De Deo uno

PETRUS LOMBARDUS, l. 1 d. 3; S. TH., 1 q. 2 a. 1-3; FRANZELIN, thes. 2 et 6; KLEUTGEN, nr. 139-179; DE SAN, nr. 30 s.; BILLOT, thes. 3 et 4; PESCH, prop. 5 et 6; MUNCUNILL, nr. 34-57; VAN DER MEERSCH, nr. 53-97; CHOSSAT, Dict. de Théol. 4, 923-948; I. DE VRIES, Vom Sinn und logischen Aufbau der Gottesbeweise. Scholastik 15 (1941) 481-507.

60. The preceding thesis stated that God's existence can be known with certainty; the present thesis further affirms that it can be proved or demonstrated. The proposition does not hold universally: whatever can be known with certainty cannot for that reason always be demonstrated or proved. For example, what is immediately evident, and what must be used as principles of argument in the very act of arguing, can indeed be known with certainty, but cannot properly be proved. When, however, the question concerns existential, mediate, certain knowledge—that is, when, from an existing object that is known, the existence of another thing is known with certainty, or when the existence of an object is known with certainty from its relation to another known thing—what can be known with certainty in this way also seems capable of demonstration. For knowledge of this kind necessarily involves an inference¹, and if it is true and certain knowledge, the inference itself must be knowable as legitimate: this is what constitutes a demonstration or proof². The present thesis, then, follows from the preceding thesis and affirms that it can be shown that the inference is legitimate by which, according to the preceding thesis, God's existence can be known with certainty from created things.

61. The opponents of this thesis are

1. the same people who deny the preceding proposition;

2. the Ontologists, insofar as in their doctrine an immediate perception of God—as the light of the intellect and the foundation of all certain and universal knowledge—is presupposed by every argument (God is the first thing known);

3. among those who follow the system of innate ideas³, some denied that God can be demonstrated; for example, according to KUHN⁴, philosophical argument alone can lead to knowledge of some pantheistic absolute being, but not to knowledge of an absolute being who is the personal God, toward whom human beings can fulfill religious duties. For this, the idea of God is required, in which God is reflected as in a mirror.

62. 4) The same idea—that philosophical demonstration alone does not lead to a personal God—appears among several recent thinkers who recoil from “intellectualism” and say that affective factors should be given greater weight in the knowledge of God. For a person does not become religious through arguments; the person does not consist of the intellect alone, but the reasons of the “heart” deserve greater attention; it is not the intellect alone but the whole person who knows. Just as religion must be distinguished from metaphysics, so religious knowledge must be distinguished from rational knowledge. The personal God is the object of religious knowledge⁵. It is readily apparent that such views also oppose the thesis insofar as and to the extent that this irrational element is introduced into the knowledge of God.

CHURCH DOCUMENTS

63. In ecclesiastical documents, both before (BAUTAIN, Denz 1622; 1627; above, nr. 8; GREGORY XVI, Denz 1620; PIUS IX, Denz 1670; BONNETTY, Denz 1650; above, nr. 9; condemnation of the Louvain propositions, above, nos. 13 s.) and after the Vatican Council (LEO XIII, above, nr. 36; PIUS X, nr. 37 ss.; PIUS XI, nr. 40; PIUS XII, nr. 41), the demonstrability of God's existence is explicitly taught. In particular, arguments used by the Scholastics are defended, among them especially the argument from causality: PIUS X in the Oath against Modernism, and PIUS XI in the encyclical “Studiorum ducem.”

64. The VATICAN Council, as was already stated in nr. 25, refrained from an explicit definition of the demonstrability of God's existence. An amendment proposed in this sense was rejected. The reason why the Council acted in this way is not given. Some suspect that the Council did not wish directly to condemn the view of those who said that, without the “idea of God,” reason alone cannot know the personal God with certainty, and who denied that there are arguments possessing the full force needed to demonstrate God's existence⁶. Yet it seems simpler to explain this from the Council's intention to define a fundamental principle directly excluding crude Traditionalism; and that principle states precisely that God can be known with certainty by the light of reason.

Nothing, however, can be inferred in favor of the contrary view from the fact that the Council did not wish to define the demonstrability of God's existence. For the Council's proposed teaching also addressed “the widely spreading error that God's existence cannot be proved by any firm arguments and therefore cannot be known with certainty by reason” (above, nr. 17). Establishing a foundation for faith—the certainty of God's existence—seemed of the highest importance for our times, since the opinion had gained ground “that God's existence cannot be proved with complete certainty by certain arguments, and that the arguments which have always been held in such high esteem are not of a kind that can establish the matter” (above, nr. 22). The Council's definition is for the arguments (above, nr. 25); knowing with certainty and demonstrating are, in a certain respect, one and the same (above, nr. 25). From this it is clear that “know with certainty,” as the Council Fathers understand it in the definition, does not abstract from “demonstrability” in the sense that the question of demonstrability is untouched by the definition. Rather, the Fathers understand by it a certain knowledge with which demonstrability is intimately connected. Accordingly, Pope PIUS XI rightly said in the encyclical “Studiorum ducem” that PIUS X had admirably interpreted the dogma solemnly proclaimed at the Vatican Council with the words of the Oath against Modernism (“can also be known with certainty and therefore demonstrated”; above, nr. 40).

65. A PRELIMINARY NOTE on the argument from Sacred Scripture and the Fathers:

It is right to invoke as a supporter of the view affirming the demonstrability of God's existence 1) anyone who intends explicitly to show that the inference from created things to God's existence is truly legitimate; this is self-evident;

2. anyone who directly and in fact proposes the arguments themselves. For although he may not intend explicitly to vindicate the legitimacy of the inference, by proposing his arguments he nevertheless affirms it;

3. anyone who does not explicitly propose the arguments themselves as such, but only indicates the reasoning by which God's existence is known with certainty from created things. For in this way he seems at least implicitly to affirm that the inference from the reasoning he has indicated is legitimate and can be known as such.

SACRED SCRIPTURE

66. We should not expect Sacred Scripture first to propose the demonstrability itself; whether it proposes the arguments themselves—the second point—is perhaps open to dispute, since St. Paul (Acts 14; 17) seems to propose an argument, although not everyone admits this⁷. But the third point is certainly found in Sacred Scripture: Wisdom 13:1, the maker from the works, that is, cause from effect; vv. 3–5, from the world's beauty and power, its author, more beautiful and powerful, that is, cause from effect (perhaps v. 1 also indicates the argument from contingency). Similarly, Rom 1, 20: through the things that have been made, the eternal power and divinity, that is, cause from effect. Acts 14 and 17: providence.

Therefore, the teaching on the demonstrability of God's existence is found at least implicitly in Sacred Scripture.

THE FATHERS

The Fathers propose not only the reasoning by which certain knowledge is attained, but the arguments themselves as well; indeed, they may even be discussing demonstrability itself⁸

67. The principal arguments by which the APOLOGISTS already show that God exists are causality and finality.

ARISTIDES, Apology 1: “Observing that the world and all that is in it are necessarily in motion, I understood that the one by whom it is moved and preserved is God. For whatever moves is stronger than that which is moved; and whatever preserves is stronger than that which is preserved. Therefore I say that he is God, who created all things and preserves them” (MG 96, 1108; R 110).

THEOPHILUS, To Autolycus, bk. 1, nr. 4 ss.: “God made all things, when previously they did not exist, so that his majesty might be known and understood from his works. For just as the soul in a human being is not seen, but, though it escapes human sight, is understood from the body's motion, so God cannot be seen by human eyes, but is seen and understood from his providence and works. For example, when someone sees a ship fitted out at sea, under way, and making for the shore, he will no doubt judge that there is a helmsman on board by whom it is steered. So God must be understood as the governor of all things, though he is not seen with the eyes of the flesh, since he cannot be grasped.… Moreover, an earthly king is believed to exist, although he is not seen by everyone; he is known through his laws, decrees, powers, resources, and images. Will you not understand God from his works and powers?” (MG 6, 1030 s.).

68. MINUCIUS FELIX, Octavius 18: “If, on entering some house, you had seen everything cultivated, arranged, and adorned, you would surely believe that a master presided over it, and that he was far better than those good things. So, in this house of the world, when you perceive heaven and earth, providence, order, and law, believe that there is a lord and parent of the universe more beautiful than the stars themselves and all the parts of the world” (ML 3, 288; R 269).

LACTANTIUS, Divine Institutes, bk. 1, ch. 2, nr. 5: “No one is so uncultivated or so savage in character that, raising his eyes to heaven, even if he does not know whose providence governs all that he sees, he fails to understand from the very greatness, motion, arrangement, stability, usefulness, beauty, and balance of things that some providence exists, and that what stands together by a marvelous ordering could not have been brought about without some greater design” (ML 6, 121; R 624).

69. ST. GREGORY NAZIANZEN, see above, nr. 55.

ST. GREGORY OF NYSSA, On the Soul and the Resurrection: “Someone sees a garment and is led by reasoning to recognize the weaver; from a ship he understands its builder; likewise, as soon as a building has been seen, the hand of its maker comes before the mind of those who look at it. But these people, while looking at the world, are blind and deluded about the one who is disclosed through it.” When Gregory asked, “About this very point, indeed… how can our adversaries avoid doubt and uncertainty that all things are from God and that all things are held together and preserved by him, or whether there is any divine power at all presiding over the nature of things above?” Macrina replied:⁹ “It would be more fitting and proper, she said, to keep silent about such matters and not deign to answer foolish and impious propositions alike. For even a certain divine saying (Prov 26, 4: ‘Do not answer a fool according to his folly, lest you become like him’) forbids answering a madman according to his madness. But, as the Prophet says (Sap 13, 1), the one who denies that God exists is altogether foolish and senseless. Since, however, we must speak about these things too, I shall tell you the reasoning—not mine, nor that of any other human being, since it is too small, whatever it may be—but the reasoning that the creation of things unfolds and recounts through the wonders within it. The eye is the hearer of this creation, and what appears resounds in the heart through a discourse at once intelligent and artful. For creation openly proclaims its maker with a loud voice, while the heavens, as the Prophet says, declare the glory of God in ineffable voices. For who, seeing and considering the harmony of the whole universe and the wonders of heaven and earth… (she lists many), if he looks upon these things with the eyes of understanding and the keenness of the mind, is not plainly taught by what appears that a divine, artful, and skillful power is manifest in all things and extends and spreads through them all; that, while fitting and adapting the parts to the whole, it also fills the whole through its parts; and that the whole universe is held in check and sustained by a single power, while it remains in itself, moves around itself, and never ceases to move, nor passes to any other place than the one in which it is?” (MG 46, 23 ss.).

70. ST. AUGUSTINE¹⁰, Confessions, bk. 11, ch. 4: “Behold heaven and earth: they cry out that they were made, for they change and vary. Whatever has been made, and yet exists, has nothing in it that was not there before; this is what it means to change and vary. They also cry out that they did not make themselves: ‘We are because we were made; therefore we did not exist before we existed, so that we could make ourselves.’ And the very evidence is their voice. You, then, O Lord, made them…” (ML 32, 811; R 1596); cf. bk. 10, ch. 6; ML 32, 782 s.; City of God, bk. 8, ch. 6: “They [the Platonists] saw that whatever is changeable is not the supreme God.… Then they saw that every form in any changeable thing, by which that thing is whatever it is, in whatever way and of whatever nature, can exist only from him who truly is, because he exists unchangeably” (ML 41, 231). In On the Psalms 73, nr. 25, he says to an unbeliever who wishes to admit only what he sees: “Your soul is visible, I suppose! Fool! Your body is visible; who sees your soul¹¹? Since only your body is visible, why are you not buried? And he answers—for he understands this much—‘Because I am alive.’ How do I know that you are alive, when I do not see your soul? How do I know? You will answer, ‘Because I speak, walk, and work.’ Fool! From the body's works I recognize that it is alive; from the works of creation you cannot recognize the Creator!” (ML 36, 944). Sermon 197: “Just as, then, from the movements and governance of the body you understand the soul, which you do not see, so from the governance of the whole world and the rule over the souls themselves understand the Creator” (ML 38, 1022). Cf. above, nr. 57.

71. St. AUGUSTINE develops the argument of his own, commonly named after him, in On Free Choice of the Will, bk. 2 (ML 32, 1243 ss.). In chapter 3 he sets out the first question to be solved: “How is it evident that God exists?” He shows that nothing in the human being is higher and more excellent than reason (ch. 3–6); in this exposition, what judges another is considered superior. Augustine then asks: “What if we are able to find something that you not only do not doubt exists, but that is also superior to our very reason? Will you doubt calling it God, whatever it is?” Evodius: “I would not immediately call God whatever I might find better than the best thing in my nature. For I do not like to call God that than which my reason is inferior, but that than which nothing is superior.” Augustine: “Quite so.… But, I ask you, if you find that nothing is above our reason except what is eternal and unchangeable, will you doubt calling this God?… ” Evodius: “I shall certainly confess that to be God than which nothing has been shown to be higher.” Augustine: “Good; for it will be enough for me to show that something of this kind exists, which you will either confess to be God or, if something is above it, will agree is God himself. Thus, whether something is above it or not, it will be evident that God exists, when, with his own help, I have shown what I promised: that something is above reason.” In chapter 7 ss. he shows that there is one unchangeable truth. He asks (ch. 12, nr. 34): “Do you think that this truth of which we have been speaking for a long time, and in which one truth we behold so many things, is superior to our mind, equal to our minds, or even inferior? But if it were inferior, we would judge not according to it, but about it, as we judge about bodies because they are below us. We often say of them not only that they are or are not thus, but that they ought or ought not to be thus; and similarly, about our minds, we know not only that the mind is thus, but often that it ought to be thus. We judge about bodies in this way when we say: ‘It is less white than it ought to be,’ or ‘less square,’ and similarly in many cases; and about minds: ‘It is less capable than it ought to be,’ or less gentle or less forceful, as the standard of our conduct requires. We judge these things according to those inner rules of truth that we see in common; but no one judges those rules themselves. When someone says that eternal things are better than temporal things, or that seven and three make ten, no one says that they ought to be so, but simply recognizes that they are so. The examiner does not correct them; the discoverer merely rejoices. If this truth were equal to our minds, it too would be changeable. For our minds sometimes see it more and sometimes less, and thereby acknowledge that they are changeable; but truth remains in itself, neither growing when we see more of it nor diminishing when we see less. Rather, whole and incorrupt, it gladdens those who turn toward it with its light and punishes those who turn away with blindness. Further, we judge even our own minds according to it, although we cannot in any way judge it. For we say: ‘He understands less than he ought,’ or ‘He understands just as much as he ought.’ But the mind ought to understand as much as it is able to draw near to and cleave to unchangeable truth. Therefore, if it is neither inferior nor equal, it remains that it is superior and more excellent.” In chapter 15, nr. 39: “You had agreed that if I showed something above our minds, you would confess it to be God, if nothing were still higher. Accepting your agreement, I had said it would be enough for me to show this. For if something is more excellent, that is God rather; but if there is not, then truth itself is God. Therefore, whether that higher thing exists or not, you cannot deny that God exists; and this was the question we had set ourselves to discuss and investigate.” Cf. On True Religion, ch. 30 s. (ML 34, 145 ss.); Eighty-Three Different Questions 83, q. 54 (ML 40, 38).

72. ST. JOHN DAMASCENE, The Orthodox Faith, bk. 1, ch. 3: “All things that exist are either created or uncreated. If created, they are certainly also changeable. For whatever began to exist through change must also be subject to change, whether it perishes or becomes one thing after another through acts of will. But if uncreated, it necessarily follows that they cannot change at all. For things whose being is opposite have opposite modes of being and properties.” He then shows that everything both perceptible to the senses and among souls, angels, and demons is changeable, and continues: “Since, then, they are changeable, they must also be created. If created, there is no doubt that they were fashioned by some maker. But the creator must be uncreated. For if he too was created, he must have been created by someone, and so on, until we reach something uncreated. Since that maker is uncreated, then, he is also altogether unchangeable. And what could this be other than God?

“Moreover, the very structure, preservation, and governance of created things teach us that God exists: he it is who has joined this whole universe together, sustains and preserves it, and provides for it. For how could it have happened that natures at strife with one another—fire and water, air and earth, I mean—came together to constitute a single world and were bound together by such a firm bond that they could not be dissolved in any way, unless some almighty power had joined them and kept them forever from dissolution?

“What is it that assigned definite places to the things that exist in heaven and on earth, that range through the air and dwell in the waters, and even to what is prior to these—to heaven, earth, and air, and also the natures of fire and water? By whom were these things mixed and distributed? What is it that impressed motion upon them and sets them turning in a perpetual course, restrained by nothing? Is it not their maker, who gave all things the order and measure by which this universe is conducted and governed? But who is their maker? Is it not he who created them and brought them into being? For we cannot attribute such power and ability to τῷ αὐτομάτῳ, that is, to chance. Let us indeed grant that it was chance that they came into being; but whose work would it then be to have arranged them? And, if you wish, let us grant that too: whose work would it be to preserve and guard them according to those laws by which they were first created? It must certainly¹² belong to something other than chance; and what could that be but God?” (MG 94, 795 s.).

THEOLOGIANS

73. The Scholastics explicitly raised the question of the demonstrability of God's existence and developed the arguments themselves in various forms¹³.

ST. ANSELM († 1109) proposes in the Monologion an argument similar to St. Augustine's argument in On Free Choice of the Will (above, nr. 71). He sought, however, an argument wholly independent (especially of the existence of things), which he then sets out in the Proslogion: the argument Kant called “ontological.” This designation must therefore be understood in the sense Kant gave it. For Kant, “ontological” is a demonstration that intends to determine a real, actual object a priori, not from experience but from a concept of the intellect or reason, independently of experience¹⁴

RICHARD OF ST. VICTOR († 1173), in his work On the Trinity (ML 196), argues from being that had a beginning—which therefore is neither eternal nor from itself—to being eternal and from itself; from degrees of being to the highest being, since the highest being cannot have what it is from an inferior being, and so must have it from itself; for if nothing were from itself, nothing would be from eternity, and then there would be no origin or succession of things, which contradicts experience; finally, from the fact that whatever exists has the possibility of being either from itself or from another¹⁵.

PETER LOMBARD († 1160), bk. 1, dist. 3, proposes four arguments: first, following Ambrosiaster, the invisible maker is known from the visible work; the second, third, and fourth are from St. Augustine, City of God, bk. 8, ch. 6; cf. his Commentary on Romans (ML 191, 1327 s.)¹⁶.

WILLIAM OF AUXERRE, († between 1231 and 1237), Summa, bk. 1, proves first from the relation of cause to effect; second, from the flow of things (one thing flows from another); third, from the fact that being is included in the highest good, or in what is best; fourth, by Anselm's argument¹⁷.

ALEXANDER OF HALES († 1245) reports several arguments: with Richard, from being that had a beginning; with Damascene, from the mutability of things; with the Auxerre master, from the fact that nothing can be its own cause; with Anselm, by the ontological argument¹⁸.

74. ST. BONAVENTURE¹⁹, in 1 d. 3 p. 1 a. unic. q. 2, shows that God can be known through creatures “because the cause shines forth in its effect, and the wisdom of the craftsman is made manifest in his work; therefore God, who is the craftsman and cause of creation, is known through creation itself.” The foundations are Sap 13, 5 and the authority of Isidore, together with arguments, the first of which is that the cause is known from its effect. He raises certain doubts about the Master's arguments and shows what they presuppose (Dubia circa lit. mag. dub. 1). He admits Anselm's argument (in 1 d. 8 p. 1 q. 2, and elsewhere). In On the Mystery of the Trinity, q. 1, art. 1, second way: “Every truth proclaimed by every creature is an indubitable truth; but every creature proclaims that God exists; therefore. That every creature proclaims that God exists is shown by ten conditions and self-evident suppositions.” These are: if there is a later being, there is also an earlier being; if there is a being from another, there is a being not from another; if there is a possible being, there is a necessary being; if there is a relative being, there is an absolute being; if there is a being in a certain respect, there is a being simply; if there is a being for the sake of another, there is a being for its own sake; if there is a being by participation, there is a being by essence; if there is a being in potency, there is a being in act; if there is a composite being, there is a simple being; if there is a mutable being, there is an immutable being. Likewise, On the Hexaemeron, coll. 10, nos. 12–18.

75. ST. THOMAS 1 q. 2 a. 3 shows by five ways that God exists: from motion, from the notion of an efficient cause, from the possible and the necessary, from the degrees found in things, and from the governance of things. These arguments have been explained in philosophy. He does not admit the ontological argument²⁰

76. In works certainly authentic, SCOTUS clearly teaches that God's existence can be proved, not indeed a priori (by a demonstration propter quid), but a posteriori (by a demonstration quia) (Oxon. in 1 d. 2 q. 2; De primo principio, ch. 3)²¹, saying: “As far as we are concerned, the existence of an infinite being cannot be demonstrated propter quid, although, from the nature of the terms, the proposition could be demonstrated propter quid. But as far as we are concerned, the proposition can be demonstrated by a quia demonstration from creatures” (Oxon. in 1 d. 2 q. 2 nr. 10). He then shows that there is something “simply first in efficiency, and something simply first in the order of finality, and something simply first in eminence” (ibid. nr. 11). He admits Anselm's “colored” argument (it can be conceived without contradiction) in some way (l. c. nr. 32).

77. The Scholastics are thus truly in agreement²² that God's existence can be proved; this agreement persisted among later theologians of various schools. Perhaps very few are to be excepted, such as WILLIAM OF OCKHAM²³ and PETER OF AILLY, who follows Ockham: for him, the proposition “God exists” is not evident to us or demonstrable with evidence, but is naturally probable (in I, q. 3, art. 2). Yet these thinkers cannot undermine that consensus²⁴. The theologians treated this question as not merely philosophical but theological, and ground it in positive sources. There is no consensus, however, about the theological qualification of this teaching. BÁÑEZ (in I, q. 2, art. 2) holds it to be most certain and says the opposite is rash; MOLINA (in I, q. 2, art. 2) says it is “not only rash, but also quite unsafe in faith, to say no more”; VÁZQUEZ (in I, dist. 20, ch. 3, nr. 8) reports that theologians generally call the opposite view rash, which seems excessive to him; SUÁREZ (De Deo, bk. 1, ch. 1, nr. 13) judges the opposite rash and close to error; in nr. 15 ss. he refutes what Vázquez said; VALENTIA (in I, disp. 1, q. 2, part 2, assertion 3): “that it can also be proved by an evident demonstration from God's effects that God exists… is so certain that to deny it is plainly erroneous in faith, if not even manifest heresy.” Among theologians of our time, KLEUTGEN (De ipso Deo, nr. 156) says “although not heretical, it is nonetheless scarcely safe in faith”; PESCH (proposition 5) calls it theologically certain; MUNCUNILL (p. 19), “theologically certain”; VAN DER MEERSCH (p. 47 s.), proximate to faith and formally, implicitly contained in revelation.

Our thesis today seems to be established at least as theologically certain, on account of the consensus of theologians, grounded in Sacred Scripture and the teaching of the Fathers; because it is a conclusion from the definition of the Vatican Council; and because the Church explicitly upholds it²⁵.

The consensus concerns not merely some demonstrability of God in the abstract, but in concrete terms includes at least that way of argument by which God's existence is proved from the visible world, as cause from effect. A Catholic is in no way free to accept or reject this argument (cf. Oath against Modernism, Denz 2145). There was never, however, a consensus about St. Anselm's (ontological) argument; theologically, this is a completely open question²⁶.