De Deo uno

For this and the following thesis: ST. THOMAS, In 1 d. 40; 41; De veritate q. 6; S. Theol. 1, q. 23; 24; BELLARMINE, De gratia et libero arbitrio, l. 2 c. 9; 10. LESSIUS, De praedestinatione et reprobatione Angelorum et hominum; De perfectionibus moribusque divinis, l. 14 c. 2; SUÁREZ, De Deo, tract. 2; RUIZ, De divina praedestinatione ac reprobatione hominum et angelorum; GONET, Clypeus theologiae thomisticae, tract. 5; FRASSEN, Scotus academicus, tr. 2, disp. 3 a. 2; 3; BILLUART, De Deo, diss. 9 art. 2-10; PETAVIUS, De Deo Deique attributis, l. 9 et 10; De incarnatione Verbi, lib. 13; TRICASSINUS, De praedestinatione hominum ad gloriam; FRANZELIN, thes. 55–56; DE SAN, nr. 31–292; BILLOT, thes. 31; 32; PESCH, prop. 53–58; 61–62; MUNCUNILL, nr. 834–841; 730–775; VAN DER MEERSCH, nr. 548–562; 566–605.

452. Negative reprobation is conceived either as a mere omission of election (e.g., SCOTUS), or as an act of the will either positively to exclude from glory as an undue good (e.g., ALVAREZ, JOHN OF ST. THOMAS), or to exclude from an efficacious election to glory (e.g., BILLUART); it is antecedent, that is, before the foreseen use of created free will, before foreseen demerit. Consequently, in view of this absolute exclusion, God must permit an unremitted sin, a final sin, so that man is justly damned eternally; therefore, consequent upon his own will, God must direct the life of the reprobate man in such a way that the man does not die in the state of grace, that he infallibly sins, and deny him the graces by which he would be converted, while offering him graces with which he will not cooperate, graces that are not efficacious for conversion. And this antecedently and independently of any foreseen demerit of the man.

Those who defend antecedent negative reprobation are SCOTUS, the BAÑEZIANI, SUÁREZ, BELLARMINE.

453. Argument 1. The universal saving will of God, as God revealed it (and this is the only way of knowing it), cannot be reconciled with antecedent negative reprobation:

a) In the sources, no terminus before which the universal saving will of God is antecedent is indicated other than man's foreseen final state; yet according to the doctrine of antecedent negative reprobation, the universal saving will has already ceased antecedently to that terminus. For, at a sign posterior to the absolute will not to save this man, there can no longer be a serious conditional will to save that same man. Therefore, the doctrine of negative reprobation cannot be reconciled with that saving will which the sources present. “A conditional will to save is incompatible with an absolute antecedent will not to save” (Franzelin, p. 582).

b) It is difficult to understand a sincere will to confer some good on someone if this will is conditional upon a condition that depends solely on the one willing and that he absolutely does not will to bring about. But such would be God's antecedent saving will toward those to be reprobated, according to this opinion; therefore.

c) God exhorts sinners to penance and conversion for as long as they are in the state of pilgrimage, and promises them the remission of sins; therefore, one must either say that he still wills their salvation, at least conditionally, namely, if they do penance—and antecedent negative reprobation is denied—or say that these warnings, exhortations, and promises addressed to sinners who are not predestined are not serious, and that God does not make his true will known to them, namely, that sinners be converted; this cannot be admitted.

d) God grants sinful men, as a true benefit¹ at least remotely sufficient grace for conversion, and does so with the intention that they use it for conversion. But toward those whom he has antecedently and negatively reprobated absolutely, he can no longer have such a will; therefore, it does not seem that he gives them sufficient grace with the intention that they use it, nor is it intelligible how sufficient grace can thus still retain the character of a benefit. For sufficient and non-efficacious grace is given consequent upon the absolute will to exclude a man from glory or from an efficacious election to glory.

e) God truly has a love of benevolence toward a just man, his adopted son and friend²; but such love seems impossible toward those whom he has negatively reprobated antecedently to foreseen guilt. For in the very same sign in which that love ought to be present, there is no longer a will, not even a conditional one, to save this adopted son of his, and this antecedently to any fault of his. Therefore, this doctrine seems to entail either that the negatively reprobated person in fact never attains justification³; or, if those not predestined do also attain justification, one must say that God still has a conditional saving will toward them.

f) Negative reprobation seems to equal positive reprobation; for to will to exclude someone from glory, or to will not to choose someone efficaciously for glory, in fact amounts to willing that he be damned. For a man who is not saved is damned; there is no third option. Likewise, one who does not will that a man be saved cannot, by that very fact, fail to will that he be damned. “In the common estimation of men, it seems to amount to the same thing whether God wills that you perish, or is unwilling to place you among his elect and (consequently) to give you congruous grace and perseverance; for damnation will follow just as infallibly from decrees of this kind. And if one of these two decrees had to be undergone, anyone would consider it a matter of indifference to him which one was chosen, since both are before the foreseeing of works”⁴.

454. Argument 2. The holy Fathers knew of no reprobation other than that following foreseen sin, that is, consequent reprobation.

ST. GREGORY OF NYSSA, Adversus Apollinarium, Antirrhet. 29: “For the Lord's will is not the cause why some are saved and others perish; otherwise the cause of their perdition would have to be referred to it. Rather, it comes about through the choice of those who receive the word that some are saved or perish” (MG 45, 1188; R 1053).

ST. JOHN CHRYSOSTOM, In ep. ad Eph., hom. 1, nr. 2 (above, nr. 440).

ST. AMBROSE, De Cain et Abel, l. 2 c. 3 nr. 11 (above, nr. 441).

455. ST. PROSPER, Responsiones ad capitula obiectionum Gallorum calumniantium⁵, chap. 2: “Objection: That the grace of baptism received by those who are not predestined to life does not take away original sin. Response: Every person who, believing in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, is reborn in baptism is absolved both from the sins of his own, which he contracted by an evil will and action, and from original sin, which he derived from his parents. But one who denies that a person who has fallen back after baptism into unbelief and impious conduct was cleansed from original sin holds an opinion as false as one who asserts that this same person is not to be condemned to eternal death. For one who departs from Christ and, alienated from grace, ends this life—what does he fall into but perdition? Yet he does not fall back into what has been remitted, nor will he be condemned for original sin; nevertheless, because of his final crimes he will suffer the death that was due to him on account of those sins which were remitted. Since this did not escape God's foreknowledge, nor did it deceive him, without doubt he never chose such a person, never predestined him, and never separated him from eternal perdition, though he was to perish” (ML. 51, 157 s.).

456. Chapter 3: “Objection: That those not predestined to life, even if they have been reborn in Christ through baptism and have lived piously and justly, gain nothing from this; but are kept in reserve until they fall and perish, and are not taken from this life before this happens to them. Response: There is no doubt that many pass from holiness to impurity, from justice to iniquity, and from faith to impiety; and it is most certain that the predestination of God's sons and Christ's coheirs does not apply to such people. Therefore, those of this sort who fell into these evils and died without the correction of penance did not have the necessity of perishing because they were not predestined; rather, they were not predestined because they were foreknown as going to become such through voluntary transgression. As for God's not taking them from this life at the time when they were in the true faith and good conduct, this must be referred to his hidden judgments, which are nevertheless never unjust. For who does not know that, within the one condition of human mortality, the ends of the dying vary with unequal spans of life, from infancy in a single hour to the most advanced old age, and that no soul departs from the body it quickens either sooner or later than God wills? If, then, someone forsook God during the length of his life, he made bad use of a good that was from God. For longevity is from God alone. And what is from God is nothing but good; and what is good is not the cause of evil. Therefore, he does not judge rightly who thinks that the prolonger of life is the author of sin for those about to fall, when, of course, it is not a sin to live long but to live badly; and this can happen even in an age of only a few years. Thus, just as good works are to be referred to God, their inspirer, so evil works are to be referred to those who sin. For they were not forsaken by God so that they might forsake God; rather, they forsook him and were forsaken, and by their own will were changed from good to evil. Although they had been reborn and justified by him, nevertheless they were not predestined by the one who foreknew them as such” (col. 158 s.).

457. Chapter 7: “Objection: That God does not give perseverance to some of his sons, whom he regenerated in Christ and to whom he gave faith, hope, and charity, because they were not separated from the mass of perdition by God's foreknowledge and predestination. Response: Many examples show, to our sorrow, that some of those regenerated in Christ Jesus abandon the faith and pious conduct, apostatize from God, and end their lives impiously in their estrangement. But to attribute their fall to God is a most excessive perversity, as though he were the instigator and author of their ruin because he foreknew that they would fall by their own will, and for this reason did not separate them from the children of perdition by any predestination. For how could the election foreordained in Christ include those whom just damnation would take as they departed from Christ? Since it is beyond doubt that perseverance in good to the end is a gift of God, and it is clear from the very fact that these people did not persevere that they did not have it, God must not be accused of failing to give these people what he gave to others. Rather, it must be acknowledged that he mercifully gave what he gave and justly did not give what he did not give, lest, just as the cause of falling arises from free will, the cause of standing also seem to arise from it, when the former is brought about by human action, but the latter is accomplished by divine gift” (col. 161 s.).

458. Chapter 12. “Objection: That obedience is withdrawn from some who have been called and are living piously and justly, so that they cease to obey. Response: If God casts a man who obeys him down from piety and makes one who runs well fall, then he repays good with evil, and unjustly punishes what he himself impels to happen. What could be said or thought more perverse, more senseless? But those are led to such a view who think that God's foreknowledge in all things is the same as his will, whereas his will never wills anything but good, while his foreknowledge knows both good and evil. He bestows good, either by doing it himself or by enabling us to do it; as for evil, he neither did it at all himself, nor advised it or impelled it to be done. Therefore, he did not withdraw the powers of obedience from anyone because he did not predestine him; rather, he did not predestine him because he foresaw that he would depart from that very obedience” (col. 167).

Responses to the chapter of the objections of the Vincentians, response to chap. 12 (above, nr. 387).

459. Thus ST. PROSPER, in defending the doctrine of St. Augustine, denies that negative reprobation—not predestination—is antecedent to foreseen sin. SUÁREZ (De praedest., l. 5 c. 5 nr. 7) wishes to explain St. Prosper's words as referring to positive reprobation; but both St. Prosper and his objectors speak clearly of those not predestined, not separated, etc. The detractors of St. Augustine “never thought that positive reprobation to eternal punishment, but rather the denial of predestination to eternal life, was attributed in Augustine's doctrine to God's antecedent will. For they said that Augustine taught that some are not predestined to eternal life by God's antecedent will; from this, they further concluded that these people are abandoned by God and permitted to sin, and that thus, consequent upon their sins, a sentence of reprobation to eternal punishment is passed. Prosper, however, consistently denies that such an antecedent denial of predestination is given or asserted by St. Augustine; and he affirms that, just as positive damnation follows on account of foreseen sins, so too the denial of predestination follows from the foreseeing of sins”⁶.