De Deo uno

S. TH. 1 q. 88 a. 3; FRANZELIN, thes. 7; 10; 11; KLEUTGEN, nr. 125-138; DE SAN, n. 23-26; BILLOT, thes. 2; PESCH, prop. 9; MUNCUNILL, nr. 9-11.

78. The knowledge of God's existence of which we have spoken thus far is such that something else (not God) is first known directly and immediately, and from it one arrives at knowledge of God's existence; God himself as he is in himself, the divine being itself, is not the immediate object of this knowledge. The question now is whether this is the only way of knowing God, or whether, besides mediated knowledge, there is also another, immediate kind by which the existing God is directly perceived immediately in himself.

Mediated and immediate knowledge are understood in this thesis in the strict sense with respect to every created objective medium. In a less proper sense, immediate knowledge can be called a natural, spontaneous, obvious inference, when it is compared with scientific knowledge acquired through investigation (someone who sees smoke “immediately” knows that fire is present); moreover, knowledge without an inference or conclusion properly so called can be called immediate, as distinct from knowledge reached by a proper inference (cf., e.g., above, nr. 60, note 63); finally, in a certain sense one could also call immediate the knowledge drawn from analysis of the subject alone, as opposed to knowledge that is a posteriori (for example, the “ontological” argument for God's existence). But in knowledge of the existence of an object that is immediate in the strict sense, every objective medium is absent, that is, an object which itself must be known in order to arrive at knowledge of the thing; such knowledge cannot be through a form belonging to something else. In this strict sense we deny knowledge of God without any created objective medium, and specifically “naturally, in this life.” The discussion, then, concerns only knowledge that can be attained by purely natural means; what can or does take place supernaturally is not asked in this thesis. Further, it says in this life, that is, during the soul's union with the body, leaving aside what may be true of the separated soul.

79. EUNOMIUS is said by some to have taught immediate perception of God, which others deny; it is beyond doubt, however, that he taught comprehensive knowledge of God¹.

The ONTOLOGISTS certainly asserted an immediate, natural perception of God; see above, nr. 10 ss.

G. C. UBAGHS²: “The idea of God is that intelligible light, always present to our mind, by which it comes about that God can be known by us, even if he is not always known. Many regard this idea as a kind of intellectual form representing God, distinct from God and naturally implanted in our mind; to us, however, this idea seems to be God himself, never absent from our mind, although not always known to us” (nr. 8; cf. nr. 14).

“The existence of a self-existent being can be proved in many ways. First, if the idea of a self-existent being is an immediate idea, a self-existent being must exist just as necessarily as it is necessary that what we see exists, provided that we truly see it. For it can hardly be denied that we have within us a true and clear idea of a self-existent being; moreover, if this idea is immediate, as I maintain it is, the object of this idea—or rather, this idea—is the very self-existent being whose existence we see” (nr. 93; similarly nr. 101 and 107, from the idea of an infinite being; in his Ontologia, ed. 4, Lovanii 1854, nr. 63; nr. 35, 6 and 7; nr. 5).

The Ontologists nevertheless said that this immediate perception of God is wholly different from the beatific vision: it is natural knowledge, which (according to some) is continuously present in the soul as direct knowledge, but becomes reflexive on the occasion of objects presented by the senses; it is obscure knowledge; it is not a vision of the divine essence itself; it is a perception of divine being under the aspect in which it is the exemplar of every being, whereas the blessed see God's inner life; it does not make a person blessed.

ROSMINI taught an immediate perception of God. According to him, indeterminate being, which manifests itself immediately to the intellect in created things, is something divine in itself, belonging to the divine nature, an actuality not distinct from the rest of divine actuality (above, nr. 12)³.

Since the thesis is expressed in universal terms, among the positions opposed to it one may also include the view that the beatific vision itself is natural for a person living in this life. Such was the view of the Beghards and Beguines condemned at the Council of Vienne. We shall discuss them later, when we treat the supernatural character of the beatific vision.

CHURCH DOCUMENTS

80. The propositions of the ONTOLOGISTS cannot safely be taught (above, nr. 11; Denz 1659 ss.); the corresponding propositions of ROSMINI were condemned (above, nr. 12; Denz 1891 ss.). The VATICAN Council, however, did not treat Ontologism in a formal conciliar manner (above, nr. 33).

The decree of the Holy Office against the Ontologists does not seem to address directly every doctrine holding that immediate knowledge of God is naturally possible for a human being. The decree speaks directly of the doctrine that immediate knowledge of God, at least habitual knowledge, is said to be essential to the human intellect, so that without it the intellect can know nothing; the doctrine at issue is therefore that this immediate knowledge of God is essential to the human being and is the principle and foundation of all certain knowledge. Thus someone who affirmed that some immediate knowledge of God is naturally possible for a human being, but denied that it is essential to the human intellect, such that all certain knowledge depends on it, and who denied the Ontologists' doctrine concerning being and universals, would not be proposing the doctrine which, according to this decree of the Holy Office, could not safely be taught. One would have to judge otherwise, however, if it could be proved that the meaning of this decree is: because all immediate knowledge of God is naturally impossible for a human being, this particular doctrine of the Ontologists cannot safely be taught. But this does not appear from the words of the decree.

The doctrine of the BEGHARDS and BEGUINES condemned at the Council of VIENNE (Denz 475) cannot be reconciled with the doctrine of immediate perception of God. What is directly condemned there is the claim that the beatific vision of God is natural, whereas the Ontologists wish to establish a perception of God that is immediate yet different from the beatific vision. But the immediate intellectual perception of an infinitely simple being is necessarily perception of his whole essence; it is impossible to perceive something of God immediately—for example, this or that attribute—without seeing the whole God immediately. Indeed, not even between the divine essence and the persons is there any distinction on the part of the thing itself: the divine essence is the Father, is the Son, is the Holy Spirit, so that whoever sees the essence immediately cannot fail to see the persons. Thus the distinction the Ontologists claim for immediate perception of God is impossible. Therefore anyone who says that some immediate perception of God is natural for a human being must consequently say that the beatific vision is natural for a human being. The Ontologists' doctrine is consequently opposed to the teaching of the Council of Vienne. Hence a doctrine asserting that immediate perception of God is natural for a human being, whether in the manner proposed by the Ontologists or in another manner, cannot indeed be called heretical by the definition of the Council of Vienne, but must be called erroneous; and the opposite doctrine is theologically certain.

HOLY SCRIPTURE

81. Holy Scripture says nothing about any natural, immediate perception of God; when it speaks of our natural knowledge of God, it always indicates mediated knowledge (Wis 13; Rom 1): from creatures to God, not from God to creatures. Through this mediated knowledge, “the invisible things of God” are perceived by the intellect. It presents as immediate, however, the knowledge of God that the blessed will have in heaven, and sets it against even the supernatural knowledge of this life (1 Cor 13; more on this text at nr. 126).

FATHERS

82. According to the holy Fathers, we do not naturally see God by intellectual vision; rather, we are led from sensible things to knowledge of God.

St. IRENAEUS (above, nr. 53) says that angels know God naturally only from his works, from his providence; likewise, human beings came to know God from the created world.

St. ATHANASIUS, Oratio contra gentes 35: “For God, who is good and gracious, cares for the souls he created. Since his nature cannot be seen or comprehended and surpasses every created substance, it was to be expected that the human race would not attain knowledge of him, since man was made from nothing, while God is without any beginning. For this reason he so aptly ordered created nature by his Word that, since he cannot be seen by his own nature, he might at least be known by human beings from his works. For often the artist is known from his works, even when he is not seen; and, as they say of the sculptor Phidias, his works presented him, though absent, to those who looked at them, through the mutual proportion and arrangement of their parts. So too, from the structure of the world one must understand God, its maker and creator, even though he is not seen by bodily eyes. For God has not misused his invisible nature (let no one allege this), nor has he left himself wholly unknown to human beings. Rather, as I was saying, he so ordered created nature that, although he cannot be seen by his own nature, he may nevertheless be known from his works”; in support of this teaching he appeals to Rom 1, 20; Acts 14, 14–16 (MG 25, 69; R 747).

83. St. BASIL, Adversus Eunomium, 1. 1. n. 14: “I believe that comprehension of him exceeds not only human beings but every rational nature. By ‘rational’ I mean created. For the Father is known only to the Son and to the Holy Spirit... For... it is established that the essence itself can be conceived by none but the Only-begotten and the Holy Spirit; but, being raised up by God's works and understanding the Creator through the things that have been made, we thus perceive his goodness and wisdom. For what is known of God, God has made manifest to all human beings”⁴ (MG 29, 543; R 931). Epistula 234 (ad Amphilochium) nr. 1: “We say that our God is known by us from his works, but we do not promise that we shall reach his very essence. For his works descend to us, while his essence remains inaccessible” (MG 32, 870; R 923); cf. epist. 235, 1 (MG 32, 871; R 924; above, nr. 54).

St. GREGORY NAZIANZEN, Oratio theologica 2, 12: “For us, who are held fast by earthly bonds, to use Jeremiah's words,⁵ and are covered by this gross flesh, it is clear that it is as impossible to be joined to things understood by mind and reason without the aid of bodily and sensible things as it is impossible for anyone, however quickly he walks, to pass beyond his own shadow (for as far as you overtake it, it always remains just as far ahead); or for the eye to join itself to visible things without the intervening light and air; or for fish to swim outside the water” (MG 41, 42; R 986).

St. CHRYSOSTOM, In act. apost. hom. 2 nr. 4: “See what Paul says: ‘His invisible things are clearly seen, being understood from the things that have been made, from the creation of the world’⁶. Surely the devil says that both are made of matter, so that we may know God from nothing at all”; similarly nr. 5 (MG 60, 31 s.). De incomprehensibili hom. 3 n. 1: “Let us therefore call him the ineffable, unintelligible, invisible, incomprehensible God, surpassing the power of human speech, exceeding the comprehension of mortal minds, untraceable by angels, invisible to the Seraphim, unintelligible to the Cherubim, unseen by the Principalities, Powers, and Virtues, and, in short, by every creature; known, however, only to the Son and the Holy Spirit” (MG 48, 720; R 1125); similarly hom. 4, 3 (MG 48, 730; R 1128); in In Ioan. hom. 15, 1 (MG 59, 98; R 1161) he says that God is invisible to creatures.

84. St. JEROME, Com. in epist. ad Galatas, on ch. 3 v. 2: “Someone might ask: if faith comes only from hearing, how can those born deaf become Christians? One can indeed understand God the Father from the greatness and beauty of creatures, and the creator is consequently recognized from the things he has made. But Christ's birth, cross, death, and resurrection cannot be known except by hearing” (ML 26, 349).

PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS, De divinis nominibus, c. 7 nr. 3: “Moreover, we must ask how we know God, who is perceived neither by sense nor by intellect, and is not at all among the things that exist. Or is it not truer to say that we know God not from his nature (for what his nature is remains unknown and surpasses every account and mind), but from the order of things, as though from an arrangement made by him, which contains in itself certain images and likenesses of his divine exemplars? In order to know that highest good and end of all goods, we ascend according to our ability, by way and order, through negation and transcendence of all things, to the cause of all” (MG 3, 870 s.; R. 2284).

GREGORY THE GREAT, Moralia, 1. 27 cap. 5 (al. 3), on Job 36, 25 (“All people see him; each one beholds him from afar”): “Every human being, by the very fact of being created rational, ought to infer by reason that the one who created him is God. To see him in this way is, surely, to discern by reasoning that he holds dominion⁷. Since it has been said, ‘All people see him,’ it is rightly added, ‘Each one beholds him from afar.’ For to behold him from afar is not yet to see him in his form, but still to estimate him solely from admiration of his works. Here even the elect behold him from afar, because they do not yet grasp his glory through the keenness of inward vision. Although they are close to him through love, they are still separated from him by the burden of their earthly dwelling; and, though they cling to him by living well, they sigh at being far from the vision of his presence... But when it is said, ‘Remember that you do not know his work,’ and then added, ‘All people see him,’ to see him, as we have said, is to infer by reason his essence, which transcends all things. It is a matter of great wonder that we both perceive him and do not know his work... We see by reason that he exists, though we do not comprehend his judgments; yet we still behold him from afar, because the cloud of our weakness separates us from his strength” (ML 76, 403).

85. But the Fathers seem to have taught an immediate perception of God⁸; for 1. they teach that the idea of God is innate in human beings. Yet it is by no means certain, and indeed in many cases improbable, that they understood “innate idea” in the strict sense. Rather, they describe the ease—and hence the universality—of this knowledge in a person who truly possesses human nature and a developed human intellect⁹. Further, even if one supposed that these Fathers taught an innate idea in the strict sense, it would still not follow that knowledge of the existing God is immediate.

St. JUSTIN, Apologia 2 nr. 6: “Father, God, Creator, Lord, Master are not names, but appellations drawn from his benefits and works... The appellation ‘God’ is not a name, but an inborn natural opinion among human beings of a thing that cannot be described” (MG 6, 453; R 130).

TERTULLIAN, De testimonio animae 5: “These testimonies of the soul are as true as they are simple; as simple as they are common; as common as they are shared by all; as universally shared as they are natural; as natural as they are divine... But whoever did not think that such outbursts of the soul were a doctrine silently entrusted to nature and to a congenital and inborn consciousness, will rather say that the use of speaking in this way has been strengthened as a kind of habit, indeed a fault, by opinions dispersed among the people and made public through literary works” (ML 1, 616)¹⁰.

86. 2. The Fathers posit a spontaneous, obvious, common knowledge of God, which seems immediate. But this may indeed be called immediate in a broad and improper sense, not in the proper sense.

87. 3. Specifically concerning St. AUGUSTINE¹¹ It is asserted that he taught immediate knowledge of God, common to all human beings and natural to them. For according to him intellectual knowledge is knowledge in eternal, immutable truth, which is God himself, the sun of truth who enlightens us, in whose light we see truth. The Ontologists invoke St. Augustine's authority in support of their doctrine.

Conf. 1. 12 nr. 35: “If we both see that what you say is true, and both see that what I say is true, where, I ask, do we see this? Certainly not in you, nor in me, but both in the immutable Truth itself, which is above our minds,” which he later calls the very light of the Lord our God (ML 32, 840). De vera religione, nr. 56 s.: “Now, when the square forum, the square stone, the tablet, and the square gem are judged according to the whole rule of squareness, and again the movements of the feet of a running ant and of an elephant walking by the same rule are judged to correspond to one another according to the whole rule of equality, who would doubt that this rule is neither greater nor smaller according to distances of place and time, since its power surpasses all things? Since this rule of all the arts is wholly immutable, while the human mind, which has been granted the ability to see such a rule, can undergo the mutability of error, it is clear enough that above our mind there is a rule called truth. Nor should we doubt that the immutable nature above the rational soul is God, and that the first life and first essence are there, where the first wisdom is. For this is that immutable truth rightly called the rule of all the arts and the art of the almighty Artificer. Thus, when the soul perceives that it does not judge the appearance and movement of bodies by itself, it must at the same time recognize that its own nature is superior to the nature it judges, while a nature by which it judges—and which it cannot itself judge in any way—is superior to it. I can explain why the limbs of every body must correspond to one another in likeness on both sides: I delight in the highest equality, which I contemplate not with the eyes of the body but with the mind. Therefore I judge the things I see with my eyes to be better insofar as, according to their nature, they are closer to those I understand with my mind. But no one can say why those things are so, and no one would soberly say that they ought not to be so, as though they could be otherwise” (ML 34, 147)¹².

88. Such statements and similar ones, considered in themselves alone, might perhaps be understood as referring to an immediate perception of God; but not within St. Augustine's own doctrine. The immediate knowledge of God known to St. Augustine is in no way natural to human beings or common to all, nor is it the beginning and foundation of intellectual knowledge. In this life it is granted only to a few perfected persons and belongs to the blessed life: it is the beatific vision itself. The natural knowledge of human beings, however, proceeds not from God to creatures but from creatures to God. For St. Augustine, “seeing” God does not always mean immediate knowledge, but also mediated knowledge through creatures.

Epistula 147 (ad Paulinam) De videndo Deo, nr. 3: “Since, then, we do not now see God either with the eyes of the body, as we see heavenly or earthly bodies, or with the mind's gaze, as we see those things I have mentioned, some of which you most certainly perceive within yourself (that is, yourself living, willing, seeking, knowing, and not knowing), why do we believe that he is seen, unless because we put our faith in Scripture, where it is written: ‘Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God’?”; similarly nr. 12. Cap. 13 nr. 31: “Then one may ask how the very substance of God could have been seen by certain people who were in this life, because it was said to Moses: ‘No one can see my face and live’¹³, unless the human mind can be snatched by divine power from this life into the angelic life before it is released from the flesh through the common death of this life. For this is how the one who heard there unspeakable words, which it is not lawful for a human being to speak, was snatched away. There was such a withdrawal of attention from the senses of this life that he said he did not know whether he was in the body or outside the body—that is, whether, as often happens in a more intense ecstasy, his mind had been removed from this life into that life while the body's bond remained, or whether he had been wholly released, as happens in full death¹⁴. Thus what was said is also true: ‘No one can see my face and live’; for the mind must be withdrawn from this life when it is taken up into the unspeakable vision of that life. Nor is it incredible that this excellence of revelation was granted to certain saints who had not yet died in such a way that their bodies remained to be buried” (ML 33, 610); cf. epist. 92 (ML 33, 318 ss.).

Sermo 141 (above, nr. 57): The philosophers of this world saw God, the stable truth in which are all the reasons of created things, but they saw him from afar; “they too saw the creator through the creature, as far as a human being can see.” De Genesi ad litteram 1. 4 n. 49: “The human mind first experiences through bodily senses the things that have been made and apprehends knowledge of them according to the measure of human weakness; then it seeks their causes, to see whether in some way it can reach those causes which abide principally and immutably in the Word of God, and thus perceive his invisible things, understood from the things that have been made¹⁵. Who does not know how slowly and with what difficulty it does this, and how much time it takes because of the corruptible body that weighs down the soul,¹⁶ even when the soul is seized by the most ardent zeal to do this eagerly and perseveringly?” (ML 34, 316 s.).

89. There is much disagreement about how St. Augustine's doctrine of “illumination” should be explained positively. Some think that the light is nothing different from the soul itself; others say that it is distinct from the soul but created; still others say that it is uncreated light. Just as the sun makes bodies visible to us by its light, so that we see bodies illuminated in the sunlight without seeing the sun itself immediately, God is the sun of our intellect, radiating a light by which eternal, immutable truths are made “visible” to our intellect. Thus, in the light of eternal truth, we know such truths without gazing upon the sun itself, God himself¹⁷.

THEOLOGIANS

90. Among the scholastics, many embraced St. Augustine's doctrine of illumination for the “higher reason,” while maintaining the doctrine of abstraction for the “lower reason”¹⁸. The doctrine of knowledge in the eternal reasons, in the uncreated light, is proper or distinctive to “Augustinianism” (especially in the Franciscan school: Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure), as distinct from “Aristotelianism,” which posits the theory of abstraction universally¹⁹.

In the Disputed Questions on the Knowledge of Christ, q. 4²⁰, St. Bonaventure sets out three interpretations of knowledge in the light of the eternal reasons. The first mode is “to understand that the evidence of the eternal light concurs in certain knowledge as the whole and sole reason for knowing.” This mode must not be admitted, because according to it the knowledge of the wayfarer would not differ from the knowledge of the blessed. The second mode is “to understand that the eternal reason necessarily concurs in certain knowledge by its influence, so that in knowing, the knower does not attain the eternal reason itself, but only its influence.” This explanation is not sufficient according to St. Augustine's words. “And so there is a third mode of understanding, as it were holding the middle between the two ways: namely, that the eternal reason is necessarily required for certain knowledge as a regulating and moving reason, not alone and in its full clarity, but together with a created reason, and as contemplated by us in part, according to the state of the wayfarer.”

“Since, then, certain knowledge belongs to a rational spirit insofar as it is the image of God, it therefore attains the eternal reasons in this knowledge. But because, in the state of the wayfarer, it is not yet fully conformed to God, it does not attain them clearly, fully, and distinctly; rather, the more or less it approaches conformity to God, the more or less it attains them, yet always in some way, because the character of an image can never be separated from it. Thus, because in the state of innocence it was an image without the deformity of sin, though it did not yet possess the full conformity to God of glory, it attained them in part, but not in an enigma. In the state of fallen nature, however, it lacks conformity to God and bears deformity; therefore it attains them in part and in an enigma. In the state of glory, it lacks all deformity and possesses full conformity to God; therefore it attains them fully and clearly. Again, because the soul is not wholly an image of God by itself, it attains along with these reasons the likenesses of things abstracted from the phantasm, as proper and distinct reasons for knowing. Without these, the light of the eternal reason is not sufficient for it to know while it remains in the state of the wayfarer—unless perhaps it were to transcend this state through a special revelation, as in those who are carried away and in certain prophetic revelations.

Therefore, as reason shows and Augustine's authorities expressly assert, we must concede that in every instance of certain knowledge the knower attains those reasons for knowing, although the wayfarer and the one who comprehends, the one who knows and the wise person, the prophet and the person who understands commonly attain them in different ways.”

To objection 15—“A proper reason for knowing corresponds to each knowable thing, so that certain knowledge of it may be had; but no intellect of a wayfarer distinctly perceives those reasons for knowing; therefore nothing can properly and determinately be known in them”—he replies: “Because we do not see the reasons in themselves with complete distinctness, they are not the whole reason for knowing. Along with them, therefore, the created light of principles and the likenesses of the things known are required; from these one has a proper reason for knowing with respect to each thing known.”

To objection 16—“If whatever is known with certainty is known in the eternal reason, and that by which each thing is known is itself better known, then the eternal reasons are better known to us; this is plainly false, since they are most hidden from us”—he replies: “As is already clear, the eternal reason does not move us to know alone, but together with the truth of principles; in the state of the wayfarer it does not do so in a particular way with respect to itself, but in a general way. Hence it does not follow that it is known to us in itself, but rather as it shines forth in its principles and in its generality. In this way it is, in a certain respect, most certain to us, because our intellect cannot in any way conceive that it does not exist; this cannot be said of any created truth.”

In his reply to objection 19, he says: “For intellects of those who know attain such reasons as guiding, but the intellects of the wise attain them as leading back and bringing to rest. And because few attain them in this way, there are few wise people, although many know. Few indeed know that they attain those reasons; indeed, what is more, few are willing to believe this, because it seems difficult to an intellect not yet raised up to contemplate eternal things that it should have God so present and near, although Paul says in Acts 17 that he is not far from each one of us.”

91. Just as St. Augustine's doctrine has been explained in different ways, so too St. Bonaventure's doctrine has different interpretations. LUYCKX summarizes it roughly as follows:

What is the ground of certainty in our knowledge of truth? Creatures cannot provide absolute certainty; therefore it comes from God's immediate illumination. Few inquire into this ground: simple people do not think about it, the learned rely on the certainty of first principles, but the wise understand that even these are not sufficient, since they too are created. By “resolving fully,” the wise person clearly understands that his absolute certainty of truth has its immediate ground in a special, immediate illumination from God himself. The wise person is astonished at the blindness of people who fail to notice what they see first, without which they can know nothing. The wise person first sees God, the first cause of truth; he sees how we know with absolute certainty through God's illumination. The eternal reasons are not the natural object of our knowledge in this life; rather, they are the medium by which we obtain absolute certainty of truth.

According to others (ROSENMÖLLER, SCHWENDINGER), however, in every certain act of knowledge a person intuits eternal truth as an object; the eternal ideas in certain knowledge are indeed a direct object (that is, not reached by way of a conclusion), but a secondary object, known only implicitly and without awareness.

However one explains St. Bonaventure's doctrine, it is certain that he does not teach immediate knowledge of God. In 2 dict. 23 art. 2 q. 3, on the question “whether Adam in the state of innocence knew God by the kind of knowledge by which we expect to know God in the state of glory,” he replies that Adam's knowledge of God lay between the knowledge belonging to the state of misery and the knowledge that will belong to the state of glory. “Only in the state of glory will God be seen immediately and in his substance, so that there will be no obscurity. In the state of innocence and in fallen nature, however, God is seen through a mirror, but differently: in the state of innocence God was seen through a clear mirror, for there was no cloud of sin in the soul. In the state of misery, however, he is seen through a mirror darkened by the sin of the first man; and therefore now he is seen through a mirror and in an enigma.” Opp. omnia 2, 544 s.

92. It is clear that the “Aristotelian” scholastic theologians do not teach immediate perception of God. According to St. THOMAS, natural knowledge of God is mediated and comes from creatures alone: in 1 d. 3 q. 1 a. 1–4; De veritate, q. 18 a. 2. The immediate vision of God is not natural to a human being: De veritate, q. 13 a. 3; Contra gent., 1. 3 c. 47; 52; Summa Theol., 1 q. 12 a. 4; 11. Immediate knowledge of God is the same as vision: in 4 d. 49, q. 2 a. 1; Contra gent. 1. 3 c. 53. In In Boethium de Trinitate, q. 1 a. 3, he explicitly denies that God is the first thing known by the mind:

“Some have said that the first thing known by the human mind, even in this life, is God himself, who is the first truth, and that through him all other things are known. But this is plainly false, because to know God through his essence is the happiness of a human being; it would follow, then, that every human being is blessed. Moreover, since in the divine essence all the things said of it are one, no one would err concerning what is said of God; experience shows this to be false. Again, the things that are first in the intellect's knowledge must be most certain; hence the intellect is certain that it understands them, which is plainly not the case here. This position also conflicts with the authority of Scripture, Exod 33, 20: ‘No man shall see me and live.’”

He then rejects another opinion: “that the divine essence is not the first thing known by us in this life, but rather the influence of its light; on this account, God is the first thing known by us. But this too cannot stand.” For how St. Thomas understands knowledge “in the eternal reasons,” see 1 q. 84 a. 5; Contra Gent. 1. 3 c. 47.

93. St. Thomas's words contain the arguments theologians usually bring against immediate perception of God: knowledge of God would be the most certain knowledge; error concerning God would be impossible; everyone would be blessed.

How Ontologism prepares the way for Rationalism, Pantheism, and Eclecticism is explained in the “Postulatum” presented at the Vatican Council (above, nr. 33).

Objections

94. It seems possible to show from the beatific vision itself that an immediate perception of God, distinct from and inferior to the beatific vision (that is, obscure and not necessarily a vision of the whole God), is possible. For in the beatific vision not everything that God eminently or virtually includes in his perfection is known, and there are different degrees of clarity²¹; therefore the argument from the Council of Vienne (nr. 80) seems ineffective.

I answer: every blessed person sees God wholly, and there is nothing of God that he does not see. The degrees, however, are within the clear vision of God; obscure knowledge is not a lower degree of clear knowledge.

We have already discussed what is commonly objected to the thesis from the doctrine of the Fathers and theologians; the objections drawn from reason (that the first thing known is the first ontological principle, that knowledge of the finite does not lead to knowledge of the infinite, and the like) have been discussed in philosophy.