De Deo uno

PETRUS LOMBARDUS, 1. 4 d. 49; S. TH., 1 q. 12 a. 1; SUÁREZ, De Deo, tr. 1, 1. 2 c. 7; PETAVIUS, De Deo, 1. 7 c. 5-7; FRANZELIN, thes. 15; KLEUTGEN, nr. 409-417; BILLOT, thes. 13; PESCH, prop. 10; MUNCUNILL, nr. 214 ss.; VAN DER MEERSCH, nr. 292-296; BERAZA, Tractatus de Deo elevante, de peccato originali, de novissimis, Bilbao, 1924, pag. 57 ss.

123. BENEDICT XII, in the Constitution Benedictus Deus (1336), describes the intuitive vision of God as follows. The blessed in heaven “see the divine essence by intuitive and also facial vision, with no creature serving as an object seen, but with the divine essence itself immediately showing itself nakedly, clearly, and openly” (Denz 530). It is therefore knowledge of God that is immediate in the strict sense: every created objective medium is denied, that is, a medium which, once known, would lead to knowledge of God (a medium from which), and a medium in which God would be known through what is known. A medium under which (light) is not excluded; a medium by which, since it does not hinder immediate knowledge, should not for this reason be denied in the vision; it will, however, be shown later that it must be ruled out for another reason. God is known neither from creatures, nor through creatures, nor in creatures; rather, knowledge has divine being itself as its immediate term. Such knowledge is not analogous, but proper per se: a thing is known as it is in itself. Thus God is not known as a creature, a finite being, but in God's own manner, as an infinite being. Since the divine essence shows itself nakedly, clearly, and openly in this vision, that knowledge is clear and distinct, neither obscure nor confused. It is readily understood that such knowledge is most aptly called “intuitive vision”: clear intellectual knowledge is called “vision,” by a transferred use of a word drawn from bodily, sensible sight; this word already indicates to some extent that the knowledge is immediate, and the added word “intuitive” emphasizes this still more, while also indicating that the object is physically present to the intellect. The same is expressed by the term “facial vision” (cf. 1 Cor 13), which expresses both the object's presence and the denial of an objective medium.

We affirm that such knowledge is possible for man. We prove this possibility by proving as a fact that God grants this vision to human beings (the blessed). We do not in any way prove this possibility a priori, nor do we claim that we can grasp this possibility intrinsically; rather, only the fact, known through revelation, that man is raised by God to the vision shows us its possibility. This thesis does not ask whether it is naturally possible.

124. The adversaries of this thesis, then, are those who deny the possibility of an intuitive vision of the divine essence itself. Such was THEODORET, who grants that angels see God's splendor, his glory (δόξα), but not the essence itself, which is distinct from that splendor.

In his work Eranistes, dial. 1: “Orth. We, for our part, using pious thoughts and believing the divine testimonies—which expressly affirm that no one has ever seen God ¹—say that those who saw did not see the divine nature, but certain visions accommodated to their capacity. — Eran. That is what we say. — Orth. So let us understand this also of the angels, when we hear that they always see the face of your Father ². For they do not see the divine substance, which can neither be circumscribed nor comprehended nor grasped by the mind, and which comprehends all things, but a certain splendor accommodated to their nature” (MG 83, 49; R 2150).

Likewise the HESYCHASTS (Palamites), Greek monks devoted to mystical contemplation, distinguish between the divine essence and a certain uncreated light that proceeds from the divine essence and is really distinct from it, yet not separate from it. The divine essence can be seen neither in this life nor in the next; mystics and the blessed, however, see that uncreated light.

JUGIE ³ describes the light as follows: “This divine light is the same as sanctifying grace, the light of glory, and glory itself, or the beatitude of the saints. It is something divine and uncreated, not separate from the divine essence, but really distinct from it. For the divine essence as such is wholly imparticipable, invisible, and incommunicable. Yet by supernatural power this divine light was seen with bodily eyes raised and strengthened: by Stephen, by Saul near Damascus, and by the Apostles on Mount Tabor. For the light in which our Lord appeared transfigured and radiant was the glory, effulgence, and ray of his very divinity; therefore it was something uncreated, although distinct from the divine essence” ⁴.

Church documents

125. BENEDICT XII, the Constitution Benedictus Deus, supra nr. 123; the same author, in the booklet Iam dudum to the Armenians (1341), lists as the eighth error of the Armenians: “The Armenians say that the souls of baptized children and the souls of many perfect men will enter the kingdom of heaven after the general judgment ... Yet they will not see the essence of God, because no creature can see it; instead they will see the brightness of God, which emanates from his essence, just as sunlight emanates from the sun and yet is not the sun ... And they say that in this consists the beatitude of perfect saints and baptized children” (Msi 25, 1196).

COUNCIL OF FLORENCE, Decree for the Greeks (1439): “And their souls ... are at once received into heaven and clearly behold God himself, triune and one, as he is” (Denz 693).

HOLY SCRIPTURE

126. 1 Cor 13, 9 ss. After speaking in cap. 12 about charismatic gifts, the Apostle points out in cap. 13 a more excellent way, namely, charity. From verse 2 he compares it with the gifts of knowledge in this life: prophecy, knowledge, and faith. But all these will one day cease, for they are imperfect kinds of knowledge and will not remain when that which is perfect comes. Charity, however, will remain forever, for it is itself perfect. Hence it is clear that the more excellent way is the way of charity.

The Apostle's thought can be set out in this form: When the perfect comes, the imperfect ceases (v. 10; 11); but our present knowledge is imperfect, whereas future knowledge will be perfect (v. 9; 12); therefore, our present knowledge will one day cease. As to the major premise: v. 10 states a universal principle, which v. 11 illustrates with an example. As to the minor premise: v. 9 had already indicated the imperfection of knowledge as the reason why it will one day cease; v. 12 shows in what the imperfection of present knowledge and the perfection of future knowledge consist, comparing the two kinds of knowledge. This part contains the argument for our thesis. Present knowledge is imperfect, for it is through a mirror: whatever one may think about mirrors in antiquity, St. Paul undoubtedly means knowledge through an instrument, mediated knowledge ⁵; the perfection opposite to it, therefore, is that future knowledge is immediate. Another imperfection of knowledge in the present life consists in its being in a riddle: truth in a riddle does not appear clearly and openly, but is wrapped up in other truths. Knowledge in a riddle is therefore understood as obscure, mediated through other truths, and improper; the opposite perfection will be clear and proper knowledge. The Apostle himself expresses the opposition to “through a mirror, in a riddle” by “face to face,” which means seeing “in such a way that face is turned toward face, immediately, in person” (ZORELL). It is, then, an immediate intuition of a person ⁶. In part: From the described character of present, imperfect knowledge it follows that by this knowledge God is known “partially,” that is, something of God is known: God under this or that aspect, in this or that respect. To this is opposed perfect knowledge, which concerns its object in such a way that the whole object is known and nothing of the object remains unknown. Even as I have been known: just as we have been known immediately by God, so we shall know God immediately. The Apostle always contrasts different modes or kinds of knowing, not different degrees of perfection within the same kind. Therefore, he does not say that our mode of knowing is at the same degree of perfection as God's; he does not affirm that our knowledge of God is comprehensive. The object of the imperfect knowledge of which the Apostle speaks is divine things, above all God himself; hence the object of perfect knowledge is the same. And since it is knowledge “face to face,” “even as I have been known,” it concerns knowledge of a personal being; hence it is knowledge of God himself.

Therefore, the future knowledge of God described by the Apostle in 1 Cor 13 is immediate, facial, clear, and proper knowledge; but this is precisely intuitive vision of God (supra nr. 123); therefore, this vision is possible for man.

127. 1 Io 3, 2: The text seems clear; nevertheless, the force of the argument from this text depends to some extent on how the words “when it appears” are interpreted. If they mean “when what we shall be appears,” then “to him” and “him” are rightly understood of God, and the intended conclusion follows. But if they mean “when Christ appears,” then “to him” and “him” seem to be understood as seeing Christ in glory at the Second Coming. Even so, however, the Apostle hardly seems to be speaking of seeing Christ's bare humanity.

The Roman Catechism understands these words in the former way: “For he (St. JOHN) means that beatitude consists of these two things: that we shall gaze upon God as he is in his nature and substance, and that we shall be made, as it were, gods” (P. 1 c. 13 nr. 7).

The intuitive vision of God possessed by angels is referred to in Mt 18, 10; see also Io 17, 24; Apoc 22, 4; 2 Cor 5, 6 ss.

THE FATHERS

128. ST. IRENAEUS, Adversus haereses, 1. 4 c. 20 nr. 5: “In view of his greatness and wondrous glory, no one will see God and live ⁷; for the Father cannot be grasped. But in view of his love and kindness, and his power over all things, he grants even this to those who love him, namely, to see God, as the prophets also foretold. For what is impossible with men is possible with God ⁸. Man does not see God by himself. But God is seen by men at his will, by whom he wills, when he wills, and as he wills. For God is powerful in all things: he was seen then through the Spirit of prophecy; he was also seen through the Son by adoption; and he will be seen in the kingdom of heaven in the paternal manner, with the Spirit preparing man in the Son of God, the Son bringing him to the Father, and the Father bestowing incorruptibility unto eternal life, which comes to each person from seeing God” (MG 7, 1035; R 236).

ST. CYPRIAN, Epist. 58, 10 (al. 56): “What glory and how great a joy it will be to be admitted to see God ...” (ML 4, 357; R 579).

129. PSEUDO-BASIL (Evagrius Ponticus?), Epist. 8, 7: Neither the Lord considered according to the Incarnation, nor the contemplation that is in angels, is the highest good to be desired. “For even knowledge of these things is crude when compared with that which is face to face. The Father alone, he says, knows, for he himself is both the end and the highest beatitude. For when we no longer know God in mirrors or through things other than himself, but approach him as though alone and one, then we shall also know the ultimate end. For they say that Christ's kingdom is all material knowledge, whereas the Father's is immaterial contemplation of God and, so to speak, of divinity itself. And our Lord himself is also the end and the highest beatitude when considered as the Word” (MG 32, 256; R 913) ⁹.

ST. GREGORY NAZIANZEN, Orat. theol. 2, n. 17, 31 (MG 36, 48. 72; R 988, 989).

130. ST. EPIPHANIUS, Adv. haeres. Panar., haer. 70, c. 7: “For God to be seen, especially by human nature, is impossible, nor is it permitted for the visible to see the invisible. But this invisible God, out of kindness and power, strengthens the weak, enabling them by his power to behold the invisible and infinite God—not insofar as he is infinite, but to the extent that their weak nature can grasp him, once strengthened with such force and power that it can attain knowledge of that mighty one. And there will be no discrepancy in divine Scripture, nor will one statement be found opposed to another” (MG 42, 349; R 1106).

ST. JOHN CHRYSOSTOM, Ad Theodorum lapsum, 1. 1 nr. 11: “Listen to what blessed Peter says: It is good for us to be here ¹⁰. If he, after seeing an obscure image of future things, immediately cast everything else from his mind because of the pleasure infused by such a vision, what will be said when the very truth of things is present, when the royal halls are opened and it will be possible to behold the King himself, no longer in a riddle or through a mirror, but face to face, no longer through faith but through direct sight?” (MG 47, 292; R 1114).

131. ST. AUGUSTINE, De civitate Dei, 1. 22 c. 29 nr. 1: “... Their angels in heaven always see the face of my Father who is in heaven ¹¹. Just as they see, so we too shall see, although we do not yet see in that way. For this reason the Apostle says what I said a little earlier: Now we see through a mirror, in a riddle, but then face to face. This vision is therefore reserved for us as the reward of faith. Speaking of it, the Apostle John also says, when he appears, we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is ¹². The face of God is to be understood as his manifestation, not as some bodily member like the one we have and call by that name” (ML 41, 797; R 1786). At least this much is to be understood of spiritual vision, according to St. Augustine; he then discusses whether, and in what sense, God is also seen by the blessed through bodies. Cf. Retractationes, 1. 1.c. 14 nr. 2 (ML 32, 606; R 1971).

132. ST. GREGORY THE GREAT, Moralia, 1. 2 c. 3 nr. 3 (ML 75, 612; R 2303); 1. 18 nr. 90 ss.: “It must be known, however, that there were some who said that God is indeed seen in his splendor in that region of beatitude, but is not seen in his nature. They were misled by a lack of subtlety in their inquiry. For in that simple and immutable essence, splendor is not one thing and nature another; rather, its very nature is splendor, and its splendor is nature. Since this Wisdom of God would one day show himself to those who love him, he himself promises, saying, whoever loves me ... I will manifest myself to him ¹³, as if to say plainly: you who see me in your (human) nature still have to see me in my (divine) nature. Hence he says again, Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God ¹⁴. Hence Paul says, Now we see through a mirror, in a riddle, but then face to face. Now I know in part, but then I shall know even as I have been known” ¹⁵ (ML 76, 93 ss.).

On the opinions of medieval theologians as to whether the beatific vision of God is without a medium, see DONDAINE¹⁶, L'objet et le “medium” de la vision béatifique chez les théologiens du XIII siècle. Rech. de Théol. anc. et méd. 19 (1952) 60-99; text 100-130. The same author, Hugues de S. Cher et la condamnation de 1241. Revue des sc. phil. et théol. 33 (1949) 170-174. In 1241 the University of Paris condemned the proposition: The divine essence in itself will be seen neither by man nor by angel. (Chartul. Univ. Paris. I nr. 128).

Objections

133. 1. From 1 Cor 13 it seems that perfect and imperfect knowledge differ only in degree; but imperfect knowledge of God is mediated; therefore perfect knowledge is mediated too. Hence it is not intuitive vision.

Proof of the major: According to v. 11, future knowledge relates to present knowledge as the knowledge of a man to that of a child, and according to v. 12 as knowledge in part to knowledge in full; but these are differences of degree; therefore.

I answer. I deny the major; I grant the minor. As to the proof of the major: a) regarding v. 11, I distinguish the major: he directly introduces that comparison to show the difference between the two kinds of knowledge, I deny (supra nr. 126: he introduces it directly to illustrate the universal principle stated earlier); perhaps the difference between the kinds of knowledge is also indicated to some extent in this example; I distinguish further: under some universal notion of the perfect and imperfect, I grant or pass over; by indicating precisely what that perfection and imperfection consists in, I deny. I pass over the minor. I distinguish the conclusion according to the distinction made in the major: one could conclude that the difference is a difference of degree if he introduced the example to show the difference between perfect and imperfect knowledge, and what it consists in, I grant; if he introduces it directly for another end, I deny.

b) Regarding v. 12: I grant the major; I distinguish the minor: it can be a difference of degree, I grant; it must be a difference of degree, I deny. I distinguish the parallel conclusion in the same way: if “in part” and “in full” necessarily expressed a difference of degree, I grant; if not, I deny. It is indeed possible that, within the same mode of knowing, the object is known in part by one act of knowledge and in its entirety by another. Nevertheless, it is also possible that the nature of one mode of knowing necessarily entails that such an object is known and can be known only in part (knowledge partial by its nature), whereas another mode of knowing is by its nature knowledge of the whole object. Hence, from the words “in part” one cannot by themselves infer anything about the nature of the knowledge; one must attend to the kind of knowledge to which they are opposed in context (cf. supra nr. 126).

2. If St. Paul's words are understood strictly, they prove comprehensive knowledge (v. 12: “even as I have been known”); but this is impossible even for the blessed; therefore, the Apostle's words must be restricted.

I answer. I distinguish the major: if the Apostle were speaking directly of different degrees of perfection in the same mode of knowing, I grant or pass over; if he is speaking of a different kind of knowing, I deny (cf. the explanation of the text).

134. 3. The same terms occur in Exod 33 and Num 12 as in 1 Cor 13; but Moses did not see God intuitively; therefore, neither do they signify intuitive vision in St. Paul's passage.

I answer. Those who affirm, with St. Thomas (1 q. 12 a. 11; 2, 2 q. 174; q. 175 a. 3) and others, that Moses¹⁷ and Paul saw God himself intuitively, pass over the major and deny the minor, and the difficulty disappears. Many theologians, however, deny that Moses had an intuitive vision of God (because of Io 1, 18; 1 Tim 6, 16); they concede the minor but deny the major. For Ex 33, 11 says that God spoke with Moses face to face, while v. 20 explicitly denies him the vision of God's face; Num 12, 8 says, “openly and not through riddles and figures he sees the Lord” (from which text some conclude that there was a true vision of God), but it does not say “face to face.” According to those who deny that Moses had a vision, those words contain nothing more “than a comparison between the more exalted intellectual manifestation made to Moses and the more symbolic manifestations made to the other prophets” (FRANZELIN, p. 189, nota 3). Moreover, in these texts one must attend to whether the subject is intellectual vision or sensible apparition, for example in Num 14, 14. Further, “it must be noted that the angel of the Lord (Maleach Iahve), who appeared to Moses and others in the Old Testament, was not God, but an angel who appeared in visible form, performing a divine mission and speaking in God's person: ‘I am the God of your fathers.’ The Jews knew this well (Act 7, 30. 34. 53; Gal 3, 19; Hebr 2). Therefore, when Jacob says, ‘I saw God face to face’ (Gen 32, 30), the context shows that he saw the visible form of the angel with whom he wrestled” (PESCH, nr. 66) ¹⁸.

135. 4. According to Holy Scripture, God is invisible: Rom 1, 20; 1 Tim 1, 17; 6, 16.

I answer. He is invisible to bodily eyes and to the created intellect by nature, I concede; that he is not visible even supernaturally, I deny.

5. Comparing 1 Cor 13 with 2 Cor 5, 7, the subject seems to be Christ; therefore, the passage concerns not intuitive vision of the divine essence, but seeing Christ glorified.

I answer. From what was said in the explanation of the text (nr. 126), the subject is knowing God himself. But if the text were applied to Christ, it would have to be understood of his divinity.

136. 6. The holy Fathers deny the vision of God. For example, ST. CYRIL OF JERUSALEM, Catech. 6, c. 6 (MG 33, 545; R 822); ST. CHRYSOSTOM, De incomprehensibili, hom. 1 n. 6: “But, if you will, leaving Paul and the prophets aside, let us ascend to heaven and see whether there may perhaps be anyone there who knows God's substance. Even if there are any there who know it, they have nothing in common with us, for there is a great difference between angels and men. Yet, so that you may learn all the more that no created power there knows it, let us listen to the angels themselves. What, then? Do they discuss that substance there and question one another about it? Not at all” (MG 48, 707; R 1123).

I answer. Attention must be paid to how they understand “vision.” When they argue against the Eunomians, it often means comprehension of God, which is rightly denied even to the blessed without denying intuitive vision; sometimes they deny only intuitive vision in this life, or bodily vision (cf. VÁZQUEZ, in 1 disp. 37 c. 1 ss.; PETAVIUS, De Deo, 1. 7 cap. 5 et 6; DONDAINE, supra nr. 132).

7. The arguments by which it is contended that intuitive vision of God is impossible cannot yet be explained here; see nr. 197 ss. for these arguments.