De Deo uno

S. TH., 1 q. 22; 103; 104; Contra gent., 3, 64; De Veritate, q. 5; SUÁREZ, De Deo, l. 3 c. 10; LESSIUS, De perf. moribusque divinis, l. 11; RUIZ, De providentia praedefiniente ac praebente praedestinationis exordium, tract. primus; PETAVIUS, De Deo uno Deique proprietatibus, l. 8 c. 1-5; BILLOT, thes. 30; PESCH, prop. 49; MUNCUNILL., nr. 666-686; VAN DER MEERSCH, nr. 511-527.

369. God created the world, not blindly, but with the highest wisdom according to an eternal plan, and ordered it to its end. Just as the exemplar idea of each created thing is in God, so too is the exemplar idea of the whole order of things toward their proper end (De Veritate, q. 5 a. 1 ad 1). This plan existing in the divine mind is called providence. According to this plan God governs the world. Hence:

providence is “the plan for ordering things to an end” (1 q. 22 a. 1 in c. et ad 2); it is eternal and internal to God:

government is “the execution of the order” (ibid. ad 2); it is temporal and may be conceived as an effect of providence.

Providence pertains to intellect and will; according to St. THOMAS, it is essentially in practical cognition.

All things that he has created: these words indicate the object of providence, namely, all creatures with all their operations, necessary and free; good and evil, physical and moral. Providence as such is immediate with respect to all things, even the least; nothing escapes the plan of order. In its execution, however, God employs means, directing lower things through higher ones, making one dependent on another (1 q. 22 a. 3). Since God's care is not equal for all things, a distinction is usually made between general providence, which concerns all creatures; special providence, toward intellectual creatures, which, unlike irrational creatures, are not ordered immediately to other creatures as their end, but only to God himself; and most special providence, toward his friends, children, the just, the predestined, or others who, by reason of their office, are subject to a special providence.

370. Providence is denied by all who do not admit a personal God, and likewise by those who posit two active principles of the world, good and evil. Providence is also excluded by Fatalism, according to which everything in the world occurs by inevitable necessity. It appears in various forms: either a “fate” is posited, some higher entity that blindly causes all events; or all freedom is denied, so that everything is already determined by the nature of things; or the events of this sublunary world are said to depend necessarily on the motions of the heavenly bodies. Deists do admit the existence of a supreme being, author of the world, but deny that he cares for the world he produced.

CHURCH TEACHING

371. COUNCIL OF BRAGA, against the fatalism of the Priscillianists: “If anyone believes that souls are bound by a fatal sign, as the pagans and Priscillian said, let him be anathema” (Denz 239)¹.

INNOCENT III, in the profession of faith prescribed for the Waldensians: “We believe with our heart and confess with our mouth that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one God, of whom we speak, creator, maker, governor, and disposer of all things bodily and spiritual, visible and invisible” (Denz 421).

JOHN XXII, errors of Eckhart, 14: “A good man ought so to conform his will to the divine will that he should will whatever God wills: because God wills in some way that I have sinned, I would not want not to have committed sins; and this is true repentance” (Denz 514; condemned as heretical, Denz 529).

COUNCIL OF CONSTANCE, session 8, errors of Wyclif, 6: “God ought to obey the devil” (Denz 586); 27: “Everything happens by absolute necessity” (Denz 607).

COUNCIL OF TRENT, session 6, canon 6: “If anyone says that it is not in man's power to make his ways evil, but that God works evil deeds just as he works good ones, not by permission alone but properly and of himself, so that Judas's betrayal is his own work no less than Paul's calling, let him be anathema” (Denz 816).

PIUS IX, Syllabus, proposition 2: “Every action of God upon men and the world must be denied” (Denz 1702).

VATICAN COUNCIL, session 3, ch. 1 § 3: “God, indeed, preserves and governs by his providence all things that he has created, reaching mightily from end to end and ordering all things sweetly². For all things are naked and open to his eyes³, even those that are to come about through the free action of creatures” (Denz 1784).

This paragraph was added by amendment 8 in place of “most provident,” which appeared in the first paragraph (above, no. 254). The definition presents 1) the fact of providence; 2) its effect: it preserves and governs; 3) its object: all things he has created; 4) its manner: mightily, sweetly.

SACRED SCRIPTURE

372. Scripture bears abundant witness to providence, in words and deeds.

1. Deeds. Sap 10 sqq. describes how God, by his wisdom, guided individual persons and peoples. Exod 1, 11; 14, 22; 16; Num 20 etc. Act 2, 23; 4, 28; Rom 9; Act 14, 16 sq.; 17, 26.

2. Words. Ps 26, 10; 32, 13; 144, 15 sq.; 146, 9; Sap. 6, 8; 8, 1; 11, 21; 12, 13; 4, 3; Eccli 11, 14; Is 42, 2 sq.; 46, 10; 49, 15 sq.; Matth 6, 25 sqq.; (Luc 12, 22 sqq.); 5, 45; 10, 29 sqq., Phil 4, 6; 1 Petr 5, 6 sq.; Iac 4, 13 ss.

1 Cor 9, 9 denies special providence concerning animals.

All things, then, are under divine providence: plants, animals, human beings, the good and the evil. God especially cares for human beings, in which his great kindness is manifest; hence we ought to have great trust in God, without anxious care.

Indeed, even evils, which seem to pose a great difficulty for admitting God's providence, are also under his providence: Ps 72; Iob; Eccle; Tobias 2, 10-18; 12, 13; Sap 3; 5, 6. 8. 9; Hebr 12, 6; Rom 5, 3; 1 Cor 15, 19.

373. This teaching of Sacred Scripture contains principles for resolving similar difficulties: the happiness that the wicked enjoy from wealth and honors is only apparent and will soon end; the good, however, though poor and despised, enjoy true happiness, peace, and friendship with God. Nor is it true that all the just are always and necessarily in want and disgrace.

Earthly goods and honors must be judged according to the truth: earthly life as a whole is only a preparation; earthly goods are merely means to an end, hence their value is relative. No one lacks what is required to attain his end. In distributing goods God is entirely free.

Some physical evils, however, are necessary and good for the universe; for lower things are ordered to higher ones, for the latter's good; the death of one is the life of another. Man is lord of the visible world, and the world exists for his good. Thus a physical evil in a particular case may be good for the whole; or a physical evil for a lower creature may be good for a higher one.

And so physical evils and the distribution of goods are subject to divine providence (cf. S. Th. 1 q. 22 a. 2 ad 2).

On moral evils below, nr. 375.

THE FATHERS

374. Since this teaching is stated so clearly in Sacred Scripture, it suffices to cite one or two passages from the Fathers.

ST. IRENAEUS, Adv. haeres., l. 2 c. 26 nr. 3: “But what if someone should ask us whether ... each of them received, according to God's providence, the measure proper to it; and, as we agree and confess, that none at all of the things that have been made and will be made escapes the knowledge of God, but that each of them has received and does receive, through his providence, its own state and order and number and measure ...” (MG 7, 801; R 202).

CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA, Strom. 5, 1, 6, 1: “There are also some things deserving of punishment; such as asking for proofs whether providence exists” (MG 9, 16; R 422).

ST. GREGORY NAZIANZEN, Orat. 40, 45: “Believe that the whole world ... was made by God from nothing, and is governed by the Creator's providence” (MG 36, 424; R 1014).

ST. JOHN CHRYSOSTOM, De consubstantiali, homily 12, 4: “For God not only brought forth the creature, but also preserves and sustains it once brought forth; whether you speak of angels or archangels, of the higher powers, or of absolutely all things that fall under sight: if deprived of his effective action, they dissolve, fall apart, and perish” (MG 48, 810; R 1134).

ST. JEROME, In Habacuc, l. 1 c. 1 nr. 14 (supra nr. 252).

Cf. how, according to the Fathers, the world leads to knowledge of its provident governor (supra, de cognoscibilitate Dei).

375. A special difficulty concerns providence with regard to moral evil. Sin cannot impede the very end of creation, since a human being who refuses freely to offer God formal glory manifests God's majesty and justice through his punishment. But sin itself, too, does not escape divine providence. This is more readily understood with respect to the material aspect of sin, but it also holds of sin's formal aspect. God cannot, of course, will formal malice as a means to a good end, as he can physical evil, for it is incapable of being intrinsically ordered to the good. Therefore God cannot will it positively and directly, but he can permit it, by not preventing it. Sin, once permitted and committed, is subject to providence and is ordered externally to some good. If this were impossible, God could not permit it either. “For God Almighty—for even unbelievers confess that he has supreme power over all things—since he is supremely good, would in no way allow anything evil to exist in his works unless he were so almighty and good that he could bring good even out of evil” (ST. AUGUSTINE, Enchir. ch. 11. ML 40, 236). That good in no way has the character of a final cause for the permission; rather, it is a condition without which God would not permit it. Examples: sin and the virtue of penance; sin and martyrdom; cf. Act 2, 23; 4, 28⁴.