De Deo uno

S. TH. 1 q. 13 a. 1-6; 12; PETAVIUS, De Deo, 1. 7 c. 1; FRANZELIN, thes. 12; 13; BILLOT, thes. 17; 18; PESCH, prop. 15; VAN DER MEERSCH, nr. 280-291; 316-324.

After it has been proved that by the natural light of reason we can know God, and indeed only mediately, from creatures, we must now inquire more precisely what this knowledge is like and what it can accomplish.

95. The EUNOMIANS, as was already said supra nr. 79, claimed that they possessed wholly perfect (quidditative), comprehensive knowledge of God.

Concerning Eunomius himself, St. CHRYSOSTOM says, On the Incomprehensible, hom. 3 nr. 2: “A man has dared to say: ‘I know God as God knows himself’” (MG 48, 712; R 1124); and of the same man SOCRATES says, Hist. eccl. 4, 7: “God knows nothing more of his own substance than we do; nor is it better known to him, while more obscure to us. But whatever we know about him, he knows all of it; and conversely, whatever he knows, you will find the same knowledge in us, without any difference” (MG 67, 474). Concerning Aëtius, Eunomius’s teacher, EPIPHANIUS says, Adv. haeres. Panarion, haer. 76 c. 36: “This man, together with his followers, fell into such madness that he said he knew God not by faith but naturally, by knowledge, just as one knows whatever is visible, as if one were to take a stone or a piece of wood in one’s hands. Thus speaks this rash man: ‘I know God as well as I know myself; indeed, I do not know myself as well as I know God’” (MG 42, 634).

96. The extreme contrary position is AGNOSTICISM¹, which, in our subject, may be distinguished well with CHOSSAT into Pure Agnosticism (neither God’s existence nor his nonexistence can be proved; all the more, every knowledge of the divine nature is impossible; the reason is that cognition cannot transcend phenomena) and Dogmatic Agnosticism (the existence of the absolute can indeed be known, but not what it is like; we cannot form true judgments about the divine nature). Such was MAIMONIDES in the twelfth century, in whom much of what is proposed by more recent agnostics is found. Agnosticism is also the Modernists’ theological Symbolism, about which Pius X says in the encyclical “Pascendi”: “For the philosopher it is certain that the representations of the object of faith are merely symbolic; for the believer, likewise, it is certain that the object of faith is God in himself; therefore the theologian concludes that the representations of divine reality are symbolic. Hence theological symbolism … Since these are symbols with respect to their object, but instruments with respect to the believer, they say that the believer must first beware of adhering too strongly to the formulas as formulas, but must use them solely in order to adhere absolutely to the truth which the formula both reveals and veils, and strives to express without ever attaining it” (Denz 2087). “If all intellectual elements, as the Modernists say, are nothing but symbols of God, would not even the very name of God or of the divine personality be a symbol? If so, one could now doubt the divine personality, and the way to pantheism would be open” (Denz 2108).

97. Against these extreme positions this thesis asserts that our natural knowledge of God is indeed imperfect knowledge (against the Eunomians), but is true knowledge (against Agnosticism).

St. THOMAS explains how something can be known, In Boeth. de Trin., q. 1 a. 2 c.: “A thing is known in two ways. In one way, through its proper form, as the eye sees a stone through the species of the stone; in another way, through the form of something else like it, as a cause is known through the likeness of its effect—for example, a man through the form of his image. A thing is known through its own form in two ways. In one way, through a form that is the thing itself, as God always knows his own essence, and an Angel knows himself; in another way, through a form that is other than the thing itself, whether abstracted from it—when, that is, the form is more immaterial than the thing itself, as the form of a stone is abstracted from the stone—or impressed upon the knower by it, as when the thing is simpler than the likeness through which it is known, as Avicenna says that we know intelligences through their impression in us … An effect is of two kinds. One is proportionate to the power of its cause, and through such an effect the power of the cause is known fully and, consequently, its quiddity; the other effect falls short of the aforesaid proportion, and through such an effect the agent’s power cannot be comprehended and, consequently, neither can its essence, but only that it exists can be known of the cause”²

Immediate cognition is cognition through the proper form of the object. Mediate cognition, by contrast, is through an alien form, at least if the object can be known only mediately; but if the object is one that can also be known immediately, it may perhaps be disputed whether its mediate cognition is also had through its proper form.

If cognition is through a proper form, the object’s proper concept is had per se, by which the thing is conceived as it is in itself. In cognition through an alien form, however, a distinction must be made: if it arises from an effect proportionate to the cause’s power (a univocal effect), and if the object can also be known immediately, the concept is proper per se (proper from proper things); but if it arises from an effect not proportionate to the cause’s power (an equivocal effect), and the object can be known only mediately, the concept is not proper per se, nor univocal. Such a concept, insofar as it is solely a concept of this object, may be called proper in opposition to a concept common to several things (proper from common things).

We shall show in three parts: 1) we do not know God through a proper form; 2) but through the form of creatures; 3) we truly know God’s quiddity.

I. We do not know God through a proper form.

98. Cognition through a proper form is either through a form that is the thing itself, or through a form impressed by the thing to be known, or abstracted from that same thing (supra nr. 97). But God’s proper form cannot be abstracted from God, because there cannot be a form more immaterial than God; nor can it be a form created by God and impressed upon the human intellect, because such a finite likeness cannot be the proper form of an infinite being. Therefore, the only proper form of God is his very essence. But cognition of God through his essence is natural to God alone, and is granted to the blessed supernaturally. Therefore, we do not know God naturally through God’s proper form (S. THOM., In Boeth. q. 1 a. 2).

Natural knowledge of God is only mediate (thesis 3); therefore, it is not through a proper form. Hence it is clear that the qualification of this part of the thesis is the same as that of thesis 3: it is theologically certain.

SACRED SCRIPTURE

99. This doctrine is contained in Sacred Scripture insofar as it establishes that our natural knowledge of God is only mediate.

FATHERS

100. The Fathers explicitly deny that we can know God’s very essence; such is especially the case with those who wrote against the Eunomians. Many passages are found in R ser. 109, of which some may be selected.

St. CYRIL OF JERUSALEM, Cat. 6, c. 2: “For we do not speak of God as much as is fitting—for these things are known to him alone—but as much as human nature can grasp and as much as our weakness can bear. For we do not declare what God is, but frankly confess that we lack exact knowledge of him; for in relation to God, it is great knowledge to confess ignorance” (MG 33, 540; R 821).

St. HILARY, De Trinitate, l. 2 nr. 7 (ML 10,56; R 861).

101. St. BASIL, Epist. 234, 1 s.: “God’s operations are various, but his essence is simple. We say that our God is known to us from his operations, but we do not promise to approach his very essence. For his operations come down to us, while his essence remains inaccessible … Know, then, that this is the word of mockers: ‘If you are ignorant of God’s essence, you worship what you do not know.’ I know that he is; but what his essence is, I consider to be beyond understanding. How, then, am I saved? By faith. Faith, moreover, is fully adequate for knowing that God is, though not what he is, and that he rewards those who seek him. Knowledge of the essence, then, consists in perceiving that he cannot be comprehended; and we worship him of whom we have learned, not what his essence is, but that this essence exists” (MG 32, 869; R 923).

102. St. GREGORY NAZIANZEN, Orat. theol. 2, nr. 17: “But what God is by nature and essence, no human being has ever discovered, nor can discover. Whether anyone will ever discover it, let whoever wishes ask and investigate. In my judgment, he will discover it only when this Godlike and divine element—that is, our mind and reason—is joined to its kindred nature, and the image has ascended to that archetype of its own which it now longs for. And it seems to me that this is the foremost principle of philosophy: that one day we shall know only as much as we have been known. But in this mortal life, whatever reaches us is nothing other than a small stream, as it were, or a little ray of a great light” (MG 36, 48; R 988).

St. GREGORY OF NYSSA, Contra Eunomium, l. 12: “The human intellect, carefully investigating by whatever reasonings it can, seeks and reaches toward the inaccessible and exalted nature; it does not see so keenly as to behold the invisible clearly, yet it is not so wholly removed from approach that it can grasp no likeness of what it seeks” (MG 45, 956; R 1048, cf. 1049).

103. St. JOHN CHRYSOSTOM, De incomprehensibili, hom. 1 nr. 3: “For after saying, When I was a child³, he added, ‘Now we see through a mirror, in an enigma.’ For this is shown by the example of our present weakness, and by the fact that knowledge is imperfect; thirdly, it is proved by these words: ‘In an enigma.’ For a child sees, hears, and speaks many things, yet sees, hears, and speaks nothing clearly; and indeed has understanding, but none of it fully. So I too know many things, but do not know their manner. I know that God is everywhere, and likewise that he is wholly everywhere, but I do not know how; I know that he is without beginning, unbegotten, everlasting, but I do not know how. Nor can human reason grasp how there can be a substance that received its being neither from itself nor from anyone else. I know that he begot the Son, but I do not know how; I know that the Spirit is from him, but I do not know how he is from him … nr. 5: Therefore, he knows God in part⁴; he said ‘in part’ not because he knows one thing of God’s substance and is ignorant of another—for God is simple—but because he knows that God exists, while he is ignorant of what he is in substance” (MG 48, 704; 706; R 1121; 1122).

St. CYRIL, Thesaurus de sancta et consubstantiali Trinitate, ass. 31 (MG 75, 452; R 2073; 2074).

104. These passages also show that when the Fathers deny that we know what God is, they are not professing Agnosticism, but, against the Eunomians, denying that we have a quidditative concept of God. They themselves affirm many things about God’s attributes, as will appear below.

THEOLOGIANS

105. On the substance of the doctrine in this part, everyone agrees; there is, however, some difference in the manner of speaking, insofar as the earlier disciples of St. THOMAS said that we can know of God that he is, but not what he is, whereas the disciples of SCOTUS said, on the contrary, that we can also know what he is. The former denied quidditative cognition; the latter affirmed cognition of the quiddity.

If we do not have quidditative knowledge of God, we have all the less comprehensive knowledge. God’s incomprehensibility was defined by the FOURTH LATERAN COUNCIL (Denz 428) and the VATICAN COUNCIL (Denz 1782).

II. God is known through the form of creatures.

106. Since God is not known by us naturally through a proper form, he is known through an alien form, which can only be that of creatures. As effects of God, they have some likeness to their cause; in some way they manifest the cause’s perfection, and so they can also lead to some knowledge of the cause. But since they are equivocal effects, not proportionate to the cause’s power, they manifest the cause’s perfection only imperfectly. Hence the concept of God and of the divine perfections which we form by this way do not represent God and his perfections as they are in themselves, but according to the manner in which the perfections are found in creatures that imitate God.

107. These concepts are formed by a threefold way. The way of causality or affirmation: Whatever pure and simple perfection is found in creatures must be found in God as their cause; therefore, such perfections can be affirmed of God: God is wise, powerful; God is wisdom, power. The way of negation: In creatures, however (God’s equivocal effects), perfections are not found in the manner in which they are in God; consequently, our concepts do not present them in the manner in which they are in God, and hence they can rightly be denied of God. “We deny, however, not perfection insofar as it is perfection, but that imperfection which is mixed into every concept of perfection we form. Thus, first of all, we deny of God whatever objectively contains imperfection; so we say: God is immaterial, immense, infinite. Next, we also deny simple perfections of God insofar as these perfections are limited by our manner of conceiving. Thus, we deny wisdom, life, and substance of God, not because God falls short of the nature of wisdom, but because wisdom as conceived in our manner falls short of God’s nature. For God’s wisdom is wholly identical with all the divine perfections. But we cannot form such a concept. Therefore, wisdom as conceived in our manner is not in God. Properly speaking, then, we deny nothing of God except negations, which is the most emphatic manner of affirmation” (PESCH, nr. 97).

The way of eminence, excellence, or excess: Since God is an infinite being, we further determine the perfection we attribute to God in such a way that it transcends every limit and every created manner of conceiving: God is omniscient, omnipotent.

These three ways do not stand separately nor are they adequately distinct, but each includes the others. When I affirm some perfection of God, I deny its imperfections and deny that it is in God in the manner in which I conceive it; indeed, I attribute this perfection to God in such a way that it surpasses both created perfection and created cognition. St. Thomas says: “According to the teaching of Dionysius (c. 1, myst. Theol. et cap. 2 caelest. Hierarch. et cap. 2 et 3 de div. Nom.), things are said of God in three ways. First, affirmatively, as when we say, ‘God is wise’; this must indeed be said of him because there is in him a likeness of wisdom flowing from him. Yet, because there is not in God wisdom such as we understand and name it, it can be denied, so that we say, ‘God is not wise.’ Again, since wisdom is not denied of God because he falls short of wisdom, but because it is in him in a more eminent way than it can be said or understood, we must say that God is supremely wise” (De potentia, q. 7 a. 5 ad 2).

SACRED SCRIPTURE

108. The way of affirmation is found in Rom. 1 and Sap. 13; in the latter passage, the way of eminence may perhaps also be indicated in some fashion: from beauty, the source of beauty is known.

FATHERS

109. The way of affirmation:

St. BASIL, Adv. Eunomium, l. 1 nr. 14 (supra nr. 83).

St. GREGORY OF NYSSA, Contra Eunomium, l. 12: “Since, as the Apostle says, his eternal power and divinity are perceived and seen through the creation of the world⁵, therefore every creature, and above all, as the text says, the adornment that is in the heavens, through the portion shown in created things, demonstrates the wisdom of the Creator” (MG 45, 985; R 1050).

St. AUGUSTINE, Confessiones, l. 11 c. 4 (supra nr. 70).

PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS, De div. nominibus, c. 7 nr. 3: “… from the order of all things … we ascend, as far as we are able, by a path and order toward knowing that supreme good and the end of all goods, through the denial and transcendence of all things, and through the cause of all” (MG 3, 869; R 2284; supra nr. 84).

St. JOHN DAMASCENE, De fide orthodoxa, l. 1 c. 12: “Accordingly, some divine names are spoken by way of negation, declaring that he surpasses every essence: for example, when he is called beyond essence, timeless, without beginning, invisible—not because he is inferior in any respect or lacks anything (for all things are his, and from him and through him they are, and in him they subsist)⁶, but because he is exalted above all things in an eminent manner. For he is none of the things that exist, but is above all things. There are other names, however, which are expressed by way of affirmation, namely, those said of him as the cause of all things … These are the affirming and denying names. From both, moreover, a most delightful conjunction is formed, such as superessential essence, superdivine deity, a principle higher than every principle, and other similar expressions” (MG 94, 845; R 2347).

110. The way of negation:

CLEMENS ALEXANDRINUS, Stromata, 5, 11, 71, 3 ss.: “If, therefore, after removing everything belonging to bodies and everything called incorporeal, we cast ourselves into the greatness of Christ and from there advance in holiness into his immensity, we shall somehow attain to an understanding of the Almighty—not, however, so as to know what he is, but what he is not. Figure and motion, position and seat, place, right and left are not even to be conceived of the Father of all, although these things are written of him; but what each of them signifies will be shown in its proper place” (MG 9, 109; R 423, cf. 424).

S. EPHRAEM, Carmina nisibena, carm. 3 (R 718).

S. GREGORIUS NYSSENUS, Contra Eunomium, 1, 12: “From the negation of what is not in him and the affirmation of what is piously understood of him (that is, God), what he is is apprehended” (MG 45, 956; R 1048).

S. AUGUSTINUS, De Trinitate, l. 5 c. 1 n. 2: “What, then, we do not find in our better nature, we ought not to seek in him who is far better than our better nature; thus, if we can, let us understand God as far as we can: good without quality, great without quantity, creator without need, presiding without position, containing all things without posture, wholly everywhere without place, everlasting without time, making mutable things without any change in himself, and suffering nothing. Whoever thinks of God in this way, even if he cannot yet discover in every respect what he is, nevertheless piously takes care, as far as he can, not to think of him as something he is not” (ML 42, 912; R 1658).

S. CYRILLUS ALEXANDRINUS, Thesaurus de s. et consubstantiali Trinitate, ass. 31 (MG 75, 452; R 2074).

PS-DIONYSIUS, S. IOANNES DAMASCENUS, in the places cited above (nr. 109); IOANNES DAMASCENUS, also De fide orthodoxa, l. 1 c. 4 (MG 94, 800; R 2340).

111. Way of eminence:

EUSEBIUS CAESAREENSIS, De ecclesiastica theologia, l. 2 c. 14: “We must necessarily acknowledge⁷ one divine reality, ineffable, good, simple, uncompounded, uniform, which is above all things, which is God himself, mind itself, the Word itself, wisdom itself, light itself, life itself, beauty itself, goodness itself, and whatever better than these anyone might conceive, and which is moreover above every mind and beyond every inquiry and thought” (MG 24, 928; R 674).

S. EPHRAEM, Adversus scrutatores, sermo 45 (R 734).

S. GREGORIUS NYSSENUS, Oratio catechetica, 1: “In the supreme nature, whatever is said of it is at once exalted in proportion to the greatness contemplated” (MG 45, 13; R 1028).

S. AMBROSIUS, De fide, ad Gratianum, l. 1 c. 16 nr. 106: God is “incomprehensible to sight, indescribable in speech, immeasurable to sense, to be followed in faith, to be venerated in religion; so that whatever can be thought with greater piety, whatever is more excellent in beauty, whatever is more exalted in power, you may understand to be fitting to God” (ML 16, 552; R 1266).

S. AUGUSTINUS, De Trinitate, l. 8 c. 3 n. 4 (ML 42, 949; R 1671).

PS-DIONYSIUS and S. IOANNES DAMASCENUS in the places cited above (nr. 109).

III. We know not merely extrinsic denominations, but truly, though imperfectly, the quiddity of God.

112. Up to this point we have considered how we arrive at our concepts of God, how we think about God, and what the nature of this knowledge is. We now ask about its value. Our answer is: although it is imperfect, it is nevertheless true knowledge.

That our knowledge of God is imperfect is clear from the first and second parts. But this imperfection is not such that nothing is known that truly and intrinsically belongs to God himself. Thus, although our knowledge proceeds also by way of negation, it is not merely negative—that is, we know of God not only that he is not a stone or something similar. Nor are our concepts merely relative, so that nothing absolute can be predicated of God himself (for example, only that God is the cause of life, while we do not know whether the perfection of living belongs to him absolutely). In general, we know not merely extrinsic denominations, which say nothing absolute that intrinsically belongs to God himself; rather, we truly know also God's absolute attributes, which belong to God positively and formally. In this sense we truly know the quiddity of God—that is, not only what God is not, but also what God truly is. We do not, however, know God's quiddity quidditatively. For quidditative knowledge of an object is that by which a thing is known as it is in itself, according to its own proper mode; therefore it can be had only of objects that can be known immediately, that are known through their own proper form, or of which one has a proper per se concept. It is already clear from the first part of the thesis that our natural knowledge of God is not of this kind.

CHURCH DOCUMENTS

113. THESIS 1a SUBSCRIBED BY BAUTAIN: “Reasoning can prove with certainty ... the infinity of his (God's) perfections” (Denz 1622).

Pius IX, letter Gravissimas inter: “It is the task of philosophy ... to demonstrate, vindicate, and defend the existence, nature, and attributes of God ... by arguments drawn from its own principles” (Denz 1670).

THE VATICAN COUNCIL established the possibility of natural knowledge that gives rise to the obligation to worship God and to tend toward God; therefore God can be known as personal, as principle and end, as Lord.

LEO XIII, encyclical Aeterni Patris: Reason “shows God to be singularly preeminent in the sum of all perfections, above all in infinite wisdom, from which nothing anywhere is hidden, and in supreme justice, which no perverse desire can ever overcome; and hence it shows that God is not only truthful, but truth itself, incapable of being deceived or deceiving.”

PIUS X, encyclical Iucunda sane: “That invincible force of argumentation is rejected by which the cause is inferred from its effects, that is, God and his attributes, bounded by no limits.” Encyclical Pascendi on the “Symbolism” of the Modernists (supra nr. 96). PIUS XII (nr. 41).

SACRED SCRIPTURE

114. 1) It speaks of the natural knowledge of God, from which follows the obligation of religious worship of God: a personal God.

2. Wis 13: the beauty of God; the power of God; Rom 1: eternal power; divinity.

FATHERS

115. ORIGEN, De principiis, l. 1 c. 3 nr. 1: “Although no one can speak worthily about God the Father, nevertheless some understanding can be gained through consideration of visible creatures and from what the human mind naturally perceives” (MG 11, 147; R 455); cf. Contra Celsum, l. 6 c. 62 (MG 11, 1393; R 532).

S. ATHANASIUS, Epistula de synodis, nr. 35 (MG 26, 753; R 786).

S. BASILIUS, Adversus Eunomium, l. 1 nr. 10: “There is indeed no name that can express the whole nature of God by encompassing it; but many and varied names, each with its own particular signification, together provide us with an understanding that is altogether obscure and very slight when compared with the whole, yet sufficient for us. Thus, among the names said of God, some signify what is in God, while others, conversely, indicate what is not in him. From these two—the denial of what is absent and the confession of what is present—a kind of imprint of God is formed in us” (MG 29, 533; R 930).

S. GREGORIUS NYSSENUS, Contra Eunomium, l. 12 (MG 45, 953 ss.; R 1047-1049). S. IOANNES CHRYSOSTOMUS, De Incomprehensibili, hom. 1, nr. 5 (MG 48, 706; R 1122). S. CYRILLUS ALEXANDRINUS, In Ps 11, 3 (MG 69, 792; R 2049). Texts from the second and first parts may also be compared.

116. This part of the thesis seems to be a matter of faith; as regards God's relative attributes, it is explicitly defined at the Vatican Council, and is also explicitly found in sacred Scripture and Tradition; as regards the absolute attributes, it is explicitly found in sacred Scripture and Tradition and seems to be defined at the Vatican Council, at least it is contained in that Council’s definition.

117. From what has been said, we know God through concepts drawn from creatures, which present perfections as they are found in creatures, not as they are in God. Our concepts of God and his perfections are inadequate: they are neither univocal nor merely equivocal (which would be Agnosticism), but analogical (cf. S. TH. 1 q. 13 a. 5; De pot. q. 7 a. 7). If perfections were attributed to God in the same way as they are found in creatures and conceived by us, our knowledge would be false. This is avoided by the threefold way described in the second part, by which our judgments about God are brought into agreement with the objective order, that is, are made true. “Now, the perfections that we conceive through inadequate and analogical ideas truly belong to God, although they are in him in a more perfect mode than we conceive or can conceive. Therefore, when we affirm that these perfections are in God, while at the same time denying that they belong to him in the imperfect mode in which we perceive them, and understanding that they are in God in a far more eminent way, although we do not distinctly grasp how they are in God—that is, while we know that they are, but do not know what they are through proper notions according to their infinite account—our judgment certainly corresponds to its object, even though the ideas we combine in it do not present the object as it is in itself. Thus knowledge is true, but imperfect” (FRANZELIN, De Deo uno, p. 168).

This imperfection of our knowledge is also the reason why we must think of the supremely simple divine being through different concepts. These concepts (of divine omnipotence, uncreated wisdom, infinite mercy, etc.), although they imperfectly present the same supremely simple object, are not identical, nor are the names said of God synonyms. For different concepts present the object through different, deficient likenesses of the divine essence, reflected in creatures as in a mirror (S. TH. 1 q. 13 a. 4; De pot. q. 7 a. 6).

Names signify God “according to the way our intellect knows him. Now, since our intellect knows God from creatures, it knows him in the way creatures represent him. But it was shown above that God possesses beforehand in himself all the perfections of creatures, as one who is simply and universally perfect. Hence each creature represents him and is like him insofar as it has some perfection—not, however, as representing him as something of the same species or genus, but as an eminent principle whose effects fall short of its form, though the effects attain some likeness to it ... Thus the foregoing names signify the divine substance, though imperfectly, just as creatures also represent it imperfectly. Therefore, when it is said that God is good, the meaning is not that God is the cause of goodness, or that God is not evil; rather, the meaning is: what we call goodness in creatures preexists in God, and does so in a higher mode” (S. Th. 1 q. 13 a. 2 c.). Our intellect, “since it knows God from creatures, forms, in order to understand God, concepts proportionate to the perfections proceeding from God into creatures. These perfections preexist in God in a unified and simple way, while in creatures they are received in a divided and manifold way. Thus, just as the diverse perfections of creatures correspond to one simple principle represented variously and manifoldly through the diverse perfections of creatures, so our intellect's various and manifold concepts correspond to one altogether simple reality, imperfectly understood according to such concepts” (S. Th. 1 q. 13 a. 4). It follows that our predication of God must conform to the formal aspect under which we represent the simple divine being by different concepts. Although the divine intellect and divine will are one and the same supremely simple divine perfection, it would nevertheless be false to say: God knows by his will, God loves by his intellect; rather, God knows by his intellect and loves by his will.

118. Our concepts of God are analogical; much is debated in philosophy about this analogy. Our representation falls short of divine reality in that our concepts present perfections according to the mode of creatures, which is essentially potential, whereas divine reality contains them according to the mode of pure act, with every potentiality excluded. We do indeed know that perfections are in God according to the mode of pure act, but we know this very thing not according to the mode of pure act, but of a potential being. From the fact that perfections are verified in God in a different way than they are conceived by us, it follows that we cannot affirm a priori that it is impossible for perfections to be affirmed of God at the same time which, if they were found according to the mode of creatures, could not coexist in the same subject and therefore also seem to us to exclude one another in an infinite being. For this reason, then—that is, because we do not understand how these can be true of God at the same time—such a fact, if it seems otherwise well established, is not yet to be denied, but we must inquire why they seem to us incapable of coexisting in the same subject. If the reason lies precisely in potentiality, which every created perfection implies, it is clear that this reason does not hold in an infinite being and therefore there is no reason to deny these perfections of God. At the same time, however, we understand that our concepts cannot tell us how they can coexist; in this sense, then, there is a difficulty here, which is not objectively in the thing itself, but arises precisely from our mode of conceiving⁸. This “difficulty,” however, is perfectly resolved if it is shown to arise precisely from the nature of our knowledge of God (for example, freedom and immutability). In this sense, therefore, it follows from the very nature of our knowledge that it cannot be proved impossible for mysteries to be found in God.

Objections

119. 1. The Fathers deny that we can know what God is; therefore we do not know his quiddity.

I answer: they deny quidditative and comprehensive knowledge of God, which their opponents asserted, I grant; they deny imperfect knowledge of the quiddity, I deny (cfr. nr. 104).

2. The Fathers teach that “our knowledge is more perfect when we have come to know that God cannot be understood.”

I answer: “This is not said as though complete ignorance were a more perfect knowledge—for what could be imagined more absurd? Rather, the more perfectly we know God, the more perfectly we understand the reason why in this life he can neither be comprehended nor understood as he is in himself. That reason is, of course, God's own infinite perfection in comparison with our finite and imperfect mode of knowing. Accordingly, in the reverse order as well, the more fully and deeply we understand this reason for our relative ignorance, the more truly and deeply we understand God's perfection” (FRANZELIN, p. 160 s.).

S. THOMAS sets out very many objections of the agnostics, De potentia, q. 7.