was cited above (nr. 455 ss.) on how St. PROSPER defends St. AUGUSTINE’s teaching that he did not teach antecedent reprobation; this entails that predestination to glory taken precisely as such is not before foreseen merits.

478. But perhaps the Fathers are to be understood as speaking of the order of execution, not the order of intention?

I answer. The Fathers clearly speak of predestination, the preparation of eternal life and heavenly glory, not of their bestowal. Moreover, one may rightly also cite texts of the holy Fathers that concern the order of execution, since the Fathers did not know that benefits were predestined in one way and conferred in another.

479. Argument 4. If a person’s eternal lot is absolutely decreed independently of and without any regard for human cooperation:

a) The admonition, “If you would enter into life, keep the commandments” ⁹, is no longer intelligible. For such an admonition makes no sense if whether one enters into life or does not enter into life has already been absolutely decreed independently of keeping the commandments.

b) The incentive to act and labor well is absent. For a person easily says to himself: Without regard to my works, I am either absolutely predestined to a determinate degree of glory or not predestined. If the former, consequent upon this decree God will order my life in such a way that I attain that degree of glory; if the latter, my labor is of no help, for consequent upon his prior absolute exclusion from glory God must and will arrange that I eventually sin and die in a state of sin. The force of this consideration increases in the system of physical predeterminations.

c) Trust in God is impossible ¹⁰. For hope of attaining eternal life presupposes at least a conditional salvific will in God, and the existence of this will must be known to the one who hopes. But if, prior to the foreseen final state, some people are absolutely predestined to glory and the rest are absolutely excluded from an efficacious choice for glory, then in that same moment the salvific will toward all the latter ceases. Since no one knows whether he is predestined or not, no one knows either whether God has a true salvific will toward him. Therefore the foundation of hope ceases, and hope is impossible.

480. Someone might say: These considerations hold under every opinion, for it is altogether certain about each person whether he will be saved, and nothing in this matter can be changed. But the answer is that, in the opposing opinion, this is certain without regard to human cooperation or lack of cooperation, and the serious salvific will toward¹¹ the reprobate already ceases at the same rational moment in which the predestined are chosen absolutely and exclusively for glory. In our opinion, however, precisely the opposite holds. The reasons given above do not proceed merely from the fact that it is already certain and God knows with certainty who will be saved and who will not; rather, they proceed from the fact that God, prior to foreseen merits, absolutely decreed that these people would be saved and those people absolutely excluded, and that consequent upon this absolute volition he orders the lives of those people in such a way that they attain glory or fail to attain it. But if, as in our opinion, the universal salvific will remains until final impenitence, and predestination to glory taken precisely as such is after foreseen merits, then the foundation of hope truly remains for all who are on the way; the incentive to act well remains; and the admonition, “If you would enter into life, keep the commandments,” retains its true and full sense.

481. But those who defend predestination to glory before foreseen merits expect salvation from God alone, whereas others expect it also from their own cooperation. Yet our salvation is more secure in God’s hands than in our own; therefore the former doctrine is more encouraging to trust. PESCH rightly replies ¹²: “Is this true? Your lot is undoubtedly most secure in God’s hands; but if this lot is your antecedent exclusion from blessedness, what then is secure in God’s hands? Your eternal damnation, independently of your demerits. One who is negatively reprobated not only cannot place all hope in God, but has no true hope at all, because true hope does not deceive, whereas the hope of one negatively reprobated deceives him, if he has any hope of attaining eternal life through his cooperation with grace. The Molinists, then, rightly judge far more consolatory the doctrine according to which no one is antecedently either reprobated or predestined, but each receives grace by using which well he will have eternal life.” Let a sermon be preached to the people about antecedent negative reprobation—which, as was shown in the first argument, necessarily accompanies predestination to glory before foreseen merits—and it will immediately be clear how consolatory this doctrine is and how greatly it encourages trust in God and urges people to act well.

Arguments of the opposing opinion.

482. In these arguments one must carefully attend to whether what is actually proved is the precise point at issue. It is not enough to show that predestination is gratuitous; one must prove that predestination to glory taken precisely as such is prior to foreseen merits, and that consequent upon the glory predestined, God chooses grace and merits.

483. Rom 8, 28-30 ¹³. Christ conquered sin and its dominion; sin has been destroyed, death overcome. The flesh still rises against the spirit, but with the grace of Christ victory is certain for us. We have received not a spirit of slavery in fear, but of adoption as children; we are children of God, heirs of God, joint heirs with Christ, “if indeed we suffer with him, that we may also be glorified with him” (8, 17). “We have been saved in hope” (8, 24); “through patience we wait” (8, 25); “the Spirit helps our weakness” (8, 26). Hence we must not fear, but hope firmly in God. And in vv. 28–30 the Apostle introduces a firm reason for this confidence: “for those who love God all things work together for good.”

“For those called according to his purpose (the saints)”: this does not restrict “those who love [God],” for then Paul’s argument would not hold, and there is no basis for such a restriction in the text; therefore those called are the same as those who love. Called: those effectively called by God to faith and grace, generally the same as Christians. According to his purpose: many Greeks (ORIGEN, CHRYSOSTOM, THEODORET, OECUMENIUS, THEOPHYLACTUS; cf. FRANZELIN, pag. 742, LAGRANGE) understand “purpose” as the purpose or will of a human being, from which it also appears what sort of order between foreknowledge and predestination they must have understood. But purpose (Rom 9, 11; Eph 1, 5. 11; 2 Tim 1, 9) always signifies the eternal divine will to confer supernatural good in time. The text goes on to say what God did for those who love him, for those called: he foreknew. This refers to the intellect: “foreknowledge signifies only knowledge of future things, but predestination signifies a certain causality with respect to them” (ST. THOMAS in h. l.). The claim that foreknow means love, choose, or predetermine is gratuitously asserted. He predestined: this word also occurs in Act 4, 28, where Pilate and Herod did to Christ what God’s plan had decreed; in 1 Cor 2, 7, of God’s wisdom in the mystery of the Incarnation, which God predestined for our glory; in Eph 1, 5, “he predestined us to adoption as children”; and v. 11, “we have been called by lot, having been predestined according to his purpose” ¹⁴. The sense, then, is that he defined beforehand, decreed; and in Act 4 and 1 Cor 2 this refers to an absolute, efficacious decree, and therefore to a consequent will. Eph 1 seems to be understood in the same sense; perhaps Rom 8 may also be understood of an absolute decree, and therefore a consequent will, though not everyone understands it this way. The object in general is something pertaining to salvation; here it is “to be made conformable to the image of his Son, that he might be the firstborn among many brethren.” Some (the Greek Fathers, PRAT) take this as conformity through grace and adoptive sonship; others (CORNELY, LAGRANGE), as conformity to the glorious body of Christ; others, as justice in this life and glory in the future (TOLETUS). “Thus the conformity to which the predestined are said to be conformed is, from the context itself, twofold—or rather threefold—so that they may be conformed to the likeness of his death by suffering with him, and to his glorification by sharing his glory, begun here and to be completed there” (FRANZELIN). ST. THOMAS: “For just as God willed to communicate his natural goodness to others by sharing with them a likeness of his goodness, so that he might not only be good but also the author of good things, so the Son of God willed to share the likeness of his sonship with others, so that he might not only be the Son himself but also the firstborn among many brethren. Thus he who by eternal generation is the only-begotten, according to Ioan 1, 18, ‘the Only-begotten who is in the bosom of the Father,’ by the bestowal of grace ‘might be the firstborn among many brethren.’ Apoc 1, 5: ‘Who is the firstborn of the dead and the prince of the kings of the earth.’ Christ has us as his brethren, both because he shared with us the likeness of his sonship, as is said here, and because he assumed the likeness of our nature, according to Hebr 2, 17: ‘He had to be made like his brethren in all things’” (In ep. ad Rom. cap. 8 lect. 6). “Those whom he predestined, he also called … justified … glorified”: that is, he called them to faith and to the grace of justification. “Glorified”: does this mean glory on earth through adoption (CHRYSOSTOM), final glory, or both? ST. THOMAS: “He also magnified them, and this in two ways: first, by progress in virtue and grace, and second, by exaltation in glory.”

484. It is difficult to understand how these words teach that adults are predestined to glory taken precisely as such before foreseen merits. If it is said that those called according to his purpose (v. 28) are only those predestined to glory, the question immediately arises: Is the object of the purpose glory taken precisely as such, or faith, justification, or the whole series of supernatural gifts? Is the purpose before foreseen merits? And finally, how is it proved that those called according to his purpose are all and only those who in fact attain eternal salvation? But if it is said that “he foreknew” (v. 29) means “he loved beforehand,” that by loving beforehand he absolutely chose them for glory and predestined them, the reply is: It is gratuitously asserted that “foreknow” has that meaning. And if that meaning were admitted (which is not granted), where does the text say that this prior love is without regard to merits? And if it were further admitted that it is before foreseen merits, where does the text say that predestination is to glory taken precisely as such, rather than to faith and justification, or that it is complete predestination? To have an argument, it is not enough that the words of the text might perhaps be understood in this way; one must show that they must be understood in this way. Indeed, perhaps the text could more easily be understood as St. AMBROSE and CHRYSOSTOM understand it: he foreknew their merits, and predestined their rewards; or, those whom he foreknew to love him, having been gratuitously called by him, to be patient in tribulations and to await with firm hope, he predestined to conformity with Christ. In this way the text would provide an argument for predestination to glory after foreseen merits.

485. In light of these considerations, one should say: a) the words of the text considered by themselves can be explained in either way; by themselves they say nothing directly about our question; b) if one considers the immediate context, the Apostle’s intention to exhort and to propose reasons for firm trust in God, it no longer seems possible to admit an explanation in terms of predestination to glory precisely before foreseen merits. For it would be a strange exhortation to firm hope, to endurance of toil and suffering, and to remaining in the love of God, if he told them: without regard to such works God has absolutely decreed to save some and to exclude others from eternal salvation ¹⁵; c) finally, when the doctrine of God’s universal salvific will is also considered, that explanation is altogether excluded.

486. Rom 9–11 ¹⁶. The Apostle treats a great difficulty: God promised the Messiah and salvation to the Israelites, but now the greater part of the chosen people rejects salvation, while many Gentiles embrace the Gospel. Yet this is not contrary to God’s promise, for not all who descend bodily from Abraham are children of the promise. Rather, from among them God freely chose—and indeed from Abraham’s children the children of Isaac (vv. 7–9), and from Isaac’s children the children of Jacob (vv. 10–13). Thus not all who are of Israel are Israelites (v. 6). God chose freely, as appears especially clearly in the example of Isaac’s sons, where God’s elective purpose came about not from works but from the one who calls. “That neither of the two cited texts (namely, Gen 25, 23; Mal 1, 2, 3) speaks of interior grace pertaining to sanctification, much less of eternal salvation considered precisely and in itself, is so clearly evident from the words and context of Genesis and Malachi that one cannot understand how some have thought that these texts directly teach that God predestined some (such as Jacob) to eternal blessedness before any foreknowledge of merits, and hated others (such as Esau) before their sins were foreseen, and therefore excluded and reprobated them from eternal glory. Proximately and directly, just as in v. 7, the subject is only the temporal inheritance and admission to the covenant of promises made by God with Abraham, granted by the grace of election to the younger brother. The Apostle certainly adduces this example, as well as the preceding one (vv. 7–9), to teach a truth of a higher order, which both examples typologically prefigure.… For by that election just mentioned, God wished to signify that admission to the new covenant and its goods, too, depends not on a right of blood or foreseen works, but on his gratuitous election” (CORNELY, in h. l.). Thus vv. 6–13 show from the history of the patriarchs that admission to the promise depends on God’s gratuitous calling, and hence that the partial rejection of the Jews and the calling of many Gentiles are not against God’s promises: the word of God has not failed (v. 6).

487. Yet there is no iniquity or injustice in God in this matter. For, as appears in Sacred Scripture, God is free both in showing mercy (v. 15) and in withholding his benefits (v. 17); and he concludes the former (v. 16): therefore attaining mercy depends not on the one who wills or runs, but on God who shows mercy. “By his conclusion, then, he teaches only that election and calling to the goods of the new economy are pure grace, which no one, neither Jew nor Gentile, can acquire or merit for himself by the power of free will or by natural works” (CORNELY).

After the second testimony from Sacred Scripture (v. 17), he draws a general conclusion (v. 18): therefore he has mercy on whom he wills, and whom he wills he hardens. God did not positively harden Pharaoh, but “God is said to harden him insofar as he caused the plagues to cease, although he foresaw that Pharaoh would again become obstinate when they ceased; in fact, the king himself must be said to have hardened himself by abusing the divine benefits. Besides, the Apostle chose this example of Pharaoh for good reason. For just as at that time, among witnesses to the same miracles, some (such as the Israelites) were led to faith in God or confirmed in it, while others (such as Pharaoh and the Egyptians) were hardened in their obstinate rebellion against God, so in Paul’s time, among the Israelites themselves, some who saw the miracles of Christ and the Apostles received the Gospel and became sharers in the messianic blessings, while others, although they had seen the same miracles, rejected the Gospel confirmed by those miracles through their own fault and hardened themselves in rebellion against their Messiah” (CORNELY). This hardening, however, is not outside divine providence; rather, the fact of hardening is ordered by God to the wisest ends: in Pharaoh’s case, so that he might display his power in him (v. 17); and, on the occasion of the rebellion of some of the Jews, others obtained God’s mercy (11, 30 s.).

488. The words “whom he wills he hardens” give rise to a difficulty (v. 19): no one can resist God’s will; by what right, then, can God complain about people, since they do what God wills? Before answering directly (vv. 22 ss.), the Apostle recalls to the human being the creature’s condition, which has no right to dispute with the Creator about the order of providence (v. 20): “On the contrary, O human being—answer this—who are you to talk back to God?” He illustrates this by the familiar comparison of the potter and the pot (v. 21). “Everyone agrees that Paul took the comparison of the potter shaping vessels as he wishes from the books of the Old Testament. The prophets use it to assert God’s supreme dominion and perfect freedom in disposing of and ruling human affairs, or rather to urge humble and pious obedience and silence, by which people are bound to revere the order of things freely established by God according to his good pleasure, and to refrain from judging and criticizing it. This meaning and purpose of the comparison was therefore well known to the new Christians in Rome, and so it immediately and almost spontaneously presented itself to them when they read it used here. We therefore rightly conclude that the Apostle too intended this meaning and purpose, and that the whole force of the comparison lies solely in showing how absurd and shameful it is for a mere man to dare to call the divine order of providence into judgment and accuse it of injustice” (CORNELY).

489. Then (vv. 22 ss.) he answers directly by showing the divine manner of acting: “But if God, willing to show his wrath and make known what he can do, endured with great patience vessels of wrath fitted for destruction, and (if God acts in this way) in order to show the riches of his glory in vessels of mercy which he prepared for glory, whom he also called—not only from the Jews but also from the Gentiles.” The apodosis is missing; CORNELY readily supplies it as follows: “What then will you say? Will you then dare to accuse God of injustice when he rebukes hardened sinners?” The word “fitted” (κατηρτισμένα) is not passive, as Calvin has it—fitted by God for destruction—but middle: those who fitted themselves for destruction. If, then, God rebukes or punishes such sinners—vessels of wrath who fitted themselves for destruction and who abuse the time granted for repentance to become more impenitent and hardened (cf. Pharaoh and the unbelieving Jews)—he does not act unjustly. Nor is there injustice if God called to faith, not only from the Jews but also from the Gentiles, vessels of mercy, which he prepared for glory, namely by calling them to faith and conferring grace. Thus the prophets announced that the promises did not pertain to all and only the Jews, but that the Gentiles too would be called to the messianic kingdom (vv. 25, 26), and that the greater part of the Jews would not attain salvation (vv. 27 ss.), but not without their fault (9, 30 ss., 10, 21). Nevertheless, God did not simply reject his people (11, 1 ss.), nor should the Gentiles boast against the Jews (11, 13 ss.); the Jews too will be converted (11, 25 ss.). Jews and Gentiles are thus brought to faith according to the divine plan so that they may be a help to one another: “For although God has now permitted Israel to be blinded for the benefit of the Gentiles and rejected it for a time, he will nevertheless faithfully preserve what he once promised to their fathers (11, 28. 29). For just as he wished the present unbelief of Israel to be an occasion for the unbelieving Gentiles to share in his mercy, so he wishes the faith of the Gentiles to be an occasion for unbelieving Israel eventually to obtain mercy (30. 31). In this way he wishes to rescue both from unbelief, showing the same mercy to both, v. 33” (CORNELY in 11, 24 ss.). “For God has shut up all (everyone, Jews and Gentiles) in unbelief, that he may have mercy on all. O depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How incomprehensible are his judgments, and how unsearchable his ways! For who has known the mind of the Lord? Or who has been his counselor? Or who has first given to him, and it shall be repaid to him? For from him, and through him, and in him are all things: to him be glory forever. Amen.”

In this whole passage St. Paul nowhere speaks of predestination to glory taken precisely as such, much less says that it is before foreseen merits; rather, the subject is gratuitous calling to faith and grace.

490. One might perhaps argue from Rom 9 for predestination to glory taken precisely as such:

According to St. Paul’s teaching, some are chosen absolutely by God for glory, independently of foreseen works, while others are passed over. Therefore he teaches predestination to glory before foreseen merits.

Proof of the antecedent. In 9, 11 s., Jacob is chosen not on account of works but by the one who calls, so that God’s elective purpose may stand. Yet although the immediate subject in Jacob’s calling concerns temporal goods, St. Paul applies this to the calling to the goods of the supernatural order, and specifically to glory itself, namely the vessels of mercy which he prepared for glory (v. 23).

I answer. I deny the antecedent. As for its proof, I concede the major; I distinguish the minor: St. Paul applies it to gratuitous calling in the supernatural order, specifically to faith and grace, I concede; to glory taken precisely as such, I deny. As for the added argument from v. 23, it must be proved 1) that glory there is to be understood exclusively as glory taken precisely as such; 2) that prepare is to be understood as predestination and not as that preparation for glory which consists in efficacious calling to faith and the conferral of grace.

It should also be noted that in the type (Jacob) both the elective decree and its execution are gratuitous, not based on works. If, then, as the argument proposes, this gratuity is applied to predestination to glory taken precisely as such, before foreseen merits, one must say that both the elective decree to glory taken precisely as such and its execution are gratuitous—that is, that the conferral of glory is not based on works—which is heretical.

491. If someone wished to argue from the comparison of the potter and the pot for predestination to glory before foreseen merits, one should say: 1) St. Paul uses the comparison to show that it is not for a human being to dispute with God about his providence, and so predestination or reprobation is not the subject; 2) if it were applied to predestination, a false conclusion would follow. For the potter positively fashions vessels for honor and vessels for dishonor; toward the vessels of dishonor he does not take a merely negative stance, leaving them in the lump. If this were applied to predestination and reprobation, it would follow that just as predestination to glory is before foreseen merits, so too positive reprobation is before demerits, which would be the Calvinist heresy.

492. An argument is also made from Eph 1, 3 ss.: he chose us in order that we might be holy, not because we are holy; he predestined us according to the purpose of his will; we were called by lot (v. 11), not on account of merits. All this indicates gratuitous election and predestination.

I answer. For the argument to be valid, it must be shown that the subject is predestination to glory taken precisely as such, and that it is before foreseen merits. But the text itself identifies the object of election: “that we might be holy and immaculate in his sight”; and the object of predestination: “to adoption as children,” that is, efficacious calling to faith in Christ and the grace of justification, which are altogether gratuitous. Nothing is said about predestination to glory taken precisely as such ¹⁷.

493. Sacred Scripture speaks of divine election and of the elect. But election is gratuitous, for election presupposes equals among whom a distinction is made by election itself. Therefore…

I answer. As for the major: the elect are usually Christians, who have been elected by God to the grace of faith (Col 3, 12; 2 Tim 2, 10; Tit 1, 1; 1 Petr 1, 1; 2, 9), without thereby saying that all of them are in fact saved. The term can also designate those who are in fact saved (Matth 24, 22. 24. 31 = Marc 13, 20. 22. 27); yet even in these passages the subject is not election to glory taken precisely as such.

As for the minor: that election can be gratuitous, I grant or pass over; that it must be gratuitous, I deny. ST. HILARY: “Thus election is not a matter of indiscriminate judgment, but a distinction made by selection according to merit. Blessed, then, is the one whom God has chosen, blessed because worthy of being chosen” (above, nr. 477). St. Hilary is speaking of election to glory. ST. BONAVENTURE calls God’s love, which regards the consequent will by which he loves all who will be saved, election. But according to St. Bonaventure, the consequent will “depends on our cause” (above, nr. 447). For the argument to be effective, it must be proved that, according to Sacred Scripture, election to glory taken precisely as such is gratuitous. To invent for oneself a concept of election that is gratuitous by its very nature, and then to explain Sacred Scripture according to that concept, is to beg the question. Thus of Matth 24, 22. 24 it is said: “Nothing is said about why these people are elect, whether on account of good works or gratuitously. In fact, they were elected gratuitously to grace, but on account of good works to glory” (PESCH, nr. 386). DE SAN, II, gives further “arguments” from Sacred Scripture with explanations.

494. The teaching of St. AUGUSTINE is invoked in favor of the opinion that predestination to glory taken precisely as such is at issue. Without doubt his authority would support this opinion, as FRANZELIN notes (pag. 681), if texts could be cited that clearly speak 1) of predestination to glory taken precisely as such, not of predestination to the grace of faith, justification, good works, or perseverance; 2) show that the order between predestination to grace and predestination to glory is such that the prior predestination to glory is the norm for predestination to merits and grace; 3) exclude from predestination to glory taken precisely as such not only natural human merit, but also supernatural merit acquired with the help of grace. But no such texts are cited, and St. Augustine never taught that different, inverted order of intention and execution. Rather, as shown above (nr. 476), gifts are predestined in the same order in which they are conferred. Nor was Augustine’s dispute on this matter with the Pelagians and Massilians; against them he defended the necessity of grace and the gratuity of grace and glory¹⁸ together—gratuity by which natural human merit is denied.

495. But perhaps an argument could be framed this way: according to St. AUGUSTINE’s teaching, after the sin of our first parents the whole human race is a mass of perdition, a condemned mass, in which God could justly leave everyone. By his mercy God separated some from that mass, and they are saved; the others perish because they were not distinguished from that mass of perdition.

496. De correptione et gratia, c. 7: “Since these things are so, we nevertheless rebuke, and rightly rebuke, those who, having lived well, did not persevere in that good life. By their own will they changed from a good life to an evil one, and therefore they are worthy of rebuke; and if rebuke does them no good, but they persevere in their lost life until death, they are also worthy of eternal condemnation by God. Nor will they excuse themselves by saying, as they say now, ‘Why are we rebuked?’—and then, ‘Why are we condemned, since, for us to return from good to evil, we did not receive the perseverance by which we might have remained in the good?’ They will in no way free themselves from just condemnation by this excuse. For if, as the Truth says, no one is freed from the condemnation incurred through Adam except through faith in Jesus Christ, and yet those who can say that they did not hear the Gospel of Christ will not free themselves from this condemnation, since faith comes by hearing ¹⁹, how much less will those who say, ‘We did not receive perseverance,’ free themselves? For the excuse of those who say, ‘We did not receive the hearing,’ seems more just than that of those who say, ‘We did not receive perseverance,’ since one can say: ‘Human being, you would have persevered in what you had heard and held, if you had wished’; but one cannot say: ‘You would have believed what you had not heard, if you had wished.’”

497. “Accordingly, those who did not hear the Gospel, and those who heard it, were changed for the better, but did not receive perseverance, and those who heard the Gospel and did not wish to come to Christ—that is, to believe in him, for he said, ‘No one comes to me unless it has been given him by my Father’ ²⁰—and those who, because of their tender age, could not believe but could be freed from original guilt only by the laver of regeneration, and who died and perished without receiving it: none of them were distinguished from that lump which is acknowledged to be condemned, since all proceed from one person to condemnation. They are distinguished not by their merits but by the grace of the Mediator, that is, freely justified in the blood of the second Adam. So when we hear, ‘For who distinguishes you? What do you have that you have not received? And if you have received it, why do you boast as if you had not received it?’ ²¹, we ought to understand that no one can be distinguished from that mass of perdition brought about through the first Adam, except one who has this gift—whoever has it has received it by the grace of the Savior.… ” ²²

498. “Whoever, then, has been distinguished from that original condemnation by this generosity of divine grace—there is no doubt that the Gospel is also arranged to be heard by them, and when they hear it, they believe; and they persevere to the end in the faith that works through love ²³. If at any time they stray, they are corrected and amend; some of them, even if they are not corrected by human beings, return to the way they had left; and some, having received grace at any age, are snatched away by a swift death from the dangers of this life. For he who made them vessels of mercy works all these things in them: he chose them in his Son before the foundation of the world by an election of grace. But if by grace, then not by works; otherwise grace is no longer grace” ^{24 25}. For they were not called in such a way that they were not elect; hence it was said, “For many are called, but few are elect” ²⁶. Rather, since they were called according to his purpose, they were certainly also chosen by the election of grace, as was said, and not by their preceding merits; for grace is all their merit.…

499. “These people are signified in the letter to Timothy, where, after it had been said that Hymenaeus and Philetus overthrow the faith of some, we immediately hear: ‘But the firm foundation of God stands, having this seal: The Lord knows those who are his’ ²⁷. The faith of these people, which works through love, certainly either does not fail at all, or, if there are some whose faith fails, it is restored before this life ends; and when the intervening iniquity has been wiped away, perseverance to the end is credited to them. But those who will not persevere, and will thus fall away from Christian faith and conduct, so that the end of this life finds them in that state, are doubtless not to be counted among these people even at the time when they live well and piously. For by God’s foreknowledge and predestination they have not been distinguished from that mass of perdition, and therefore they were not called according to his purpose, and consequently are not elect; they are among those called of whom it was said, ‘Many are called,’ not among those of whom it was said, ‘but few are elect.’ And yet who would deny that they are elect when they believe, are baptized, and live according to God? They are plainly called elect by those who do not know what they will become, not by him who knows that they do not have the perseverance that brings the elect to blessed life, and who knows they stand in such a way that he foreknows they will fall” (ML 44, 923 ss.).

500. Some understand this teaching of St. Augustine as referring to antecedent (negative) reprobation, to which there must correspond predestination to glory before foreseen supernatural merits. They admit that he did not propose this teaching from the beginning, but either proposed it toward the end of his life or inclined strongly toward it. Others deny that the teaching is to be understood of negative reprobation ²⁸, but say that he sets forth an unquestioned Catholic doctrine accepted by all: namely, that no one is rescued from a state of sin and liability to eternal damnation except by the wholly undeserved mercy and grace of God. This, however, is an altogether different question from whether the reprobation of adults is without regard to their demerits, and whether the predestination of adults to glory taken precisely as such is without regard to, and prior to, their foreseen supernatural merits ²⁹.

501. Therefore it is not established that St. Augustine ever taught predestination to glory taken precisely as such before foreseen merits. But even if it were proved that he proposed this opinion at the end of his life, his authority as a doctor of grace approved by the Church could not be invoked in favor of this teaching, for in this matter the Church never approved St. Augustine’s teaching, much less made it her own. In the “Indiculus” of Celestine it is said: “As for the deeper and more difficult parts of the questions that arise, which those who resisted heretics treated at greater length, just as we do not dare to despise them, so we are not obliged to affirm them, because we believe it sufficient for confessing the grace of God, from whose work and favor nothing at all should be taken away, to hold whatever the writings of the Apostolic See have taught us according to the rules set out above” (Denz 142). And when the Jansenists exaggerated St. Augustine’s authority, the proposition was condemned: “Wherever one finds a teaching clearly grounded in Augustine, one may absolutely hold and teach it, without regard for any papal bull” (Denz 1320). Innocent XII applies Celestine’s words specifically to our question. For when the University of Louvain (7 May 1693) had asked the Supreme Pontiff for permission to continue the teaching of its predecessors on grace and predestination, and for the Holy See to declare that the doctrine of grace efficacious in itself and of predestination before foreseen merits had not been condemned or weakened by any Apostolic decrees issued thus far, Innocent XII (1694) said: “In this matter we greatly commend your devotion to the See of St. Peter. But since, as St. Celestine wrote to the bishops of Gaul, the deeper and more difficult parts of the questions that arise, which those who resisted heretics treated at greater length, just as we do not dare to despise them, so we are not obliged to affirm them, we do not think it opportune at present to undertake that more exact treatment of divine aids which our predecessors Clement VIII and Paul V instituted. For we believe it sufficient for confessing the grace of God, from whose work and favor nothing at all should be taken away, to hold whatever the writings of the Apostolic See have taught” ³⁰.

502. ST. THOMAS, whom defenders of predestination to glory before foreseen merits appeal to, did not teach this opinion ³¹.

1. For St. Thomas, predestination simply speaking is never predestination to glory taken precisely as such, but is always to grace and glory, that is, predestination considered completely. Therefore, when he says predestination is gratuitous and does not arise from merits, he is to be understood as speaking of predestination taken completely ³².

2. He does concede that if someone wishes to consider predestination only in relation to one of its effects, namely eternal life, it is reasonable to say that God predestines some because he foreknew that they would act well (In ep. ad Rom. cap. 8, lect. 6; see above, nr. 476; cf. 1 q. 23 a. 5; In ep. ad Eph. c. 1 lect. 1) ³³. But this is the doctrine that predestination to glory taken precisely as such is after foreseen merits.

3. St. Thomas does not hold the points fundamental to the teaching of the Bañezianists:

a) the final state of a human being is the terminus of the antecedent salvific will (above, nr. 448 ss.);

b) hence he does not defend antecedent negative reprobation (cf. PESCH nr. 432 ss.);

c) to prove the gratuity of predestination he does not apply the fundamental principle of Scotus and the Bañezianists: namely, that God must first absolutely will human glory as an end, and then merits and grace as means to this end (on this principle, see nr. 505). Rather, he proves the gratuity of predestination from the gratuity of grace ³⁴;

d) hence, too, he says nothing of an inverted order of intention and execution, of predestination and conferral ³⁵.

503. Mannens summarizes as follows his reasons for showing that St. Thomas’s teaching contains the doctrine that predestination to glory taken precisely as such is after foreseen merits: “He teaches and inculcates this doctrine not only once or in a single way, but repeatedly and in various ways. He teaches it implicitly both in his very clear doctrine of the absolute will for the salvation of human beings consequent upon foreknowledge of their dispositions and works, and in the closely related principle of equality between the order of predestination and execution in human salvation. He presupposes it when he teaches that eternal glory is not gratuitous except in grace, or the root of meriting; and when he derives the gratuity of predestination solely from the gratuity of grace, not from the gratuity of glory. Finally, he declares it most plainly when he teaches in several places that even glory as predestined has a meritorious reason in works of grace; that predestination includes a consequent will, which regards works as the meritorious cause of glory; and that predestination presupposes foreknowledge of future things which, on the part of the free creature, are required beforehand as a motive for the fulfillment of the predestined effect” (pag. 151).

504. But according to ST. THOMAS (1 q. 23 a. 4), this order must be established ³⁶: love, election, predestination. Hence the argument: By gratuitous love God effectively chooses some for glory, and consequently predestines for them the means—efficacious graces and merits—by which they may attain this glory. But this is precisely the doctrine of predestination to glory before foreseen merits. Therefore…

I answer. 1) In article 5 of this question, where St. Thomas explicitly treats the gratuity of predestination, he proves it from the gratuity of grace.

2. The argument from article 4 might perhaps be valid if election were considered incompletely by St. Thomas, namely, as election to glory; and if predestination were likewise considered incompletely, namely, as predestination to the means, efficacious graces and merits. But in fact St. Thomas explicitly says that the terminus of election is grace and glory (ad 1), so that election and predestination have the same termini: grace and glory. Like theologians generally in the thirteenth century, St. Thomas considers predestination completely ³⁷.

505. The opposing opinion is usually proved in this way by reasoning: “The first fundamental reason. Whoever acts prudently and in an orderly way intends the end before the means. But God acts prudently and in an orderly way, and merits are means while glory is the end. Therefore he intends glory before merits. (Here: a. 4 o. and q. 6 and verit., a. 1 o.)” ³⁸. Scotus seems to have been the first to apply this reasoning explicitly to this matter (above, nr. 405) ³⁹.

I answer. I distinguish the major: he intends absolutely before the necessary means an end to be attained by himself, I grant or pass over; an end—that is, what he proposes to another as an end to be desired by that other and communicated to him as a reward—before the means, I subdistinguish: he intends it conditionally first, I concede; he intends it absolutely first, I deny.

As for the minor: I concede the first part; I contradict the other part of the minor: that the glory of a human being (blessedness) is an end to be attained by or for God, I deny; that it is an end proposed by God to a human being, I concede.

Therefore God must first will glory conditionally, by an antecedent will, but not absolutely. God wills that all adults merit eternal life by supernatural merits, and wills to give them glory if they merit it. Therefore he grants them helps so they can merit it; after their merits have been foreseen, he wills absolutely to give it to them. In this matter insufficient attention is sometimes paid to the fact that human blessedness does not have the character of an end for God. The state of a human being at the goal is no more an end for God than the state of a human being on the way.

Objections

506. 1. The principal reason against antecedent negative reprobation and predestination to glory before foreseen merits is said to be that this doctrine seems incompatible with God’s universal salvific will as it appears in the sources (nr. 453; 470). But the same reason seems capable of being pressed against our opinion; therefore that reason does not seem effective.

Proof of the minor. If it is incompatible with God’s universal salvific will for God, prior to foreseen demerit, freely to exclude someone absolutely from glory or from an efficacious choice for glory, then it seems equally opposed to this universal salvific will for him, prior to foreseen demerit, to prepare merely sufficient grace, when he could give efficacious grace. But the preparation of efficacious grace rather than merely sufficient grace is not after foreseen merits, and the preparation of sufficient grace rather than efficacious grace is prior to demerits—something everyone must concede. Therefore the same difficulty arises for our opinion.

I answer. I grant or pass over the major; I deny the minor. As for its proof, I distinguish the major: that it seems equally opposed if efficacious grace is denied and purely sufficient grace is prepared consequent upon God’s absolute will not to save this person, I concede; for then the serious conditional salvific will toward the reprobate would cease at a point prior to final impenitence, and the salvific will as it appears in revelation would not be preserved. But that it seems equally opposed if sufficient grace is prepared consequent upon the antecedent will to save all human beings, including this person, and with the intention that the person use that help, I deny; for then the salvific will remains at every point prior to final impenitence. I concede the minor; and I distinguish the consequent accordingly: if in our opinion sufficient grace were prepared consequent upon an absolute will not to save this person, I concede; but if it is prepared consequent upon a conditional will to save this person too, I deny.

507. According to the opinion of negative reprobation and predestination to glory before foreseen merits, some people are chosen absolutely for glory, and the rest are absolutely excluded, prior to foreseen merits or demerits. By that very fact, the conditional salvific will toward the former becomes an absolute will, while it ceases toward the rest. Just as consequent upon this absolute will God must prepare for the predestined such an order of life that they infallibly attain the degree of glory determined for them, so too he must prepare the order of life of the negatively reprobated in such a way that their eternal damnation is assured. Therefore he must prepare for them graces with which they will ultimately not cooperate—that is, not graces ultimately efficacious, but merely sufficient. Since there is no longer a conditional salvific will toward the negatively reprobated, the preparation of sufficient grace can no longer proceed from such a salvific will, but from an absolute will not to save them. Therefore, in this opinion, both exclusion from glory and exclusion from efficacious grace cannot be reconciled with the universal salvific will found in the sources (see nr. 464).

508. In our opinion God’s conditional salvific will toward everyone remains at every point before final impenitence. Consequently, God prepares for everyone, in accord with this will, grace by which they can attain salvation if they will; therefore the preparation of every grace flows from the universal salvific will. In choosing the present order, however, and thus in choosing graces, God remains free. By this conditional universal salvific will God has not bound himself to prepare for everyone graces with which they will in fact cooperate, but graces with which they can cooperate if they will. Nor has he in any way bound himself, in place of a grace with which a person does not wish to cooperate, to prepare another grace with which that person does wish to cooperate. In other words, the conditional universal salvific will does not require that efficacious graces be given to all, but at least that sufficient graces be given. Since in this opinion the preparation of sufficient grace proceeds from the universal salvific will, this opinion is entirely consistent with the doctrine of the salvific will as it appears in the sources (above, nr. 465-467).

509. If one asks why God gave this person only sufficient grace and not efficacious grace, we do not answer, “Because by an absolute decree he had already excluded him from glory beforehand,” but, with St. Augustine (above, nr. 383), “We do not know.” “From his antecedent will for salvation, God assigns to all the graces they need, in different ways and degrees according to the plan of his wisdom, willing that all use the graces granted and be saved through them. Yet not in such a way that he has, as it were, bound himself to accommodate human perversity, choosing another grace for people to consent to whenever he sees that they will reject one grace. This is indeed what he does (God), in order to heal all; but he acts according to his judgment, and does not receive the order of healing from the sick person (St. Augustine, De natura et grat. c. 27, 31). For the antecedent salvific will is not absolute. Why it is not absolute, when it could be, is, as I said, a matter for God’s judgment: he preferred to bring good out of evils rather than allow no evils at all. O human being, who are you to answer back to God? Do not ask why God, infinitely wise, good, and just Lord of his gifts, did not choose the economy that people imagine for themselves; rather, ask why people whom God wills to save and make eternally blessed with divine blessedness do not themselves will it, and prefer earth to heaven, the briefest and most wretched pleasures to eternal joys that surpass all understanding, and laughable—or rather lamentable—honors to heavenly glory!” ⁴⁰.

510. 2. Predestination to final perseverance is not after foreseen merits. But predestination to final perseverance includes predestination to glory. Therefore predestination to glory is not after foreseen merits.

I answer. I concede the major; I distinguish the minor: if this means that predestination to glory taken precisely as such is prior to the foreseen merits that a person has at the end of life, I deny; if it means that it is after those foreseen merits, I concede. Or: if it means that predestination to glory precedes predestination to perseverance and is the reason for predestination to perseverance, I deny; if it means that predestination to glory—that is, the absolute will to confer glory—follows predestination to perseverance, I concede. An adult who has the gift of perseverance dies in the state of grace and merits; on account of the merits he has at the end of life, God wills absolutely to give him glory. Therefore this is after foreseen merits ⁴¹. In the opinion that predestination to glory taken precisely as such is before foreseen merits, the account is: because God chose this person absolutely for this degree of glory prior to foreseen merits, he prepared the gift of perseverance for him in such a way that he would die with so many merits that this glory would correspond to them as a reward; predestination to perseverance follows predestination to glory. In our opinion, God prepares the gift of perseverance for this person, who prays much; because the person dies in the state of grace, and because he dies with these merits, God wills to give him that degree of glory as a reward for his merits: predestination to glory follows predestination to perseverance.

But then the distinction between the predestined and the reprobate seems to depend on human free will and not on God.

I answer. The distinction arises from the fact that God freely chose this order and not another, which he could also have chosen. If God chose the present order because these people will cooperate with grace and those will not—or even because these people would cooperate with grace and those would not—it could in a certain sense be said that the human being himself is ultimately the one who distinguishes himself. We absolutely deny this, and say with St. Augustine (above, nr. 384) that God has not revealed to us why he chose precisely this order and not another; therefore we are altogether ignorant of it (cf. De gratia Redemptoris, pag. 363). That in the order God chose independently of human free will some are saved and others are not is due to this: in this order some cooperate with grace and others do not. If God had chosen another order, perhaps different people would have been saved and damned, according to whether each person in that order cooperated with grace or did not cooperate. God knows what would happen in the various orders he could choose, and he knows this also of the present order. Thus his free choice of this order is God’s special love toward those who are saved in this order, toward the predestined.

In all these and similar objections, keep in view what was said in nr. 465-467.

511. If, then, one asks: Why did God choose precisely the present order among the various possible orders? We answer: We do not know. But we add that he did not choose it because he had antecedently chosen some human beings absolutely and exclusively for eternal life, and willed to give eternal life absolutely to them alone.

If one asks: Why, in this present order which he freely chose absolutely, does God will to give eternal life absolutely to these particular people? We answer: because by the knowledge of vision he foresaw that they would merit eternal life for themselves by cooperating with grace and would die in the state of grace.

If one asks: Why does God positively reprobate the rest in the present order? We answer: because by the knowledge of vision he foresaw that they would sin and die in a state of mortal sin.